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i Science of Ethics

BY

REV. MICHAEL CRONIN, M.A., D.D.

I'rofesSDr of Ktliics and Polincs

University College, Dublin National University of Ireland

VOLUME II SI'ECIAL KTHICS

LONGMANS, GREKN AND CO.

39 I'ATKRNOSTKk ROW, LONDON

NKW Yr)KK, HOMHAY, lAl.Cl nA, AND MADKAS

AL H. GILL AND SON. LTD.

50 Ul'FKk OCONXF.Ll, STKKKT, DUHLIN 1917

6J low

CI

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

On Natural Religion (pp. 1-46) —	PAGE
Definition .......	I
Nature .......	3
Presuppositions of religion ....	5
How ordinary men may know of God's
existence by natural reason .	6
Necessity and ground of religion .	II
Objections ......	12
Erroneous theories of Kant and others .	13
The acts of religion .....	15
Vices opposed to religion ....	20
Superstition .....	20
Irreligion ......	22
Man's duty of loving God ....	23
Appendix —
The primitive races and natural religion	31
The alleged pre-religious period	32
Erroneous theories on origin of religion	40
Monotheism — the earliest stage in historj	r
of religion ....	43

CHAPTER II

A Man's Duties Concerning Himself and some of HIS Duties towards Others (pp. 47-79) —

Our duties towards ourselves .... 48

On Suicide ....... 52

On the indirect compassing of one's own death 56

IV

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

A M\n's Duties — continued

Our duties towards ourselves — continued

PAGE

Qn Temperance .....	. 59
Law of temperance	. 60
in eating and drinking	. 60
in regard to sex	. 63
Some duties towards others.	. 66
Charity ......	. 66
Speaking the truth ....	. 69
Mental restrictions	. 77
CHAPTER III
Our Duties towards Others, continued —	On
Justice (pp. 80-112)—
General Observations .....	. 80
Commutative Justice — its ground	. 81
—its end .	. 84
Whether it is lawful to kill animals	. 86
Personal injuries	• 93
Whether criminals may be put to death	• 93
Whether an innocent man may be put to de	ath 96
Killing in self-defence ....	• 97
Accidental killing ....	. 103
Duelling ......	. 105
Injures to hberty ....	. 109
Injuries to honour, reputation, friendship .	. no

CHAPTER IV

On Private Ownership and on Communism (pp. 113-

149)—

Definition of private ownership ....

Kinds of private ownership ....

Grounds of private ownership ....

The individual interest ....

113

114

115

118

CONTENTS

On Private Ownership — continued

The family interest

The general interest Duties attaching to ownership The natural titles of ownership

Occupancy .

Labour

Gift ....

Bequest

Intestate succession Certain civil titles of ownership —

Prescription

Accretion .

PAGE 122 126

136

143

144

145

146

147 149

CHAPTER V

Socialism (pp. 150-184) —

Definition ........ 150

History of modern socialism .... 152

Karl Marx 156

Syndicalism ...... 160

Grounds of Socialism ...... 160

The materialistic view of history . . . 162 Supposed law of concentration in capital . 163 Smaller industries not disappearing . 163 No tendency to unlimited concentra- tion in large industries . . . 174 Such concentration as exists is not in direction of socialism . . .180

CHAPTER VI

Grounds of Socialism, continued— {p^. 185-225)—

The surplus- value of labour . . .185

Manual labour not the only factor in pro- duction— importance of industrial ability 187

Vi

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Grounds of Socialism — continued

The surplus-value of labour — continued

A third factor in production — the natural sources ....

Some difficulties answered . Crises ......

Are they necessary under capitalism

Causes of crises Are they possible under socialism . The exploitation of labour . The reserve-army of labour The ' iron-law ' of wages

Recent modifications of the ' iron law

PAGE

194 199 201 203 204 209 214 217 220 223

CHAPTER VII

Present Wages and Socialist Incomes Compared (pp. 225-252)— Explanation of problem — position of wage-earners 221 Division of national income in 1904-5 . . . 228 Summary of result ..... 232 Incomes under socialism ..... 235 Difficulty — the theory that under socialism absolute loss is impossible .... 248

CHAPTER VIII

Remaining Defects of Socialism — Summary of Case AGAINST Socialism (pp. 253-297)— Effect of Socialism on — Public as producers Public as buyers . ' . Resumption of arguments against socialism Financial impossibility of socialism Socialism opposed to human welfare

Socialism and the individual interest

254 257 2O0 260 261 265

CONTENTS vii

Remaining Defects — continued page

Socialism opposed to human welfare — continued

Socialism and the family interest . 268

Socialism and the general interest . 271

Limits of lawful nationalisation . . . . 275

Appendix A —

Nationalisation of the land .... 280

The systems of private ownership in land 280 Whether land can be privately owned . 281 Necessity of private ownership in land . 282 Inefficacy of proposed methods for

eliminating private ownership . . 284

Inefficacy of methods for administering the land under socialism .... 286

Appendix B —

Nationalisation of the coal-mines . . 289

Appendix C —

Nationalisation of unearned increment in building-sites ...... 290

Appendix D —

Theory of primitive communism in land . 291

CHAPTER IX
On Contracts (pp. 298-312) —
Definition ......	. 278
Consent .....	. 299
Effect of error on consent	. 301
fear	. 305
Object of contract	. 306
The contracting parties	. 309
Kinds of contract ....	. 309
CHAPTER X

Some Particular Contracts (pp. 313-353) —

Promise ........ 313

Gift 314

Vlll

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Some Particular Co-stracts —cotttinued			PAGE
Buying and selling Obligations of seller The just price Auction sales				316 320
Monopolies Contracts of chance .				325 32&
Bailments				328
Loan of money . Just rate of interest The wages-contract Its nature				328 333 334 335
The minimum just wage			343
CHAPTER XI

The wages-contract, continued — On Strikes (pp. 354-

371)— Definition and kinds of strikes Morality of strikes

The simple or direct strike . Conditions of a just strike The trades-union executives The sympathetic strike The general strike The remedy ....

354 355 356 360

363 364 369 370

On

CHAPTER	XII
Injustice in regard to	Property	AND ON
Restitution (pp. 372-84)-	-
Stealing ....		• 374
Duty of restitution		. 377
Possession mala fide		. 377
Possession bona fide		• 379
Doubtful ownership		. 380

CONTENTS

IX

On Injustice in regard to Property — continued page

Damage 380

Duty of restitution ..... 383 Co-operation . 383

CHAPTER XIII The Family and Marriage (pp. 385-414) Definition of society Kinds of society The family Marriage .

Ends of marriage Necessity of marriage Causes or springs of marriage

Positivist opinions. Theory of primitive promiscuity

385 387 388

389 390 392 400 402 404

CHAPTER XIV

The Attributes of Marriage (pp. 415-460) Primary and secondary laws Unity of marriage

Monogyny versus Polygyny Monandry versus Polyandry Indissolubility of marriage .

By the primary principles of natural law marriage must endure until the family is fully reared By the secondary principles of natural law marriage is absolutely indissoluble, lasting to the end of Ufe Case of infertihty The natural impediments . Consanguinity

Parent and child marriages Brother and sister marriages

415 419

4^9 425 429

430

435 441 442 443 444 447

X THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

The Attributes of Marriage — continued page

Consanguinity — contmued

The remote degrees . . . , ^49.

Endogamy and exogamy . . .451

- Appendix- -histot ical

Polygyny : Polyandry : Indissolubility . 455,

CHAPTER XV
The State — its Nature, Origin and En	D (pp. 461-
503)—
Definition .....		461
Origin .....		462'
The State — a natural institution		471
End of State ....		472
On governmental interference		477
in regard to marriage		479
„ „ education .		486
Appendix —
The Social Contract Theory .		491
Theory of Hobbes, Kant, etc.		491
Theory of Suarez and Card. Bellarmine	499
CHAPTER XVI
The State— its parts (pp. 504-556)—
The people ....		504
On nationalities .		507
Territory .....		513
Authority of State		515
Grounds of political authority		515
Titles „		517
Popular election .		519
Possession .		519
Conquest		521
Prescription .		522
Popular consent		532
Exclusive ability to govern		537

CONTENTS				xi
TiiE State — its parts — continued page
Consequences of authority .... 538
Rebellion				540
Attributes of authority				544
Unity ....				544
Sovereignty .				545
Conception of				545
Content of				548
Necessity of .				551
Seat ot .				553
CHAPTER XVII
The Forms of State— Constitutions (pp. 557-598) —
Classification of forms	. 557
Unitary and federal States .			563
Confederations and alliances			565
Constitutions ....			567
Definition ....			567
Kinds ....			568
Monarchy .....			570
Aristocracy ....			574
Democracy ....			575
Swiss referendum and initiative			. 576
The best State ....			584
Appendix —
Prerogative of English monarch			592

CHAPTER XVIII

The Functions of Sovereignty (pp. 599-632) —

slation ....			599
Relation of civil to natural law			599
Organ of legislation			600
The party system			601
The dual-party system .			604
The two-chamber system			606
The case of dead-lock .			609

Xll

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

The Functions of Sovereignty — continued

The executive .

The judicial function . Duties of judges ,

,, ,, advocates Trial by jury

Separation of the powers

Effects of over-separation Parliamentary government Cabinet government The administrative courts

CHAPTER XIX International Law (pp. 633-679) — Subjects of international law Kinds of ,, ,, . .

Nature of „ ,, . .

The natural precepts of international law Justice. ....

Charity ....

Principle of non-intervention Treaties ......

War

Definition ..... Kinds .....

Lawful war always defensive Killing in war is indirect Combatants and non-combatants . Air-raids and^sinking of merchant ships Reprisals ..... Conditions of just war . Close of war ....

APPENDICES The Financial Impossibility of Socialism Natural and Revealed Religion

081 682

THE

SCIENCE OF ETHICS

CHAPTER I ON NATURAL RELIGION

DEFINITION

By religion * is meant the worship of God, the supreme origin, cause, and ruler of the world. Natural religion is the worship of God as determined by reason alone : or, more fully, it is that body of religious truths and the duties resulting from them which our reason makes known to us without revelation.

* The derivation of the word is uncertain. Some derive it from relegere, a reiterated reading of or thinking upon the things of God ; some from re-eligere or the constant choice of <k)d ; others from re-ligare, i.e., a continued binding of the soul to, or union with God. Mr. Westermarck derives the word from re-ligare, but considers that it arose out of the practice common to certain savage races of binding sacred things in cloths or rags.

Our definition given in the text, which is evidently based upon the essentials of religion in its highest form — monotheism, at once suggests the difficulty that many of the lower forms of religion were true at least in part, and therefore that they ought to find a place in our definition of religion. It will be found, however, that the essentials of these primitive forms are preserved in our definition of religion, a proof of which is that our definition, as will presently be seen, is in almost all respects the same definition that is adopted by those who attempt to define religion by abstracting from the various primitive religions their common content {see p. lo). In any case, in defining religion according to its highest form, which is monotheism, we are only following the analogy of the various sciences which in defining their terms make use only of the developed conceptions of science, ignoring all discarded ideas and beliefs as either inadequate or untrue. The primitive religions have disappeared. They have been finally repudiated by civilised men. Polytheism is not the accepted doctrine of any developed people to-day. In this fact alone, apart altogether from what is revealed by a critical examination of these primitive religions taken in themselves, we find ample evidence of their untruth

VOL. II — I I

2 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Our duties toM'ards God are of two kinds, those de- pending on charit}' and those depending on justice. By charity we are bound to the love of God our final end. Justice prescribes the rendering, to God of all the worship due to God as the first cause, as creator and sovereign ruler of the world, from whom we have received our being, and on whom we are totally dependent in every need of existence and of life. By charity w^e are bound to God as one with us, all love being based on the unity of the thing loved with the lover.* As a part of justice religion defines our duties to God as distinct from us, and God's rights as against us. As a part of charity religion binds the soul to God, its highest good, as a virtue of justice religion consists in the payment to God of what we owe Him, and thus getting out of His debt.

Now in a wide sense f religion may be regarded as comprising all of our duties to God, those of charity and those of justice. But in its stricter sense it is confined to the worship of God as defined by justice alone. It is as a part of justice that we shall consider natural religion in the present chapter : at the end of our discussion.

or their inadequacy, and, therefore, we are justified in defining religion according to the form which it attains in its highest development. " He," says Euckcn (" The Truth of Religion," p. i) " who wishes to ascertain the intrinsic truth of religion need neither trace its blurred beginnings in time nor pursue its slow ascent, but may take liis stand upon the summit of its development." It is, however, our intention in the present chapter, and so far as the purpose of this work permits, to give ample consideration to these primitive religions.

• See Vol. I. p. 320.

t It is in this broad sense that St. Thomas uses the word in S. Theol., II. II. Q. LXXI. art i, where he speaks of religious worship as due to God, " cui principaliter alligari dcbcmus tamquam inde- ficicnti principio : ad (piem etiam nostra electio assiduc dirigi debet, sicut in ultimum fincm." \\v defines religion in its more jirccise sense as a part of justice in the third article of the same (juestion where he writes : " ad religionem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni Deo secundum unam rationem ; in quantum scilicet est i)rinium principium crcationis et gubernationis rerum " ; and again in the first article of the same (picstion — " dominium convenit l)eo secundum propriam et singularem quandam rationem ; quia scilicet ipse omnia fecit ; et quia summum in omnil)us rebus obtinet princi|)atun> ; et id<'o speciali.s ratio Horvitutis ei debetur, et talis scrvitus nomine latriac designatur."'

I

NATURAL RELIGION 3

however, will be added a brief consideration of man's duty to God as grounded on charity.*

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

The definition which we have just given will enable us to distinguish three elements that go to make up the complete notion of religion, viz. the object, the motive, and the act of religion.

The object of religion is God. All religious honour is paid to Him, and finally rests in Him. Now there are some creatures who stand in very close and intimate relationship with God, who are His special friends, to whom it is given in an especial way to reflect His glory, who also by Divine appointment occupy an intermediate position between God and man, sometimes acting as intercessors for man, and sometimes as God's special representatives and emissaries. To these also religious honour is given of a secondary kind and in a secondary and dependent way only. They are honoured, not for themselves, but merely as God's friends and representa- tives. The first and final object of all religious honour is God.

The motive of religious worship is man's indebtedness to, and dependence on, the Supreme Being. Our in- debtedness to, and dependence on God are of the most complete and absolute kind. First, He is our creator, our first cause, the ultimate principle of our being. From Him we have received all that we are and have. More- over, as our creator He is also the sustainer of our existence. Without His helping hand we should dis- solve into the nothingness out of which we came. In Him, therefore, we live and move and have our being. Secondly, God is the supreme ruler of the universe.

♦A difference between religion as a part of justice and religion as a part of charity that follows from the fundamental difference given in the text is that religion as a part of justice relates to the things to be done in order to satisfy our indebtedness to God ; charity relates to God Himself immediately and directly.

4 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

From Him proceed all the laws, physical and moral, by which the world (and man in particular) is directed to its end. He, therefore, is supreme lord and master, and in Him is the fullness of power and authority in regard to all creatures. We are, therefore, in a position of absolute dependence on God, dependent on His good- ness for what we are and have, and dependent upon His authority as supreme ruler of the universe. The virtue of religion, as a part of justice, consists in the acknowledgment of this condition of dependence and in paying off our debt to the Divine goodness, in so far as in us lies, by acts of religion.

The act of religion is worship. As we have seen, our indebtedness to God is of a very special kind, and worship is the act whereby we acknowledge this special indebtedness. Just as there are special acts whereby a child acknowledges its own position of subjection and the father's position of authority, and other acts whereby the supremacy of a monarch is acknowledged, so also there must be special acknowledgment of our indebted- ness to, and dependence on, God ; and the act whereby we acknowledge this special indebtedness is worship.* Love and reverence may be paid to creatures : worship is given to God alone. We love a person for the goodness that is in him ; we reverence those who excel in good- ness ; but worship is extended only to the infinite and incommunicable excellence of the Supreme Being.

We should, of course, in acknowledging our relation to God, express not only our own condition of dependence, but also the special excellence of God, His greatness, independence, and majesty, as compared with us. But these are the opposing terms of the one relation, and, therefore, they arc expressed by the same act. " B}' one and the same act," writes St. Thomas, " we acknow- ledge the excellence of God (the act of homage — culius) and our condition of subjection {scrviius) ; and worship

•S. Thcol., II., II., LXXXf., 4,

NATURAL RELIGION 5

is due on both accounts." * But justice regards not so much the excellence of the giver, as the indebtedness of him who receives ; and, therefore, religion as a part of justice will primarily regard and be based upon the indebtedness and dependence of the creature in regard to God.

Corollary.

This being the nature of religion, it follows that any supposed forms of worship which fail to fulfil the con- ditions we have enumerated are not to be regarded as religions in the true sense or even as parts of the true religion. What are sometimes spoken of as nature- worship, soul-worship or animism, fetish-worship, are not real religions but shadows only, or spurious imita- tions of religion. The feelings that animate these so- called forms of worship may, indeed, present certain analogies to the religious feeling, just as the fear of a man presents analogies to our fear of God. But just as the fear of a man has not in it even the first beginnings of religious worship, this latter being proper to God alone, so also there is only one kind of worship which is really religious, viz. the worship of the true God. The rest is false religion, superstition, or, as we have said, the shadow of religion only. What these spurious religions are, and what is their relation to the worship of the true God, and how they originated, are questions of great importance ; they will be considered in a later portion of the present chapter.

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF RELIGION

Without a knowledge of God there could be no re- ligion. We cannot worship that which we do not know. This knowledge and the divine truths to which it relates

* II., II., Q. LXXXI., Art. 3.

6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

are spoken of as the presuppositions of religion. These presuppositions we now proceed to define.

(i) In the first place we must know that God exists. A man could not worship that which is either known to be non-existent or the existence of which is doubtful. Religion is the giving up of one's whole heart and soul to God, and only he who knows and believes that God exists is capable of such an act. Two conclusions follow — first, that since religious worship is a duty, it is our duty also to know God ; secondly, that wherever re- ligion exists or has existed, there God either is known or has been known — His name either is, or once was, upon the lips and in the hearts of the people. Now a know- ledge of God's existence may be acquired in either of two ways — either by revelation or by the use of our natural reason. It is the second kind of knowledge, that, viz. which is acquired by our natural reason, that forms the first and chief presupposition of natural religion.

How ordinary men may know of God's cxisttncc by natural reason alone.

A problem of great interest and importance here suggests itself. Since religion in some form has always existed amongst men, and since religion is the possession not merely of men who are scientifically equipped for the pursuit of difficult reasoning, but of ordinary men also, the question arises how it is possible for the ordinary mind, without the aid of revelation, to come to a knowledge of God's existence. It should of course be remembered, in considering a question of this kind, tliat for his knowledge tlie individual is very rarely left to his own resources, that he lias always access to, and is, in a sense, necessarily the recipient of the conclusions yielded by the combined thinking of the race or tribe to which he belongs, that most races, even those least learned and civilised, have their special tliinkcrs and teachers, and that to these also the individual can have recourse on problems whose full solution he might regard as exceeding liis own individual cajiacities. The form, tlierefore, in wliich our j)n'S('nt ])rol)lcm ]iresents itself is wlielher there arc any proofs avaihd)le for God's existence wliich lie within the

NATURAL RELIGION 7

mental compass of any ordinary individual who cared not only to use his own powers of observation and reasoning but also to avail himself of such intellectual aids as are ordinarily afforded to the individual by his social environment, even amongst the least civihsed races ?

Our answer (which must be exceedingly brief in form, this question being rather one for the science of Natural Theology than for Ethics) is that there are many ways in which a knowledge of God could be brought home even to the ordinary uneducated mind by reason alone and without the aid of revelation, (a) In the first place the plainest and most unthinking man must realise that the world has a cause. That events are produced by causes is a proposition which no ordinary intellect would think of rejecting. The category of cause is as simple and necessary as the category of being itself. Kant and Hume may raise certain meta- physical objections to causality, but these objections would not occur to, or, if they occurred to, would certainly have no weight with ordinary minds. To the plain man it is an obvious truth that the things that he sees around him have not brought themselves into existence, that he himself has not caused his own existence, that his parents are not the full cause of his Ufe since there is so much in the body and mind of man which they do not understand and which they could not possibly contrive, that they themselves are caused by some one outside of themselves, etc. His mind thus naturally travels up to the thought of One who has made all things, the founder and creator of the universe.* (b) Secondly, to the ordinary mind the evidences from design are not only most intelligible but most convincing also. The general order of the world suggests the thought of a mind over-shadowing and over-ruling all ; the element of design evident in every living thing, in the aptitude of every organ for the performance of its own functions, and in the sum of the organs for providing for all the necessities of our

* Judging from the attestation of those who have had most opportunity of examining and analysing the beliefs of early man, this line of reasoning is not merely to be regarded as a possible ground for his religion— it seems to have been actually also the ground of his beliefs. Ed. B. Tylor attests that the religious beliefs of the savage races were due not to " spontaneous fancy " but to the " reasonable inference that effects are due to causes." And Mr. J. Buchan in his interesting work, " The First Things," quotes a series of answers given to him by savages as to the ground of their religious belief. In every case their belief was found to be based ultimately on what to them was the obvious necessity for a first cause of all things.

8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

life,* this probably more than an3^ other consideration, not only brings the ordinary mind to a knowledge of the Creator, ——-but brings men also into close touch with God as the supreme ruler, as one who cares for and superintends the things of this world, is kind and bountiful to His creatures, and desires their happiness, (c) Again, though, as we saw in an earlier chapter in this work,| the mere existence of a distinction between good and evil and the recognition of this distinction by conscience is not itself a proof of God's existence, yet the conviction of reason that good action calls naturally for reward, that evil action renders a man liable to punishment, that somehow and somewhere the wrongs of this world will have to be righted, that compensation is to be had for pain and suffering unjustly borne, in general terms, that the world is a reasonable world, which it would not be if the tyrant and the robber and the murderer had not awaiting him some retribution for his evil life, all this brings back the mind and heart of man to the thought of a moral governor, of One who will bring all things to a good end, who has pity for suffering, and will defend the noble, the just, the pure, and the truthful, and equalise the losses of virtue with gains a hundredfold. It would, indeed, be difficult to put this argument into a form that would completely satisfy the logician and the sceptic, but it is an argument which makes a powerful appeal both to the ordinary and the educated ' mind. Our reason revolts at the idea of wrongs for ever unrighted. It is satisfied and tranquilhscd at the thought of One who is empowered to bring to actual effect those compensations without which the world and life would be not only bitter but unbearable, (d) Finally, the heart of man opens at the thought of One who will bring perfect happiness to man J or who will supply the conditions under which such happiness is attainable. Why this burning desire for happiness arising out of the very nature of the human heart, this longing which no finite thing can satisfy, if perfect happiness is nowhere obtainable ? Witl^.out God man is an unintelligible riddle ; through the thought of God the

• For instance, the fact that animals and men arc provided so fully with the organs necessary for the reception, mastication and digestion of food, evidently with a view to the maintenance of life.

t Vol. I., p. 472.

j This arKiinunt is quite distinct from that just given. The present argument does not suppose the existence of injustice, tyranny, and other evils. It is an argument that would hold even in a perfect world

NATURAL RELIGION 9

whole world, and in particular the world of man, comes to have a meaning, and becomes rational and intelligible.

In these several ways the thought of the ordinary man and even of primitive man rises easily to the conception of God, the creator and ruler of the universe. The arguments we have quoted are not all that are available for the existence of God. They are only the arguments that appeal to ordinary uneducated minds. As they stand they are not even correct but require to be modified in many ways in order to be brought up to the standard of strict scientific proof. But they are accurate in the main, and they make instant appeal to the humble and uncritical mind not hindered in its natural operation by vanity and prejudice.*

(2) Religious w^orship is the acknowledgment of man's absolute dependence on God and of God's supreme mastership and authority over man. This dependence is grounded on the fact that God is the first cause of all things, that all that we are and have are from Him, and, therefore, this truth that God is the first eause and creator of the world is another necessary presup- position of all religion. For most minds, however, this second presupposition is contained in or is itself a pre- supposition of the first, since for most minds the argu- ment based on the necessity of a first cause is itself the clearest and most potent proof of God's existence.

(3) We honour and reverence that which is possessed of excellence of any kind. Now worship is honour of the highest and fullest kind. It is honour without limitation and so it can only be paid to One who has in Him the fullness of excellence. Religion, therefore, sup- poses not merel}' the existence of God, but the existence

* It is in determining the attributes of the Deity that the primitive mind should almost of necessity go astray. The Deity might present itself as a living being but corporeal, or as a spirit with some material attributes. It is impossible to think that the savage mind could without revelation come to a perfect conception of the attributes of the Supreme Being. But it is to be remembered that these errors of the savage, even though important and far-reaching, do not necessarily deprive his religion of all value as a mode of acknowledging the Divine excellence and man's indebtedness to God— the first cause and ruler of the world.

10 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

of a God of infinite majesty and goodness. Nor is it difficult even for the ordinar}^ mind to come by this idea of the infinite excellence of God. For a Being who is the first cause of all must have in Him all possible excellences, since it is from Him that all excellences proceed.

{4) Religious worship would not be paid to a being who stood out of all relation to the universe, who had no care for it, and no desire for worship and love. In other words religion presupposes not merely the existence of a supreme cause but also of a supreme moral governor of the world, of One who not only has a right to expect but actually does also expect reverence and homage from men, who demands obedience to the laws of nature which are His creation, and who will reward the ob- servance of those laws and punish their violation. This presupposition, however, is, like the second, for many minds a part of or at the root of the first, since for many minds it is an essential part of the proof of God's ex- istence.*

* It will be found that all these presuppositions are present even in the lowest forms of primitive religion. Naturally, the character under which the Divinity is viewed in the different religions varies with the form of the religion. The polytheistic religions, for instance, acknowledge the excellence of various gods and man's dependence on them — monotheism the excellence of the Supreme Being. Again, in some the excellence most emphasised is that of power, in others bountifulness, in others holiness. But in all we find recognised the existence of a Divinity, His excellence, man's dependence on the Divinity, and some sort of intimate relation of the Divinity with the Universe. This is most easily seen by examining those definitions of religion which have been formed by various writers in order to express the characteristics common to all religions. Morris Jastrow (" The Study of Religion," p. 171), for instance, explains these common elements in all forms of religion as the recognising of a power or powers superior to us and beyond our control, the feeling of dependence on this iK)wcr, and entering into relations with it ; Ladd (" The Philosophy of Kcligion," p. 89) mentions the following : a belief in invisible superhuman powers, a feeling of dependence, a sense of responsibility to tho.sc powers. J. G. Frazcr (" 'Jhe Golden Bough," I. 63) and 'lielc (" Klements of the Science of Religion," 11. 194^ give the same conditions in other forms.

We think it rii( ht to explain that worship may still be true religious worship even llioiigh it is the ]iower of God and not His goodness in the sense of His bountifulness that is most emphasised. The power of God is to be regarded as a Divine excellence just like His bountiful-

NATURAL RELIGION ii

THE NECESSITY AND GROUND OF RELIGION

That God exists and is known to exist, that He is the first cause of the universe, that He is infinitely perfect and is the supreme moral governor are, as we have seen, necessary presuppositions of rehgion, in the sense that no form of worship can be regarded as a rehgion without them. But these truths are also the grounds on which religion is based and the}^ demonstrate its necessity. For, once it has been proved, as it is proved in Natural Theology, on the ground of clear established fact,* that God exists, is infinite, and is the creator of the world, etc., it then becomes our clear duty to acknowledge God, His power and goodness, and to offer Him the special homage due to His position and His greatness. Thus :

(a) God, being the first cause of the world, we depend on Him for all that we are and have. As our creator God possesses a full and special right of ownership over man, stronger and clearer than any other ownership known to the world. And being our owner He is our supreme lord and master, and His supremacy must be recognised and acknowledged by special acts of homage not given to any other being. This special homage is the homage rendered in religious worship.

(6) God is not only the first cause of the world but He is a Being of infinite majesty and excellence. God's majesty and excellence are not only greater and grander than the excellence of any creature : they are different in kind : they transcend all other excellences : they

ncss and His beauty. Writers, therefore, are not justified in claiming that the religious rites of certain primitive races were not religious in the proper sense because "it is strength rather than goodness that primitive man admires, worships, fears" — {See A. H. Sayce, "The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia.")

* Other than the existence of religion. You could not argue that religion presupposes the existence of God, that, therefore, since religion exists, God exists, and that consequently religion is necessary. The argument would be a vicious circle. The facts alluded to in the text are those facts enumerated in Natural Theology which form the starting point of our proofs of God's existence. See S. Theol. Pars Primli, II. 3. ••

12 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

are the cause and source of all. And, therefore, to God we owe special acts of homage and reverence different from those offered to any creature.

(c) God is not only the owner and founder of the universe : He is its supreme ruler and governor. From Him proceed all the laws, physical and moral, by which are determined the being, the structures, the needs, and requirements of all things, and also the courses, move- ments, actions proper to their nature. Every natural law, ph^'sical and moral, comes directly from God ; human laws have all their authority ultimatel}' from Him. If, therefore, special honour must be paid to kings because of their special function and prerogative as ruler, to God must be paid the highest and profoundest homage of which the mind and heart of men are capable — a homage reserved for Him alone, and befitting in so far as anything in or from us can be said to befit His greatness.

Objections.

(i) It is impossible that our acts should ever befit the Divine Majesty. Anything that man can do in God's honour falls short of what is due to God,

Reply. — The highest of human acts would indeed be utterly unworthy of God were it not for the Divine con- descension which recognises man's impotence to do more than the things lying within the scope of his human faculties, and at the same time is wiUing to accept his homage, not for what it is in itself, but for what a true child of God would wish it to be, i.e., something worthy of the Divine Majesty.* The value of our acts, says St. Thomas, is to be computed not from what they are in themselves but " secundum quamdam considerationem humanae facultatis et divinac acceptionis." f

(2) Since (iod is infinite He has in Himself all that is noble and excellent and desirable, and, therefore, our worship can add nothing to His greatness. The homage of the

• " Never anything can be amiss

When simplcness and duty tender it."

- (Midsummer Nij^lil's Dream). t II II ', I XXXI. 5. ad. 3.

NATURAL RELIGION 13

creature would, therefore, seem to be useless and out of place.

Reply. — [a) Our duty to God is measured not by what our acts confer on God but by what we owe Him. And we owe Him the fullest reverence and allegiance. The child gives to its father in token of love many things that the father does not require. The subject in token of allegiance presents his sovereign with things that a sovereign possesses a hundred- fold, {h) Even if no glory were conferred on God by our actions, yet to worship and love God is to confer a perfection on ourselves, (c) Though by our actions we add nothing to the intrinsic greatness of the Supreme Being, yet our worship does increase His external glory.

Two Erroneous Theories.

(i) The considerations put forward in the present section to establish the necessity and assign the grounds of religion serve to bring into clear relief a great and important truth, viz. that religion is a special virtue, and that there exists a particular and special duty of the religious worship of God. Now, in a remarkable work, entitled, " Rehgion within the Limits of Reason," * Kant makes himself responsible for the theory that religion consists wholly and exclusively in the leading of a good life, in preserving one's self free from stain, in doing our ordinary duty for duty's sake. In other words there is, according to this writer, no special virtue of religion outside of and distinct from the other moral virtues, and man is under no special obligation of worshipping the Divinity. The same theory is commonly defended by ordinary men, as a justification for their neglect of all religious practices. To lead a good life, they say, is religion enough for me. God cannot be displeased with me as long as I observe the ordinary moral laws.

Now such an expression of opinion is not only false and without foundation of any kind in reason, but is also a grave insult to God and a denial of His sovereign rights. Children should not only observe the commands of their parents and refrain from offending them, but they should render to their parents special love and reverence. A loyal subject, particularly one who has access to his sovereign, not only refrains from disobeying the king's commands, but also renders him special homage, befitting the rank and majesty of a sovereign ruler. To come into the presence

* part IV. cli. 6.

14 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

of a monarch, and to decline to pay him any marks of special reverence on the ground that observance of his laws is all that a monarch may justly claim of his subject, would be a grave insult, and a positive irreverence to the person of the monarch and to his position. But Almighty God holds a position raised far above that of any earthly monarch, and His dignity and excellence transcend the excellence of saints and angels and " thrones and dominations," And, therefore, we owe Him special homage and reverence such as no creature may claim or accept even if offered by us. It is true that the acts of the other virtues such as temperance, benevolence, purity of heart, fall under the control of religion and if done out of a religious motive may be made into religious acts {commanded acts of religion). But religion has its own special acts {elicited acts) just like the other virtues, and to decline to observe the special duties imposed by religion is to decline to acknowledge God's special greatness and His special claims upon His creatures. " God's do- minion," writes St. Thomas,* " is of a proper and special nature, for He has made all things, and is the supreme ruler of all, and, therefore. He has a right to special worship."

(2) Another erroneous view may usefully be examined here. We have seen that religion supposes and is based upon our knowledge of God, upon the clear apprehension that God exists, that He is a Being of transcendant excellence, etc. Intellectual certitude and clear intellectual knowledge of a real Divinity beyond us are the first presupposition and the chief ground of all religious worship.

Now there are writers who have tried to show that religion is based not on the clear knowledge of a hving God, but on feeling, the feeling of some vague unreality felt as lying outside of the known world, but suggested to our imagina- tions by association with the thought of the known world.-f This finite world, it is said, suggests to our imaginations an infinite world or the inimitable ; time suggests the time- less, space the spaceless. In this way we come to think of something mysterious, unapproachable, awful, majestic ; and it is this thought that elicits in us the act of religious reverence and worship.

• S. Theol. II II« , Q. LXXXI., Art. i.

t The theory is taught in one form or another by various well- known philosophers, e.g. Schleiermacher, Max Muller, Von Hartmann. The various forms of the theory can be seen in such works as E. S. Waterhcjuse's " Modern Theories of Religion," and Caldccott's " Philosophy of Keligion."

NATURAL RELIGION 15

But how foreign all this is to the real character of religious worship may easily be shown. Religious worship has in it just those elements that are present in the thought of a child about its father, of a loyal subject about his sovereign, but magnified, enriched, transformed so as to befit and express the special excellence and greatness of the Divine Majesty. It includes love, honour, adoration, sorrow at goodness offended, hope in the Divine greatness and con- descension, desire for the fuller glory of God amongst men, and everything else that comes of sonship, loyalty, and devotion to One who is worthy of every honour. We could not love a mere shadowy vacuity ; we could not honour an abstraction, an unreality, however immense and undefined ; we could not imagine a mere abstraction offended, or pleased, or bountiful, or wise, or patient, or issuing commands, or accepting and expecting honour or love from men, a)l cl which belongs to the very essence of religious worshi[^. The theory, therefore, that religion is based, not or the clear intellectual knowledge of God, but on the feehng of the unlimited, deprives religion of everything that the world from the beginning has regarded as essential to its substance.

THE ACTS OF RELIGION

We have to distinguish between commanded and elicited acts of religion. Religion may prompt us to, or command, any virtuous act. It may urge us to love our parents, to be patient, benevolent, temperate. These are spoken of as commanded acts of religion. But just as the virtues of temperance and benevolence have their own special acts, so there are certain acts proper to the virtue of religion also, acts to which we are urged by this virtue alone. They are called elicited acts of the virtue of religion. It is these elicited acts that form the special object of the present discussion.

Again, acts of religion are either internal or external according as they are acts of mind only, or involve the use of the bodily faculties and organs also, like speech and movement. Religion is primarily internal, an act of the mind ; first, because it is mind that makes an act human and purposeful, and, secondly, because it is.

i6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

through the mind that we are capable of conceiving and addressing the Divinity. But external acts are also necessary. The external act is alwa3's secondary, that is, it has a value only as connected with the internal act. But it has its proper place in all religious worship, and for the following reasons : — I (i) External acts are the natural supplement of internal thought and desire. It is quite natural for man to express his inner thought and emotion by out- ward signs. Men are not minds only : the}^ are made up of soul and body, and even our most abstract thought is naturally accompanied b}' external movement. If, therefore, there is question of expressing one's self to God it is right that all a man's expressive power both of soul ind body should be utilised in the act. The man whose heart is full of the love of God would compel, if he could, not only his own tongue but the whole earth also to recite God's praises.

(2) We belong to God not in soul onl}' but in our bodies also ; and hence, in as much as our bodily members can unite with mind in reciting God's praises, they ought to be used to this end.

(3) External worship is necessary to internal. By our bodily acts we not onl}' express but also concentrate and intensify the inner act of mind. " Worship," says Father Rickaby, " mostly of the silent sort, worship that finds no expression in word or gesture — worship away from pealing organs and chants of praise, or the simpler music of the human voice, where no hands are uplifted, nor tongue loosened, nor posture of reverence assumed, becomes with most mortals a vague, aimless reverie, a course of distraction, dreaminess, and vacancy of mind, no more worth than the meditations of the Lancashire stone-breaker who was asked what he thought of during his work — ' Mostly nowt.' "

(4) Men arc by nature social. It is natural to them to communicate their thoughts to one another in regard to the things of common interest and also to unite in

NATURAL RELIGION 17

common action for the realisation of those interests. The people come together to celebrate a victor}'. To- gether they greet the heroes of the battle-field, cheer for them, pay tribute to them. Together also they throng to hail and honour their sovereign. Now God is the common Father and Sovereign of men. It is, therefore, natural that the}^ should worship Him to- gether, that not only should their hearts be raised to Him individuall3% but also that they should sing His praises in chorus. And since it is through external acts that men communicate with one another and act in concert, so external acts are necessarj' for the fullness of religious worship.*

In all this reasoning, however, it is supposed that the external act is such as befits the holiness and sacredness of religious worship. To be suitable for religious worship it should fulfil three conditions. First, it should be united to and inspired by inner reverence — external sacrifice for instance without inner reverence is not only not religious, it is an insult to God. Secondly, it should be such an act as is, considering both the requirements of nature and also human understandings and con- ventions, capable of expressing the interior act to which it is joined. Thirdly, there should be nothing disgraceful or ludicrous in an outward act which is to form part of the Divine service. All these conditions are expressed by St. Thomas when he says that the reason why the externals of idolatry provoked the just derision even of a pagan like Seneca was because men used outward actions in religious services, not as signs of, or as helps to, inner reverence, but as things of value in themselves even though divorced from inner worship, and also because the external acts in which the}- sought to honour God

* It is sometimes objected that the external act taken by itself is a mere material, mechanical movement— whereas worship should be human and deliberate. The answer is that when the external act is joined to, is controlled by and forms one whole action with the internal, it is not mechanical but human and personal and free.

VOL. II — 2

i8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

were empty and meaningless and often positively dis- graceful.*

We now proceed to enumerate in a very general way the acts which are included in latria or religious worship. They are, as we have already shown, internal acts which are principal, and external acts which are secondary and subordinate.

The internal acts to which our relation to God naturally prompts us are devotion, or the dedicating of one's mind and heart to God, and prayer, by which we confess our dependence on God and ask Him for what we need.

On the external side it is possible to express ourselves to God in many ways. The first great central act of religion is adoration, in which both mind and body bend low before the greatness of God in acknowledgment of the infinite majesty and our total dependence. Then there are vocal prayer, beseeching God with tongue a& well as heart for aid, the oaih, in which God's veracity is invoked in confirmation of the truth of our words,, thus testifying to God's supreme and unfailing truthful- ness, the vow, by which something is promised in a most sacred manner to God and, therefore, devoted to Hia service.!

• II., 1I«., LXXXI. 7 ad 3.

t St. Thomas explains that to perform a virtuous action under vow is better than to perform it without the obligation of a vow : and for three reasons, first, because a virtuous act done under vow is done from the highest virtue and the highest motive, i.e. religion,, e.g. an act of temperance done under vow is not only an act of tem- perance but an act of religion in its special and proper sense: secondly, the man who not only performs a virtuous act but vows it, places under subjection to God not only his act but his power to act, for by his vow he surrenders up his power of acting otherwise ; he is, there- fore, in the position of a man who gives to another not merely the fruits of the tree but the tree itself, the power to act beijig the source and root of each particular action : thirdly, it is more virtuous to perform a good J\ct with a fixed and undeviating will than with a vacillating will. Under the vow the determination of our wills is. fixed and (inal, for by the vow we nut ourselves under the gravest of obli(,;ations to do the good act. Weakne.sijes and temptations will always arise to prevent the doing of good. The vow forestalls these weaknesses, and secures the performance of some virtuous and noble work. The vow is the burning of the boats behind one in the fight for Clod's honour and for the victory of gpod oveE evil in our own lives^

NATURAL RELIGION 19

Now, just as many acts of homage paid to a king are also used to reverence lesser dignitaries, so, of the external acts just mentioned, some are used not only in our rela- tions with God, but also in our dealings with other persons, e.g. raising the hands, bowing the head. Even, however, in the case of these acts it is always understood that any signs of reverence shown by man to God are always meant to signify more than the same things when used in respect to men.

But there is one special external act used to typify our attitude towards God which has always been re- served for Divine worship alone, not only amongst civilised but among uncivilised peoples also, and which forms the most distinctive of all the external acts of religion, viz. the act of sacrifice. " Sacrifice," says Reinach, " is the crucial part of all cults, the essential bond between man and the Deity." In a wide sense sacrifice means any voluntary offering made to God, but in its strict sense it means an act whereby some material thing of value is offered to God and destroyed, disrupted, or altered in some way, in token of God's supreme ownership over it and over all things.* Now, the act of sacrifice understood in this latter sense ex- presses in a manner possible to no other act God's supremacy over the whole world, and our complete dependence on God. God has not only given form to the world as men bestow a form on marble and bronze, but He has created it out of nothing, and, therefore, He possesses the fullest ownership over all things. By offering to God some external object of value, in the way described, we acknowledge God's supreme ownership in the fullest way possible to man, since, in the first place, we thereby cancel our own ownership over it ; secondly, we render human ownership of it, so far as can be, im- possible ; and, thirdly, the object sacrificed is offered to God as His absolute property.

* Sacrifice is intimately connected with the act of adoration. It is an effect and a sign of the heart's adoration.

20 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

THE VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION

All vices are indirectly and remotely sins against religion, for all sins dishonour God. But there are vices and sins which offend against this virtue of religion in a most special and formal way, in the same way that intemperate acts violate the virtue of temperance, and robbery violates justice. These vices may be divided under two general headings — (i) superstition (2) irre- ligion.

(i) Superstition.

Superstition is any wrong or perverted form of worship. It has always in it the element of Divine worship, but that element is either wrongly used or wrongly directed. It includes two classes of acts : [a) the unworthy worship of God, i.e. worshipping Him in a false or absurd manner, for instance, singing profane songs or expecting things from God which ought not to be expected ; [h) giving to other beings the worship that belongs to God alone, of which category of sin the three following are signal examples : — spaying divine worship to another person or thing, i.e. idolatry : foretelling future events by means not naturally destined to make the future known, as in cutting cards, in which act we either assume divine powers to ourselves or attribute them to the means used, i.e. the cards : magic {i.e. attempting, without the help of God, to realise effects that lie completely out of man's power and can be realised by God alone) in which act again we give to some other being honour and acknowledgment that are due only to God.

St. Thomas Aquinas takes a broad and very sensible view of the moral character of certain of those practices which are usually spoken of as superstitious. Many strange effects, he tells us, may be produced by the invo- cation of demons, and such practices are always and obviously sinful in themselves no matter what the circumstances. But sometimes, he explains, strange

NATURAL RELIGION 21

effects can be produced without the conscious invocation of demons by the employment of what are apparently quite natural agencies, e.g. cutting cards and the use of certain herbs for curing. Are these practices lawful or are they to be avoided as superstitious ? We shall answer in St. Thomas' own words — " whenever agencies are employed to produce particular effects some enquiry should be made as to whether the agencies employed are naturally capable of producing these effects. If they are, there is nothing illicit in their use ; for there is nothing wrong in utilising causes to produce their proper (natural) effects. But if it should appear that the effects produced are such that the agencies in question could not naturally produce them, then it is evident that these agencies (which we are using) are not really the cause of the effects produced, and that some other power (is producing these effects and) is using what is apparently the agency as a mere outward sign (the real agent and true causal agency being hidden from us). Such effects are wrought in conjunction with some demoniacal power," St. Thomas, however, immediately raises the practical difficulty — how are we to know whether the agency that we are using is not capable naturally of producing the effects in question ? It is exceedingly difficult, he explains, merely by examining a natural object to determine what effects it is able to produce. What, asks St. Thomas, could be more mysterious and unexpected than the power of a magnet to attract iron. Merely by examining the structure of the magnet one could never be led to expect that it possesses such a property. And, in the same way, may it not be that the natural agencies employed in these supposed questionable acts are really capable of producing the mysterious effects referred to without the aid of spirits ? Again St. Thomas answers in a broad and sensible way : if it seems to your reason, he writes, that the effects in question could be produced by the agency in question, i.e. the agency which you yourself

22 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

are using, if the disproportion between the two is not perfectly manifest, then there is nothing illicit in using the agency in question. But if it is manifest to human reason that there is no proportion, that the agency in question could not possibly produce the effect in question, e.g. attempting to foretell the future by looking at certain figures, thpn your act is certainly superstitious and illicit. St. Thomas in this answer simply assumes that men are possessed of some judgment, of some sense of proportion, that with the aid of common sense and science we should be able to determine that some properties do not belong to certain bodies. Obviously, however, he allows for a large margin of speculation in which certainty is not attainable, in which properties which we regard as not natural may still be real and natural, and may one day become established scientific facts ; and within that sphere he is content merely to warn us that all is not certain, and that until certainty becomes possible there is danger.

(2) Irreligion.

In superstition there is always, as we said, some element of Divine worship, but spoiled in some way or wrongly directed. Irreligion is marked by the privation of worship where worship should have a place. It consists in positive irreverence towards the Divinity, or in the doing of acts which are contrary to worship. Any irreligious treatment of God, e.g. contempt of God, daring Him, blaspheming, i.e. wishing evil to God, comes under the head of irreligion ; also irreverence towards things dedicated to God, which irreverence may take the form of sacrilege or simony.

All the foregoing acts contained under the two cate- gories of superstition and irreligion are directly and formally opposed to the virtue of religion, the object of which is to give due honour to God.

NATURAL RELIGION 23

ON man's duty of loving god

Religion, as we saw, in its strict sense means the worship of God as defined by justice. In a broad sense it includes also our duties to God, as defined by charity, i.e. our duty to love God our final perfection and end. Before bringing this chapter to a close we wish to say a few words on this duty of loving God. We will sketch briefly the grounds and nature of this obligation in so far as they are defined by natural law, and in so far as they depend on the essential relations of Creator and creature, making abstraction of special benefits con- ferred in particular cases which give rise to special duties of gratitude and affection.

We must recall to the reader's memory the division * of love into love of desire (amor concupiscentiae) and love of benevolence or friendship (amor amicitiae) because we are bound to love God with both kinds of love ; but the nature of these two as well as the principles in which they issue are very different.

We may be permitted to quote the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas j : —

" As the philosopher says, ' to love is to wish good to another ' ; so, therefore, the movement of love tends to two objects, to the good which one wishes for a person, either one's self or another ; and to the person for whom one wishes the good. Towards the good then which one wishes for somt one the love of desire is entertained : but towards the person for whom one wishes that good there is entertained the love of friendship.

" What is loved with the love of friendship is loved abso- lutely and by itself ; but what is loved with a love of desire is not loved absolutely and by itself but is loved for another.

" The love wherewith an object is loved that good may accrue to it is loved absolutely, but the love wherewith a thing is loved that it may be the good of another is love in a restricted sense."

* Vol. I. p. 319.

t S. Theol., I. II. Q.XXV., Art. 4— translated by Father Rickaby, S.J.

24 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

From this it is clear that there are two ways in which we can love God. We can love God as good to ourselves, as an end to be enjoyed b}^ us, as a good for us. In that case we love God as means to ourselves only. It is the love of desire. Or we can love or wish good to God for His own sake. That is the love of friendship. The first is a very imperfect form of love in comparison with the second. But man has a duty, not in revealed religion only but also in natural law, of loving God with both kinds of love.

I. God ought to be loved for our own sake.

There is a natural obligation to love God with the love of desire, of loving Him as our greatest good, as affording us happiness, as perfecting us fully, and in this respect He is to be loved more than any other object. This is clear from the fact that God is man's final natural end. As we saw, only the Infinite good can fill up man's capacity for desire, and, therefore, God is the final end of human life. It follows from this that He ought to be loved above all other ends because all other ends ought to be subordinated to our last end.

\\'e may add, too, that as "in the arts * there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost," so man ought to aim at this, his last end, with an energy limited by his psychological capacity only. Man ought, then, to love God as his last end more than he loves any other object and with all his strength.

II. God ought to be loved for His own sake and not merely for the sake of man.

That God should be loved for His own sake and not merely for the sake of another, even of ourselves, is evident from an enumeration of the ways in which it is possible to love a thing for the sake of another.

• Aristotle, Politics, I. 9.

NATURAL RELIGION 25

We may love anything for the sake of another in four ways according to each of the four causes.* " By way of final cause, as we love medicine for the sake of health ; by way of formal cause, as we love a man for the sake of his virtue . . . : by way of efficient cause as we love certain persons because they are the children of such a father : by way of disposition or material cause as we love a thing by virtue of something disposing us to love it, for example, love on account of benefits received, though once we have begun to love we do not love our friend on account of those benefits but on account of his virtue.

Now in the first three ways God is not to be loved for anything else but for His own sake. For, He is not ordained to another as to an end, being the last end of all : nor is He good by means of anything else, His substance being His goodness : nor is goodness in Him derived from any other, but from Him to all others. In the fourth way God can be loved by reason of some- thing else, i.e. the benefits we have received from Him, etc.," but these things should lead us on to love Him for Himself.

It is clear then from these arguments which show forth the great distinctive perfection of God, that God is worthy of love for His own sake and not merely for the sake of another, and that we do not carry out our duty of loving God if we do not give Him a personal love of friendship for His own sake. Man ought also manifestly to love God with a higher love of friendship than he bears to any other friend, since God infinitely transcends every possible friend in every lovable quality. But all this will be made clearer and more compelhng by our reasoning in the next section.

III. Man ought to love God more than he loves himself. It was shown in the last paragraph that man owes

♦ S. Theol., II. II. Q. XXXVII., Art. 3

26 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

God a love of friendship greater than he gives to any other person. But in the present thesis we go beyond this, and declare that a man must love God not only above all other persons but above oneself. We here reach the critical point in our discussion. It would seem to be psychologically impossible to love God above oneself, for love, as we have already fully shown,* is based on the union of the thing loved with the person loving, and a man is more one with himself than he is with God who is wholly distinct from man. We saw that friendship proper is not entertained towards one- self, but something greater than friendship, because friendship imports union, whereas the relation of a man to himself is unity which goes beyond union with another. Also, as unity is the principle of union, so the love wherewith one loves oneself is the principle and root of friendship ; for our friendship for others con- sists in wishing good to them as we wish it to ourselves, but in a lesser degree, in proportion as they are removed by differences from unity with oneself. All this was shown in our general dissertation on the ground of friend- ship. What would seem to follow is that one may love friends, and God most of all ; but, as the}^ all fall short of that unity with one which each has to himself, the love for them, which is based on union with another, and which starts from it, must necessarily be less than the love of each for himself. The highest expression of such love would be dimidium animac, other persons being always the lesser half of ourselves. And in this respect it is no use to say that God is the infinite good and, so, more loveworthy than oneself. This is quite true, but it ignores the principle on which human love is based, viz. love of self, and of others in so far as they are one with this self. We may call this principle a limitation, an impotence of our will ; but it is part of our nature and governs all our acts. Men are not ex- pected to love men who are better than themselves

• See Vol. I. p. .319.

NATURAL RELIGION 27

more than they love themselves, and so it might not be surprising if it turned out that man's nature was so constituted that he had to love himself more than God whom he nevertheless confessed to be infinitely above him. He might even find a motive for humility in such natural baseness. Indeed, there were writers in the Middle Ages alluded to by St. Thomas * who were so impressed by this difficulty that thej' frankly declared that the love of God above oneself was wholly impossible.

We now go on to treat of this difficulty, and we shall draw our chief proof of the duty of loving God above all, even above oneself, from the consideration and solution of it.

The love of friendship is based on union with the lover. Our fellow-men have a certain union with us in race and nature, and we love them for this : but they fall away in many ways from unity with us. For in us there are many things that are not in them, and by which we are divided from them ; and, therefore, since what we love in ourselves is only partially existent in our fellows, we love them only partially or in a lesser degree than we love ourselves. What we love in ourselves is not in them : but if it were we should love them as much as we love ourselves. We should, of course, still be distinct from them numcro and in substance, but our perfections and theirs would be the same specie : and, therefore, our reason fixing upon this identity would at once make it psychologically possible to love them as much as ourselves, and would impose this love upon us as a natural duty.

Now God is distinct from us numcro and in substance, but the perfections that are in us are in Him also, and, therefore, it is possible to love Him with the love of friendship. But God has all that is in us and more, all that we love in ourselves but in a higher degree, and, therefore, following out the principle of love already put forward, we ought to love God as much as ourselves

♦" S. Theol." 1. Q. LX., Art. 5.

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and more.* Indeed, since every good that is in us is also in Him, and sublimated and raised to infinite ex- cellence, there is no limit to the greatness of the love which a man who really loved himself will give to God. A friend is an alter ego, but lesser : God is an alter ego, but greater, and, therefore, lovable above the ego. This reason at once dissolves the difficulty and shows that though we ought to love ourselves above all creatures we should love God above ourselves.

Our relation to God as an object of love may also be viewed in another way which confirms the conclusion now reached. God not only has in Him all the good possessed by us, but His excellence is the cause of all the good that is in us. Nov/, when what we love de- pends wholly and absolutely on any cause, we love that cause principally, because the loss of the cause would be to us a worse and more radical evil than the mere loss of the loved effect. Therefore, a man ought to love God more than he loves himself.

Again, God is the essential and infinite goodness, of which every other particle of existing goodness is a participation. Each one's self is such a particle. And if such a small part of what is found in God fires us with love, a fortiori, we ought naturally to be carried away with affection for God, the essential and infinite good.

Finally, God being the infinite good and the end of man, we are related to Him as part to whole. Now every part, as a part, naturally loves the common good more than its own particular good, in the sense that it refers and ordains its own good to that of the whole. The hand, as St. Thomas says, will automatically expose itself to a blow in order to save the whole body. This implies that our own good and welfare should be sub- jected and referred to God, that the personal love of

• We should, therefore, not only love God as our end, the attain- ment of whom will jjive us complete happiness, which is the love cf desire only, but we sliould direct all our happiness, even the final happi- ness of attaininf; God, to the Divine ^lory.

NATURAL RELIGION 29

God is the final act to which all other love, even that of ourselves, ought to be ordained.

IV. The love of God is the highest and best of moral ads*

In the first place this act is better than any act of intellect for it is an act of the will engaged on the highest and noblest of objects. The intellect is a higher facult}' than the will : but certain acts of will are higher than corresponding acts of intellect. As the intellect acts by taking objects into itself, the nobility of the operation depends on the intellect. But the will acts by tending to its object and, therefore, the nobility- of the operation is measured by the object. Now, in the case of objects inferior to the soul, acts of intellect are higher than those of will, since these objects are elevated by being taken into the soul : but for a similar reason in respect of objects that are superior to the soul the act of the will is better. f Therefore an act of will loving God is better than any intellectual act. It is also better than any other will-act, for its object is the highest and most noble of all.

And not only is the love of God for His own sake better than all other acts, but it is the most unselfish of all. Bishop Butler spoke of even the love of God as selfish — a long-sighted selfishness. In a sense this would be true of a love of God that mainly centred in the happiness which the attaining of God would afford the creature. But it is not true of the love of God for His own sake, which is man's highest act, the crown and perfection of all his best work. Kant also considered that the love of God was selfish, that all love was selfish. The only purely unselfish act of which man is capable,

• This question does not concern the problem whether the a/tain- nient of the ultimate end is an act of intellect or of will. The present question is — which is our highest moral act ?

t " S. Theol." II. II., Q. XXIII. Art. 6, ad. i.

30 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

he maintained, and, therefore, the only truly moral act is the doing of one's duty out of respect for duty. And that such an act is most unselfish no one will den3^ It is not, however, more unselfish than the love of God for His own sake alone. But in point of nobility and per- fection who would compare them ? The one act con- cerns a pure abstraction, a principle, a skeleton of reality : the other concerns the living God, in whom is every perfection, in whom every abstraction has its living source, every principle its living ground, and in whom is the fullness of all being, of all reality.

The love of God being the highest moral act of man, it follows that all other virtues without this love of God must be imperfect ; for all virtues presuppose a will fixed and set in the true end of man, and being our highest object He is also our true end. On the other hand, where charity is present all other virtues acquire a merit and a value above that which is proper to them- selves, since acts that are ordained to a higher end than that which is proper to them acquire a new excellence from this end.

Again, charity being our highest moral act, our moral perfection lies principally in this act of the love of God. But not in it alone. The love of God does not super- sede other human interests : it simply rules them to a higher end, raises them to a higher level. But whereas the love of God is capable of infinite growth, our other affections are limited in their capacity for expansion, it being a rule, as Aristotle says, of all arts and sciences in so far as they are practical, that, whereas the use of the means is limited, the end may always be sought to the uttermost. And so, though human interests are not excluded by, on the contrary, though they may advance along with charity, the wings of charity soon leave them far behind, so that in one who is fired with the love of God, other love, though present, will, in

NATURAL RELIGION 31

comparison with charity, become steadily weaker. In one that loves God above all things all other affections, must gradually lose in power and prominence, taking; up less and less of the soul's interest and attention.

APPENDIX

The Primitive Races and Natural Religion

It will be well before closing the present chapter to consider briefly two questions of great historical importance in con- nection with the subject of natural religion. One is whether a pre-religious period ever obtained in the life of the human race — a period when man had not yet begun to think of God or of anything beyond this world, not a brief period such as on any theory of the origin of religion would be required whilst the problems of religion were taking shape and the human mind was preparing itself for their solution, but a lengthened period such as is in general required for large evolutionary changes — the hypothesis of a pre-rehgious period being altogether a part of the evolutionist theory as applied to rehgion. The second question is whether there is any soHd foundation for those many theories which ex- plain religion as nothing more than an extension of, a development from nature-worship, magic, animism, fetishism, or some other production of the untutored imagination of the savage races. Having examined two of these theories, we shall th^^n briefly consider the evolutionist view, which represents monotheism as the last stage in the ascending series of the consecutive religious positions occupied by the race of man in its growth upwards from savagery to civilisation.

Before, however, considering these questions we think it well to remark that whatever may be the answer to them, whether primitive man possessed or did not possess a religion, whether his religion sprang or did not spring out of nature- worship, and whether fetishism and polytheism did or did not precede monotheism in time, these things in no way affect the question of the validity of monotheism taken in itself, and in no way lessen the claims of rehgion on the minds.

32 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

of civilised men to-day. In science we do not allow the errors of one period to militate against the general body of scientific truth accepted in the next. So also the true re- ligion must still be regarded as having a claim on our ac- ceptance, whatever may have been the errors of primitive man.

I. — The Alleged Pre-Religious Period

It is now a good many years since the first appearance of Lord Avebury's remarkable work on the " Origin of Civilisation," wherein, with great show of scholarship, that writer expounded and developed his celebrated theory of a pre-religious period in human development — a view which was based almost wholly on the supposition that to-day many savage races are without religion, and that the nearer we get down to the primitive stock the more numerous be- come the cases of religionless peoples. Since, he argues, these present-day lower savage races are all instances of arrested development it must needs follow that at least their mental condition is similar in all essential respects to the mental condition of their remote ancestors, and therefore, inasmuch as these present-day representatives of the early races are without religion, the primitive stock must also have been without rehgion. To-day, it is contended, whole races or tribes are in the pre-religious period. Originally this pre- rehgious condition was the condition not of certain peoples only but of the whole human race.

Criticism. (i) Lord Avebury's theory, although it still has its ad- herents, may nevertheless be regarded as steadily losing ground in recent years amongst enquirers of almost every school of thought. The facts of history to which Lord Ave- bury made appeal, and which have been more closely scrutinised in recent times than was possible when Lord Avebury first adopted his theory, will not bear the inter- pretation then put upon them.

" There is not the same necessity now," writes Prof. Ladd,* " as that wliich formerly existed for defending the historical truthfulness of this assumption " (viz. that as far back as investigation has been able to bring us there is no trace of a people without religion.)

* " Philosophy of Religion," I. 120.

NATURAL RELIGION 33

And again, "it is scarcely too much to say that at present all the witnesses on whom Lubbock relied have been shown to have been misled, either by haste, incom- petence, or prejudice." *

" Religion," writes De la Saussaye,f " is the specific and common property of all mankind."

" We find," writes Andrew Lang, J " no race whose mind as to faith is a tabula rasa."

" All savages," writes C. H. Brown, § " and half-civilised peoples are intensely religious "

" Hitherto," writes Gustav Roskoff,|| " no primitive people has been discovered devoid of all trace of religion."

" Whether," says Max Miiller,^ " we descend to the lowest roots of our intellectual growth or ascend to the loftiest heights of modern speculation, everywhere we find religion as a power that conquers, and conquers even those who think that they have conquered it."

These testimonies, taken at random from the works of modern writers of high authority, are evidence at least of this, that, even though an isolated people, here and there, may have lost its rehgion, no large part of the savage world is without a religion in the sense of nev-er having had any ; and since on the hypothesis of our opponents the savage

* In addition to these three sources of error others also should be mentioned, e.g. (a) the fact that the true reUgious beliefs of the savage races are rarely revealed to any others than the initiated of their own tribe. Savage beliefs, writes H. C. Brown {" Bases of Religion," p. 7) contain many " esoteric doctrines designed for the initiated alone . . . who are sworn to secrecy. Outside this kernel an exoteric form for the benefit of the uninitiated is usually put forth that shadows in gross, ambiguous, and misleading terms these inner truths." [b) Even Tylor is constrained to recognise that many investigators seem hardly to have been willing to accept anything short of the established theology as in any sense a religion, (c) Many writers, like Lord Avebury, while acknowledging the existence of the externals of religion still deny to the rites of certain savage peoples the character of a true religion because of the apparent want of a true religious inner motive, magical incantation (a non-religious motive) often, we are informed, taking the place of propitiation or petition which are the proper acts of religion. We can only say that it is exceedingly difficult to discern the inner motives of races so different from ourselves in their whole mentality. Certainly the difference betwfeen incantation and petition is not always clearly discernible.

t " Manual of the Science of Religion," p. 14.

X " The Making of Religion."

§ " The Bases of Religion, " p. 2.

11 " Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvolker," p. 178.

^ " Lectures on the Origin of Religion," p. 5.

VOL. II — 3

34 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

races are instances of arrested development and are now in the same position approximately as their prehistoric ancestors, these testimonies are proof also that it is not lawful lightly to assume that the primitive races passed necessarily through a long period of unreligion before the concept of God arose in their minds.

(2) We believe, however, that, essential as it is to produce testimonies of the kind just given lest the opinions of men like Lord Avebury might be regarded as incontestable or at least as unquestioned, what is much more important is that the reader should be given instances of races which were once almost universally regarded as without religion, and which, as the methods of investigation improved, were found to be possessed, behind all the paraphernalia of their very material and often grotesque ritual, of a rehgion that was not only to some extent spiritual and elevated, but often even mono- theistic. We shall here consider a few such instances.

(a) THE NORTH CENTRAL AUSTRALIANS

Until quite recently this race was deemed universally, mainly on the strength of the testimony of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen,* to be not only wholly without rehgion but to be still actually in the pre-rcligious stage — the stage which precedes the appearance of religion. Now it is exceedingly doubtful whether these people have not at present a re- ligion as genuine and good as that of other Australian races. But, whether they have or not, it is now becoming increasingly certain that at one time they were possessed not only of a religion but of a rehgion which was genuinely monotheistic. The parts of our proof for this proposition may first be given separately and then presented as one complete argument. First, on the admission of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen themselves, there is one exception to their statement that the North Central tribes are without religion, viz. the Kaitish tribe. Not only is this people possessed of a religion but their religion is monotheistic. They worship a Supreme Being under tlie name Atnatu.f Secondly, many other North Central tribes teach the boys undergoing tlic initiation ceremonies that the All-Father of whom tlicy have been hearing from their parents is a mythical personage invented for the amusement and

• In their work on the " Northern Tribes of Central Australia." f Spencer and Gillen explain that Atnatu is not regarded as a moral ruler in the sense of rewarding good and jninishing evil. Thi» may or may not be true : but Atnatu is at least the Supreme Being.

NATURAL RELIGION 35

comfort of women and children. There is still, therefore, amongst these particular tribes a monotheistic religion which is handed down, even now, from parent to child, but which for some reason or other * is now being ousted from the peoples' hearts and understandings. Thirdly, according to Mr. Howitt,f the South Eastern tribes, which formerly were united with the North Central, and which, as Mr. Lang \ has shown, are more primitive than the latter tribe, still retain their monotheistic religion, ac- knowledging a Supreme Being under various names and images.

The argument, therefore, afforded in the present case by the study of Comparative Religion is as follows : there is still amongst the North Central tribes of Australia one undoubtedly monotheistic tribe ; others are plainly en- deavouring to discourage the traditional monotheism which, however, is still being handed down from mother to child in spite of the tribal prohibition ; and the more primitive South Eastern tribes, which once were one with the North Central, still preserve their monotheistic beliefs. The only conclusion possible would seem to be that if the North Central Australians are now without religion (a supposition which is not at all to be regarded as certain) this defect is to be attributed not to their being in the pre-religious stage, as our opponents suppose, but to the fact that they

* The conception of God has probably suffered much and become itself unacceptable to the men of these tribes on account of the absurd myths and legends that have gathered round it. The savage mind is most prolific in the creation of myths and legends.

t " The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia," p. 507. Mr. Howitt endeavours to show that in spite of their belief in a Supreme Being, these people are not really religious on account of the human way in which the Supreme Being is conceived by them. He is supposed to have the shape, the passions, the weaknesses of men. Now such a form of argument is quite unsound for (i) it is natural for savages to imagine their God in human shape as we have already seen, p. 9. (2) These anthropomorphic representations belong as a rule to the mythical side only of these ancient religions. They are not part of the real doctrine of their religion. We admit, however, that it is often not easy to distinguish doctrine from myth. (3) Howitt himself admits that many S.E. tribes regard their Supreme Being as invisible and as producing all things, which is very far removed from anthropomorphism. (4) Howitt makes the naive confession that under favourable conditions their present beliefs might have developed into a genuine religion. It is hard to see how such an assertion could be so confidently made unless the beliefs and practices of these peoples had already in them some element of religion.

X " The Primitive and the Advanced in Totemism." Journal of Anthrop. Inst., 1905.

36 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

have lost an inheritance which once was theirs, viz. their beUef in an All-Father — the title by which the Supreme Being is most familiarly known amongst these simple peoples. " Since," writes Mr. Jevons, " the appearance of Mr. Howitt's work the evidence that the ideas of the Northern tribes are the result of degradation, and are a degradation from the South Eastern tribes' belief in an All-Father, has been decisive on the point."

(b) SOME AFRICAN TRIBES

Mr. Herbert Spencer and Lord Avebury describe many of the African races as without religion. The Hottentots, for instance. Lord Avebury assures us, show no sign of rehgious worship and particularly no sign of the worship of a Supreme Being, his chief argument being that in the public life of the people such worship finds no place.* Now we can only express surprise that Lord Avebury would, with the results of recent investigations before him, make himself responsible for the assertion that where the worship of the Supreme Being forms no part of the public rehgion of a people. His existence is not acknowedged by them nor His rights recognised. No part of the life and customs of the savage races has been more clearly estab- hshed than the ui\willingness evinced by some of these peoples to attempt to propitiate by worship a Being whom they regard as supremely good and just, and whose rulings, therefore, they look on as so perfect as not to be in need of change, particularly at the instance of mere human beings. The lower deities, on the contrary, the attendant spirits, they will freely propitiate.

But Lord Avcbury's opinion as to the rcligionless con- dition of the African tribes has been disproved utterly by the experience of those who have lived amongst and, therefore, were in a position to understand these African races. Mgr. Le Roy who lived amongst the Bantu peoples of Mid-Africa for twenty years, and who was admitted by some of them to witness many of their most sacred rites, thus describes the religion of these peoples : f " We have seen that the Hottentots have neither temples nor figures. But frequently we find amongst them as well as among the ' San ' certain consecrated places which they never pass without leaving some small offering, accompanying their

• " Marriage Totemism and Religion," p. 197: t " La Religion dcs Primitifs," p. 318.

NATURAL RELIGION 37

act with an invocation. ... In all the encampments of the A-Koa and Beku. ... I have found a behef in God set forth in clear and living light." He then goes on to describe a conversation with one of this poor tribe who explained to him, in a manner that would not be unworthy of a Christian believer, the tribal behef in the Supreme God the ruler of the world, one who will bring the good to rest and condemn the wicked to torments.

And Le Roy's testimony is borne out by innumerable others. " There is no need," wrote Livingstone, " of beginning to tell the most degraded people of the South of the existence of God or of a future life, both these facts being universally admitted." Dr. Hahn, too, in his most interesting work on the Hottentot tribes,* attests to the belief of these people in a Supreme Being, the cause and ruler of the world. A recent testimony is that of J. H. West Sheane, F.R.G.S. (native commissioner).! " As with the Bantu J faiths," he writes, " so with the Avemba religion, they acknowledge a Supreme Being, Leza, who is above the tutelary spirits of the land. . . . He is the judge of the dead, and condemns thieves, adulterers and murderers . . . there is no special worship of Leza, for he is to be approached only by appeasing the inferior spirits who act as intercessors. But, in blessing, the parent beseeches Leza to protect his child," etc.

(c) THE " GODLESS " ANDAMAN ISLANDERS AND OTHER PYGMY RACES

For long the Andamanese were regarded as an indis- putable instance of a people without religion. They are in many ways like beasts, wrote Lubbock, with no idea of higher beings, and no religion. Yet when the Andaman Islanders came to be studied in situ, as A. Lang remarks, by an educated Englishman, Mr. Man, who knew their language and lived with them for eleven years, they were found to be possessed not only of religion but of a high form of monotheism. Their Supreme Being (Puluga), though imaged in material colours, and surrounded by myth such as the savage imagination cannot fail to weave around all invisible or transcendent things, is nevertheless

* " Tsuni-||Goam the Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi," i.e. of the Hottentots.

t In Journal of Anthrop. Inst., 1906.

j These Bantu peoples extend across the South Mid-Continent of Africa from one coast to the other.

38 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

clearly and forcibly and logically conceived. Though like fire, yet, He is "invisible," was " never born," is "immortal"; by Him all things were " created," except the powers of evil : He " knows the thoughts of the heart," is " angered by sin," is " pitiful to those in distress," is the " judge of souls. ..." *

Much light has of late been thrown upon the present discussion by the comparative study of the Andamanese beMefs with those of the other peoples which, together with the Andamanese, make up the interesting group known as the Pygmy races. The Pygmy races, if not, as many authorities insist, the oldest, are certainly amongst the oldest and most primitive of the races now existing. Putting aside some doubtful peoples, and certain other peoples of mixed blood, we find included in the Pygmy group five principal races f — the Central African Pygmies, the Bushmen, the Aeta of the Phillippines, the Andamanese, and the Semang tribe of the Malay Peninsula. Though now so widely scattered over the earth, it is believed by scientists that all these races were originally one. What is of interest for our present discussion is that they are all monotheistic in religion. J In spite of the develop- ment of absurd myth and the anthropomorphisms that accompany it, these poor peoples hold fast by their belief in the Supreme God. Strange to relate, also, they all, in one form or another, practise what is probably the oldest of all species of sacrifice, that, viz. of the first fruits. Probably the most interesting of all these races is the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the most remote and primitive of men, the least affected by the presence near them of other peoples and beliefs. They believe in one Supreme God, who existed before the creation, who is

• Mr. Man's exposure of an ancient and perhaps not creditably maintained tradition in regard to this poor people did not, as might be expected, escape the censure of his opponi'iits. His article (in Journal of Anthrop. Inst., 1882-3) was criticised in " Folk-Lore," September, 1909, by Mr. A. R. Brown with much vehemence ; and the controversy that followed between Mr. Brown on the one side, and Schmidt and Lang on the other, in the pages of " Man " (1910) is of great interest. Mr. Brown's arguments are not only fully met, but .shown to confirm Mr. Man's views in an able work by P. W. Schmidt — " Die Stellung der PygmJienvolker in dcr Entwicklungsge- schichte des Menschen," p. 203 and foil.

f V. W. Sclimidt, «/>. cit., p. 192 and foil.

j Even, therefore, if any doubt remained about the Andamanese religion, it would be removed by the connection of these with the other Pygmy peoples.

NATURAL RELIGION 39

the judge of souls and the master of life and death. Scarcely a trace of animism or ancestor-worship is found here, nor any other corrupting or degenerate influence, with the exception of some magic. Their monotheism is practically pure and unspoiled, those other lower elements which are to be found even amongst the less primitive peoples of the same land,* being practically unknown. It is difficult to see how the Andamanese can be now regarded as a test case for the theory of godless primitive races.

{d) THE MAORIS

We wish to close this list of instances, which could be multiplied many times, by reference to the Maori people. ■" Many writers," says Mr. Elsdon Best.f " have touched on the theme of the Maori religion, and almost all such writers have remarked that the gods of the Maori were truly malevolent beings, beings to be feared and placated, to whom no true invocations were recited, but merely crude charms or incantations. Also that the Maori had no conception of a Supreme Being, creative or otherwise. . . It is now many years since we first gained a dim knowledge that the Maori believed in tke existence of a Supreme Being. . . . Since that time we have obtained more light. . . . The information so gained, we now ofter . . . as evidence that an ' inferior ' race, a * savage ' people was quite capable of evolving the concept of a Supreme Being, a creative and eternal God." In the course of his article this interesting writer makes reference to the Maori custom of conceahng the full significance of the tribal religion from all but the initiated. In fact only the higher priesthood was allowed to invoke God's name. No image of God was ever fashioned ; no offerings were made to Him. Nevertheless all acknowledged the " Great," the eternal, permanent, unchangeable cause of all things, from Whom all life emanated, and Who, though Himself supremely just and good, yet refrains, this people main- tains, from inflicting punishment on the unjust and bad.

The foregoing cases will serve to show how, gradually, Lord Avebury's theory is being disproved by facts, how each

* See later p. 45. Also Le Roy, op. cit., pp. 274 and 275.

t " Maori Religion : The Cult of lo, the Concept of a Supreme Deity as evolved by the ancestors of the Polynesieins." Man. July, 1913-

40 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

year the veils are being drawn aside, and revealing behind the often gruesome ritual of savage fetishism, ancestor- worship and incantation, a background of genuine religious feeling and behef.

II. — Two Erroneous Theories on the Origin of Religion

ANIMISM

This theory is usually connected with the name of Ed. B. Tylor, and is described in his well-known work on Primitive Culture. A briefer though more thorough-going account of it is given in Spencer's work, the " Principles of Sociology."*

The following is a brief sketch of the theory as developed by Spencer : —

" Changes in the sky and on the earth occurring hourly, daily, and at shorter or longer intervals, go on in ways about which the savage knows nothing — unexpected appearances and disappearances, transmutations, meta- morphoses. While seenjing to show that arbitrariness characterises all actions, these foster the notion of a duality in the things which become visible and vanish, or which transform themselves : and this notion is con- firmed by experiences of shadows, reflections, and echoes." There must, the savage thinks, be more than one object present under each of these single appearances. The experience of dreams confirms this suggestion. To the primitive man dreams appear real. The savage did the actions, saw the places, carried on the conversation dreamt of. Hence there must be in him a double which goes abroad during sleep and returns again at waking. When people die the savage mind considers that the second self has merely gone away. It will come back again, and its

• " Principles of Sociology," Vol. I. Herbert Spencer's theory is sometimes six^kcn of as the " ghost theory " of the origin of religion. But it differs in no essential from the animistic hypothesis of Ed. B. Tylor, except that in Spencer's theory the element of ancestor worship is most emphasised. We are prevented by limitations of space from treating of the supposed place of magic and the " worship " of the totem in the dcvclojjment of religion. The general theory is given in Hobhouse, " Morals in Evolution," Vol. II. The account of animism given al>ovc will serve to show the absurd length of rein which sociologists arc accustomed to allow to their imaginations in theorising on the origin of religion.

NATURAL RELIGION 41

return to the body will be what is now spoken of as the resurrection of the body. Thus each thing comes to appear to have a second self, which, when first its existence comes to be suspected, is thought of as Hke unto the visible self, and to have the same needs and propensities. The second self of the dead man hunts, eats, and drinks in some land beyond our own. These doubles of dead men swarm everywhere. " They are workers of remarkable occurrences in the surrounding world." Men are at the mercy of these ghosts. Primitive man tries first to defend himself against them by the aid of the exorcist and the sorcerer, i.e. "antagonistically"; later, losing faith in the efficacy of opposition, he has recourse to propitiation and petition.* The souls of ancestors are not only feared but revered. Some of the rites performed over the dead denote awe, fear and reverence only, some propitiation and petition. " Out of this motive and these observances come all forms of worship." " Every holy rite is derived from a funereal rite." " Remote ancestral ghosts ' come to be ' regarded as creators and deities." " From the worship of the dead every other kind of worship has arisen."

Criticism.

Our criticism of this theory which must be of the briefest kind is as follows : —

{a) This theory does not now carry much weight amongst anthropQlogists. As R. R. Marett f says — " the impression left on my mind by a study of the leading theorists is that animistic interpretations have been by them decidedly overdone."

{b) This theory of animism supposes that the savage regards all nature as living, each thing being inhabited by spirits. Now the savage may indeed regard some parts of nature as the homes of spirits just as civilised men do, but the supposition that in his mind every tree and every stone X

* This change of attitude from exorcist antagonism to petition is also found in Sir J. G. Frazer's theory of the origin of reUgion as expounded in his now famiUar work, " The Golden Bough," p. 77.

f " The Threshold of Religion."

I For a statement of the theory that stone-worship was once prevalent amongst all savage races see Hobhouse, " Morals in Evolu- tion," II. p. 5. He explains that stones were at first, through some kind of paradoxical development, worshipped in themselves as in- animate : later they were regarded and worshipped as the dwelling- place of spirits.

42 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

has its attendant spirit is absurd. Even the structure of the language of some of those races that are supposed to suffer from this delusion completely disproves such a supposi- tion. Let us take the instance of the Bantu languages (African). The Bantu languages arrange all their nouns under specific categories, some of male, some of female ; some of animate, some of inanimate things, showing conclusively that in the eyes of this people the whole world is not animated.* It is not always easy to get at the mentality of savages, but all experience goes to show that their views about the world around them are, like those of civilised men, strange mixtures of truth and falsehood. They are never wholly absurd.

(c) The mere belief that behind the trees and stones and mountains there are attendant spirits stronger than us and having power over us could not give rise to religion f any more than the fear of other men stronger than oneself could give rise to religion. All investigation goes to show that all religion is based on the conception of One who created all things, on whom all things depend for their continued existence, to whom, therefore, we are indebted. One also who will punish the wicked and reward the good. This idea of complete dependence in the sense that we are indebted to God for what we are and have is the essential element in all religion. The mere thought of spirits behind the phenomena of the world could not, therefore, suffice to explain the genesis of rehgion. Granted, however, the idea of a Creator then the idea of other spirits co-operating with God in the government of the world might easily arise in the savage as well as in the civilised mind. " If man," writes Jastrow,J "was without religion before the animistic hypothesis presented itself to his mind animism would not of itself have led to the rise of rehgion."

{d) Belief in the existence of souls surviving after the death of the body which is the essential feature of animism is in the case of every race of men inseparably bound up with

♦ Sec on this point Lc Roy, " La Hcligion dcs Primitifs," p. 78 ; Also article on ' Hantu Lan^uaf-cs," in Ency. Brit.

t If fear and awe of f>ersonat spirits Iwhind phenomena could not Rive ri.sc to religion neither could awe of a mere force that ' leaves in solution the distinction of personal and impersonal " become the basis of religion. To such a force Mr. Marett gives tlie name of Mana, awe of which he tells us forms the first step in the development of religion. It jirecedes, he maintains, the animistic period. Sec " Ihreshold of Keligion," p. 119. Also for criticism of the theory see " Dramas and Dramatic Dances," by W. Kidgeway.

t " The Study of Keligion," p. 183.

NATURAL RELIGION 43

and dependent on belief in the existence of God. No atheist, except those of a purely academic sort, believes in immortality. The savage's belief in souls and spirits presupposes a belief in God, and, therefore, presupposes some sort of religious worship.

(e) It is absurd to regard the savage as believing that when he kills his enemy in sleep his second soul has been out of his body, and committed murder. A day's experience would suffice to demonstrate even to the savage mind the unreality of dreams.

(/) Finally, animism is almost wholly unknown amongst some of the oldest and most primitive races who yet are deeply religious, for instance, the Pygmy races which are amongst the oldest and most primitive on the earth.

NATURE-WORSHIP

other writers maintain that religion began in the awe and wonder aroused in the savage mind by such impressive phenomena as lightning the rising and setting sun, the great forests and mountains.

Nearly all, however, that has been said in criticism of animism applies to the present hypothesis also. The essential characteristic of all religions is that of total dependence on some one above us. Such phenomena as are here described have nothing in common with this inseparable attribute of religion.

III. — Monotheism — the Earliest Stage in the History OF Religion

Only the very briefest reference can here be made to the important question,* which form of rehgion is the oldest, that of monotheism or polytheism and the rest.

Until a few years ago most anthropologists were fully prepared in accordance with their theory of evolution to accept the view that the history of religion represents a slowly ascending series of stages from nature-worship through

* We are here abstracting from the information afforded by revela- tion, and relying on natural scientific investigation only, Ethics being a purely natural science. We cannot, therefore, be expected to consider in a work like the present the arguments for a primitive revelation or the theories of Wellhausen and the Assyriologists opposed to such revelation. For these the reader should consult " La Revela- tion Primitive," by R. P. G. Schmidt.

44 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

animism, fetishism, and polytheism, up to monotheism. An opposite theory is now very widely accepted by anthro- pologists (even those who are very little influenced by religious dogma) to the effect that in the religions of savages there are many indications which go to prove that the primitive religion was one of pure monotheism, that the other forms mentioned represent stages of retrogression and decadence rather than of development, and that their appearance belongs to a comparatively late period in the history of the savage races.

Thus to quote only one or two of the arguments offered : — *

(i) If monotheism were a development out of the rest then it should be the most prominent element in the religion of those peoples where the monotheistic element and the others are mingled together. The opposite, however, is the case. Amongst some savage races fetishism and the rest constitute the most vigorous part of the racial worship, whilst the monotheistic element has every sign of decay upon it, and lies buried under the debris of ages so that only the most patient investigation on the part of scientists has succeeded in bringing it to light. And this argument is found to be all the more convincing when it is remembered that the older the primitive race and the less affected by advance in civihsation the more pronounced is the belief in one God, and the fewer and less distinct the traces of animism and polytheism. This will be shown in the third argument to follow.

(2) We know that amongst primitive peoples it is a very common occurrence for one god to come to be gradually represented as many, either through being known by different names, or through the various powers of a god being personified, each, therefore, becoming a god, or for some other reason. The opposite also occurs, i.e. the phenomenon of syncretism : but it is rare amongst the. savage races. Mr. Howitt has given instances of the multij^lication of deities amongst the S. E. Australians, Dr. Halm f amongst the Hottentots, and de Broglie % amongst the more developed

• Useful expositions of the view here defended are to be found i0 Andrew Jiang's and de Rroglic's works mentioned in the notes to our present discussion, in Chr. Pesch's " Gott und Gotlcr," in R. P. G. Schmidt's work, " La K6v6lation Primitive," and in P. W. Schmidt's able work on the I'ygmy Races here frequently referred to.

t op cit,

J In his interesting work, " ProblSmes ct Conclusions dc I'Histoire dcs Religions."

NATURAL RELIGION 45

peoples.* In these cases, therefore, polytheism and the other forms mentioned would seem to have been preceded by monotheism, not vice versa.

{3) It is certain that monotheism is the religion of the very oldest of the primitive races f — fetish-worship, animism, magic, polytheism, and the rest being characteristic rather of the later tribes. In this connection an interesting study in Comparative Rehgion is afforded by the tribes of the Malay Peninsula. Here there are three primitive Pagan tribes — the Semang pygmies, the Sakai, and the Jakun. The first is the most primitive and isolated. Nomads of the forest, Hving by the chase, innocent of all kinds of regular business, they are quite unprogressive, and still retain all the characteristics and cherish the traditions that have come down to them from their ancestors in ages past. Their religion is one of pure monotheism. The Sakai are the next " higher " grade. They have mingled to a shght degree with the neighbouring peoples. Their religion is mono- theistic, with, however, a notable mixture of the other forms. The " highest " level is that of the half-civiUsed Jakun. Here the monotheistic element is faint and in- operative as compared with the elements of animism, ancestor worship, and magic. :{:

From this it is clear that the nearer one gets to the primitive stock the purer the monotheism, from which it follows that all the rest are accretions belonging to a later period.

Our conclusion is that fetishism, animism, polytheism did not precede the appearance of monotheism ; on the contrary,

* Mere " syncretism " could not explain the worship of one supreme God, Lord of all things, which is the worship practised by all the oldest of the primitive races, e.g. the Andamanese, and the Semang Pj'gmies. If two tribes worshipping distinct " local " gods unite, these " local " gods may coalesce and become the god of the joint territory and community. But this god would still be " local," not the God of all things. The conception of God as supreme over all things can only rest on reasoning of one or other of the kinds we have described, p. 6.

f The argument is fully given in P. W. Schmidt's work already quoted, and Skeat's " Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula."

X In addition to the arguments given in the text others might also be quoted showing that the savage religions manifest evidences of having been derived from the teachings of Genesis. R. P. G. Schmidt points out that the sacrifice of the first fruits is essential in many of the most primitive religions such as that of the Andamanese. Also the social organisation and monogyny of the very earliest races like the Pygmies, and the S. E. Australians point to Genesis. See the argument in " La Revelation Primitive et les Donnees Actuelles de la Science," pp. 214-236.

46 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

that it preceded them ; that in general these cruder reUgions represent a retrogression ; that in fact they are nothing more than so many degraded conceptions such as could hardly fail to appear at some time during the course of ages as accompaniments to a true natural religion in minds and lives so distorted and strange as those of the savage races.*

* Various theories have been devised to show how monotheism might develop out of polytheism. For instance, it is explained by Hobhouse [op. cit. II. 119) that one god might be exalted as king over the rest, or all the gods might gradually come to be identified with one, or all might come to be regarded as manifestations of some one force underlying all things, or from the worship of one national god the people might come to acknowledge one God absolutely. It is in this latter way that the Hebrews are said by some to have re- linquished " monolatry " or the worship of the national god, Yahveh^ for monotheism or the acknowledgment and worship of one God (for a criticism of other theories on the origin of Hebrew monotheism see R. P. G. Schmidt's " La Revelation Primitive," etc., ch. 3)

But how unnatural and improbable are all these mental processes in comparison with that simple and natural act of reasoning which would place primitive man in possession of monotheism from the beginning and which consists in no other postulate than that the world must have a cause ! The mind of primitive man would not necessarily and vatttrally be led to accept the suggestion that the gods have a king, or that their national or tribal god was the only god, or that all gods are manifestations of a single force underlying all things. But the mind of primitive man as well as the mind of developed but uncritical men would naturally and necessarily accept the proposition, particularly if suggested to it, that the world must have a cause. As we said before, a Hume or a Kant might raise difficulties about the notion of cau.se, but such difficulties would not suggest themselves to primitive man. Nor should it be thought that so abstract and profound a conception as that of an ultimate cause would present difficulties to the savage mind. It is just these abstract and ultimate conceptions that are most easily understood and accepted by the plain mind. The axioms of Euclid are more easily understood than the " propositions." The concept of an ultimate cause moving the world is more easily grasped than the concept of the intermediate causes. These latter represent highly complex things which only an educated man can understand. Our contention, therefore, is that in the absence of proof to the contrary when a primitive race is found to possess a monotheistic religion we should presume that this belief is due to some of those very simple proce.s.ses of reasoning which we have enumerated in the cour.se of the present chapter, and which could hardly (ail to suggest themselves in some way to the primitive races. But this assumption is shown to be fully in accordance with fact from what the investigations of scientific men have now succeeded in disclosing, viz. that it is the later primitive races only that exhibit traces of animism, fetishism, and polytheism, whilst the oldest primitive races are monotheistic.

CHAPTER II

A MAN'S DUTIES CONCERNING HIMSELF, AND SOME OF HIS DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS

In a sense, all a man's duties concern himself or are duties towards himself, for they all concern some good object or end, the attainment of which constitutes a perfection, in some sense, of one's self. Most duties, however, concern the self only indirectly. Directly they are duties to attain some object quite distinct from the perfecting of one's self, e.g. our duty to help the poor, to avoid stealing, murder, etc. But some duties are such that the immediate object which they concern is one's own self ; * their immediate and direct aim is to

* The obvious objection will occur to the reader — how can a man have duties towards himself ? Why may not each of us do what he likes with himself ? He who owns a book can treat it in what way he likes ; why not treat himself in what way he likes ? The assumption, it will be added, that each one owns himself is here quite legitimate, for nature has given each man into his own control ; he directs himself in all his actions ; and what does ownership mean except that a man controls the thing which is possessed, and that he can exclude others from its control ? Man owns himself, therefore, and can do what he likes with himself, and, therefore, has no duties in regard to himself.

Reply (a) It is not true that man controls himself to the extent that is supposed in this objection and that is commonly assumed. We do not bring ourselves into existence, nor maintain ourselves in existence, and there are thousands of functions, physical and mental, over which we have no control, (b) Man, unlike ordinary property, is a person, with dignity and rights, and he should be treated with all the respect that personality has a right to, no matter into whose hands he is entrusted, whether his own or those of other people, (c) Man has a duty to seek his own perfection, which duty is based on the presence in man of a natural appetite for his own good (See Vol. I. p. 90, and present Vol. p. 52). Man has no such natural appetite towards the preservation of his property. He cannot, therefore, treat himself in the way in which he treats other things. We should explain, however, that a man's duties towards himself are never duties of justice, but of charity only. Justice is essentially a virtue ad alter um.

47

48 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

perfect one's self, e.g. the dut}^ to improve one's intellect, to strengthen one's character, to sustain life and health. This is the class of duty with which we are here con- cerned, duties the direct object of which is a man's own self.

OUR PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES ENUMERATED

Our duties towards ourselves may all be summed up in the one formula, viz. we are bound to seek our own perfection — our own good. Now our good is to be found (i) partly in ourselves, e.g. increase of knowledge, the maintenance of health ; (2) partly in the possession of objects outside ourselves, e.g. friends, money, a good reputation. We may be allowed to refer briefl}^ to each of these.

(i) A man is bound to seek his own personal per- fection by the proper exercise of his own capacities. Now we can perfect ourselves in a hundred different ways and along a hundred different lines. But it would be absurd to say that a man should perfect himself or develop along all the lines that it is open to him to pursue. All men possess in some degree capacities for studying mathematics, history, music, poetry, painting, law, philosophy, theology, the military art, etc. Not one of these branches is completely closed, by nature at all events, to any individual. But no man could perfect himself along all these lines together, and to attempt to do so would mar our chance of perfection or even of progress along any one. It is absurd, therefore, to insist that men should seek the exercise of all the capacities that they possess. To do so is not only not a law, it is not even in accordance with the economy of nature. The fact is that nature has supplied all men in varying degrees with all the capacities that belong to human nature, but she has left each one to determine, in accordance with his circumstances and the require- ments of society, in what particular branch he will

A MAN'S DUTIES 49

develop and perfect himself, or (which is the same thing) what class of human interest he will choose to promote. Some study mathematics, others history : some become medical men, others lawyers, others soldiers, others artists ; some undertake the duties of family life, others remain single for the purpose of. pursuing some work or furthering some interest which requires personal freedom — the soldier that he may fight battles for his country, the philanthropist that he may alleviate some of the world's sufferings, the missionary in order to belong to the people over whom he is set, to be at their beck and call, and to carry on the work of God untrammelled by any human ties. These and a thousand other lines of pursuit, as wide-extending as the sum of the world's work and interests, are the alternatives which nature so generously opens out before us. In giving to each the full number of capacities, she has, to a great extent, placed the choice of our vocation in our own hands. But she requires that some one choice be made, that at least one line of human perfection be followed.

But there are some things that are a duty for each and all, that are required for the proper ordering of life in every department. Some of these are (a) goods of the soul, like knowledge and virtue ; some (6) goods of the body, (a) A man is bound to acquire some knowledge of the law of God, without which his whole life will be imperilled and misdirected. All, too, are obliged to acquire such knowledge as is necessary for the proper performance of the duties that attach to their state in life. Every man also is bound to seek to strengthen and adorn his will with the necessary moral virtues, particularly the virtue of temperance for the control of passion, without which, virtue and harmony are impossible in our lives, {b) Every man is under a strict obligation to preserve his health un- impaired. He may indeed fast and abstain, out of certain higher motives, but nothing would justify him in injuring his health by such practices. Then there is

50 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

a negative duty not to injure ourselves in any way, and in particular not to destroy our own lives. Of this very grave duty, however, we shall speak at some length presently.* These are all duties that concern internal goods.

(2) We are bound also to perfect ourselves by the possession of certain external goods. Every man is bound, without, of course, undue anxiety, to provide a sufficiency of goods for his own maintenance and the maintenance of those committed to his care. The degree and kind of maintenance will depend on circum- stances of a person's state in life. One's calling may, indeed, be such as to induce him, with a fine courage and trust, to throw all his reliance on God or on man- kind, and to go boldly forth to do some work of great moment, without any guarantee as to the future main- tenance of himself or others. Great saints, philanthrop- ists, and scientists have done so. But in ordinary circumstances a man is bound to rely on himself, and to take no unnecessary risks, but to provide as far as possible for the due performance of his obligations in life by securing himself against want.

Men should also have a genuine care for the good opinion of others. Against this precept it is possible to err in three principal ways — (a) making no account of the opinion of others. The esteem of other men is to be reckoned a genuine good, of valtie in and for itself. As such, it is an ornament and a possession which one cannot afford to dispense with. It is also good as a means, first, as an aid to the proper accomplishment of duty, for it is easier to work in a friendly environment than in one that is hostile ; and secondly as a true norm of excellence — there being few better tests of a man's good character and life than the esteem of those who arc in a position to know and understand him. {b) Wc err also by aiming at too much praise, for this is to over-estimate the element of genuine good that is

• p- 52.

A MAN'S DUTIES 51

in human esteem. There is a Hmit to the value of human esteem just as there is a limit to the value of money ; and just as it would be wrong to desire all the money in the world or even superabundant riches, so it is absurd to seek for the esteem of all men, unless indeed our position in societj^ renders the universal esteem of real value to us. (c) We do wrong also in setting a higher value on public esteem than on our own independence, surrendering our own judgment in order to be praised by others. A man is worth more to himself than the esteem of all the world can be to him.

But besides valuing the esteem of others, a man should also set a high value on the possession of friends. A true friend is amongst the greatest of human blessings. It would be wrong to despise the friendship of others, just as it would be wrong to overestimate its value by subjecting ourselves completely to others or by seeking to have too many friends. " A few friends for pleasure's sake like sweetening in your food," and " Have neither many friends nor none," are tried and sensible maxims.

Again, men stand in need of amusement and should not be insensible to pleasure, just as one should not overestimate the value of pleasure. Not all pleasures or amusements suit all callings, but there is no calling that cannot be suited by some amusements. Amuse- ments, rationally indulged in, are a true human good both in themselves and as means to the bettering of mind and body.

Of the various duties of a man concerning himself two of the most prominent and important are those of self-maintenance and of temperance. The former gives rise to the problem whether suicide is lawful, the latter to the question of the nature and the law of temperance. We shall devote the remainder of our discussion on a man's duties to himself to the consideration of these two problems — of suicide and of temperance.

52 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

OF SUICIDE

By suicide is meant the direct compassing of one's own death. Directly compassing death means the desiring of death in itself, and the voluntary taking of effective means to its accomplishment. Suicide must be most carefully distinguished from another class of action which will be considered at the close of our present discussion, viz. the indirect compassing of one's own death through the pursuit of something which happens to result, against or independently of our will, in death ; as when a soldier dies in battle, or a patient as the result of an operation. In suicide a man aims at death. It is accomplished in two ways, positively, as, for instance, by taking poison or stabbing one's self : negatively, as by voluntary self-imposed starvation undertaken in order to die. In their moral character there is no difference either in kind or degree between negative and positive suicide. In both there is a positive aiming at death. The difference is only in the means chosen.

We shall first proceed to prove that suicide is radically opposed to the nature of the person who attempts it, so opposed that under no circumstances whatsoever could it be justified. Secondly, we shall show that it is an injustice to society ; thirdly, that it is an insult to God.

(i) The first and most obvious element of evil in suicide is that it is a violation of the natural * law in as much as it violates the nature of the individual who commits it. We saw, when treating of the moral criteria, t that the powers of man are directed by nature to the attainment of some object or end, and, through the attainment of such object or end, to the development and fuller being of the individual to whom these powers belong. This principle holds true of every kind of power — intellectual, sensuous, and vegetative. The will from its very nature aims at happiness in the attainment

♦ And, therefore, ol the eternal law of God in which the natural law iH grounded.

t Vol. I. p. 90. Sec ' S. Thcol.' II., II. Q. LXIV. Art. 5.

A MAN'S DUTIES 53

of some end, and, therefore, also at the well-being and development of the individual. The sensuous appetites, like that for food, aim at the fuller life and development of man on his sensuous side. Such vegetative tendencies or appetites as growth and the digestive movements are directed to the well-being or betterment of the substance of the body. It is impossible that any appetite set up in us by nature should be directed to any other thing than the fuller being of the individual. It is impossible that it should aim at nothingness or at destruction. A time comes no doubt when the body begins to fall into decay. But this decay is due not to the fact that our natural powers are aiming at decay, but to the fact that they can no longer function, that their working is interfered with, that their objects cannot be attained. The result of this failure to function properly is decay. No natural faculty is directed by nature to its own annihilation, or to that of the constitution to which it belongs. " The tendency," writes M. Guyau, " to persevere in life is the necessary law of life, not of human life only, but of all life." * This natural and necessary tendency of living forces to their own further and completer existence is an admitted fact of science and of philosophy.

Now in suicide a man makes voluntary use of his own powers, and by his act those powers are directed to attain an object the very contrary of that which, -by their own nature, they are directed to attain — they are used, viz. not for the welfare but for the destruction of the agent. There could be no more direct or unequivocal violation of nature than this. To use a power and to use it for the accomplishment of what is most directly opposed to its own natural end is the most complete per- version that is possible of nature's purposes and aims. Suicide, therefore, is a violation of nature, of the natural law, and, through the natural law, of the eternal law of God also, on which the natural law is ultimately grounded.

* See Vol. I. of this work, p. 90.

54 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Some Difficulties

The principle to which we have made appeal in proving the unnatural character oi suicide suggests the following difhculty : it is quite true that vegetative and sensuous powers tend necessarily to the maintenance and develop- ment of the agent. For this reason an animal could neither desire death and extinction, nor attempt to take its own life. But an intellectual being is capable of desiring death, and hence it cannot be true that the intellectual appetite of will is fixed by nature on the maintenance and develop- ment of the individual. In the very act of suicide itself, for instance, the agent does not desire his own maintenance or well-being.

Reply. — This difficulty only helps to bring out in a clearer light the universality of the law that all life (indeed all being), of whatever kind, tends naturally and necessarily to preserve itself in being. For, even when a man wishes for death, that act of willing is based upon a still more fundamental move- ment of will, a movement which is never absent from any act of willing, and on which every human act is grounded, viz. the natural and inseparable tendency of the will to good, to well-being, to happiness, to satisfaction of some kind. Whether we desire to pass an examination, or to take a holiday, or to read a book — in every act the agent simply brings to bear upon some concrete end or object the desire of the will for happiness or the " good." Some- times the object in which we seek to realise that desire is a real " good," sometimes it is an apparent " good." But in every act we seek to realise this most fundamental of all desires, that, viz. for happiness. In suicide also we aim at happiness or satisfaction, either some positive gratification, like that of disappointing or hurting others, or the negative good of escaping from unhappincss. Our will, therefore, aims always at the well-being of the self, and that aim is maintained even in our attempt at sclf-anniliilation. " Through very love of self," says a writer of note,* " him- self he slew." It is this deepest and most fundamental of all desires, this setting which the will has received from nature and of which it can never be deprived, that is opposed and violated, as well as cheated of its natural object, in suicide,

A second difficulty is the following : is it correct to say that in suicide the person desires to compass his own destruc-

• G. Meredith, " The Egoist," p. 5.

A MAN'S DUTIES ' 55

tion or annihilation ? At death the soul does not disappear. It is a dogma of faith that the body will rise again. Does it not seem, therefore, that what is desired and accomphshed in suicide is not annihilation, but a new life, more perfect than the present, and, if so, how can it be said that suicide is a violation of our natural appetite for continued existence and well-being ?

Reply. — Natural tendencies are all tendencies to the well-being of the natural agent, the agent regarded as a product of nature. Nature could not set up in any thing a tendency towards a condition which is either unnatural or which is even above nature. But the natural constitution of man, from which springs all our natural powers and appetites, is that of a composite of body and soul combined to form one person. And, therefore, our natural desire for happiness is a desire for the happiness and well-being of the natural ^^x son, consisting of body and soul. In suicide, therefore, we use our natural powers for an end which is the frustration of their own natural purpose.

A third difficulty, the last support and argument of those who contemplate freeing themselves from life's burdens, may be briefly put thus : better even annihilation than a life full of pain and sorrow. Why, therefore, not choose the better and leave the worse ?

Reply. — Cold reason answers — there is nothing in this life, no matter how unwelcome to us, that is not better than annihilation. For annihilation is nothing, and in nothing there is no perfection and no " good," And if this reply, though it really strikes at the root of the present difficulty, is regarded as too abstract to afford comfort in bearing the trials of life, we answer that it is not meant to give comfort, but only to represent the true facts of the case. But there are other considerations also that can supply all the comfort and sustaining power that are required. In every life, no matter how unhappy, there is much good. The evil of each one's life is but one of its many elements, and it is outweighed many times by the good. It is the very essence of sorrow, however, that it turns our attention away from the good and fixes it upon the evil, and thus we find it hard to realise that in an unhappy hfe there is any real good or happiness. Again even our natural reason tells us that evil can be turned to good, if not here, at least elsewhere,* if not in this world.

• See Vol. I. p. 86.

56 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

then in the next. There are many seasons and many climes in nature, and the good of present losses does not always appear at once or where we will. Finally, even if we have no trust in nature itself, still the Author of nature remains, and, as ruler of the universe. He must bring things to a good end. We must be patient and wait for His reward. Better anything than to offend Him by throwing His gift, the gift of life, in His face, and rushing into His presence unsum- moned. Suicide is the worst of all solutions for pain and sorrow.

(2) Our second argument for the wrongfulness of suicide is the following : Suicide is a violation of justice as between the individual and society. The individual is naturally destined for society,* and, therefore, he is naturally a part or member of society and belongs to society as the part of any organism belongs to the whole. To cut ourselves off from existence is to deprive society of that which belongs to it by the same kind of title by which the limb belongs to the body of which nature makes it a part.

(3) Suicide is an insult to the Creator. The Author of nature has given us all that we are and have. It is for Him who gave us our life to take it from us when He wills, not ours to throw His gift in His face. He has set us in this world in order to work out our per- fection here. It is for us to remain at our appointed posts until we are recalled.

The Indirect compassing of one's own death.

Indirectly a man causes his own death, when without aiming at death he does that which results in death. f

♦ Sec Vol. I., pp. 107, 108; Vol. II., pp. 463. 471.

t So as not to complicate the problem here, we take it for granted that death is foreseen as certain in each case. Usually adjoined to the above conditions is the provision that the more remote the pro- bability that the evil effect will occur, the less the degree of goodness or utility in the other effect that is required to justify our act. Where there is extremely little danger of death any small good will suffice to justify our act. Where death is almost certain, as when a man jumps

A MAN'S DUTIES 57

It can occur in two ways, positively, as when one rushes into battle ; negatively, as when a man refuses to eat so that another may take the only food available and thereby be enabled to live.

The question whether it is lawful for some good purpose to do an act which we know will result in death leads us back to a problem of great importance which occupied us in the early part of this work, that, viz. of the double effect. We saw * that where an act which is in itself indifferent has two results, one good and one bad, it is lawful to do this act in spite of the foreseen evil consequences, provided that three conditions are fulfilled (i) that the evil effect is not desired on its own account ; for that would be directly to wish evil, which is never lawful ; the evil must be permitted only, not aimed at as an end ; (2) that the good effect does not follow from the bad, since, if it did, the evil element would be desired as means to the good ; it would be desired, therefore, in itself (although not for itself), and thus it would be desired directly, which is unlawful ; (3) provided also that there is a sufficient reason for permitting the bad effect, or, which is the same thing, provided there is a sufficient proportion between the good and the evil effect, the one in some way counter- balancing the other. Now the problem which we are at present considering is only a concrete instance of this more general problem of the " double effect." Is the indirect compassing of one's own death ever lawful ? Is it lawful to do an act which, while accompanied by some good consequence, such as fighting for one's country, or feeding the hungry, involves also another evil conse- quence, viz. one's own death ? From what precedes

from a high tower, only the greatest good or the avoiding of some terrible evil would justify the act. A man may jump from a tower (trusting to some accident to save his life) to avoid the rising flames. But no cause will justify him in shooting himself through the brain. Such an act is not indifferent. Of its nature it is fatal. It is the direct procuring of one's own death. • Vol. I. p. 39.

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it will be evident that such an act is sometimes lawful, but only under the prescribed conditions. It is lawful to do an act involving as a consequence my own death, provided (i) that I do not aim at death ; (2) that the good accomplished by my act is not itself the result of my death. It would not, for instance, be lawful for me to starve myself to death in order that some one in whom I am interested might become heir to my pro- perty, or in order that by my death I might escape some great evil : (3) provided also that the good effect pro- duced in some way counterbalances the ever grave evil of death. I may go to battle, knowing that I shall die, for the sake of my country's honour. If the surrendering of all the food in my possession is necessary for another's life, I may make the sacrifice without sin, one life, no matter how poor or ignoble, being always sufficiently the equivalent of another life. A captain may stick * to his ship and not attempt to save himself as long as there is even one passenger on board who might require his assistance. Nay, even if none remained, he would be justified in clinging to his post if any glimmer of hope remains that in the end the vessel might be saved. In both cases a great charge is being fulfilled. But if all hope of saving the vessel has departed and no one remains who might require assistance, a captain is bound to try to save his life, not even the disgrace of his failure sufficing to justify him in refusing to make use of such means of safety as are at hand.f Men, too, may lawfully stand aside and not rush for boat or belt whilst the lives of women and children, or even of other men, are being

• Sticking to the ship is an indillcront action in itself. Throwing himself into the sea in order to he drowned is not indilferent, but bad : it is the direct compassing of one's own death, and could under no circumstances be justified. Jkit as we saw in a note (p. 57) merely jumping into the sea with the hope of not being drowned may be indifferent.

t For two reasons, first, there is no proportion between the saving of his reputation and the loss of his life : and, secondly, he avoids <lisgracc hy dying. Jhc good effect follows, therefore, as a result of the bad (see p. 57).

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saved. In all these cases the compensating considera- tion is that of at least one human life saved for each one which is surrendered.

Nor is the saving of another's life always necessary as compensation for the loss of our own. Any great and overwhelming good may suffice as compensation. But in no case may a man seek his own death, no matter what the good to be gained. Our right extends only to the doing of that which is in itself good or indifferent or to remaining inactive ; and our action or inaction must be really necessary for the attainment of the " good " end to which it is directed, the " good " which justifies us in permitting ourselves to die.

OF TEMPERANCE

In the first part of the present work we explained in a general way the nature of the virtue of temperance and also its various parts, integral, subjective, and potential. It will be necessary here to give a more detailed account of this virtue and in particular to set before the reader, with what fullness the scope of this work allows, an analysis of the law or norm of temper- ance.

Man is not a being of reason alone. He is a creature of sense also, and out of his sense nature spring a number of sense appetites, i.e. of permanent tendencies or inclinations towards certain sense objects. They are of two kinds — concupiscible appetites, or appetites for the attainment of certain pleasurable ends, and irascible appetites, or appetites urging one to the facing and overcoming of difficulties.* Temperance has to do with the first kind of appetite onl}-. Its function is to restrain man from the immoderate pursuit of pleasure.

* This latter appetite is very highly developed in some animals. Dogs and cats will even set themselves to imagine opposition and resistance on the part of some object in order to experience the pleasure of capturing it in spite of resistance.

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Now the concupiscible appetites natural to man are very varied. They vary in their objects (and, therefore, in degree of importance), in their strength and intensity, and in the persistence with which they urge one to the attainment of their ends. Most important of all, how- ever, and also, in the design of nature, most difficult of resistance and most persistent in their exercise, are those appetites that concern the maintenance of life. They are two — the appetite for food and drink, by which the life of the individual is conserv-ed, and the appetite of sex subserving the propagation and maintenance of the species. The controlling and directing of these two appetites forms the central and essential function of the virtue of temperance. Other less important and less intense passions or appetites are controlled and directed by the lesser virtues which we speak of as the allied or potential parts of temperance.

The control or government of the passions falling under the virtue of temperance implies the existence of a law or norm of temperance with which the exercise of these passions must be made to accord. This law or norm of temperance we must here attempt to deduce. Like all other laws of human action it is defined by the end or object aimed at. The law regulating the use of the means is always set by the end,* those things being prescribed in every case which are necessary for attain- ing the end. The law governing the use of the two appetites here under consideration is set by their natural end. Food and drink are meant in the economy of nature for the maintenance of the individual life, and the law governing their use is that they should be used in such a way as to promote life and health, or, at all events, that their use should not be inconsonant with the maintenance of health. f The end of the sex appetite

• Aristotle Nich. Eth., VJl. *'

t " S. Thcol.," Q. CXLI. Art. 6. St. Thomas explains (a) that a

thing can be necessary for life in cither of two senses — first, for life

itself, so that without it life would become extinct, e.g. food : secondly,

for the conveniences of life, e.g. pleasant food. The virtueof temperance

A MAN'S DUTIES 6i

is in the order of nature the propagation and welfare of the race, and the law governing the exercise of this capacity or appetite is that it should accord with the welfare of offspring. Let us examine these two parts of the law of temperance in some detail.

The requirements of health vary in different individuals and, therefore, the rules governing the use of food vary with different individuals. Also the requirements of health and life vary in the case of the same individual with difference of circumstances. The requirements of the law of temperance vary in a corresponding manner. And so it may happen, not merely that wide divergences may occur in the law of temperance governing the actions of men in different sets of circumstances, but that under abnormal circumstances the requirements of temperance may be completely at variance with \Nhat is a universal law under normal circumstances. Thus, if a surgical operation is necessary for health and life, and no anaesthetic can be had, it would be lawful to administer whiskey in such quantities as would render the patient unconscious, a thing which could never be lawful under ordinary circumstances. Under all cir- cumstances the bodily health and life of the individual are the norm and law of temperate action.

Opposed to temperance in the use of food and drink is gluttony. The glutton is one who eats and drinks as long as pleasure can be derived from those acts, without care for the governing law of temperance. Gluttony becomes gravely sinful when it leads to serious injury to one's health, when it renders a man unfit to perform the duties to which he is bound by grave obliga-

allows fully for both these necessities. But there are things that are necessary for life in neither of these senses. Of these (b) some though not necessary are still not opposed to life in any way ; and in some cases they may even promote life and health {e.g. the more delicate and expensive foods), and of these, according to St. Thomas, nature allows a moderate use, account being taken of times and circum- stances : (c) others are opposed to life, and these cannot be allowed. Even, however, in the case of the best food, the quantity should be such as accords with the health of the person.

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tion, or when one casts off and despises all thought of law and ordinateness in eating and drinking, and sets himself to seek the pleasures of the palate for its own exclusive sake, making as it were a god of this pleasure. A special case of gluttony is the condition known as drunkenness — or the condition in which the reason becomes suspended through over-indulgence in intoxi- cating liquor. The elements of sin here are many. First, drunkenness always involves injury to health in some degree. Secondly, in drunkenness the faculty which is by nature meant to guide and control us in eating and drinking is itself suspended as a result of drinking. Drunkenness is, therefore, a perversion of the natural order ; it is analogous to that other per- version of the natural order which occurs when the citizens of the State seize without reason upon their monarch, cast him into prison and treat him as a subject of the citizens and as inferior to them instead of as ruler. The temporary suspension of reason is not in itself evil. Reason is temporarily suspended in sleep by the gentle operation of nature itself. It is violently extinguished at surgical operations by means of an anaesthetic. But in both these cases, as St. Thomas so well puts it,* reason herself requires the temporary suspension of her own exercise for the sake of the welfare of the individual. Since, therefore, it is reason that prescribes its own suspension in these cases, the order of reason is here fully maintained. f In ordinary drunkenness, however, reason is suspended for no end which is prescribed by reason, but merely for the sake of excess in the pleasure of drinking. Thirdly, % in

• " S. Theol.," II. II*., CLIIl. 2 ad. 2 — " rationis actus aliquando intermittatur pro aliquo quod secundum rationcm fit."

\ I'o restrain a monarch in obedience to the orders of the monarch himself would not be inordinate in a citizen, since by following the command of the monarch the subject treats him as ruler and not as a subject. It is so also in the case j^iven above.

X This third reason is a variant of the second ; but it has its own special significance. The second argument emphasises the fact that the guide of conduct is put away, the third that "higher" is made subject to " lower."

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drunkenness the higher part of man is made completely subject to the lower. In sleep and in surgical operations reason and consciousness are suspended for the sake of the welfare of the whole man, and the whole man is superior to reason which is a part only. But in ordinary drunkenness, reason, the higher part, is suspended for the sake of a lower part, for the sake, viz. of a passing organic pleasure alone. Drunkenness, therefore, is a subversion of the natural order obtaining between the parts of our human constitution.

The law of temperance in regard to sex desire must now be explained. The end of the sex function in the order of nature is the continuance and increase of the human race. For that end the sexual faculty is supplied by nature, and for that end nature has provided a special inclination to its -exercise. The law governing the exercise of this function, as in the case of all other functions, is set by its end. The sexual function can only be exercised in a way consonant with the generation of offspring. Any other use of it would be a perversion of the natural order and, therefore, a violation of the natural law. Sometimes, indeed, nature herself, through no fault of the person, fails to realise the end of the function through the sterility of either party. But that failure on the part of nature is not to be attributed to the human agent, and constitutes no bar to the legitimate exercise of the sexual function, the governing law of temperance in regard to which is that, so far as depends on the human agent, the exercise of this faculty should be of a kind which is consonant with its end. If the subsequent natural processes over which man has no control fail of their effect, that failure is an accident only, it is not a sin, and represents no unlawfulness on the part of man.

But the law of temperance as governing the relation of the sexes goes farther still. For nature aims in this function not at children only, but at perfect children,.

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i.e. at children up to the standard of nature — at children, therefore, existing in a condition in which body and mind can be properly cared for by those responsible for its existence, not at children maimed in body and defective in mind, or, through want of the responsible natural guardians, exposed to the danger of a defective existence. But, as we shall see later, an essential and indispensable condition of the welfare and development of the child is a stable union of father and mother bound together for the welfare of their offspring, or what we speak of as the condition of marriage ; and, therefore, marriage is an essential antecedent condition of the exercise of the sexual function. Only in matrimon}' is its exercise allowable by natural law. The future child has a right even when the foundations of its existence are being laid to this guarantee of protection and welfare.*

The chief part of the virtue of temperance as governing the sexual relations is chastity, whereb}^ one avoids all that is contrary to reason and to the law of temperance in the exercise of the sexual function. Governing the less important relations of sex is the beautiful virtue of modesty. Highest of all is virginity, or complete abstinence from carnal desire f-or the sake of the more perfect exercise of the higher faculties of man, and particularly for the sake of more perfectly worshipping and loving God, the highest and most perfect object of human affection. In every department of human life abstinence has its legitimate place, not only as a virtue, but also as meriting the praise and commendation of men. Men abstain from certain kinds of food and drink in some cases for the sake of their health, in other •cases in order to maintain a strong and unclouded

* And this law and condition remain in force even though it is anticipated that there will be no offspring. Nature's laws are deter- mined not by accidents and exceptions but by what normally occurs ; and besides it is clear that an act which (whatever may occur through accident) is primarily intended by nature for offspring should not be performed under conditions opposed to the essential and inseparable lights of offspring.

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intellect. The philanthropist leaves country and friends in order to carry out great schemes for the happiness of other people. The soldier abstains from marriage in order the more freely to serve his country. The virgin renounces contact with the more material pleasures in order to serve God more closely and unreservedly than the married state allows.

Virginity is lawful because there is no commandment of nature binding each particular individual to marry. The sustainment of the race is a debt which is due not by each individual but by the race at large. The main- tenance of the individual life is a duty that falls on each individual. Nobody else is in a position to secure this end. But the propagation of the race, like progress in the various branches of knowledge, does not require the co-operation of each individual. " There are many needs in a community," writes St. Thomas,* " and one individual cannot meet them all ; but they are met by the community through one man fulfilling one need, another another. . . . The precept concerning generation is one that regards the community as such . . . and it is sufficient if some devote themselves to the propa- gation of the race, whilst others devote themselves to divine things, thus contributing to the beauty and the welfare of the whole race, just as in an army some guard the camp, some bear the standards, some wield the sword, all of which offices are debts of the community, debts which no one man could discharge."

Thus it will be seen that though every man is free to marry, virginity being a privilege and not a law for any man, and though marriage is a high and holy state, yet there is a higher and holier state still, that, viz. of the few who are specially favoured by God with power to renounce the more material pleasures, and are called by Him to undertake offices that require this higher state. But virginity is a virtue for the few only, not for all or for the greater number. The race, with all

•"S. Theol.," II. II., CLII. 3. VOL. II — 5

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its aptitude for greatness, even its aptitude for virginity in some, has to be sustained ; and marriage, b}' which nature has provided for its sustainment, is a condition of great worth, and of high and outstanding merit.

Some of Our Duties Towards Others

Our duties towards others are principally three — the duty of charity or benevolence,* of speaking the truth, of justice. We shall treat briefly of the first two classes of duty in the present chapter. The third will occupy us during many subsequent chapters.

Of Charity

A man is bound to be charitable towards, in the sense of loving, his neighbour, first, because his neighbour i» one with him in his human nature. In benevolence we put another man in our own place, and love him as an alter ego ; and we are enabled to do this because of the unity of all men in their common human nature, f Through this unity of all with all in their common human nature, nature has laid on us an obligation of loving all men, this love being only a natural extension of, or develop- ment from, our love of ourselves. This ground of benevolence determines the measure also of the law of benevolence — we must love others as we love our- selves. Our duty, however, to love our neighbour as ourselves is not to be understood as meaning that we must love others with the same intensity with which we love ourselves. It means that our love of others must be like that which we bear to ourselves. We must

• Wc speak in the present chapter indifferently of charity, love, and benevolence. The word charity is used here in a wider sense than that commonly given to it. Love and benevolence we treat as the same conceptions. The fine differences between them drawn by St. Thomas in " S. Thcol.," II. Il«., 27, 2, netd not be observed in our present di.scussion.

t Sec Vol. I. p. 318.

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wish them well in the same way that we wish well to ourselves.

Secondly, we are bound to love the rest of mankind because we are all parts of one society, and it is a natural law that the part exists for the whole and should pro- mote the good of the whole. It is true that the in- dividual man is not so much a part of society as that his interests are to be treated as wholly subordinate to those of society ;* nevertheless the individual is a part, and should, therefore, love his fellowmen and seek their good.

Thirdly, we should love our fellowmen because all men have the same origin and are travelling to the same end. We have come from God and God is our end and home. Things that have the same nature have the same end. If, in this world, men pass as strangers to one another it is because the conventionalities and perhaps the exigencies of society make it difficult for us to realise, in all the relations of our lives, the fact of our common origin and end, the full and vivid realisa- tion of which fact, if allowed full play in our imaginations, could not fail to unify all in the bonds of universal love and sympathy, as all are unified in their origin and their end. It is our imperfections as men that prevent the links of charity from being forged or that cause them to break and disappear as fast as nature and reason tend to form them. However, being imperfect and below the proper standard of human nature, it is as well that the degree of friendship and brotherhood which our common origin and end would justify and even ought to entail, should not in this world be allowed to come to complete fruition.

The love that nature demands from us is not without its due order : for men are not all related to one another with the same degree of closeness. Other bonds exist besides those of origin, nature, and final end. Husband

♦ See Vol. I. pp. 334 and 343.

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and wife are most closely related in their common life and in the identity of their immediate daily aims ; parents and children, sisters and brothers are identified in community of blood. All these must extend to one another love in its highest degree. Others are related as superiors and subjects, or as comrades carry- ing on the same work. The bonds here are close and intimate and the love they owe each other should be of a degree commensurate with those bonds. Others, again, are related as compatriots, patriotism being a strong and sacred link. It also should beget a special love. But all men have at least one tie, viz. the element of their common humanity, and, therefore, love is owing to all.

The claims also to which this love gives rise vary as the closeness of men's relationship varies. When aid, for instance, pecuniary or personal, is needed, those who are closest to us have the first claim. But there is no one who has not in absolute distress a claim on our generosity. In pecuniary matters, indeed, it is not possible for any man to help all that require aid, but practically all can help some one, and everyone can at least sympathise with all.

The love of our neighbour has man}^ effects,* and is opposed by many sins. Its effects are, internally, joy at another's good, sadness at another's woes, the desire for peace with others ; externally, beneficence, alms- giving, friendly reproof, administered, not anywhere, at any time, and to anybody, but only when and where there is a hope of producing good results. Opposed to the love of one's neighbour are hatred, a sour tempera- ment, envy, discord, contentiousness, sedition, scandal. Greatest sin of all these is, perhaps, a wasteful and unjust war, where men, on one side and on the other, arc treated as beings without rights and as the mere slaves of wanton rulers.

• " S. Thcol.," II. 11^, Q. 28.

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Of Telling the Truth

The question of method is of importance here. Some people arbitrarily define a lie as telling an untruth to one who has a right to know the truth ; and having given this definition they proceed to draw the not very difficult conclusion that there is no sin in saying what is false unless the person addressed has a right to know the truth. The defect of this method will be obvious when it is pointed out that if adopted generally in morals it could be made to justify almost any act no matter how bad. By arbitrarily defining murder, for instance, as the killing of a man who has done me no harm, we might, following this method, then proceed to justify the killing of one who has done me harm — a kind of reasoning which neither moralist nor court of justice could tolerate.

We are about to proceed to the definition of a lie ; and the question of method is, as we said, of supreme importance. Now the first thing to be made clear is that in Ethics our discussion relates to things, not words. What we are interested in here is the question whether it is ever lawful to say what one knows to be false. Whether we call this x, or y, or a lie, or anthro- pophagus, makes no matter to our discussion. We may, however, be allowed to remark that once it is settled that saying what we know to be false is in- trinsically wrong, the further question whether the same thing is wrong when the person addressed has or has not a right to the truth becomes superfluous. If saying what is believed to be false is intrinsically wrong, it is wrong in every case. Although, therefore, we shall ourselves in the present discussion adopt as our definition of a lie that which men usually understand by lying, viz. saying to another that which one believes to be untrue, we do so because that is, as we have said, what men usually understand by lying, and it is the definition adopted by the leaders in philosophy. But if any one objects that his notion of a lie is different from this.

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we can only say, first, that this is the meaning which we attach to the word ; secondly, that our discussion here is concerned with things, not words, it is con- cerned with the morahty of declaring that which one believes to be untrue, and that it matters not whether we call this a; or y or a lie ; thirdly, that, once it has been shown that telling an untruth is intrinsicalty bad, the reader can then go on, if he wishes, to draw the simple conclusion that to tell an untruth to one who has no right to the truth is bad, and a fortiori it is bad to tell it to one who has this right.

I. THE DEFINITION

We define a lie as speaking against one's own mind ; speaking against one's understanding of things ; saying that something is the case which one believes not to be the case, or vice versa ; setting up an opposition between one's speech and one's thought : locntio contra mentem.* These are all one conception, viewed and worded in different ways. As our discussion proceeds it will be useful to emphasise sometimes one form of the definition sometimes another. In order, however, that we may clearly see what is and what is not contained in our definition we shall here expand it into the following form and then explain each part : a lie is any speech, statement, communication, or representation, made to another person, which seriously, that is, really, purports to represent what one believes to be true, but which yet the speaker knows to be untrue.

(a) Speech, statement, or representation. Such repre- sentation ma}' be made orally or in writing or by any other sign, such as bending or shaking the head, shrugging the shoulders, a nod, anything in fact which is usually accepted by men as a statement or the equivalent of one. From this it will be obvious that merely to do

• " S. Thcol.," 11. II'""., ex. I — " mcndacium noiniiiatur ex eo <)Uf)(I cnntrrt nicnlcm diritiir."

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things which mislead others is not a lie unless there is made some statement whether by word or act. To bear an unperturbed manner outwardly when one is raging inwardly is not a lie.

(h) Made to another 'person. The primary and funda- mental function of speech is that of communication between one mind and another. We could not com- municate our thought to another and each mind and each man would consequently be isolated from all the rest, unless by outward signs of some kind men were capable of expressing their thoughts, and these signs would be useless unless made to another who is capable of understanding their meaning. There is no lie, there- fore, in our statement, unless our statement is of the nature of speech, that is, a communication made to some other person. To say, for instance, when alone, that the sun goes round the earth or that one's age is twenty when it is thirt}^ or to say such things to one's dog or cat is not a lie. Communication requires two persons, and speech is of the nature of communication.

(c) Seriously, i.e. really purporting to represent what one believes to he true. The word " serious " is not here used as opposed to " jocose." A statement made to another and really purporting to represent the truth, is, if it does not represent the truth, a lie, and it remains a lie even when the end which one puts before himself is jocose, i.e. when it is meant to create amusement, either for himself or for others. To say to a boy on All Fools' day that his teacher wishes to see him, when it is known that this is not the case, is a lie — a very minor lie, no doubt, but still a lie. The innocence of the end aimed at diminishes, * indeed, the sin of lying, but it still leaves the lying statement what it is in itself, just as any other end would.

♦ " Diminuitur," says St. Thomas, " culpa mendacii si ordinatur ad aliquod bonuna vel delectabile, et sic est mendacium jocosum." The holy doctor, had, as we see, an understanding for the delectation of a jocose lie.

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It should be remembered, however, that it is possible for the jocular element in our statement to become itself a part of the statement instead of remaining outside the statement, as merely the end to which it is directed. And thus what is often incorrectly called a jocose lie is really not a lie, but a true statement, made up partly of words, partly of jocose acts, and partly, perhaps, of the circumstances, for even the circum- stances sometimes " speak." We said before that " speech " is to be understood in a very broad way in our definition of a lie. It includes not only words but any acts that may be utilised by us to express, or even to modify our expression of, our inner thought. Smiling, nodding, a jocular tone of voice may all be used to convey our meaning or part of our meaning, just as well as words ; and, provided their significance is under- stood by people generally, they have a claim to be regarded as a substantive part of our speech, as adding to, or modifying the literal sense of the words used. When a lady of forty claims that she is twenty-two and laughs whilst doing so, all sensible people understand her meaning. Her laugh adds on the new statement — " at least," to the words actually used. The statement " it is a fine day," made when the rain is coming down in torrents, gets a new meaning from the circumstances. The very absurdity of the situation may be accepted as giving a new meaning to our words.* Such statements, therefore, are not lies. Taken in their completeness, i.e. words, acts and circumstances being all included, they do not oppose the speaker's mind.

We repeat, therefore, that any statement which, while purporting to represent our mind to another.

• The absurdity of the statement is not always to be regarded as altcririK the meaning of our words, and as saving our statement from the guilt of lying. If such were the case there would be no such thing as lying to foolish people or " Hats." If our statement, which, taken literally, is false, is to be saved from lying, the circumstances and the absurdity of the situation must " speak " to both the parties concerned, and not merely to the person who, makes the statement.

A MAN'S DUTIES 73

represents the opposite of our mind or belief, comes within our definition of a lie.

(d) Which yet the speaker knows to be untrue. There is no difficulty in understanding this last clause con- sidered in itself. But the interesting question arises whether the lie, besides including all cases of statements known to be untrue, includes also statements not known to be true. There is a very great difference between making a statement which is known to be untrue, and making a statement not knowing whether it is true or untrue. Is this latter kind of statement a lie ? Obviously it has not been expressly included in our' definition, nor do we wish any expression of opinion that is given here to prejudice the discussion to follow. But we may record our opinion that even in the second kind of statement mentioned, the opposition between thought and speech, which we found to be the essential element of the lie, is present in sufficient degree to bring such statement within the category of lying. When a man makes the statement " x is in London," whereas, as a matter of fact, he has no idea whether x is in London or Dublin, there is conscious opposition between the expression used and the thought of the speaker, or the world of reality as understood by the speaker. Even if X should happen to be in London, the expression used, though it does not contradict the fact, yet does contradict the speaker's mind about the fact. The expression used is equivalent to, and is understood by all to mean " the presence of x in London is the fact as known to me," whereas as a matter of fact the presence of X in London is unknown. The expression used pur- ports to represent a positive mentality in the speaker, whereas the speaker's mind is purely negative. He has no mind on the question. All speech purports to repre- sent the world of reality * as understood by the speaker. If the statement made accords with this mentality there is no lie : if it does not the expression is a lie.

* or, rather, a particular portion of the world of reality.

74 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Hence saying what one does not know to be true would seem to fall within our definition of the lie.

This lengthened discussion as to a mere definition will perhaps be considered superfluous and aiming at over-correctness. We have, however, been induced to pursue it, because of the many kinds of serious mis- understanding to which St. Thomas' brief definition exposes him. For the discussion that follows, however, it will not be necessary to take account of all the distinctions we have given. In proving the evil of lying we shall confine our attention to the most ordinary case of lying, i.e. saying in words and under ordinary circumstances what we know to be untrue. As we said before, it matters very little what we agree to include in or exclude from the definition of the word " lie." The main interest of the moralist centres round the question whether consciously making a false state- ment, whatever the name by which it goes, is, or is not, in itself an evil act.

II. THE WRONGFULNESS OF LYING

We now go on to show that the lie is intrinsically unnatural and bad. Some writers attempt to base the evil of lying upon the consequences that it produces — misunderstandings, danger to contracts, etc. But these consequences do not constitute the essential and funda- mental evil in lying — they are a resultant evil only. If the evil of lying consisted in its consequences only, a lie would be lawful in any case in which the speaker could guard against these consequences * — a conclusion which will hardly recommend itself to the acceptance of even the least exacting of consciences.

The consequences of lying are genuine evils, but they are extrinsic to the act. Besides this extrinsic element, however, there is an intrinsic element also, an intrinsic

• See Vol. I. p. 292.

A MAN'S DUTIES 75

" inordinateness," to use St. Thomas' words, in the lie itself, which places it in the category of things forbidden, semper et -pro semper, in all circumstances, and inde- pendently of its effects. This evil element is thus described by St. Thomas :* " What is evil of its nature can no wise be good and lawful ; because if a thing is to be regarded as good, all that goes to make it up must be good ; for goodness supposes soundness all round, whereas any single defect makes a thing evil. But a lie is evil of its nature for it is an act falling on undue matter ; for since language is naturally the sign of thought it is unnatural and undue to say in word what one has not in his mind." The foregoing argument makes certain assumptions which require to be ex- plained.

The primary criterion of morals lies, as we saw, in the natural objects or ends of the faculties. An}' act in which a faculty is used for an end or object which is opposed to its natural end or object is unnatural, and being unnatural is morally bad. In regard, therefore, to the lie, the question arises — what is the natural end of speech or language ? St. Thomas answers in the words — " since language is naturally the sign of thoughts it is unnatural and undue to say in word what one has not in his mind." Language is naturally the expression of thought. If language does not represent thought then what does it represent ? This is what all men understand it to represent. Remove that understanding ; let it be understood hy common agreement that when a man says " ;v is y " neither he nor his listeners should regard the expression as implying that this was also the speaker's belief or thought, and in that case language would have lost all meaning. It would neither convey information nor deceive. Its function would be gone. It could no longer be used as a means of communication between man and man. It would not be language any longer. Speech, therefore, has this as its essential

* " S. Theol.," Ila. 11:-^., ex. 3.

76 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

characteristic, viz, that from its own nature, and in every act, it purports to represent a man's thoughts. We may prevent it from doing so by telHng a he, but even when we do so, of its nature, it carries with it this imphcation, it purports to represent our thought.* And consequently this being the inner, inseparable, and natural implication of speech, the condition without which language is not language and has no meaning, its natural object and end must be to represent man's thought. When by speaking falsely we frustrate speech of its natural object, using it, not to represent our thought, but the opposite of our thought, then speech is an act falling on " undue matter " and is evil. The lie, therefore, is of its nature evil.

We are now in a position to understand the principle so clearly inculcated in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas that the lie is bad independently of its effects. It is bad, in the first place, whether it deceives another or does not, and whether it is intended to deceive or is not.f In most cases, of course, a man tells lies only to deceive. But there are cases in which a man may have no such intention. He may know that deception is impossible, but still speak falsely for some other end, e.g. so as to avoid making a certain admission. But whatever his intention, the intention to deceive is not essential to the lie. The intention to deceive belongs, as St. Thomas says, not to the essence but to the " per- fection " of the lie, J i.e. to its full effectiveness. It is not an absolute requirement. It is an extrinsic effect, not a part or constituent of the lie itself. Again, a lie is bad whether the person addressed has a right to know the truth or has not. " A lie," writes St. Thomas, " has the character of sinfulness not only from the injury which it inflicts on others but from its own

• As Bosan(|uct says : " The claim to be true is rooted iu our assertions." (Phil. Theory of the State," p. 148).

t St. Augustine considered that the intention to deceive was of the essence of lying and necessary to it.

J II. 11*., ex. I.

A MAN'S DUTIES 77

inordinateness." * It is bad from its very substance and its intrinsic badness is prior to its evil effects — a fact which should be evident from our ordinary con- ception of the particular disgrace which attaches to lying. For if a man has a right to know the truth, we violate that right quite as effectively by keeping silence as by telling an untruth. But when in addition to merely witholding the truth we also proceed to tell a lie, the whole world recognises a new disgrace in our act. We have now not only denied to another his just rights but we have incurred a special guilt with a special name. We are not only unjust men but liars also. This universal and instinctive method of viewing the lie confirms, we claim, the view expressed in the present paragraph that the lie has an inordinateness of its own, distinct from its effects.

OF MENTAL RESTRICTIONS

Mental restrictions, properly so called, are not lies, and of themselves are not evil. " Non est Hcitum," writes St. Thomas, t " mendacium dicere ad hoc quod aliquis alium a quocumque periculo liberet : licet tamen veritatem occultare prudenter sub aliqua dissimulatione." There is no untruth unless the words are opposed to the mind of the speaker. Now a speaker may employ a form of words which, whilst effectively conceahng his thought, or rather whilst not revealing it, yet in no way can be said to oppose his thought ; such a form of words does not fall under the category of the lie.

When a question is put to a man, he may, if he does not wish to give the required information, do either of two things. On the one hand, he may remain silent or rebuke the questioner, or say that he refuses to answer ; on the other hand, he may reply by an ambiguous expression, which, intended in one sense opposes the speaker's mind, intended in the other does not. Naturally a speaker who wishes at once to be truthful and yet to conceal his opinions intends

*I1. II«., ex. 3, ad. 4.

t 11. II- , ex. 3, ad. 4.

78 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

his words in the latter sense, and if this is really a legitimate sense, then, no matter how his words are understood by those to whom they are addressed, the guih of the he is not incurred. Such answers are known as mental restrictions, because they are statements in which the speaker intends his words in a restricted sense, in one meaning out of the many which they are capable of bearing. Thus the master of a house who does not desire to interview his visitors gives orders to his servants to say that he is not at home. Now " not at home " bears two senses for people who are in the habit of visiting. It may mean " out," or it may mean " not receiving visitors," and if the words are intended in the second sense the expression accords with the speaker's knowledge of the facts, and consequently there is no lie.

In all cases of lawful mental restriction it is supposed that the words used really bear the meaning intended, the meaning in the sense of which they are true. If they do not legitimately bear this meaning, if in the common under- standing (at least in the understanding of the class of persons concerned in the conversation) this meaning is impossible or absurd, in other words, if the meaning intended, and in which •alone the words are true, exists in the mind of the speaker only, and not in the words themselves, then the restriction intended is purely mental, and the statement is simply a lie.* Thus, if a man when questioned as to whether he had fired a shot into the street answers that he did not, meaning that he did not fire it of his own accord, that he was induced to do so by another, such person makes use of a restriction which is purely mental. No sensible person would regard the words " I did not fire " as capable of bearing such a meaning. This meaning, therefore, does not reside in the expression used, but only in the mind of the speaker. Consequently, in the only sense in which the words can be understood, they oppose the mind of the speaker and constitute a lie.

The use of mental restrictions is not without its dangers. It is easy to transgress the bounds of veracious statement by attempting to use words in restricted meanings, for often

• Hence the distinction between restrictions broadly mental aftd purely mental. In the first case it is supposed that the sense intended by the speaker, the sense which justilies the use of the statement, not only exists in the speaker's mind, but genuinely attaches to the words also. In the second case the meaning intended is supT)osed to dwell in the mind of the speaker only. The former kind of restriction is lawful, the latter unlawful.

A MAN'S DUTIES 79

such meanings do not genuinely attach to them. Besides, a hahit of using mental restrictions is likely to create a facihty in imagining as possible what really are impossible meanings, and often leads to the formation of a lax conscience in the matter of speaking the truth. Very cute and over- careful people who take a dehght in hiding their thoughts from others, are Ukely to become too venturesome in the use of mental restrictions, and often in this way come to be regarded as, and to be, liars.

CHAPTER III

OUR DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS

{Continued)

On Justice

general observations

In an earlier chapter of this work we defined justice,

■ regarded as a special virtue,* as that virtue which

i inclines a man to give every one his own. It is essentially

i a social virtue regulating our relations with the rest of

society. The virtue of charity also takes account of

our relations with others ; but whereas charity imposes

on us obligations towards other men which are based

on the fact that others are one with us in human nature,

in blood, in nationhood, or in some other common

possession, justice takes account of the opposite of this,

viz. our independence of one another, our claims as

against one another, our distinction, our " otherness "

as persons. It is essentially a virtue ad alterum.

Now justice relations arise in society in two ways : | first, as a part or member of society each has certain justice relations to the whole of which he is a part ; secondly, he has certain justice relations to the other parts considered as parts. Distributive justice regulates the first class of relations, commutative justice the second class. Distributive justice inclines a ruler as representing the whole of society to distribute the public

* In a wide sense; the word " justice " is sometimes used to sif^nify " what accords with law." In this sense it is spoken of as general justice, and is the equivalent of " all virtue." But there is a special justice also.

t "S. Thcol.," II. II'., LXI. I.

80

OUR DUTIES 8i

goods, such as public money, political honours, positions in the public service, etc., in a just manner, without favouritism, and without injury to the common good ; also to abstain from placing unjust burdens, by way of taxation, on any particular class in the community. Commutative justice regulates the actions of each member of society in regard to the others considered as mere parts. Also it regulates our dealings with one another, not in regard to public moneys, but to private possessions.

The limits of our space, as well as the scope of the present work, forbid any discussion on problems of distributive justice, most of which are considered in the special science of Political Economy. The problems in justice that are to be considered in the present work are all problems of commutative justice.

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE — ITS GROUND

Justice, like ever}^ other virtue, is based on the relation of men to their final end. A man is bound to attain his natural final end. This he does by aiming at his own natural perfection. He is, therefore, under an obligation to aim at his natural perfection.* Being under an obligation to attain this end, he has a right to the means 1 that lead to this end. And his right extends not only to the things that are absolutely necessary for this end but to all the means that are supplied by nature, and that promote it in any way, provided that in taking these means he does not interfere with the rights of other people. A man has a right to eat or run or walk or talk or open a business, but he must not, in the exer- cise of his right, interfere with other persons.

We have distinguished means that are absolutely neces- sarv for one's end, and means that are not necessary but that promote this end. To both classes of means

* in some degree. VOL. II — 6

82 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

men have rights, for nature supplies her goods that they may be used for man's perfection. But there is a difference in our rights to these two classes of things. To those means that are absolutely necessary, e.g. the food necessary to life, man has an absolutely inde- feasible right, a right which cannot be defeated by any human law. To the rest he has a right, but it is a right that can be defeated by the civil law if the good of society so requires : and even if not defeated wholly, it is a right that is largely subject to compromise, in which way only is it possible in certain cases to har- monise the competing rights of different people.* In general, then, it may be said that in proportion as things are necessary for a man's natural perfection and final end, one's right to these things is absolute and indefeasible.

From this it will be seen that in the order of nature

j the law of justice is a law of equality, that all men are

' possessed of equal rights, in the sense that they all

have the same final end, and the rights of men are

determined by that end. In the order of nature, and

considering men as human beings only, as persons, and

apart from other conditions to be mentioned presently,

the rights of men are equal. As a person, no man i&

mere means to another, the end of all being the same.

Human beings, as human beings, are all possessed of

y' equal initial rights.

What is meant by this condition of initial equality and how it gives place by natural law to later inequality can be seen by an example. If twenty men, standing in no other relation to one another but the relation of man to man,t happened to be cast on a desert island not one of these men would at the beginning have superior rights to the others in regard to life or property. But soon this initial law of equality would be succeeded by a condition of actual inequality, or, rather, woukl

• How inequalities arise in men's rights will presently be seen. I l-atlur and son would have differttnt rights.

OUR DUTIES 83

itself give rise to such a condition. For in the first place an equal division of property having been made it would soon transpire that the superior strength, energy and ability of one man enabled him to use his property to greater effect than the others, and to the surplusage of the fruits accruing to him over the amount accruing to the others he would have a full natural right. Then, later, we might imagine a further influx of persons into the island, and families being founded, and property transmitted, and in a brief period the original condition of equality obtaining in that small community would be completely eclipsed by the subsequent inequalities. These inequalities would be created by the unequal capacities, energies, and opportunities of the original inhabitants, and also by the exercise of their rights by other persons, for instance, their right to set up such businesses as in no way interfered with the rights of the original inhabitants. And it is important to point out that this condition of inequality in possessions would be quite in harmony with the original law of equality dictated by nature, and would itself arise out of the free exercise of men's equal initial rights ; also that to disturb any man in his possessions, even though they happened to be greater than those of others, would be to violate and defeat that very law of equality whereby each in the beginning was made owner of all that he could produce by the exercise of his own capacities. By leaving each man in his possessions, therefore, we maintain the equality required by justice : for which reason Aristotle explains that the end of justice is to maintain or restore equality not in the sense that all should have equal amounts but that men should be left with all that they have justly acquired, and that if this balance happens to be disturbed it should be restored.

In a second way also inequalities would supervene upon the original condition of equality, and without doing violence to that condition. For a group of men

84 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

could not long continue to work together without feeling the need of some ruling authority to settle disputes and to combat disorder when it arose, and so they would appoint * one of themselves to rule over them either permanently or temporarily, or each acting in turn, all being equally eligible for the position, but some being more suited to rule than others ; and thus beside inequalit}- of possession, there would arise juridical inequality, or inequalily iii--j»ling-^uthorTty ; and this inequality would itself be consonant with, and a re- sultant of, the equal rights of all, for it would accord with the wishes of all. each being anxious to exercise his rights in peace, and, therefore, under a rule that preserved and guaranteed justice and order. Inequali- ties, therefore, arise not only through the unequal talents, energies and opportunities of different individ- uals, but through the exigencies of^ the social body as such. But these inequalities in no way contravene the natural and original equality of the rights of all men as men, or as persons.

In the present chapter we have nothing to do with the relations of ruler and subject. These relations will come before us in a later chapter on the State. Our present discussion relates only to a man's rights to his possessions, and in this respect we now go on to speak of the etid of commutative justice.

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE — ITS END

All justice, whether distributive or commutative, aim at establishing equality, not, as has just been said, in the sense that all men should have equal amounts, but that each man should get what he has a right to, and that if any man holds that to which he has no right

• This is not the only rightful way in which a ruling authority appears in society. It is not even the original way as will be seen later in our discussion on the origin of the State. Wc arc here dis- cussing only a particular case.

OUR DUTIES 85

the balance required by law should be restored. But the kind of equality at which distributive justice aims is different from that which is effected by commutative justice. Distributive justice aims at equality of pro- portion * — at giving to each according to the worth of each, the better positions and the higher salaries going to those persons who are cleverer, more industrious, and of greater value to the State. Commutative justice takes no account of the worth of persons, in the sense that, in deciding what one man should pay another, it treats the parties as men only, as equals, and decrees that if a man has wrongfully been deprived of his pos- sessions they should be restored to him, and in full, no matter what his position, character, or worth. " It makes no difference," says Aristotle, writing of com- mutative justice,! " whether a good man defrauds a bad one or a bad man a good one . . . the law looks

♦ " Nich. Eth.," V. 3, 8. Aristotle is here speaking of distributive justice in which connection he gives the following formula : if ' a ' represents one individual (or rather his worth), ' b ' the worth of another, and ' c ' and ' d ' are the respective amounts due to them by the State, then ^ = 4. Of this formula Aristotle also gives an interest- ing variant showing how the position of the parties after distribution (i.e., the person plus the goods received) corresponds with their respective degrees of worth or merit before, viz., |t|=^- In commutative justice, on the other hand, ' a ' and ' t, ' are treated as equal and, therefore, the problem that confronts us here is the relatively simple one of restoring or maintaining the balance in things without respect of persons. Commutative justice deals with ' c ' and ' d ' only.

In V. 4, 3 Aristotle speaks of distributive justice as aiming at geometrical proportion, whilst commutative justice is said to aim at arithmetical proportion. The latter expression is not well chosen, its only justification being that in a certain class of problem commu- tative justice corresponds with the arithmetical mean between two numbers. Thus if two men have five pounds each, and one steals a pound from the other, their respective possessions are now six and four pounds. Commutative justice requires the re-establishment of the original position which is represented by the arithmetical mean of the two sums. The series 4, 5, 6, Aristotle here speaks of as an arithmetical proportion. Moderns call it an arithmetical pro- gression. In contrasting, therefore, distributive and commutative justice it is better to speak of the former, as Aristotle does in more than one place, as aiming at proportional equality. Commutative justice may then be said to aim at simple, or absolute equality.

t " Nich. Eth.," V. 4, 3.

«6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

■only to the difference created by the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal and only asking whether the one has done and the other suffered injury or damage."

We now go on to speak of some problems in com- mutative justice. A man can suffer injustice in three ways — in his person (as by assault), in his character (as by detraction), and in his property (as by robbery). We shall treat of the more fundamental problems arising under each of these headings, devoting the remainder of the present chapter to injuries to the person and to character : injuries to property will be considered in several chapters to follow.

The first set of problems, i.e. injuries to the human person, is best introduced by a discussion of the question :

WHETHER IT IS LA\VFUL TO KILL ANIMALS ?

Our position is that it is lawful to kill animals, and for the following reasons : —

(a) Animals are not possessed of rights, and, therefore in killing them no injustice is done to them. Our state- ment that animals have no rights and that no injustice can be done them will appear strange to readers who meet it for the first time, and will also seem to lead to consequences that are generally repudiated by sensible and feeling men. But a little consideration will show that our contention is far from unreasonable either in itself or in its consequences. Right, as we saw,* is a moral relation, holding between moral persons only, between rational beings. Right is a very different thing from physical force or a physical fact. To have a right to a thing means that it ought to be given to one or left in one's possession, and this " ought " and its correlative right may still remain, even though the

• Vol. I. p. <)3^.

OUR DUTIES 87

object is not and never shall be actually in the possession of its owner. Right, therefore, so far from being a physical fact of any kind, expresses a moral relation, which only a rational being is capable of understanding, and which obtains in the sphere of reason and rational beings only. Only a rational being is capable of under- standing the conception of " oughtness." And, there- fore, since animals are not possessed of reason and are not moral persons, they lie outside the sphere within which rights obtain.

These propositions we have established in an earlier chapter of this work, and our proofs need not be re- peated at this point. But we may here be allowed to mention, as an indication of how far removed animals are from the order within which rights obtain, the fact that an animal from its very nature is incapable of claiming anything as its own. An animal may use claws and teeth to hold what it has, but it cannot claim anything as its own, either externally, by an outward expression of its will, or internally by any mental act. For claiming is an act of reason and it relates to an ob- ject which, as we have said, the animal is wholly in- capable of conceiving, viz. that something belongs to it, that is, that something ought to be left in its posses- sion, that it has a right to something. Being incapable therefore, of an act of claim, incapable, i.e. not merely now hut for all time, it cannot be regarded as having rights. Right and the power to claim what is one's right are inseparable conceptions. Children and idiots may, indeed, be incapable of actually claiming what is theirs. But they possess at least the faculty by which claims are made, viz. reason. Animals do not possess the faculty of claiming. Therefore, they do not come within the world of rights.

Nor does the admission of this principle that animals have no rights embarrass us by the conclusions to which it leads. Though animals have not rights, and we have no duties to or towards animals, we 3'et may have

88 THE