value. It is assumed that because the T'ai Kung had already composed the Six Secret Teachings, his comments when peace had been attained throughout the realm would mainly expand and supplement the earlier treatise. This would account for the more extemporaneous character of the material and for the absence of many focal military topics, such as battlefield command and tactics.

The book then surfaced when transmitted by a nondescript old fellow to Chang Liang a decade before he became famous and powerful. The Shih chi records the incident:

Once when Chang Liang was leisurely strolling across the Hsia-p'ei Bridge, he encountered an old man wearing the poor garb of a retired gentleman. When the old fellow reached the place where Chang was standing, he deliberately lost his shoe over the side of the bridge. Looking at Chang he commanded: "Young fellow, go down and fetch my shoe." Chang Liang was startled by this and wanted to beat him soundly, but because of the man's age he repressed his impulse.

Chang went down below the bridge and got the shoe. Upon returning the old man ordered: "Put it on my foot." As Chang had already gone and retrieved the shoe, he formally knelt down and put it on. Once he was wearing the shoe the old man smiled and departed. Chang Liang was quite surprised and continued staring at him. After the old man had gone about a few hundred yards, he turned and said: "Son, you can be taught. Five days from now, at dawn, meet me here." Chang Liang felt this was strange, but he knelt and assented.

Five days later, at dawn, Chang went to the bridge. However, the old fellow was already there, and he upbraided him: "When you make an appointment with an old man, how can you arrive after him?" He then departed, saying: "In five days we will meet even earlier." Five days later, when the cock first crowed, Chang Liang went there. However, the old fellow was first again, and once more he was angry. "How can you come after me?" As he departed he yelled: "In five more days come again, even earlier!"

In another five days, before the night was half over, Chang Liang went there. In a little while the old man also arrived and was happy. "This is the way it should be," he said. Then, taking out a book, he continued: "If you read this you can become a teacher of kings. Ten years from now you will flourish. In thirteen years you will see me on the northern bank of the Chi River. The yellow rock at the foot of Ku-ch'eng Mountain will be me." Then he departed without another word, never to be seen again. In the morning Chang Liang looked at the book and discovered it to be the T'ai Kung's military strategy. He thereafter regarded it as something exceptional and constantly studied and worked over the book.

The old man may have been a proud descendant of Ch'i's official state historian, a Worthy whose family had preserved the secret teachings for generations. According to the military historian General Hsü P'e-ken, this is sug-

gested by his knowledge of the area, which was so detailed that he identified himself with a large yellow rock (huang shih)—a reference that would eventually give the book its name, Three Strategies of the Duke of Yellow Rock. Because Ch'i was one of the last states vanquished by the infamous Ch'in, the Duke of Yellow Rock would have been amply motivated to assist in overthrowing the now-tortured dynasty. Providing this essential work of strategy to a young fugitive who was being hunted for his attempted assassination of the emperor would have been a highly appropriate gesture.

There are actually five basic views concerning the origin of the Three Strategies, with the first, traditional one just discussed attributing it directly to the T'ai Kung. The second, a variation on the first, ascribes it to the disciples or later military followers of the T'ai Kung. This view envisions a prototypical text that evolved around a kernel of concepts over the centuries—until it eventually underwent extensive revision in the pre-Ch'in period, which accounts for the anachronistic language and concepts and for the possibility that it may also have influenced Sun-tzu and Wei Liao-tzu (rather than the reverse). The third view assumes that rather than simply handing down the writings of the T'ai Kung, Huang Shih-kung wrote the book himself shortly before the famous incident. This would equally explain the concepts and language, especially the highly visible Taoist influence. The fourth view, which is essentially identified with conservative classical scholars, derisively terms the book a blatant forgery of the Wei-Chin period or later. Some scholars, such as Cheng Yuan, characterized the Three Strategies as having stolen the empty words of Taoism and being a useless book, whereas others exoriated its brutality or attacked the rusticity of its language.

The final view—advanced by the contemporary scholar Hsü Pao-lin—based on the concepts, language, and historical references incorporated in the text—concludes that the work was written around the end of the Former Han dynasty, probably by a reclusive adherent of the Huang-Lao school who had expert knowledge of military affairs. In addition, this view holds that the book transmitted to Chang Liang was not the present Three Strategies but the Six Secret Teachings—the T'ai Kung's military thought—as is stated by Su-ma Ch'ien in the Shih chi biography. (Huang Shih-kung's book, known as the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, was originally titled The Records of Huang Shih-kung and only acquired its present name during the Sui dynasty.) This explains the reference to powerful families usurping power, the prevalence of Huang-Lao thought amid concepts from many schools, and the narrow focus on government affairs in an age of peace. Although elements of Hsü's arguments seem somewhat tenuous, in the absence of archaeological evidence to the contrary, his general conclusions should
probably be accepted and the Three Strategies acknowledged as the last of the truly ancient works, with a likely composition date somewhere around A.D. 0.\textsuperscript{10}

**Basic Content and Focus**

The tone of the Three Strategies is far less strident than that of the Six Secret Teachings and other works on which its author clearly drew, presumably because the brutal, monumental task of consolidating the empire and establishing enlightened rule had already been accomplished by the Han dynasty. Although many of the themes and ideas of the previous five Military Classics are represented in the Three Strategies, it focuses primarily on government and military administration and control. With the possible exception of a brief passage advancing a theory of strongpoints,\textsuperscript{11} discussions of campaign strategy and battle tactics are absent. Instead the text concentrates on concepts of government; the administration of forces; the unification of the people; the characteristics of a capable general; methods of nurturing a sound material foundation; motivation of subordinates and the soldiers; implementation of rewards and punishments; ways to foster majesty—which was a critical concept—and the need to balance between the hard and the soft.

Four main threads of thought—differences apparently reconciled and their viewpoints remarkably integrated—are clearly present in the Three Strategies.\textsuperscript{12} Further study is required to determine whether the author deliberately fashioned a grand synthesis on the new intellectual ground of Huang-Lao thought, as claimed by the scholar Hsi Pao-lin, or whether contemporary researchers are simply succumbing to the temptation to creatively perceive unity after extensively pondering and analyzing the text. Generally speaking, the fundamental concepts of Confucianism—such as benevolence, righteousness, the practice of humanitarian government, the promotion of the welfare of the people, rule by Virtue, and the employment of the Worthy—underlie the entire work. Pivotal measures espoused by the Legalists—such as strengthening the state, rigorously enforcing the laws, strictly implementing rewards and punishments, and ensuring that the ruler retains power and exercises authority—supplement the original Confucian approach, bringing the entire work much closer in tenor and outlook to Hsun-tzu than Confucius and Mencius. The Taoist spirit—which emphasizes the passive, being harmonious, not contending, preserving life, the Tao and Te (Virtue), and especially the evilness of warfare—pervades the book but is modified to accept the reality of righteous warfare and contending for harmony.

The works of the previous military strategists—especially the Wei Liao-tzu and the Six Secret Teachings (which is sometimes quoted as the Military Pronouncements)—provide essential concepts for government administration, organization, and control. Many of the amalgamated Confucian and Legalist policies, such as treating the people as the basis and rigidly implementing rewards and punishments, have long traditions among the strategists. Some of these have been described as reaching their pinnacle in the Three Strategies, although this might merely be a question of emphasis. Clearly, the text is more complex philosophically than a simple work on military administration and therefore requires further study. Due to various limitations, such detailed analysis must be left to specialized monographs, with the introduction below supplying only a brief summary of salient points as a guide to Huang Shih-kung’s world.

**Hierarchy of Strategies**

In its present form the work consists of three sections denominated in the traditional way as upper, middle, and lower. Unfortunately, these terms are open to two interpretations: as simple indicators of position in the work or as indicating some assigned value or priority. A passage in the book itself, which may be a commentator’s interpolation rather than the author’s own thoughts, clearly states that each of the sections is both necessary and appropriate to its own period of moral and political deterioration.\textsuperscript{13} There is no identification of the hierarchy of chapters as being respectively appropriate to different styles of government and ages of virtue, as might have been expected.

Over the millennia Chinese intellectuals have conceptualized their history in terms of recurring dynastic cycles superimposed on a general pattern of moral decline. Starting with the age of true Sage Emperors, civilization became more complex, artificial, and perverse—culminating in the period when mere men usurped power and disputants had to consciously create and espouse concepts of virtue in a futile attempt to master evil. Each philosophic school interpreted this decline from its own, self-serving perspective. In extremely simplified form, the Confucians viewed the creation of culture and civilization as the great accomplishment of former Sages and culture heroes and as the means by which to ensure and preserve an ordered society wherein Virtue should prevail and morality rule. The Taoists, championed by their paragon Lao-tzu, decried the creation of concepts of virtue and the chains of civilization as serving solely to further hasten the already preci-
ous decline from spontaneity, simplicity, and natural harmony. The Legalists derived a very different lesson from this deterioration, envisioning it as proof of the absolute need for draconian measures: for law and authority to prevent civil disorder, foster a strong state, and guarantee the ruler's security.

Mankind's apparent passage through several dramatically different forms of government, each characterized by distinctive virtues and policies, was seen to furnish illustrative justification for these respective theories. It is tempting to view Huang Shih-kung as having directed each of the three strategies to a particular style of government and degree of aggressive administration. However, the present text makes no such assertion, and in fact the "Superior Strategy" establishes the forms of propriety and rewards"—clearly not the method of the earliest Sages. In harmony with the Legalists, who felt that laws must be newly created for each age, Huang Shih-kung proclaims that all three theories are necessary for their respective periods of decadence. Each section provides the ruler with functionally specific techniques for attaining his administrative objectives:

The Sage embodies Heaven, the Worthy model on Earth, and the wise find their teachers in antiquity. Thus the Three Strategies has been written for a period of decadence. The "Superior Strategy" establishes the forms of propriety and rewards, discriminates between evildoers and the valiant, and makes clear success and defeat. The "Middle Strategy" makes out the differences in Virtue and behavior and makes manifest changes in the balance of power [ch'üan]. The "Inferior Strategy" arrays the Tao and Virtue, investigates security and danger, and makes clear the calamity of harming the Worthy.

Thus if the ruler thoroughly understands the "Superior Strategy" he will be able to employ the Worthy and seize his enemies. If he thoroughly understands the "Middle Strategy" he will be able to employ and control his generals and unite the people. If he thoroughly understands the "Inferior Strategy" he will be able to discern the sources of flourishing and decline and understand the regulations for governing a state. If his subordinates thoroughly understand the "Middle Strategy" they will be able to achieve merit and preserve themselves.

Despite the above passage, a close examination of the book's contents suggests this interpretation lacks a strong textual basis. Although there is some difference in emphasis among the strategies, essentially the same themes and concerns underlie all three sections. The first chapter contains most of the writing, whereas the other two introduce some new subjects and expand on others. Whether this resulted from the text having been tampered with or whether the transmission has been imperfect and large sections lost can never be known. This sort of textual imbalance is unusual, but the author may have simply expressed his ideas without concern for symmetry and length.

**Concepts of Government**

By accepting the historical "decline" theory, the Three Strategies commits itself to a program that stresses the cultivation of Virtue and the simultaneous implementation of aggressive government policies to cope with an age in decline. In concord with the Six Secret Teachings and the Wu-tzu it emphasizes nurturing the people, fostering their allegiance and willing support, and integrating them under a moral leader and a vigorous government. Because the highest ideal is the Sage King, the author advocates essentially Confucian measures designed to promote the people's material welfare and engender their voluntary adherence. The ruler and also the general should act to ease distress, remove evil, and increase prosperity. Consequently, they should minimize taxes and labor duties, avoid disrupting the critical agricultural seasons, and nurture stability and tranquility. Because it is expected that the well-ordered, ideally governed state can mobilize its citizens when confronted by hostilities, military matters—apart from actual strategy and tactics—essentially become questions of civilian government and administration. Conscripts provide the basis for military strength, and defensive capabilities are stressed.

**Exercise of Authority**

Both the "Superior" and "Inferior Strategies" discuss the numerous problems that arise when the ruler has lost effective control of the government, the evil have gained control of offices and power, and parties and cliques dispense governmental largesse. The Three Strategies warns against allowing these situations to develop, following the essential Legalist doctrine that the ruler himself must wield as well as theoretically hold power. The key to preventing the encroachment of the great families, the ruler's relatives, and even powerful military men is the successful employment of Sages and Worthies. (This represents a deviation from standard Legalist principles, which held that moral worth and individual talent cannot and should not be relied on. In contrast, the Mohists and Confucians stressed the role and importance of sagely paragons, a policy the author of the Three Strategies envisioned as "according with the subtle," "according with the Tao.") When the good are recognized and advanced and the evil removed and punished, the proper context for true, effective, benevolent government will have been established, and the people will naturally regard the court in a positive light.
Military Preparation, Management, and Execution

As mentioned above, a Taoist influence pervades the book—from the overall unification in the practice of the Way (Tao)\(^\text{15}\) to the general recognition that warfare is inauspicious and evil and that it violates what the Taoists perceive as the natural tendency to life.\(^\text{16}\) In contrast to the positive attitude of the Six Secret Teachings and other works, which still deem warfare to be of momentous importance to the nation, the negative or dark side of military affairs also commands attention in the *Three Strategies*. The army must be employed with restraint; however, when absolutely necessary to preserve the state, uphold the principles of civilization, and protect life, its use accords with the Tao. Because hesitation and doubt doom military enterprises, once the decision to employ the army has been reached, its use should be decisive: "The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious... Weapons are inauspicious implements, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven." Lao-tzu's famous sentence ("the army is an inauspicious implement")\(^\text{17}\) has clearly been modified to accept the reality of Huang-Lao thought in the *Three Strategies*.

The foundation, the possibility of military action always remains the people. In many states the populace is impoverished and disaffected; the populace of the true ruler should be adequately nourished, clothed, rested, and strongly bound to his king and state. Immigrants and the persecuted as well as the worthy and talented should all be welcomed and granted refuge, thereby strengthening the country. Once they are brought under the sway of government policies, all the people will be forged into a cohesive, integrated whole.

Motivating the People

The *Three Strategies* discusses in some detail the age-old problem of motivation, directing attention to the entire spectrum of commoners, bureaucrats, ministers, generals, officers, and soldiers. It even identifies around twenty types of individuals by their predominant character or behavioral tendencies and suggests means to use each type to the state's advantage.\(^\text{18}\) However, stability and prosperity are essential because without security, enjoyment becomes impossible and without prosperity, the government will lack adequate resources to offer the necessary incentives. If men are to exert themselves for the state, they must have prospects of appropriate rewards; if they are to die for it, they must be strongly stimulated with the promise of material goods as well as abstract honor.\(^\text{19}\)

The nature and form of incentives must be suited precisely to the individual because men differ in their values and requirements. For example, although many enthusiastically pursue great profits, the pure and incorruptible are motivated only by fame, honor, and position. The proper combination of respect—both public and private—and material gain must be determined and employed. Allegiance must be gained through the benevolent, enlightened government policies discussed previously; and the submission of the men's minds (which is attained through pleasure) as opposed to just their bodies (attained through their conformance—willing or otherwise—to the forms of propriety and the laws of the land) is vital. Thereafter, virtually everyone can be attracted and utilized by playing on their characters and desires. However, only Virtue will attract the Worthy; thus the ruler and commander should continually strive to perfect themselves.

Military and Tactical Concepts

Although Huang Shih-kung focuses on problems of administrative control, several important military concepts found in the *Three Strategies* merit attention: generalship, swiftness, authority, integration and balance, and the hard and soft.

From the time of the Spring and Autumn period, the commanding general was entrusted increasingly not only with tactical command but also with complete governing authority for the military and its related, largely civilian support groups. With few exceptions the measures discussed for the civilian sphere are equally applicable in the military realm. Once the general assumes his duties his authority must be unquestioned. Because of the breadth of his powers and the range of his responsibilities, only a man of wide comprehension, decisiveness, and extensive abilities can master the problem. He should be emotionally controlled and never display doubt or indecision. Furthermore, he must be receptive to suggestions and criticism, although his authority must still be unquestioned. Swiftness, secrecy, unity, and uprightness should characterize his exercise of power. His anger should be righteous and result in the punishment of offenders.

Sun-tzu initiated the idea of “swiftness rather than duration,” and the *Three Strategies* continues to emphasize speed and decisiveness throughout: "Battle should be like the blowing wind. Attacks should be like a flowing river.” Doubting, questioning decisions, consulting spirits or using divination, or anything else that might undermine the army's commitment and retard its actions should never be permitted.

In antiquity as today, the image of authority frequently constituted the real and frequently the only basis of power and means of controlling men.
Wei, which is perhaps best translated as "awesomeness," is a term commonly employed to describe the aura of the authoritative figure. According to Confucius, wei is the image, the impact of the man of righteousness when he dons his armor. It is the ultimate power of a general or the remoteness of a ruler wielding the might of a trembling empire.

Virtually all of the Legalists and military thinkers sought consciously to develop this awesomeness because of its critical role in governing men and causing the enemy to shiver and quake. Without it the general would be reduced to impotence because he would lose the allegiance of his men and his orders would be ignored or insulted.

The timeless foundation of administrative and actual power is the personal, unquestioned control of the twin handles of rewards and punishments. Although the theory and implications of the rigorous, severe, systematic imposition of rewards and punishments tend to be most closely identified with the Legalist school, every military thinker probably acknowledged their vital importance. When their credibility remains undoubted, the majesty, the awesomeness of the commander is established: "The army takes rewards as its form and punishment as its substance. When rewards and punishments are clear the general's majesty is effected."

The second element in the general's and ruler's awesomeness is his expert use of orders and commands. Orders must never be issued lightly, nor should they be rescinded; otherwise they lose their power and impact. His continued fearlessness depends on the acceptance and execution of his orders; and this execution depends on the fear, respect, and willing allegiance of the men. Clearly, the most extensive efforts must be taken to preserve this interrelationship because once a crevice such as doubt appears, the collapse of authority is imminent.

An early passage in the "Superior Strategy" expands on the following quotation from a presumably ancient military text: "The soft can control the hard, the weak can control the strong." Perhaps the author intends to startle the reader because, by citing an obviously Taoist paradigm, he strikingly denies conventional military wisdom which holds that strength and hardness provide the keys to victory. Lao-tzu's recognition of the soft being able to conquer the hard—conceptualized in several of his verses—leads him to believe that one should assume a passive, low posture to avoid becoming brittle, strong, and exposed. Huang Shih-kung has expanded these insights to apply them rigorously in the military sphere. However, rather than accepting the power of softness or weakness alone, he equally advocates the employment of the hard and strong—each as appropriate to the moment and conditions. Such conscious employment, in Huang Shih-kung's view, accords with the Tao (Way) of Heaven and is necessary if one is to be effective under the harsh conditions of real statecraft.

A somewhat later passage again cites the Military Pronouncements to substantiate Huang Shih-kung's view that appropriate implementation of all these four—softness, hardness, weakness, and strength—is required. Tending to one extreme or another will result in an unstable situation, and the state will perish. Accordingly, Virtue—which is identified as softness—should be practiced, but the state should also have a strong military and prepare for righteous warfare. Some of the commentators, such as Liu Yin in the Ming dynasty, also point out the possibilities of deceit and trickery—whereby softness is feigned and hardness employed and the reverse. However, there is no expansion of this theme in the Three Strategies, and the analysts who cite these passages as incontrovertible evidence that the work was produced by a member of the Huang-Lao school (rather than an eclectic strategist) may be overstating the case. Taoist thought has a long association with military thinking—extending back as far as Sun-tzu—and the incorporation of such observations does not automatically prove this contention.
I

SUPERIOR STRATEGY

The commander in chief's method focuses on winning the minds of the valiant, rewarding and providing salaries to the meritorious, and having his will penetrate to the masses. Thus if he has the same likes as the masses, there is nothing he will not accomplish. If he has the same dislikes as the masses, there is nothing he will not overturn. Governing the state and giving security to one's family is a question of gaining the people. Losing the state and destroying one's family is a question of losing the people. All living beings want to realize their ambitions.

The Military Pronouncements states: "The soft can control the hard, the weak can control the strong." The soft is Virtue. The hard is a brigand. The weak is what the people will help, the strong is what resentment will attack. The soft has situations in which it is established; the hard has situations in which it is employed; and the strong has situations in which it is augmented. Combine these four and control them appropriately.

When neither the beginning nor end has yet become visible, no one is able to know them. Heaven and Earth are spiritual and enlightened, with the myriad things they change and transform. His changes and movements should not be constant. He should change and transform in response to the enemy. He does not precede affairs; when the enemy moves he immediately follows up. Thus he is able to formulate inexhaustible strategies and methods of control, sustain and complete the awesomeness of Heaven, bring tranquility and order to the extremes of the eight directions, and gather and settle the Nine Barbarians. Such a strategist is a teacher for an emperor or a true king.

Thus I say everyone covets strength, but rare are those capable of preserving the subtle. If someone can preserve the subtle he can protect his life. The Sage preserves it in order to respond to the slightest change in affairs. If he releases it then it will extend throughout the Four Seas. If he rolls it up it will not fill a cup. He dwells in it, but without a house. He guards it, but without city walls. He stores it away in his breast, and enemy states submit.

The Military Pronouncements states: "If one can be soft and hard, his state will be increasingly glorious! If one can be weak and strong, his state will be increasingly illustrious! If purely soft and purely weak, his state will inevitably decline. If purely hard and purely strong, his state will inevitably be destroyed."

Now the Way [Tao] to govern the state is to rely on Worthy and the people. If you trust the Worthy as if they were your belly and heart, and employ the people as if they were your four limbs, then all your plans will be accomplished. If your measures follow on each other as naturally as the four limbs, or the way the joints of the bones cooperate with each other, this is the Tao of Heaven, the natural. There is no gap in such skill.

The essence of the army and state lies in investigating the mind of the people and putting into effect the hundred duties of government.


If you gain a strategic position, defend it. If you get a dangerous defeile, block it. If you take difficult terrain, then establish encampments [to hold it]. If you secure a city, then cut off [to eneoff the generals]. If you seize territory, then divide it up [as a reward for the officers]. If you obtain riches, then distribute them [among your troops].

When the enemy moves observe him; when he approaches prepare for him. If the enemy is strong, be deferential [to make him arrogant]. If the enemy is well rested, then leave him. If the enemy is insulting, then wait [for his chi to decline]. If the enemy is explosive, then soothe him. If the enemy is rebellious, then treat him with righteousness. If the enemy is sincere, then lead him [to abandon his perverse ruler].

Accord [with the enemy's actions] to initiate measures and repress him. Rely on the strategic configuration of power [shih] to destroy him. Spread false words and cause him to make errors. Set out your net to catch them.

When you gain something, do not keep it [for yourself]. If you occupy a territory, do not set up permanent defenses. If you seize a city, do not [keep it for yourself] for long. If you establish a new ruler, do not take the state
The Military Pronouncements states: “When the army's wells have not yet been completed, the general does not mention thirst. When the encampment has not yet been secured, the general does not speak about fatigue. When the army's cookstoves have not yet been lit, the general does not speak about hunger. In the winter he does not wear a fur robe; in the summer he does not use a fan; and in the rain he does not set up an umbrella.”14 This is termed the proper form of behavior for a general.

He is with them in safety, he is united with them in danger. Thus his troops can be combined but cannot be forced apart. They can be employed but cannot be tired out. With his beneficence he ceaselessly gathers them together, with his plans he constantly unites them. Thus it is said that when you cultivate beneficence tirelessly, with one you can take ten thousand.

The Military Pronouncements states: “The basis of the general's awesomeness is his commands and orders. The basis of complete victory in battle is military administration. The reason officers treat battle lightly is the employment of commands.” Thus the general never resists an order. Rewards and punishments must be as certain as Heaven and Earth, for then the general can employ the men. When the officers and soldiers follow orders, the army can cross the border.

Now the one who unifies the army and wields its strategic power [shih] is the general. The ones that bring about conquest and defeat the enemy are the masses. Thus a disordered general cannot be employed to preserve an army, while a rebellious mass cannot be used to attack an enemy. If this sort of general attacks a city it cannot be taken, while if this type of army lays siege to a town it will not fail. If both are unsuccessful then the officers' strength will be exhausted. If it is exhausted then the general will be alone and the masses will be rebellious. If they try to hold defensive positions they will not be secure, while if they engage in battle they will turn and run. They are referred to as an “old army.”

When the troops are “old,” then the general's awesomeness will not be effective. When the general lacks awesomeness, then the officers and troops will disdain punishment. When they disdain punishment, the army will lose its organization into squads of five. When the army loses its squads of five, the officers and soldiers will abandon their positions and run off. When they flee, the enemy will take advantage of the situation. When the enemy seizes the opportunity to profit from this situation, the army will inevitably perish.

The Military Pronouncements states: “The exemplary general, in his command of the army, governs men as he would want to be treated himself. Spreading his kindness and extending his beneficence, the strength of his officers is daily renewed. In battle they are like the wind arising; their attack is like the release of a pent-up river.”15 Thus our army can be seen but not with-
stood, can be submitted to but not be conquered. If you lead the men in person, your soldiers will become the most valiant under Heaven.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “The army employs rewards as its external form and punishments as its internal substance.” When rewards and punishments are clear, then the general’s awesomeness is effected. When the proper officials are obtained, then the officers and troops are obedient. When those entrusted [with responsibility] are Worthies, enemy states will be fearful.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “Where the Worthy go they have no enemies before them.” Thus officers can be deferred to, but they cannot be arrogant. The general can be pleased but cannot be troubled. Plans can be complex, but they cannot be doubted. When the officers are arrogant, their subordinates will not be submissive. When the general is troubled, his subordinates and troops will not trust each other. When plans are doubted, the enemy will be roused to confidence. If one proceeds to mount an attack under these conditions, chaos will result.

Now the general is the fate of the state. If he is able to manage the army and attain victory, the state will be secure and settled.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “The general should be able to be pure; able to be quiet; able to be tranquil; able to be controlled; able to accept criticism; able to judge disputes; able to attract and employ men; able to select and accept advice; able to know the customs of men; able to map mountains and rivers; able to discern defiles and difficulty; and able to control military authority [ch’üan].”

Thus it is said that the wisdom of the benevolent and Worthy, the thoughts and plans of the Sages and illuminated, the words of the wood carriers, the discussions in court, and the affairs of ascension and decline—all of these are what the general should hear about.

If the general can think of his officers as if thirsty, his plans will be followed. But if the general stiles advice, the valiant will depart. If plans are not followed, the strategists will rebel. If good and evil are treated alike, the meritorious officers will grow weary. If the general relies solely on himself, his subordinates will shirk all responsibility. If he brags, his assistants will have few attainments. If he believes slander, he will lose the hearts of the people. If he is greedy, treachery will be unchecked. If he is preoccupied with women, then the officers and troops will become licentious. If the general has a single one of these faults, the masses will not submit. If he is marked by two of them, the army will lack order; if by three of them, his subordinates will abandon him; if by four, the disaster will extend to the entire state!

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “For the general’s plans one wants secrecy. For the officers and masses one wants unity. For attacking the enemy one wants swiftness.” When the general’s plans are secret, treacherous impulses are thwarted. When the officers and masses are unified, then the heart of the army is united. When the attack on the enemy is swift, they will not have time to prepare. When the army has these three, their plans cannot be snatched away.

If the general’s plans leak out, the army will not be able to effect the strategic disposition of power [shih]. If external agents spy out internal affairs, the disaster that will befall the army cannot be controlled. If wealth [is] brought into the encampment, a myriad evildoers will assemble. If the general is marked by these three, the army will inevitably be defeated.

If the general does not carefully contemplate his course of action, his strategists will abandon him. If the general is not courageous, the officers and troops will be terrified. If the general moves the army recklessly, it will not be imposing. If he transfers his anger [to the innocent], the whole army will be afraid. As the *Military Pronouncements* states: “Contemplation and courage are what the general values; movement and anger are what the general employs.” These four are the general’s clear precepts.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “If the army lacks material resources, officers will not come. If the army does not have [ample] rewards, the officers will not go into battle [with the proper commitment].”

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “Beneath fragrant bait there will certainly be dead fish. Beneath generous rewards there will certainly be courageous officers.” Thus the forms of propriety are what officers will turn to, while rewards are what they will die for. If you summon them with what attracts them and display what they will die for, then those you seek will come. But if you treat them respectfully and afterward express regret at doing so, then they will not remain with you. If you reward them and afterward regret it, then the officers will not respond to your commands. If you are tireless in effecting propriety and rewards, the officers will compete with each other to die.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “A state about to mobilize its army concentrates first on making its beneficence ample. A state about to attack and seize another concentrates on first nurturing the people.” Conquering the many with only a few [is a question of] beneficence. Conquering the strong with the weak [is a question of] people. Thus the good general, in nurturing his officers, treats them no differently than himself. Therefore, he is able to direct the Three Armies as if they were of one mind, and then his victory can be complete.

The *Military Pronouncements* states: “The key to using the army is to first investigate the enemy’s situation. Look into his granaries and armories, estimate his food stocks, divine his strengths and weaknesses, search out his na-
ural advantages, and seek out his vacuities and fissures." Thus if the state does not have the hardship of an army in the field yet is transporting grain, it must be suffering from emptiness. If the people have a sickly cast, they are impoverished.

If they are transporting provisions for a thousand li, the officers will have a hungry look. If they must gather wood and grass before they can eat, the army does not have enough food to pass one night. Accordingly, if someone transports provisions a thousand li, he lacks one year's food; two thousand li, he lacks two years' food; three thousand li, he lacks three years' food. This is what is referred to as an "empty state." When the state is empty, the people are impoverished. When the people are impoverished, then the government and populace are estranged. While the enemy attacks from without, the people steal from within. This is termed a situation of "inevitable collapse."

The Military Pronouncements states: "When a ruler's actions are cruelly violent, his subordinates will be hasty to implement harsh measures. When the taxes are onerous, impositions numerous, fines and punishments endless, while the people mutually injure and steal from each other, this is referred to as a 'lost state.'"

The Military Pronouncements states: "When the secretly greedy display an external appearance of incorruptibility; prevaporation and praise can gain fame; bureaucrats steal from the state to distribute their own benefice, causing confusion in the ranks; and people adorn themselves and feign the proper countenance in order to attain high office, this is referred to as the beginning of thievry."

The Military Pronouncements states: "If administrative officials form parties and cliques, each advancing those with whom they are familiar; the state summons and appoints the evil and corrupt, while insulting and repressing the benevolent and worthy; officials turn their backs on the state and establish their personal interests; and men of equal rank disparage each other, this is termed 'the source of chaos.'"

The Military Pronouncements states: "When strong clans assemble the evil, people without position are honored, and there are none who are not shaken by their majesty; when these practices proliferate and are intertwined they cultivate an image of virtue-establishing it through public beneficence—and they snatch the authority [ch'uan] belonging to those in official positions; when they insult the people below them, and within the state there is clamoring and backbiting, while the ministers conceal themselves and remain silent, this is 'causing chaos at the root.'"

The Military Pronouncements states: "Generation after generation they act treacherously, encroaching upon and stealing district offices. In advancing and retiring they seek only their own convenience, and they forge and distort documents, thereby endangering the ruler. They are referred to as 'the state's treacherous ones.'"

The Military Pronouncements states: "When the officials are many but the people few; there is no distinction between the honored and lowly; the strong and weak insult each other; and no one observes the prohibitions or adheres to the laws, then these effects will extend to the ruler, and the state will reap the misfortune."

The Military Pronouncements states: "When the ruler regards the good as good but does not advance them, while he hates the evil but does not dismiss them; when the Worthy are hidden and covered, while the unworthy hold positions, then the state will suffer harm."

The Military Pronouncements states: "When the branches [the ruler's relatives] and leaves [the powerful families] are strong and large, forming parties and occupying positions of authority so that the lowly and mean insult the honored, growing more powerful with the passing of time, while the ruler cannot bear to dismiss them, then the state will suffer defeat from it."

The Military Pronouncements states: "When deceitful ministers hold superior positions, the entire army will be clamoring and contentious. They rely on their awesomeness to grant personal favors, and act in a manner that offends the masses. Advancement and dismissal lack any basis, the evil are not dismissed, and men seek gain with any appearance possible. They monopolize appointments for themselves, and in advancements and dismissals boast of their own merits. They slander and vilify those of great Virtue, and make false accusations against the meritorious. Whether good or evil, all are treated the same by them. They gather and detain affairs of government so that commands and orders are not put into effect. They create a harsh government, changing the ways of antiquity and altering what was common practice. When the ruler employs such wanton characters, he will certainly suffer disaster and calamity."

The Military Pronouncements states: "When evil men of courage praise each other, they obfuscate the ruler's wisdom. When both criticism and praise arise together, they stop up the ruler's wisdom. When each person praises those he favors, the ruler loses the loyal."

Accordingly, if the ruler investigates unusual words, he will discover their beginnings. If he engages scholars and Worthies, then evil men of courage will withdraw. If the ruler appoints [virtuous] men of experience and age, the myriad affairs will be well managed. If he respectfully invites the recluses and hidden scholars to take positions, the officers will then fulfill their functions. If plans extend to the firewood carriers, achievements will be predictable. If he does not lose the minds of the people, his Virtue will flourish.
II
MIDDLE STRATEGY

Now the Three August Ones never spoke, but their transformations flowed throughout the Four Seas. Thus the world had no one to whom to attribute the accomplishments.

The Emperors embodied Heaven and took Earth as their model. They spoke and issued orders, and the world attained Great Peace. Ruler and minister yielded the credit for this to each other, while all within the Four Seas were transformed without the common people being conscious of how the changes came about. Therefore, in employing subordinates they did not rely on the forms of propriety or rewards. There was the beauty of accomplishments and no harm.

Kings governed men by means of the Tao, causing their hearts to be compliant and their wills to be submissive while also establishing restrictive measures and making preparations against decline. All [the feudal lords] within the Four Seas assembled [at their courts], and the duty of kingship was not neglected. Even though they made military preparations, they never suffered the misfortune of warfare. Rulers did not doubt their subordinates, while subordinates had faith in their rulers. The state was settled, the ruler secure, and bureaucrats could resign with righteousness, so they also were able to have beauty without harm.

The hegemons governed their officers by virtue of authority—bonding them through trust, motivating them with rewards. When that trust declined the officers grew distant, and when rewards became inadequate they would not submit to orders.

The Army's Strategic Power states: “When the army is mobilized and advances into the field, the sole exercise of power lies with the general. If in advancing or withdrawing the court interferes, it will be difficult to attain success.”

The Army's Strategic Power states: “Employ the wise, courageous, greedy, and stupid. The wise take pleasure in establishing their achievements. The courageous love to put their will into effect. The greedy fervently pursue profits. The stupid have little regard for death. Employ them through their emotions, for this is the military’s subtle exercise of authority [ch’üan].”

The Army's Strategic Power states: “Do not allow your disputatious officers to discuss the enemy’s good points because they may delude the masses. Do not allow the benevolent to control the finances, for they will dispense too much and become attached to the lower ranks."

The Army's Strategic Power states: “Prohibit mediums and shamans from divining about the army’s good or bad fortune on behalf of the officials and officers.”

The Army's Strategic Power states: “One does not employ righteous officers with material wealth alone. Thus the righteous will not die for the malevolent. The wise will not make plans on behalf of an obtuse ruler. The ruler cannot be without Virtue, for if he lacks Virtue his ministers will rebel. He cannot be without awesomeness, for if he lacks awesomeness he will lose his authority [ch’üan]. A minister cannot be without virtue, for if he lacks virtue then he has nothing with which to serve his ruler. He cannot be without awesomeness, for if he lacks awesomeness the state will be weak. If he is too awesome then he himself will be overturned. Therefore the Sage Kings—in governing the world—observed the flourishing and decline [of the seasons], measured human gains and losses, and created forms of administration. Thus the feudal lords have two armies, the regional earls have three armies, and the Son of Heaven has six. When the world is turbulent, rebellion and contrariness are born. When the king’s bountiful influence is exhausted, the feudal lords swear oaths [of alliance] and attack each other.

If your state’s Virtue and strategic configuration of power [shih] are the same as those of the enemy so that neither state has the means to overcome the other, then you must win the minds of the valiant, share likes and dislikes with the common people, and only thereafter attack the enemy in accord with changes in the balance of power [ch’üan]. Thus without stratagems you have no means to resolve suspicions and settle doubts. Without rumor and the unorthodox you have no means to destroy evildoers and stop invaders. Without secret plans you have no means to be successful.

The Sage embodies Heaven, the Worthy model on Earth, and the wise find their teachers in antiquity. Thus the Three Strategies has been written for a period of decadence. The “Superior Strategy” establishes the forms of propriety and rewards, discriminates between evildoers and the valiant, and makes
clear success and defeat. The “Middle Strategy” marks out the differences in Virtue and behavior and makes manifest changes in the balance of power [ch’üan]. The “Inferior Strategy” arrays the Tao and Virtue, investigates security and danger, and makes clear the calamity of harming the Worthy.

Thus if the ruler thoroughly understands the “Superior Strategy” he will be able to employ the Worthy and seize his enemies. If he thoroughly understands the “Middle Strategy” he will be able to employ and control his generals and unite the people. If he thoroughly understands the “Inferior Strategy” he will be able to discern the sources of flourishing and decline and understand the regulations for governing a state. If his subordinates thoroughly understand the “Middle Strategy” they will be able to achieve merit and preserve themselves.

When the soaring birds have all been slain, then good bows are stored away. When enemy states have been extinguished, ministers in charge of planning are lost. Here “lost” does not mean they lose their lives but that [the ruler] has taken away their awesomeness and removed their authority [ch’üan]. He enfeoffs them in court, at the highest ranks of his subordinates, in order to manifest their merit. He presents them with excellent states in the central region in order to enrich their families, and bestows beautiful women and valuable treasures on them in order to please their hearts.

Now once the masses have been brought together they cannot be hastily separated. Once the awesomeness of authority [ch’üan] has been granted it cannot be suddenly shifted. Returning the forces and disbanding the armies [after the war] are critical stages in preservation and loss. Thus weakening [the commanding general] through appointment to new positions, taking [his authority] by granting him a state, is referred to as a “hegemon’s strategy.” Thus the hegemon’s actions incorporate a mixed approach [of Virtue and power]. Preserving the altars of state, gathering those of character and courage—both are encouraged by the strategic power [shib] of the “Middle Strategy.” Thus to exercise such power [shib] the ruler must be very secretive.

III

INFERIOR STRATEGY

Now one who can sustain the imperiled under Heaven can control the security of All under Heaven. One who can remove the distress of those under Heaven will be able to enjoy the pleasure [of governing] All under Heaven. One who can rescue those under Heaven suffering from misfortune will be able to gain the prosperity of All under Heaven. Therefore, when the ruler’s munificence extends to the people, Worthy men will give their allegiance. When his munificence reaches the multitudinous insects, then Sages will ally with him. Whomever the Worthy give their allegiance to, his state will be strong. Whomever the Sages support, [under him] the six directions will be unified. One seeks the Worthy through Virtue, one attracts Sages with the Tao. If the Worthy depart the state will become weak; if the Sages depart the state will grow depraved. Weakness is a step on the road to danger, depravity is a sign of doom.

The government of a Worthy causes men to submit with their bodies. The government of a Sage causes men to submit with their minds. When their bodies submit the beginning can be planned; when their minds submit the end can be preserved. Their physical submission is attained through the forms of propriety; their mental submission is attained through music. What I refer to as music is not the sound of musical instruments—the stones, metal [bells], strings, and bamboo [pipes]. Rather, I refer to people taking pleasure in their families, clans, occupations, capitals and towns, orders of government, the Tao, and Virtue. One who rules the people in this fashion creates music in order to bring measure to their activities, to ensure that they do not lose their essential harmony. Thus the Virtuous ruler uses music to give pleasure to the people; the debauched ruler uses music to give pleasure to himself. One who provides pleasure to others endures and prospers; one who pleasures himself does not endure, but perishes.

One who abandons what is nearby to plan for what is distant will labor without success. One who abandons the distant to plan for the nearby will
be at ease and attain lasting results. A government marked by ease has many loyal ministers. A government marked by labor has many resentful people. Thus it is said: “One who concentrates on broadening his territory will waste his energies; one who concentrates on broadening his Virtue will be strong.” One who is able to hold what he possesses will be secure; one who is greedy for what others have will be destroyed. A government that verges on being destroyed will entangle later generations in the misfortune. One who enacts policies beyond proper measure will, even though successful, inevitably be defeated. Indulging oneself while instructing others is contrary to natural order; rectifying yourself and transforming others accords with the Tao. Contrariness is a summons to chaos; according with is the essence of order. The Tao, Virtue, benevolence, righteousness, and the forms of propriety—these five—are one body. The Tao is what men tread; Virtue is what men gain; benevolence is what men approach; righteousness is what men consider appropriate; and the forms of propriety are what people embody. You cannot lack any one of them.

Thus rising in the early morning, sleeping at night are constraints of the forms of propriety. Punishing brigands and taking revenge are decisions of righteousness. The compassionate heart is an expression of benevolence. Gaining [what you want] yourself, and gaining it for other people, is the path of Virtue. Ensuring that people are equal and do not lose their place, this is the transformation of the Tao.

What proceeds from the ruler and descends to the minister is termed “commands.” What is recorded on bamboo strips and silk rolls is termed “orders.” What is initiated and implemented is termed “government.” Now when commands are disobeyed, then orders are not put into effect. When orders are not put into effect, then government is not established. When government is not established, then the Tao does not penetrate [the realm]. When the Tao does not penetrate, then depraved ministers prevail. When depraved ministers prevail, then the ruler’s majesty is injured.

To welcome Worthies a thousand li away, the road is far; to bring in the unworthy, the road is quite near. For this reason the enlightened ruler abandons the near and takes the distant. Therefore, he is able to complete his achievements. He honors [worthy] men, and his subordinates all exhaust their energies.

If you dismiss one good [man], then a myriad good [acts] will decline. If you reward one evil [man], then a myriad evils will be drawn to you. When the good are rewarded and the evil suffer punishment, the state will be secure, and the multitudes of good people will come.

When the masses are doubtful, there are no settled states. When the masses are deluded, there are no governed people. When doubts are settled and the deluded returned, then the state can be secure. When one order is contravened, then a hundred orders will be disobeyed. When one evil act is done, a hundred evils will form. Thus if you put good into effect amidst a compliant people and impose harsh measures on wicked people, orders will be implemented without any discontent.

Employing the discontented to govern the discontented is termed “contrary to Heaven.” Having the vengeful control the vengeful, an irreversible disaster will result. Govern the people by causing them to be peaceful. If one attains peace through purity, then the people will have their places, and the world will be tranquil.

If those who oppose the ruler are honored, while the greedy and uncivilized are enriched, then even if there is a Sage ruler he cannot realize a well-ordered government. If those who oppose the ruler are punished, while the greedy and uncivilized are arrested, then a transformation will be effected and the myriad evils eliminated.

Pure, incorruptible officers cannot be enticed with rank and salary. Self-constrained, righteous officers cannot be coerced with awesomeness or punishment. Thus when the enlightened ruler seeks the Worthy, he must observe what will attract them. To attract pure, incorruptible officers, he perfects his observance of the forms of propriety. To attract self-constrained, righteous officers, he perfects himself in the Tao. Only thereafter will they be attracted and the ruler’s reputation preserved.

The Sage and perfected man perceive the sources of flourishing and decline, understand the beginnings of success and defeat, have attained true knowledge of the crux [chi] of governing and turbulence, and know the measure of coming and going. Such men, even in poverty, will not hold a position in a doomed state. Though lowly, they will not eat the rice of a turbulent country. They conceal their names and cling to the Way [Tao]. When the proper time comes they move, reaching the pinnacle which a subject can attain. When they encounter Virtue that accords with them, they will establish extraordinary achievements. Thus their Tao is lofty, and their names will be praised in later generations.

The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious. Now using the righteous to execute the unrighteous is like releasing the Yangtze and Yellow rivers to douse a torch, or pushing a person tottering at the edge of an abyss. Their success is inevitable! Thus [when action should be taken] one who hes-
states and is quiet, without advancing, seriously injures all living beings. Weapons are inauspicious instruments, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven. Now men in the Tao are like fish in water. If they have water they will live; if not they will die. Thus the ruler must constantly be afraid and dare not lose the Tao.

When prominent, powerful families gain control of official duties, the state's awesomeness weakens. When the power of life and death lies with the prominent, powerful families, the state's strategic power [shih] is exhausted. If the prominent, powerful families bow their heads in submission, then the state can long endure. When the power of life and death lies with the ruler, then the state can be secure.

When the four classes of people have nothing for their use, then the state will lack all stores. When the four classes have enough for their use, then the state will be secure and happy.

When Worthy ministers are brought inside government, depraved ones will be outside. When depraved ministers are inside, Worthy ministers will perish. When within and without lose what is appropriate, disaster and disorder will last through generations.

If the major ministers doubt the ruler, a myriad evils will accumulate and gather. If the ministers usurp the respect that should be due the ruler, then the upper and lower ranks will be confused. When the ruler [effectively] occupies the position of a minister, upper and lower [ranks] lose their order.

If someone injures the Worthy, the calamity will extend three generations. If someone conceals the Worthy, he himself will suffer the harm. If someone is jealous of the Worthy, his reputation will not be complete. If someone advances the Worthy, the blessings will flow to his sons and grandsons. Thus the ruler is anxious to advance the Worthy and thereby make his good name illustrious.

If you profit one person but injure a hundred, the people will leave the city. If you profit one person and harm ten thousand, [the populace of] the state will think about dispersing. If you get rid of one and thereby profit a hundred, the people will long for your munificence. If you get rid of one and thereby profit ten thousand, your government will not be disordered.
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Translator's Introduction

Through political measures and the brutal, unremitting implementation of aggressive military strategies, the brief Ch'in dynasty unified the empire in 221 B.C. Within two decades it had been supplanted by the glorious Han, whose reign encompassed four centuries of centralized, prosperous rule and civilization until itself perishing. Thereafter, China was again characterized by political fragmentation during the period of Disunion, which ended when the dynamic Emperor Sui Wen-ti seized power in A.D. 581. The historical legacy of his dynasty mirrors that of the Ch'in because he not only reunified the country geographically but also imposed central bureaucratic institutions that regained political control of the populace and made local bureaucracy an instrument of the state. Furthermore, he conducted extensive efforts to culturally integrate the north and the south; displace the powerful, entrenched aristocratic families; and reform the tax system. The many institutions created under his reign subsequently provided the foundation for the illustrious T'ang.¹

Unfortunately, his heir, Sui Yang-ti (reigned A.D. 604–618), quickly displayed many of the reprehensible traits characteristic of archetypical last rulers, historically associated with the loss of Heaven's Mandate. Foremost among these traits was his extravagance, particularly in the area of public works. Millions of people were pressed into service for such projects as restoring the Great Wall, rebuilding and extending canals, and constructing the new capital. Furthermore, in the period A.D. 611 to 614, Sui Yang-ti mounted three disastrous expeditions to impose Chinese suzerainty over Korea, largely by conscripting men from the northeast region. The heritage of these onerous state policies was impoverishment, discontent, and death—inevitably stimulating more than two hundred factions to revolt.

Li Yuan, the powerful Sui official who eventually founded the T'ang dynasty (reigning under the title T'ang Kao-tsu), has traditionally been portrayed as having been forced into revolting by the combined influences of popular prophecies and the machinations of his son, Li Shih-min (T'ang
Li Yuan not only commanded the strongest provincial army but was directly related to the Sui imperial family as well as to powerful semi-barbarian aristocratic families in the northwest region. Entrusted with suppressing several of the sporadic revolts that had begun to appear in A.D. 613, his success augmented his authority and solidified his control over the strategic province of Shansi. Initiated in the fifth month of A.D. 617, the revolt quickly gathered major support from a number of other rebels and strong generals; by the eleventh month of that year, Li Yuan had captured the capital. In the fifth month of A.D. 618, the year of Sui Yang-ti's murder, he formally ascended the throne to establish the T'ang dynasty.

During the rise of both the Sui and T'ang, the nomadic powers outside the historical borders had become fragmented, with some of the Turks nominally acknowledging Chinese suzerainty and many of their tribesmen even serving in the imperial military forces. The Eastern Turks provided significant support to Li Yuan's revolt in its formative stages—not only by furnishing horses, men, and limited supplies but also by essentially foregoing any opportunistic actions to capitalize on the chaos. At the time of the establishment of the dynasty, the only limited area in the north had actually been brought under central government control; the next ten years were spent consolidating its power, extending the imperial domain in all directions—including to the agriculturally critical eastern areas—and creating a heritage of tranquility for succeeding generations.

The T'ang established itself through the talents of its skilled generals, the adoption of Sui institutions, the populist appeal of its policies, and a benevolent pacification policy—especially in the south. Three generals particularly distinguished themselves: Li Ching, the strategist to whom this seventh military classic is attributed; Li Shih-chi; and Li Shih-min, the second son of Li Yuan who became T'ang T'ai-tsung upon his usurping the throne in A.D. 627. All three were active in the founding and integration of the empire, with T'ang T'ai-tsung being depicted as heroically leading his elite troops into many pitched conflicts.

T'ang T'ai-tsung, who asks the questions and offers short observations in this military classic, apparently received a Confucian education; he therefore had thorough knowledge of the classics and histories as well as being extremely skilled in the martial arts. He reportedly commanded troops by age fifteen and after contributing to the establishment of the T'ang as both a strategist and a commander, was instrumental in subduing numerous challenges to the new state—including those mounted by segments of the Western Turks. He finally became emperor by displacing his father, although only after murdering his older brother, the designated heir. Stories of his prowess and famous horses abound in popular Chinese history.

As emperor he consciously cultivated the image of a proper ruler, one responsive to the needs of the people and willing to accept criticism and advice. The country was truly unified, both politically and culturally. Measures were enacted to reduce the plight of the people and stimulate the economy. Government expenditures were reduced, and effective administration was imposed throughout the nation. With the passage of time and perhaps distance from the uncertainties of the initial period, he eventually became more independent, intolerant, and extravagant. However, the formative years of the T'ang saw the rebirth of thought and culture, the resurgence of a civilization that would dazzle Asia for three centuries.

Li Ching—who lived from A.D. 571 to 649—began his career under the Sui, serving in the northwest in a military capacity. He eventually joined the T'ang forces just after the fall of the capital, Ch'ang-an, and became one of T'ang T'ai-tsung's earliest associates and supporters. Thereafter, he commanded T'ang troops in the suppression of both internal and external challenges, the great conquest of the Western Turks (for which he became famous), and the pacification of the south. Thus if the Questions and Replies actually preserves his conversations with T'ang T'ai-tsung, or even a large part of them, the strategies they discuss were not only theoretical concepts but had been personally tested and employed by them in critical battles.

The book differs markedly from the earlier classics, being more of a survey of earlier works, combined with a wide-ranging discussion and appreciation of their theories and contradictions. Illustrated by historical examples from their own campaign experiences, these discussions apparently reveal the predominant strategies and tactics of their era. Although most historians consider the book to be a forging of either the late T'ang or Northern Sung, arguments have also been advanced that—as with other compendiums summarizing the thought and actions of the period—it is at least based on an actual protowork or recorded notes.

Li Ching's biography from the Hsin T'ang-shu not only depicts the turbulent career of a successful T'ang politician and commander but also portrays the man and his strategies in action:

Li Ching, whose personal name was Yao-shih, was a native of San-yuan in the Metropolitan prefecture. Tall and elegant in appearance, he was thoroughly versed in the classics and histories. He once said to those close to him: "In this life a man wants to attain wealth and rank through accomplishments. Why
must one compose passages like the Confucians?" Whenever his uncle Han Ch'\textquoteleft in-hu discussed military affairs with him, he would sigh in amazement and say: "If one cannot discuss Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu with this man, who can one discuss them with?" When Li Ching served the Sui dynasty as Chief of the Palace Attendants, Niu Hung—Minister for the Ministry of Personnel—saw him and remarked: "This is a talent to assist a king!" The Left Vice Director [for State Affairs], Yang Su, placing his hand on his great seat, said to him: "My lord, in the end you should sit here!"

At the end of the Ta-yeh period he served as Vice Magistrate of M\textquoteleft ci District. When T\textquotesingle ang Kao-tsu attacked the Turks, Li Ching observed that Kao-tsu was marked by extraordinary ambition. He had himself arrested [for being disloyal to Kao-tsu] in order to urgently report Kao-tsu\textquoteleft s revolutionary intentions and sent to Chiang-tu. When he reached Ch\textquotesingle ang\textquotesingle an the road was blocked. Kao-tsu then conquered the capital [and captured Li Ching]. He was about to have him beheaded when Ching cried out: "My lord raised troops to eliminate perversity and chaos on behalf of All under Heaven. If you want to achieve the great affair [of becoming emperor], how can you slay a righteous man because of personal enmity?" The king of Ch\textquotesingle in [Li Shih-min] also interceded on his behalf, and he was released, being brought into the government as a member of the Three Capital Guards. He accompanied [Li Shih-min] on the campaign to pacify Wang Shih-ch\textquotesingle ung and for his achievements was appointed a commander.

Hsiao Hsien occupied Chiang-ling, so [Kao-tsu] issued an imperial edict to Ching to pacify the area. Accompanied by a few light cavalrymen he crossed to Ching\textquotesingle s command to confront several tens of thousands of Man [barbarian] Teng Shih-luo bandits encamped in the mountain valleys of the region. King Yuan of Lu\textquotesingle chiang had not been victorious, so Ching planned the attack for him, forcing the enemy to withdraw. They proceeded to Hsiao-chou, where they were blocked by Hsien\textquoteleft s army and could not advance. The emperor assumed he was procrastinating and issued an imperial edict to the Supervisor in Chief Hsu Shao to head Ching. Shao entered a plea on Ching\textquoteleft s behalf, and he was spared.

The Man peoples in K\textquotesingle ai-chou under Jan Chao-tse then invaded K\textquotesingle ui-chou. Hsiao-kung, king of Chao Commandery, engaged them in battle but without gaining any advantage. Ching led eight hundred men to destroy their encampment and strategic defenses, establishing an ambush which resulted in the beheading of Chao-tse and the capture of five thousand prisoners. The emperor explained to his attendants: "Employing men of achievement is not as good as using those who have erred. This is certainly true in Li Ching\textquoteleft s case." Thereupon he personally drafted his citation, saying: "You are blameless for what is already past. I have long forgotten previous events." Li Ching subsequently planned the strategy for ten campaigns against Hsien.

By imperial edict Ching was appointed Commander in Chief of the Campaign Army, concurrently serving as Aide to Hsiao-kung\textquoteleft s Campaign Army, with both armies\textquoteleft administrative matters all being entrusted to him. In August of the fourth year of the Martial Virtue reign period [A.D. 621], he reviewed the troops in K\textquotesingle ui-chou. It was the time of the autumn floods, with heavy waves on the viles, overflowing waters [of the Ch\textquotesingle ang-chiang River]. 6 Hsien believed Ching would not be able to descend, so he did not establish any defenses. Ching\textquoteleft s generals also requested they await the calving of the river before advancing. Ching said: "For the army the most critical affair is for its speed to be spiritual. Now the men have just assembled and Hsien does not yet know it, so if we take advantage of the water to attack his fortifications, it will be like being unable to cover one\textquoteright s ears at a thunderclap. Even if he is able to suddenly summon his troops, he will lack the means to oppose us, and we will certainly capture him." Hsiao-kung followed his plan, and in the ninth month the navy attacked I-ling. Hsien\textquoteleft s general Wen Shih-hung encamped at Ch\textquotesingle ang-chiang with several tens of thousands of troops. Hsiao-kung wanted to attack him, but Ching said: "You cannot! Shih-hung is a stalwart general, while those below him are all courageous men. Now when they have newly lost Ching-men, they will all be full of ardor to oppose us. This is an army which can rescue the defeated and cannot be opposed. It would be better to go to the southern river bank and wait for their ch'i [spirit] to abate, and then take them." Hsiao-kung did not listen but instead left Ching behind to guard the encampment and personally went forth to engage them in battle. After being soundly defeated, he returned. The bandits then employed boats to disperse and plunder the countryside. Ching saw their disarray and let his army loose to destroy them. They seized more than four hundred vessels, while ten thousand of the enemy drowned.

Thereupon, leading a vanguard of five thousand light cavalry, he raced to Chiang-ling. They besieged the city and encamped, [subsequently] destroying generals Yang Ch\textquotesingle in-mao and Cheng Wen-hsiu and taking four thousand armored soldiers prisoner. Hsiao-kung continued the advance, and Hsien was terrified. He summoned the troops of the Chiang-nan region, but when they did not arrive, surrendered the next day. Ching entered their capital. His orders were quiet but strict, and the army did not loot [the city].

Some [of his generals] requested that Ching confiscate the family wealth of Hsien\textquoteleft s generals who had opposed them in order to reward the army. Ching said: "The army of a True King has sympathy for the people and seizes the guilty. They were coerced into coming, so if we confiscate their wealth because the army opposed us—what they fundamentally did not wish to do—we make no allowance for the real rebels. Now that we have just settled Ching and Ying, we should display generosity and magnanimity in order to pacify their hearts. If they surrender and we confiscate their wealth, I am afraid that from Ching south, they will strengthen their walls and increase their emplacements. Forcing them into a desperate defense is not excellence in planning." He stopped their actions and did not confiscate their wealth. Because of this the line of cities between the Chiang and Han rivers competed with each other to submit.
For his achievements he was appointed duke of Yung-k’ang District and acting prefect for Ching-chou [Prefecture]. Thereupon he crossed the mountains to Kuei-chou and dispatched emissaries along different routes to proclaim the policy of pacification. Tribal leaders—such as Feng-ang—with their children, all came to submit, and the entire southern region was settled. When they calculated the gains, established authority, and created offices, they had added ninety-six commanderies in all, with more than six hundred thousand households. He was summoned by imperial edict and his efforts praised. He was granted the titles of Pacification Commissioner for Ling-nan and acting Commander in Chief for Kuei-chou.

He felt that Ling-hai was rustic and distant and [that] for a long time it had not seen a proper display of Virtue, so that unless he manifested awesomeness and military majesty and displayed the rites and righteousness, he would not have the means to transform their customs. Thus he led the army on a southern tour. Wherever they went he inquired about the sick and suffering and saw the elders and aged in his courtyard. He proclaimed the emperor’s beneficent intentions, and near and far submitted in fear.

Fu Kung-shih occupied Tan-yang in rebellion. The emperor appointed Hsiao-kung Commander in Chief and summoned Ching to the court where he received the general strategy and was appointed Vice Commander under Hsiao-kung. When they marched east on their punitive expedition, Li Shih-chi and the others—seven general officers—all received appointment as Area Commanders. Kung-shih dispatched Feng Hui-liang with thirty thousand naval forces to invest Ch’ung-tu and Ch’eng-t’ung with twenty thousand infantry and cavalry to invest the Chü-hsing Mountains. From Mount Liang they connected their forces in order to sever the road to Chiang and built crescent-shaped walls stretching out more than ten fathoms from north to south extending their flanks.

All the [emperor’s] generals voiced their opinion: “They have strong soldiers and unbroken palisades. Even without engaging in battle they will wear out our army. If you directly seize Tan-yang and empty his stronghold, then Hui-liang and the others will surrender by themselves.” Ching said: “It is not so. While those two armies are elite units, the ones under Kung-shih’s personal command are also spirited troops. Since they have already secured Shih-tou Mountain, their stronghold cannot be breached. If we remain we will not gain our objective, but we must shun retreat. For the stomach and back to have overwhelming worries is not a completely successful plan. Moreover, Hui-liang and Ch’eng-t’ung are experienced rebels of more than a hundred battles. They will not fear combat in the wilds. Right now they are maintaining the security of their position, clinging to Kung-shih’s strategy. If we do the unexpected, provoking them and attacking their fortifications, we will certainly destroy them. Hui-liang will be drawn out and Kung-shih captured.”

Hsiao-kung listened to him. Ching, leading Huang Chun-han and the others, advanced along water and land routes. After a bitter battle they killed and wounded more than ten thousand men. Hui-liang and the others fled, so Ching—in command of light cavalry—went to Tan-yang. Kung-shih was afraid, but although his forces were still numerous, they were incapable of fighting, so he fled. They captured him, and the region south of the Ch’ang-chiang River was at peace.

When the Branch Department of State Affairs was established for the Southeast Circuit, Ching was made Minister for the Ministry of War. He was granted a thousand pieces of silk, a hundred female slaves, and a hundred horses. When the Branch Department of State Affairs was discontinued, he was made Acting Chief Administrator for the Yang-chou Superior Area Command. The emperor sighed and said: “Ching, could the ancient generals Han, Pai, Wei, and Hsu have done any more than you in the vital affairs of Hsien and Kung-shih!”

In the eighth year [625] the Turks made an incursion into T’ai-yuan. Ching, as Commander in Chief of the Campaign Army, encamped with ten thousand men from the Chiang and Hui armies in the T’ai-ku region. At this time all the other generals suffered numerous defeats, while Ching alone returned with his army intact. For a short while he was appointed Acting Commander in Chief for An-chou [Prefecture].

When T’ang T’ai-tsung ascended the throne he received appointment as Minister of the Ministry of Justice, his accomplishments were recorded, and he was enfeoffed with four hundred households, concurrently acting as Secretariat Director.

A portion of the Turks separated and revolted, so the emperor planned a strategy to advance and take them. As Minister of the Ministry of War he acted as Commander in Chief for the Campaign Army of the Ting-hsing Circuit, leading three thousand crack cavalry through Ma-ki to race to the O-yang Mountains. Hsien-li K’o-han was astonished: “If the entire T’ang Army has not been mobilized, how would Ching dare to bring his single army here?” Thereupon the soldiers were repeatedly frightened. Ching let loose his agents to sow discord among the K’o-han’s trusted confidants. At night he launched a sudden attack against Ting-hsing and destroyed it. The K’o-han managed to escape and fled to Chi-k’ou.

For his accomplishment Ching was advanced and enfeoffed as duke of Taikoo. The emperor said: “Li Ling crossed the desert with five thousand infantrymen but in the end surrendered to the Hsiung-nu. His achievements were still recorded on bamboo and silk. With three thousand cavalrymen Ching trampled through blood and took their court prisoner, subsequently taking Ting-hsing. Antiquity does not have its like. It is enough to wash away my shame at Wei River!”

Hsien-li went to secure Mount T’ieh, then dispatched an emissary to acknowledge his offense, requesting that his state could become an inner vassal. Ching, as Commander in Chief of the Ting-hsing Circuit, was sent out to receive him. The emperor also dispatched the Chief Minister of the Court of State
Ceremonial, T'ang Chien, and General An Hsiao-jen to act as officers for the pacification. Ching [who knew Hsieh-li's submission was uncertain] spoke with his Lieutenant General Kung-chin: "The Imperial Emmissary is on the contrary, a prisoner, so Hsieh-li must feel secure. If ten thousand cavalrymen, carrying twenty days' rations, stage a sudden attack from Pai-tao, we will certainly obtain what we desire." Kung-chin said: "The emperor has already agreed to the surrender, and the administrators are with them. What about that?" Ching said: "The opportunity cannot be lost. This is the way Han Hsin destroyed Chi.' For someone like T'ang Chien, what is there to regret?"

He directed the army on an urgent advance. Whenever they encountered [enemy] patrols, they took the soldiers prisoner and had them follow. Only when they were seven li from his headquarters did Hsieh-li realize it. The tribesmen were terrified and scattered, and Ching's army killed more than ten thousand, making prisoners of a hundred thousand men and women. They captured Hsieh-li's son, Tch-hui-shih, and killed [his wife] the princess of Tch'eung. Hsieh-li fled but was captured and presented to the emperor by the Assistant Commander in Chief of the Campaign Army for the T'a-tung Circuit, Chang Pao-hsiang. Thereby the T'ang enlarged its territory from north of Mount Yi to the Great Desert.

The emperor thereupon declared a general pardon throughout the realm and bestowed five days of festivities on the people. The Censor-in-Chief Hsiao Yu accused Ching of disregarding the laws while commanding the army, allowing the troops to plunder extensively, and losing a great many rares and treasures for the state. The emperor summoned Ching and upbraided him. Ching did not offer any argument but bowed his head to the ground and acknowledged his offense. The emperor slowly said: "In the Sui when General Shih Wan-sui destroyed Ta-t'ou K'o-han, he was not rewarded, but was executed. I will not do that. I pardon your offenses, and take note of your achievements." Then he advanced him to be Left Grand Master for Splendid Happiness, presented him with a thousand pieces of silk, and increased his rife to five hundred households. When this had been done he said: "Previously, people slandered and criticized you, but now I have realized the truth." Then he bestowed an additional two thousand pieces of material and transferred him to be Vice Director on the Right for State Affairs. Whenever Ching participated in discussions he was very respectful, as if he could not speak, and was considered profound and sincere.

At the time the emperor dispatched emissaries to the sixteen circuits to travel about investigating the customs of the people and appointed Ching to be Commissioner for the Metropolitan Circuit. It happened that he suffered from a foot disease, so he beseeched the emperor to release him from this duty. The emperor dispatched the Vice Director of the Secretariat, Ts'en Wen-pen, to proclaim to him: "From antiquity those that knew how to stop after attaining riches and honor have probably been few. Although you are ill and weary, still exert yourself to go on. Now if you consider the welfare of the state, I will deeply admire it. If you want to complete your elegant objectives and become a model for the age, you must accept." Then he bestowed upon him the privilege of an Acting Lord Specially Advanced remaining in residence, and gave him a thousand pieces of silk and a superior carriage with two horses. For his salary [the emperor] continued his previous emoluments as an officer for the state and domain. Whenever his illness abated somewhat he would go to the Secretariat-Chancellery one day out of three as a Grand Councillor for the Secretariat-Chancellery and was accorded the privilege of using the staff of spiritual longevity.

A short time later the Tu-yu-hun invaded the border. The emperor addressed his attendants: "Is Ching able to again assume the post of general?" Ching went to see Fang Hsuan-ling and said: "Even though I am old, I can still undertake one more campaign." The emperor was elated and appointed him the Commander in Chief of the Campaign Army for the West Seas Circuit. Five other generals with their armies—Tsao-tsung, King of Ch'eng; Hou Chün-chi; Li Ta-liang; Li Tao-yen; and Kao Tseng-sheng—were all subordinate to him. When the army arrived at the city of Fu-ssu, the Tu-yu-hun had already burned all the grass and withdrawn to secure the Ta-fei River valley. The generals all advised that since the spring grass had not yet sprouted and the horses were weak, they could not do battle. Ching decided that their strategy would be to make a deep penetration. Subsequently, they passed beyond Mount Chi-shih and engaged in more than several tens of major battles. They killed and captured great numbers, destroying their states, and most of the inhabitants surrendered. Fu-yün [Qughan of the] Tu-yu-hun, being depressed, hung himself. Ching then established [Fu-yün's son] Mu-jung Sun, [also known as] King Ta-niing, in authority and returned home.

[Early in the campaign] Kao Tseng-sheng's army, traveling by way of the salt marsh roads, arrived late. Ching upbraided him somewhat, so that after they returned Kao reviled him. Together with the Aide for Kuang-chou, T'ang Feng-i, he accused Ching of plotting to revolt. Officers investigated the charge but found it unsubstantiated. Tseng-sheng and the others were judged guilty of making false accusations. Ching then closed his doors and dwelt in seclusion, refusing the visits of guests and relatives.

The emperor changed his enfeoffment to Duke of Wei-kuo. His wife died. The emperor instructed that the grave should be built in the style [indicated by] stories about Wei and Huo, making the towers like Mount T'ieh and Mount Chi-shih to manifest his accomplishments. He was advanced to Commander Unequaled in Honor.

The emperor wanted to attack Liao, so he summoned Ching to come [to the court] and said: "In the south you pacified Wu, in the north destroyed the Turks, in the west settled the Tu-yu-hun. Only Kao-li [Koguryo] has not submitted. Do you also have any inclination about this?" He replied: "In the past I relied upon the awesomeness of Heaven to achieve some small measure of merit. Now
although I am weak from my illness, if your Majesty is truly unwilling to release me, my sickness will be healed." The emperor took pity on his old age and did not consent to the assignment.

In the twenty-third year [649] his illness became acute. The emperor favored him with a visit at his official residence and wept. "You have been my lifelong friend and have labored for the state. Now your illness is like this, I sorrow for you." He died at age seventy-nine. He was granted the posthumous titles Minister of Education and Auxiliary Regional Area Commander in Chief. As a loyal minister he was interred on the side of the Imperial burial grounds at Chao-ling and bestowed the posthumous title Ching Wu.

As may be evident from the biography, Sui and T'ang military forces consisted of crossbowmen, cavalry, and infantrymen. The chariot had long ceased to have any military significance, and bronze weapons had vanished. Great flexibility was possible due to the large number of smaller, locally based units that could be called on for a major campaign. These troops were essentially professional and were supplemented by general conscription when required. Weapons groups were specialized, the emphasis was on speed and mobility, and flanking and other indirect maneuvers received preference over brute shock action.

BOOK I

The T'ai-tsung inquired: "Kao-li [Koguryo] has encroached on Hsin-lo [Silla] several times. I dispatched an emissary to command them [to desist], but they have not accepted our edict. I am about to send forth a punitive expedition. How should we proceed?"

Li Ching replied: "According to what we have been able to find out about them, Kai Su-wen reliance upon his own knowledge in military affairs. He says that the Central States lack the capability to mount a punitive expedition and so contravenes your mandate. I request an army of thirty thousand men to capture him."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Your troops will be few while the place is distant. What strategy will you employ to approach them?"

Li Ching said: "I will use orthodox [cheng] troops."

The T'ai-tsung said: When you pacified the T'u-chüeh [Turks], you employed unorthodox [ch'i] troops. Now you speak about orthodox troops. How is that?"

Li Ching said: "When Chu-ko Liang captured Meng Hu seven times, it was not through any other Way [Tao]. He employed orthodox troops, that's all."

The T'ai-tsung said: "When Ma Lung of the Chin dynasty conducted a punitive campaign against Liang-chou, it was also in accord with the 'Diagram of Eight Formations,' and he built narrow chariots. When the terrain was broad he employed encampments of 'deer-horn chariots,' and when the road was constricted he built wooden huts and placed them upon the chariots so they could both fight and advance. I believe it was orthodox troops which the ancients valued."

Li Ching said: "When I conducted the punitive campaign against the T'u-chüeh, we traveled west for several thousand li. If they had not been orthodox troops, how could we have gone so far? Narrow chariots and deer-horn
The T'ai-tsung said: “Whenever an army withdraws can it be termed unorthodox?”

Li Ching said: “It is not so. Whenever the soldiers retreat with their flags confused and disordered, the sounds of the large and small drums not responding to each other, and their orders shouted out in a clamor, this is true defeat, not unorthodox strategy. If the flags are ordered, the drums respond to each other, and the commands and orders seem unified, then even though they may be retreating and running, it is not a defeat and must be a case of unorthodox strategy. The Art of War says: ‘Do not pursue feigned retreats.’ It also says: ‘Although capable display incapability.’ These all refer to the unorthodox.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “At the battle of Huo-i, when the Army of the Right withdrew somewhat, was this a question of Heaven? When Lao-sheng was captured, was this due to the efforts of man?”

Li Ching said: “If the orthodox troops had not changed to unorthodox, and the unorthodox to orthodox, how would you have gained the victory? Thus for one who excels at employing the army, unorthodox and orthodox lie with man, that is all! He changes them in spirit-like fashion, [which is] the reason they are attributed to Heaven.”

The T'ai-tsung nodded his head.

The T'ai-tsung said: “Are the orthodox and unorthodox distinguished beforehand, or are they determined at the time of battle?”

Li Ching said: “According to Duke Ts'ao's Hsin shu [New Book], if you outnumber the enemy two to one, then divide your troops into two, with one section being orthodox, and one section being unorthodox. If you outnumber the enemy five to one, then three sections should be orthodox and two sections unorthodox.” This states the main point. As Sun-tzu said: ‘In warfare the strategic configurations of power do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox cannot be completely exhausted! The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?’ This captures it. So how can a distinction be made beforehand?

“If the officers and troops are not yet trained in my methods, if the assistant generals are not yet familiar with my orders, then we must break [the training] into two sections. When teaching battle tactics, in each case the sol-
diers must recognize the flags and drums, dividing and combining in turn. Thus [Sun-tzu] said: ‘Dividing and combining are changes.’

“These are the techniques for teaching warfare. When the instructions and the evaluation [of their implementation] have been completed and the masses know my methods, only then can they be raced about like a flock of sheep, following wherever the general points.” Who then makes a distinction of unorthodox and orthodox? What Sun-tzu refers to as ‘giving shape to others but being formless ourselves’ is the pinnacle in employing the unorthodox and orthodox. Therefore, such a distinction beforehand is [merely for the purpose] of instruction. Determining the changes at the moment of battle, [the changes] are inexhaustible.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “Profound indeed! Duke Ts’ao must have known it. But what the Hsin shu teaches is only what he [conveyed] to his generals, not the fundamental method of the unorthodox and the orthodox.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “Duke Ts’ao states, ‘Unorthodox troops attack from the flank.’ My lord, what do you have to say about this?”

Li Ching replied: “I recall that, in commenting on Sun-tzu, Duke Ts’ao said: ‘Going out first to engage in battle is orthodox; going out afterward is unorthodox.’ This is different from his discussions about flank attacks. I humbly refer to the engagement of great masses as orthodox, and those which the general himself sends forth as unorthodox. Where is the restriction of first, or later, or flank attack?”

The T’ai-tsung said: “If I cause the enemy to perceive my orthodox as unorthodox, and cause him to perceive my unorthodox as orthodox, is this what is meant by ‘displaying a form to others’? Is employing the unorthodox as orthodox, the orthodox as unorthodox, unfathomable changes and transformation, what is meant by ‘being formless’?”

Li Ching bowed twice and said: “Your Majesty is a spiritual Sage. You go back to the ancients, beyond what I can attain.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “If ‘dividing and combining are changes,’ wherein lie the unorthodox and orthodox?”

Li Ching said: “For those who excel at employing troops there are none that are not orthodox, none that are not unorthodox, so they cause the en-

emy never to be able to fathom them. Thus with the orthodox they are victorious, with the unorthodox they are also victorious. The officers of the Three Armies only know the victory; none know how it is attained.” Without being able to fully comprehend the changes, how could [the outstanding generals] attain this? As for where the dividing and combining come from, only Sun-tzu was capable [of comprehending it]. From Wu Ch’i on, no one has been able to attain it.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “What was Wu Ch’i’s strategy like?”

Li Ching said: “Permit me to speak about the general points. Marquis Wu of Wei asked Wu Ch’i about [the strategy to be employed] when two armies confront each other. Wu Ch’i said: ‘Have some of your low-ranking, courageous soldiers go forward and attack. When the fronts first clash, have them flee. When they flee, do not punish them, but observe whether the enemy advances to take [the bait]. If they sit as one and arise as one, and do not pursue your fleeing troops, the enemy has good strategists. If all their troops pursue the fleeing forces, some advancing, some halting, in disordered fashion, the enemy is not talented. Attack them without hesitation.” I think that Wu Ch’i’s strategy is generally of this sort, not what Sun-tzu would refer to as ‘an orthodox engagement.’

The T’ai-tsung said: “My lord, your uncle Han Ch’in-hu once said you could discuss Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu with him. Was he also referring to the unorthodox and orthodox?”

Li Ching said: “How could Ch’in-hu know about the pinnacle of the unorthodox and orthodox? He only took the unorthodox as unorthodox, and the orthodox as orthodox! He never knew about the ‘mutual changes of the unorthodox and orthodox into each other, the inexhaustible cycle.’”

The T’ai-tsung said: “When the ancients approached enemy formations and then sent forth unorthodox troops to attack where unexpected, were they also using the method of ‘mutual changes’?”

Li Ching said: “In earlier ages most battles were a question of minimal tactics conquering those without any tactics, of some minor degree of excellence conquering those without any capabilities. How can they merit being discussed as the art of war? An example is Hsieh Hsüan’s destruction of Fu Chien. It was not [because of] Hsieh Hsüan’s excellence but probably Fu Chien’s incompetence.”
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change states: 'The number of formations is nine, with the center having the excess which the commanding general controls.' The "four sides" and "eight directions" are all regulated therein. Within the [main] formation, formations are contained; within the platoons, platoons are contained. They [can] take the front to be the rear, the rear to be the front. When advancing, they do not run quickly; when withdrawing, they do not race off. There are four heads, eight tails. Wherever they are struck is made the head. If the enemy attacks the middle, the [adjoining] two heads will both come to the rescue. The numbers begin with five and end with eight. What does all this mean?"

Li Ching said: "Chu-ko Liang set stones out horizontally and vertically to make eight rows. The method for the square formation then is this plan. When I instructed the army, we invariably began with this formation. What generations have passed down as The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change probably includes its rough outline."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Heaven, Earth, wind, clouds, dragons, tigers, birds, and snakes—what is the meaning of these eight formations?"

Li Ching said: "There was an error made by those who transmitted them. The ancients secretly concealed these methods, so they craftily created these eight names. The eight formations were originally one, being then divided into eight. For example, 'Heaven' and 'Earth' originated in flag designations; 'wind' and 'clouds' originated in pennant names. 'Dragons,' 'tigers,' 'birds,' and 'snakes' originated in the distinctions of the platoons and squads. Later generations erroneously transmitted them. If they were cleverly creating formations in the image of animals, why would they just stop at eight?"

The T'ai-tsung said: "The numbers begin with five and end with eight, so if they were not set up as images, then they are really ancient formations. Would you please explain them for me?"

Li Ching said: "I observe that the Yellow Emperor governed the army according to the methods by which he first established the 'village and well' system. Thus the 'well' was divided by four roads, and eight families occupied it. Its shape was that for the Chinese character for 'well' [see Figure 1],
so nine squares were opened therein. Five were used for formations, four were empty. This is what is meant by 'the numbers beginning with five.'

The middle was left vacant to be occupied by the commanding general, while around the four sides the various companies were interconnected, so this is what is meant by 'ending with eight.'

As for the changes and transformations to control the enemy: Intermixed and turbulent, their fighting [appeared] chaotic, but their method was not disordered. Nebulous and varying, their deployment was circular, but their strategic power [shih] was not dispersed. This is what is meant by 'they disperse and become eight, reunite and again become one.'

The T'ai-tsung said: "The Yellow Emperor's governance of the army was profound indeed! Even if later generations have men with the wisdom of Heaven and spirit-like planning ability, none will be able to exceed his scope! After this who came near to him?"

Li Ching said: "When the Chou dynasty first flourished, the T'ai Kung substantially copied his methods. He began at the Ch'i state capital by establishing the well-acrea system, constructing three hundred chariots, and training three hundred Tiger Guards in order to establish a military organization. They practiced advancing 'six paces, seven paces,' [making] 'six attacks, seven attacks,' so as to teach them battle tactics. When he deployed the army at Mu-yeh, with [only] a hundred officers the T'ai Kung controlled the army and established his military achievements. With forty-five thousand men he conquered King Chou's mass of seven hundred thousand.

"In the Chou dynasty the Ssu-ma Fa was based upon the T'ai Kung. When the T'ai Kung died the people of Ch'i obtained his bequeathed strategies. When Duke Huan became hegemon over all under Heaven, he relied on Kuan Chung who again cultivated the T'ai Kung's methods. Their army was referred to as a 'restrained and governed force,' and all the feudal lords submitted."

The T'ai-tsung said: "The Confucians mostly say that Kuan Chung was merely the minister of a hegemon [rather than a true king], so they truly do not know that his military methods were founded upon a king's regulations. Chu-ko Liang had the talent of a king's supporter, and he compared himself with Kuan Chung and Yüeh I. From this we know that Kuan Chung was also the true sustainer of a king. But when the Chou declined the king could not use him, so he borrowed the state of Ch'i and mobilized an army there."

Li Ching bowed twice and said: "Your Majesty is a spiritual Sage! Since you understand men this well, even if your old minister should die, he would not be ashamed before any of the great Worthies of antiquity."

"I would like to speak about Kuan Chung's methods for organizing the state of Ch'i. He divided Ch'i to compose three armies. Five families comprised the fundamental unit, so five men made up a squad of five. Ten fundamental family units composed a hamlet, so fifty men composed a platoon. Four hamlets constituted a village, so two hundred men composed a company. Ten villages constituted a town, so two thousand men formed a battalion. Five towns made up an army, so ten thousand men composed one army. It all proceeded from the Ssu-ma Fa's meaning that one army consists of five battalions, while one battalion consists of five companies. In actuality, these are all the bequeathed methods of the T'ai Kung."

The T'ai-tsung said: "People say the Ssu-ma Fa was composed by Jang-chü. Is this true or not?"

Li Ching said: "According to the 'Biography of Jang-chü' in the Shih chi, he excelled in commanding the army at the time of Duke Ching of Ch'i, defeating the forces of Yen and Chin. Duke Ching honored him with the post of Commander of the Horse [Ssu-ma], and from then on he was called Ssu-ma Jang-chü. His sons and grandsons were then surnamed Ssu-ma. In the
time of King Wei of Ch’i they sought out and talked about the methods of the ancient Commanders of the Horse [su-ma] and also narrated what Jang-chû had studied. This subsequently became a book in ten chapters called Su-
ma Jang-chû. Moreover, what has been transmitted from the military strategists and remains today is divided into four categories: ‘balance of power and plans,’ ‘disposition and strategic power,’ ‘yin and yang,’ and ‘techniques and crafts.’ They all come out of the Su-ma Fa.51

The T’ai-tsung said: “During the Han, Chang Liang and Han Hsin ordered [the books on] military arts. Altogether there were one hundred and eighty-two thinkers, but after they collated and edited them to select the important ones, they settled on thirty-five. Now we have lost what they transmitted. What about this?”

Li Ching said: “What Chang Liang studied was The Six Secret Teachings and The Three Strategies of the T’ai Kung. What Han Hsin studied was the Su-ma Jang-chû and the Sun-tzu. But the main principles do not go beyond the Three Gates and Four Types, that is all!”

The T’ai-tsung said: “What is meant by the Three Gates?”

Li Ching said: “I find that in the eighty-one chapters of the Plans of the T’ai Kung, what is termed ‘secret strategy’ cannot be exhausted in words; the seventy-one chapters of the Sayings of the T’ai Kung cannot be exhausted in warfare; and the eighty-five chapters of the Warfare of the T’ai Kung cannot be exhausted in resources. These are the Three Gates.”52

The T’ai-tsung said: “What is meant by the Four Types?”

Li Ching said: “These are what Jen Hung discussed during the Han. As for the classes of military strategists, ‘balance of power and plans’ comprises one type, ‘disposition and strategic power’ is one type, and ‘yin and yang’ and ‘techniques and crafts’ are two types. These are the Four Types.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “The Su-ma Fa begins with the spring and winter ceremonial hunts.53 Why?”

Li Ching said: “To accord with the seasons, secure the connections with the spirits, and stress their substance. They were the most important government affairs according to the Chou li [Rites of Chou]. King Ch’eng held the spring hunt on the southern side of Mount Ch’i. King K’ang held the assem-

bly at Feng Palace. King Mu held the assembly at Mount T’u. These are the affairs of the Son of Heaven.

“When Chou rule declined, Duke Huan of Ch’i assembled the armies [of the feudal states] at Chao-ling, while Duke Wen of Chin made his alliance [with the feudal lords] at Ch’ien-t’u. In these cases feudal lords respectfully performed the affairs of the Son of Heaven.54 In actuality they used the Law for Nine Attacks55 to overawe the irreverent. They employed the pretext of the hunt to hold court assemblies, accordingly conducting tours and hunts among the feudal lords, instructing them in armor and weapons.56 The [Su-
ma Fa also] states that unless there is a national emergency, the army should not be wantonly mobilized, but that during the times between the agricultural seasons they should certainly not forget military preparations.57 Thus is it not profound that it placed the hunts of spring and winter at the beginning?”

The T’ai-tsung said: “During the Spring and Autumn period, the Methods for the Double Battalion of King Chuang of Ch’u58 stated that ‘the hundred officers should act in accord with the symbolization of things, military administration should be prepared without official instructions.’59 Did this accord with Chou regulations?”

Li Ching said: “According to the Tso chuan, ‘King Chuang’s chariot bat-
talions [kuang] consisted of thirty chariots per battalion. [Each chariot] in the battalion had a company [tsu] of infantrymen plus a platoon [liang] for the flanks.’60 When the army was advancing [the ones] on the right deployed by the shafts.61 They took the shafts as their defining measure. Thus they stayed close to the shafts to fight.62 These were all Chou regulations.

[In the case of Ch’u] I refer to one hundred men as a company [tsu], while fifty men are called a platoon [liang]. Thus each chariot is accompanied by one hundred and fifty men, many more than in the Chou organization. Under the Chou each chariot was accompanied by seventy-two infantrymen and three armored officers. Twenty-five men, including an officer, formed one platoon [liang], so three Chou platoons were seventy-five men altogether. Ch’i is a country of mountains and marshes; chariots were few, men numerous. If they were to be divided into three platoons [tsu],63 then they would be [functionally] the same as the Chou.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “During the Spring and Autumn period, when Hsun Wu attacked the Ti, he abandoned his chariots to make infantry lines.64 Were they also orthodox troops? Or unorthodox troops?”
Li Ching said: “Hsün Wu used strategy for chariot warfare, that is all! Although he abandoned the chariots, his strategy is still found therein. One force acted as the left flank, one force acted as the right flank, and one resisted the enemy in the front. Dividing them into three units, this is one tactic for chariot warfare. Whether one thousand or ten thousand chariots, it would be the same. I observe that in Duke Ts'ao's Hsün shu it states: ‘Attack chariots [are accompanied by] seventy-five men. To the fore, to oppose the enemy, is one unit; to the left and right corners are two more units. The defense chariots’ have an additional unit. It consists of ten men to prepare the food, five to repair and maintain the equipment, five to care for the horses, and five to gather firewood and fetch water—altogether twenty-five men. For a pair of attack and defense chariots, altogether there are one hundred men.’ If you mobilize one thousand men, you would employ one thousand each of the light [attack] and heavy [defense] chariots. This is the general outline of Hsün Wu’s old methods.

Moreover, I observe that in the period from Han to Wei, army regulations had five chariots compose a platoon [tui], with a supervisor [to command them]. Ten chariots formed a regiment [shib], under a chief commander. For one thousand chariots there were two men, a general and lieutenant general. If more chariots, the organization followed this pattern. If I examine it in comparison with our present methods, then our probing force is the [old] cavalry; our frontal assault troops are the [old] infantry and cavalry, half and half; and our holding force goes forth with combined chariot tactics.

When I went to the west to rectify and punish the T'u-chüeh, we crossed several thousand li of treacherous terrain. I never dared change this system, for the constraints and regulations of the ancients can truly be trusted.”

The T'ai-tsung honored Ling-chou with an imperial visit. After he returned, he summoned Li Ching and invited him to be seated. He said: “I ordered Tao-tsung, A-shih-na She-erh, and others to mount a campaign of rectification and punishment against Hsüeh-Yen-t'o. Several groups among the T'ieh-le peoples requested the establishment of Han bureaucratic administration, and I acceded to all their requests. The Yen-t'o fled to the west, but I was afraid they would become a source of trouble to us, so I dispatched Li Chi to attack them. At present the northern regions are all at peace, but the various groups of barbarians and Han Chinese dwell intermingled with one another. What long-term method can we employ to settle and preserve them both?”

Li Ching said: “Your Majesty has ordered the establishment of sixty-six relay stations from the T'u-chüeh to the Hui-ho [Uighers] to connect the forward observation posts. This step already implements the necessary measures. However, I foolishly believe it is appropriate for the Han [defensive] forces to have one method of training and the barbarians another. Since their instruction and training are separate, do not allow them to be intermixed and treated the same. If we encounter the incursion of some other group, then at that moment you can secretly order the generals to change their insignia and exchange their uniforms, and employ unorthodox methods to attack them.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “For what reason?”

Li Ching said: “This is the technique referred to as ‘manifesting many methods to cause misperception.’ If you have the barbarians appear as Han Chinese, and Han Chinese masquerade as barbarians, the [enemy] will not know the distinction between barbarians and Chinese. Then no one will be able to fathom our plans for attack and defense. One who excels at employing an army first strives not to be fathomable, for then the enemy will be confused wherever he goes.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “This truly accords with my thoughts. You may go and secretly instruct our border generals that only through this difference between Han and barbarians can we manifest the methods of unorthodox and orthodox warfare.”

Li Ching bowed twice and said: “Your thoughts are those of a Sage, they flow from Heaven! You hear one and you know ten. How can I fully explain it all!”

The T'ai-tsung said: “Chu-ko Liang said: ‘A well-organized army, [even if] commanded by an incompetent general, cannot be defeated. An army that lacks good order, [even if it] has a capable general, cannot be victorious.’ I suspect that his discussion is not expressive of the highest principles.”

Li Ching said: “This was something Marquis Wu [Chu-ko Liang] said to stimulate the troops. I observe that Sun-tzu said: ‘If the instructions and training are not enlightened, the officers and troops lack constant duties, and their deployment into formation is askew, it is termed chaotic.’ From antiquity the number of cases in which a chaotic army brought victory to the enemy can never be fully recorded.” As to ‘the instructions and leadership not being enlightened,’ he was speaking about their instruction and inspection lacking the ancient methods. With regard to ‘the officers and troops lacking constant duties,’ he was speaking about the generals and their subor-
Li Ching said: "First manifest a form and cause the enemy to follow it. This is the technique."

[T'ai-tsung: 74] "I understand it now. Sun-tzu said: 'For the army, the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless.' And 'In accord with the enemy’s disposition we impose measures upon the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them. This is what is meant.'"

Li Ching bowed twice. "Perfect indeed! Your Majesty's sagacious thoughts have already penetrated more than half of it!"

The T'ai-tsung said: "Recently, the remnants of the Ch'î-tan [Khitan] and Hsi peoples have all submitted. I have determined that the two [tribal] commanders in chief of the Sung Mo and Jao Le regions will be united under the An-pei Protectorate. I would like to employ Hsüeh Wan-ch'ê [as governor]. What do you think?"

Li Ching said: "Wan-ch'ê is not as suitable as A-shih-na She-erh, Chih-shih Ssu-li, or Ch'i-pi Ho-li. They are all barbarian subjects who thoroughly understand military affairs. I once spoke with them about the mountains, rivers, and roads of the Sung Mo and Jao Le regions, as well as the submissive and rebellious barbarians as far out as the western regions where there are tens of peoples. In every detail they can be trusted. I taught them methods of deployment, and in all cases they nodded their heads and accepted my instructions. I hope you will entrust them with the responsibility without having any doubt. [Men] like Wan-ch'ê are courageous but lack planning and would find it difficult to bear the responsibility alone."

The T'ai-tsung smiled and said: "These barbarians have all been well employed by you. The ancients said: 'Using the Man and Ti to attack the Man and Ti is China's strategic power.' My lord has attained it."
BOOK II

The T’ai-tsun said: “I have looked through all the military books, but none surpasses Sun-tzu. In Sun-tzu’s thirteen chapters there is nothing that surpasses the ‘vacuous’ and ‘substantial.’ Now when employing the army, if one recognizes the strategic power [shih] of the vacuous and substantial, then he will always be victorious. Our contemporary generals are only able to talk about avoiding the substantial and attacking the vacuous. When they approach the enemy, few recognize the vacuous and substantial, probably because they are unable to compel the enemy [to come] to them, but on the contrary are compelled by the enemy. How can this be? My lord, please discuss the essentials of all these in detail with our generals.”

Li Ching said: “Instructing them first about the techniques for changing the unorthodox [ch’i] and orthodox [cheng] into each other and afterward telling them about the form [hsing] of the vacuous and substantial would be possible. Many of the generals do not know how to take the unorthodox to be the orthodox, and the orthodox to be the unorthodox, so how can they recognize when the vacuous is substantial, and the substantial vacuous?”

The T’ai-tsun said: “[According to Sun-tzu:] ‘Make plans against them to know the likelihood for gain and loss.’ Stimulate them to know their patterns of movement and stopping. Determine their disposition [hsing] to know what terrain is tenable, what deadly. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.” Accordingly, do the unorthodox and orthodox lie with me, while the vacuous and substantial lie with the enemy?”

Li Ching said: “The unorthodox and orthodox are the means by which to bring about the vacuous and substantial in the enemy. If the enemy is substantial, then I must use the orthodox. If the enemy is vacuous, then I must use the unorthodox. If a general does not know the unorthodox and ortho-
doxygen, then even though he knows whether the enemy is vacuous or substantial, how can he bring it about? I respectfully accept your mandate but will [first] instruct all the generals in the unorthodox and orthodox, and afterward they will realize the vacuous and substantial by themselves.”

The T’ai-tsun said: “If we take the unorthodox as the orthodox and the enemy realizes it is the unorthodox, then I will use the orthodox to attack him. If we take the orthodox as the unorthodox and the enemy thinks it is the orthodox, then I will use the unorthodox to attack him. I will cause the enemy’s strategic power [shih] to constantly be vacuous, and my strategic power to always be substantial. If you teach the generals these methods, it should be easy to make them understand.”

Li Ching said: “One thousand essays, ten thousand sections do not go beyond ‘compel others, do not be compelled by them.’ I ought to use this to teach all the generals.”

The T’ai-tsun said: “I have established the Yao-ch’ih Supervisor in Chief subordinate to the An-hsi Protector-general. How shall we manage and deploy the Han [Chinese] and barbarian peoples in this area?”

Li Ching said: “When Heaven gave birth to men, originally there was no distinction of ‘barbarian’ and ‘Han.’ But their territory is distant, wild, and desert-like, and they must rely on archery and hunting to live. Thus they are constantly practicing fighting and warfare. If we are generous to them, show good faith, pacify them, and fully supply them with clothes and food, then they will all be men of the Han. As your Majesty has established this Protector-general, I request you gather in all the Han border troops and settle them in the interior. This will greatly reduce the provisions necessary to feed them, which is what military strategists refer to as the ‘method for governing strength.’ But you should select Han officials who are thoroughly familiar with barbarian affairs, and you should disperse defensive fortifications throughout the region. This will be sufficient to manage the region for a long time. If we should encounter some emergency, Han troops can then go out there.”

The T’ai-tsun said: “What did Sun-tzu say about governing strength?”

Li Ching said: “‘With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the sated await the hungry.’ This covers the main points. One who excels at employing the army extends these three into six: ‘With enticements await their coming. In quiescence await the impetuous. With the heavy await the light. With the strictly [disciplined] await the inattentive,
With order await the turbulent. With defense await attacks. When conditions are contrary to these, your strength will be insufficient. Without techniques to govern [the expenditure of force], how can one direct the army?

The T'ai-tsung said: "People who study Sun-tzu today only recite the empty words. Few grasp and extend his meaning. Methods for governing the expenditure of strength should be thoroughly expounded to all the generals."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Our old generals and aging troops are exhausted and nearly all dead. Our armies are newly deployed, so they have no experience in assuming formations against the enemy. If we want to instruct them, what should be most essential?"

Li Ching said: "I would instruct the soldiers by dividing their activities into three steps. [The men] must first be organized into squads according to the Method of Five. After this organization into squads of five is complete, provide them with [military organization] into armies and brigades. This is one step.

"The method for military organization into armies and brigades is to build from one to ten, from ten to one hundred. This is one step.

"Entrust them to the command of subordinate generals. The subordinate generals will unite all the platoons of a brigade. Assemble and instruct them with the diagrams for the dispositions. This is one step.

"The commanding general examines the instructions in each of these three steps and thereupon conducts maneuvers to test and evaluate their deployment into formation and their overall organization. He divides them into unorthodox [ch'ii] and orthodox [cheng], binds the masses with an oath, and implements punishments. Your Majesty should observe them from on high, and all measures should be possible."

The T'ai-tsung said: "There are several schools of thought on the Method of Five. Whose is the most important?"

Li Ching said: "According to Master Tso's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals: 'First the battalion [of chariots], afterward the squads of five [in the gaps]. Moreover, the Su-ma Fa states: 'Five men make up the squad of five.' The Wei Liao-t'zu has [a section entitled] 'Orders for Binding the Squads of Five.' Han military organization had the one-foot [wooden strip] for records and insignia [for the squads]. In later ages the records and insignia were done on paper, whereupon they lost the organization.

"I have studied and contemplated their methods. From the squad of five men they changed to twenty-five. From twenty-five men they change to seventy-five, composed of seventy-two infantrymen and three armored officers. When they set aside chariots and employed cavalry, then twenty-five [infantry] men were equivalent to eight cavalrymen. This then was the organization of 'five soldiers matching five.' Thus among the military methods of the various strategists, only the Method of Five is important. In the minimal arrangement there are five men, in the largest twenty-five. If the latter are tripled, they become seventy-five. Multiplied by another level of five, one obtains three hundred and seventy-five. Three hundred men are orthodox forces, sixty are unorthodox [with the remaining fifteen being the armored shih]. In this case they can be further divided into two, forming two orthodox [companies] of one hundred and fifty men each, and two [unorthodox] platoons of thirty men, one for each flank. This is what the Su-ma Fa means by 'five men composing the unit of five, with ten squads of five being a platoon,' which is relied upon until today. This is its essence."

The T'ai-tsung said: "I have discussed military strategy with Li Chi. For the most part he agrees with what you say, but Li Chi does not thoroughly understand its origin. From what techniques did the methods by which you established the 'Six Flowers Formation' originate?"

Li Ching said: "I based them on Chu-ko Liang's Eight Formations. Large formations contain small formations; large encampments contain small encampments. All the corners are interlocked, the curves and broken points correlated. The ancient system was like this, so I made the diagram in accord with it. Thus the outside is drawn to be square, but the inside environment is circular. They then become the 'Six Flowers,' as commonly termed."

The T'ai-tsung said: "What do you mean by 'the outside is square and the inside circular?""

Li Ching said: "The square is given birth from the pace, the circle is given birth from the odd. The square provides the means to keep the paces straight, the circle the means to continue their turning. For this reason the number of paces is settled by the Earth, while the demarcation of the circular responds to Heaven. When the paces are settled and the circle complete, then the army's changes will not be disordered. The Eight Formations can become the Six Flowers. This is Chu-ko Liang's old method."
The T'ai-tsung said: "By drawing the square one can evaluate the paces; by setting the circle one can evaluate the weapons. From the paces one can instruct them in 'foot' techniques; with the weapons one can instruct them in hand techniques. This is advantageous to training the hands and feet and certainly seems correct."

Li Ching said: "Wu Chi states: 'Although on desperate ground, they cannot be separated, even if in retreat they will not scatter.' This is the method of paces. Instructing the soldiers is like placing chessmen on a board. If there were no lines to demark the paths, how could one use the chess pieces? Sun-tzu said: 'Terrain gives birth to measurement; measurement produces the estimation of forces. Estimation of forces gives rise to calculating the numbers of men. Calculating the numbers of men gives rise to weighing strength. Weighing strength gives birth to victory. Thus the victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, while the defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! It all commences with measuring out the square and circle.'"

The T'ai-tsung said: "Sun-tzu's words are profound indeed! If one does not determine the terrain as near or distant, the shape of the land as wide or narrow, how can he regulate the constraints?"

Li Ching said: "The ordinary general is rarely able to know what constraints are. 'The strategic configuration of power [shih] of those that excel in warfare is sharply focused, their constraints are precise. Their strategic power is like a fully drawn crossbow, their constraints like the release of the trigger.' I have practiced these methods. Thus the standing infantry platoons are ten paces apart from each other, the holding platoons [of chariots] twenty paces from the main army [of infantry]. Between each platoon one combat platoon is emplaced. When advancing forward, fifty paces is one measure. At the first blowing of the horn all the platoons disperse and assume their positions, not exceeding ten paces apart. At the fourth blowing they position their spears and squat down. Thereupon the drum is beaten, three strikes to three shouts, and they advance thirty to fifty paces [each time] in order to control the changes of the enemy. The cavalry comes forth from the rear, also advancing fifty paces at a time. The front is orthodox, the rear unorthodox. Observe the enemy's response, then beat the drum again, with the front [changing to be] unorthodox and the rear orthodox."

Again entice the enemy to come forth, discover his fissures, and attack his vacuities. The Six Flowers Formation is generally like this."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Duke Ts'ao's Hsin shu states: 'When you deploy your formation opposite the enemy, you must first establish the pennants, drawing the troops into formation according to the pennants. When one brigade comes under attack, any other brigade that does not advance to rescue them will be beheaded.' What tactic is this?"

Li Ching said: "Approaching the enemy and then establishing the pennants is incorrect. This is a method applicable only when you are training men in the tactics of warfare. The ancients who excelled at warfare taught the orthodox, they did not teach the unorthodox. They drove the masses just as if driving a herd of sheep. The masses advanced with them, withdrew with them, but they did not know where they were going. Duke Ts'ao was arrogant and loved being victorious. Contemporary generals have all followed the Hsin shu without anyone daring to attack its shortcomings. Moreover, if you set up pennants when about to engage the enemy, is it not too late?"

"I secretly observed the music and dance you created called 'Destroying the Formations.' At the front they put out four pennants, to the rear deployed eight flags. Left and right circled about, marching and racing to the gongs and drums, each in accord with its constraints. This then is the Eight Formations Diagram, the system of four heads and eight tails. The people only see the flourishing of the music and dance; how can they know that military actions are like this?"

The T'ai-tsung said: "In antiquity, when Emperor Kao of the Han settled the realm, he wrote a song that went 'Where can I get fierce warriors to guard the four quarters?' Probably, military strategy can be transmitted as ideas but cannot be handed down as words. I created the Destruction of the Formations, but only you understand its form and substance. Will later generations realize I did not carelessly concoct it?"

The T'ai-tsung asked: "Are the five flags in their different colors for the five directions for orthodox [forces]? Are the pennants and banners for penetrating the enemy for unorthodox [forces]? Dispersing and reforming are changes; how does one realize the appropriate number of platoons?"

Li Ching said: "I have examined and employ the methods of old. In general, when three platoons combine, their flags lean toward each other but are
not crossed. When five platoons are combined, then the flags of two of them are crossed. When ten platoons are combined, then the flags of five of them are crossed. When the horn is blown, then the five crossed flags are separated, and the combined unit will again disperse to form ten [platoons]. When two crossed flags are separated, the single unit will again disperse to form five [platoons]. When the two flags leaning toward each other, but uncrossed, are separated, the single unit will again disperse to form three [platoons].

"When the soldiers are dispersed, uniting them is unorthodox; when they are united, dispersing them is unorthodox. Give the orders three times, explain them five times. Have them disperse three times, have them reform three times. Then have them reform the orthodox configuration, after which the ‘four heads and eight tails’ can be taught to them. This is what is appropriate to the [training] method for the platoons."

The T’ai-tsung lauded his discussion.

The T’ai-tsung said: "Duke Ts’ao had fighting cavalry, attack cavalry, and roving cavalry. What elements of our contemporary cavalry and army are comparable to these?"

Li Ching said: "According to the Hsin shu: ‘Fighting cavalry occupy the front, attack cavalry occupy the middle, and roving cavalry occupy the rear.’ If so, then each of them was established with a name and designation, so they were divided into three types. Generally speaking, eight cavalrymen were equivalent to twenty-four infantrymen accompanying chariots. Twenty-four cavalrymen were equivalent to seventy-two infantrymen accompanying chariots. This was the ancient system.

"The infantrymen accompanying the chariots were normally taught orthodox methods; cavalrymen were taught unorthodox ones. According to Duke Ts’ao, the cavalry in the front, rear, and middle are divided into three covering forces, but he did not speak about the two wings, so he was only discussing one aspect of the tactics. Later generations have not understood the intent of the three covering forces, so [they assume] fighting cavalry must be placed in front of the attack cavalry; how then is the roving cavalry employed? I am quite familiar with these tactics. If you turn the formation about, then the roving cavalry occupy the fore, the fighting cavalry the rear, and the attack cavalry respond to the changes of the moment to split off. These are all Duke Ts’ao’s methods."

The T’ai-tsung laughed and said: "How many people have been deluded by Ts’ao Ts’ao?"}

The T’ai-tsung said: "Chariots, infantrymen, and cavalry—these three have one method. Does their employment lie with man?"

Li Ching said: "According to the Yü-li formation recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals: ‘First the battalions [of chariots], afterward the squads of five [in the gaps].’ Then in this case they had chariots and infantrymen but no cavalry. When it refers to the left and right [flanks] resisting, it is speaking about resisting and defending, that is all! They did not employ any unorthodox strategy to attain victory.

"When Hsün Wu of Ch’in attacked the Ti [barbarian tribes], he abandoned the chariot and had [their personnel] form rows [as infantrymen]." In this case numerous cavalry would have been advantageous. He only concentrated on employing unorthodox forces to gain the victory, and was simply not concerned with resisting and defending.

"I have weighed their methods: In general, one cavalryman is equivalent to three infantrymen; chariots and infantrymen are similarly matched. When intermixed they are [governed] by a single method; their employment lies with men. How can the enemy know where my chariots will really go? Where my cavalry will really come from? Where the infantrymen will follow up [the attack]? ‘Hidden in the greatest depths of Earth, moving from the greatest heights of Heaven, his knowledge is spirit-like!’ This saying only refers to you, your Majesty. How can I be capable of such knowledge?"

The T’ai-tsung said: "T’ai Kung’s book states: ‘On an area of terrain six hundred paces square or sixty paces square, set out the pennants for the twelve constellations of the zodiac.’ What sort of tactic is this?"

Li Ching said: "Demark a perimeter of one thousand two hundred paces, total, in a square. Each section [within it] will occupy a square of [one] hundred paces on edge. Every five paces horizontally, station a man, every four paces vertically, station a man. Now two thousand five hundred men will be distributed over five occupied areas with four empty ones [remaining]. This is what is meant by a ‘formation containing a formation.’ When King Wu attacked King Chou, each Tiger Guard commanded three thousand men. Each formation had six thousand men, altogether a mass of thirty thousand. This was the T’ai Kung’s method for delineating the terrain [see Figure 2]."
The T'ai-tsung said: "How do you delineate the terrain for your Six Flower Formation?"

Li Ching said: "Large-scale maneuvers are as follows. On an area twelve hundred paces square there are six formations deployed, each occupying an area with four hundred paces [on edge]. Overall it is divided into two boxes, east and west, with an open area in the middle, one thousand two hundred paces long, for training in warfare [see Figure 3]. I once taught thirty thousand men, with each formation consisting of five thousand. One encamped; five [practiced] the square, round, curved, straight, and angular dispositions. Each formation went through all five changes, for a total of twenty-five, before we stopped."\(^{114}\)

The T'ai-tsung said: "What are the Five Phase formations?"

Li Ching said: "They originally established this name from the colors of the five quarters, but in reality they are all derived from the shape of the terrain—the square, round, curved, straight, and angular. In general, if the army does not constantly practice these five during peacetime, how can they approach the enemy? Deception is the Way [Tao] of warfare,\(^ {115}\) so they resorted to naming them the Five Phases. They described them according to the ideas of the School of Techniques and Numbers about the patterns of mutual production and conquest.\(^ {116}\) But in actuality the army's form is like water which controls its flow in accord with the terrain.\(^ {117}\) This is the main point."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Li Chi spoke about male and female, square and circular tactics for ambush. Did they exist in antiquity or not?"

Li Ching said: "The male and female methods come out of the popular tradition. In actuality they refer to yin and yang, that is all. According to Fan Li's book:\(^ {118}\) 'If you are last then use yin tactics, if you are first then use yang tactics.'\(^ {119}\) When you have exhausted the enemy's yang measures, then expand your yin to the full and seize them.' This then is the subtle mysteriousness of yin and yang according to the strategists.

"Fan Li also said: 'Establish the right as the female, increase the left to be male. At dawn and dusk accord with the Tao of Heaven.' Thus left and right, dawn and dusk are different according to the time. They lie in the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox. Left and right are the yin and yang in man, dawn and dusk are the yin and yang of Heaven. The unorthodox and orthodox are the mutual changes of yin and yang in Heaven and man. If one
have had more severe punishments and laws than the Ch'in? Emperor Kuang Wu's rise was probably due to his according with the people's hatred for Wang Mang. Moreover, Wang Hsün and Wang I did not understand military strategy and merely boasted of their army's masses. Thus in this way they defeated themselves.\textsuperscript{122}

"According to Sun-tzu: 'If you impose punishments on the troops before they have become [emotionally] attached, they will not be submissive. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have become [emotionally] attached, they cannot be used.'\textsuperscript{123} This means that normally, a general should first bind the soldiers' affection to him, and only thereafter employ severe punishments. If their affection has not yet been developed, few would be able to conquer and be successful solely by employing severe laws."

The T'ai-tsung said: "In the Shang shu it says: 'When awesomeness exceeds love, affairs will be successful. When love exceeds awesomeness, there will be no achievement.'\textsuperscript{124} What does this mean?"

Li Ching said: "Love should be established first, and awesomeness afterward—it cannot be opposite this. If awesomeness is applied first and love supplements it afterward, it will be of no advantage to the prosecution of affairs. The Shang shu was extremely careful about the end, but this is not the way plans should be made in the beginning. Thus Sun-tzu's method cannot be eliminated for ten thousand generations."

The T'ai-tsung said: "When you pacified Hsiao Hsien, our generals wanted to appropriate the households of the traitorous officials in order to reward their own officers and troops. Only you did not concur because Ku'ai T'ung had not been executed by Han Kao-tsu. The regions of the Chiang and Han rivers all submitted to you.\textsuperscript{125} From this I recall the ancients had a saying: 'The civil is able to attract and attach the masses, the martial is able to overawe the enemy.' Does this not refer to you, my lord?"

Li Ching said: "When Emperor Kuang Wu of the Han pacified the Red Eyebrows,\textsuperscript{126} he entered the rebel encampment for a tour of inspection. The rebels said: 'King Hsiao [Emperor Kuang Wu] extends his own pure heart in sympathy unto others.' This was probably due to [the king] having previously evaluated their motives and emotions as basically not being evil. Did he not have foresight?"

"When I rectified the T'u-chueh, commanding the combined troops of both Han and barbarians, even though we went outside the pass a thousand li, I never killed a single Yang Kan nor beheaded a Chung Chia.\textsuperscript{127} This, too,
was a case of extending my innate compassionate sincerity and preserving the common good, that is all! What your Majesty has heard is excessive, putting me into an unrivaled position. If it is a question of combining both the civil and martial, how would I presume to have [such ability]?

The T'ai-tsun said: "Formerly, when T'ang Chien was an emissary to the T'u-chueh, you availed yourself [of the situation] to attack and defeat them. People say you used T'ang Chien as an 'expendable spy.' Up until now I have had doubts about this. What about it?"

Li Ching bowed twice and said: "T'ang Chien and I equally served your Majesty. I anticipated that T'ang Chien's proposals would certainly not be able [to persuade them] to quietly submit. Therefore, I took the opportunity to follow up with our army and attack them. In order to eliminate a great danger I did not concern myself with a minor righteousness. Although people refer to T'ang Chien as an expendable spy, it was not my intention.

"According to Sun-tzu, employing spies is an inferior measure. I once prepared a discussion [of this subject] and at the end stated: 'Water can float a boat, but it can also overturn the boat. Some use spies to be successful; others, relying on spies, are overturned and defeated.'

"If one braids his hair and serves the ruler, maintains a proper countenance in court, is loyal and pure, trustworthy and completely sincere—even if someone excels at spying, how can he be employed [to sow discord]? T'ang Chien is a minor matter. What doubts does your Majesty have?"

The T'ai-tsun said: "Truly, 'without benevolence and righteousness one cannot employ spies.' How can the ordinary man do it? If the Duke of Chou, with his great righteousness, exterminated his relatives, how much more so one emissary? Clearly, there is nothing to doubt."

The T'ai-tsun said: "The army values being the 'host'; it does not value being a 'guest.' It values speed, not duration. Why?"

Li Ching said: "The army is employed only when there is no alternative, so what advantage is there in being a 'guest' or fighting long? Sun-tzu says: 'When provisions are transported far off, the common people are impoverished.' This is the exhaustion of a 'guest.' He also said: 'The people should not be conscripted twice, provisions should not be transported thrice.' This [comes from] the experience of not being able to long endure. When I compare and weigh the strategic power [shih] of host and guest, then there are tactics for changing the guest to host, changing the host to guest."

The T'ai-tsun said: "What do you mean?"

Li Ching said: "By foraging and capturing provisions from the enemy, you change a guest into a host. If you can cause the sated to be famished and the rested to be tired, it will change a host into a guest. Thus the army is not confined to being host or guest, slow or fast, but only focuses on its movements invariably attaining the constraints and thereby being appropriate."

The T'ai-tsun said: "Were there such cases among the ancients?"

Li Ching said: "In antiquity, Yuëh attacked Wu with two armies—one to the left, the other to the right. When they blew the horns and beat the drums to advance, Wu divided its troops to oppose them. Then Yuëh had its central army secretly ford the river. Without sounding their drums, they suddenly attacked and defeated Wu's army. This is a case of changing a guest into a host.

"When Shih Le did battle with Chi Chan, Chan's army came from a distance. Shih Le dispatched K'un Ch'ang to act as an advance front and counterattack Chan's forces. K'un Ch'ang withdrew, and Chan advanced to pursue him. Shih Le then employed his concealed forces to ambush him from both sides. Chan's army was badly defeated. This is an instance of changing the tired to the rested. The ancients had many cases like this."

The T'ai-tsun said: "Were the iron caltrops and chevaux-de-frise created by the T'ai Kung?"

Li Ching said: "They were. But they were for resisting the enemy, that is all! The army values compelling men and does not want to resist them. In the Six Secret Teachings the T'ai Kung discusses equipment for defending and repelling, not what would be used in offensives."
BOOK III

The T'ai-tsun said: "The T'ai Kung has stated: 'When infantrymen engage chariots and cavalry in battle, they must take advantage of hillocks, funeral mounds, ravines, and defiles.' Moreover, Sun-tzu said: 'Terrain that looks like fissures in the Heavens, hillocks, funeral mounds, and old fortifications should not be occupied by the army.' What about this [contradiction]?

Li Ching said: "The successful employment of the masses lies in their being of one mind. Unification of mind lies in prohibiting omens and dispelling doubts. Should the commanding general have anything about which he is doubtful or fearful, their emotions will waver. When their emotions waver, the enemy will take advantage of the chink to attack. Thus when securing an encampment or occupying terrain, it should be convenient to human affairs, that is all! Terrain such as precipitous gorges, deep canyons, ravines, and passes with high sides, natural prisons, and heavily overgrown areas are not suitable for human activity. Thus military strategists avoid leading troops into them to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage over us. Hillocks, funeral mounds, and old fortifications are not isolated terrain or places of danger. If we gain them it will be advantageous, how would it be appropriate to turn around and abandon them? What the T'ai Kung discussed is the very essence of military affairs."

The T'ai-tsun said: "I think that among implements of violence, none is more terrible than the army. If mobilizing the army is advantageous to human affairs, how can one—for the sake of avoiding evil omens—be doubtful? If in the future any of the generals fails to take appropriate action because of yin and yang or other baleful indications, my lord should repeatedly upbraid and instruct them."

Li Ching bowed twice in acknowledgment, saying: "I recall the Wu Liao-tzu states: 'The Yellow Emperor preserved them with Virtue but attacked [the evil] with punishments. This refers to [actual] punishment and Virtue, not the selection and use of astrologically auspicious seasons and days.'"

Accordingly, through the 'Tao of deceit' [the masses] should be made to follow them but should not be allowed to know this. In later ages ordinary generals have been mired in mystical techniques and for this reason have frequently suffered defeat. You cannot but admonish them. Your Majesty's sagely instructions should be disseminated to all the generals."

The T'ai-tsun said: "When the army divides and reassembles, in each case it is important that the actions be appropriate. Among the records of earlier ages, who excelled at this?"

Li Ching said: "Fu Chien commanded a mass of a million and was defeated at Fei River. This is what results when an army is able to unite but cannot divide. When Wu Han conducted a campaign of rectification against Kung-sun Shu, he split his forces with Lieutenant General Liu Shang, encamping about twenty li apart. Kung-sun Shu came forward and attacked Wu Han, whereupon Liu Shang advanced to unite with Wu Han in a counterattack, severely defeating Kung-sun Shu. This is the result that can be attained when an army divides and can reassemble. The T'ai Kung said: 'A force which wants to divide but cannot is an entangled army; one which wants to reassemble but cannot is a solitary regiment.'"

The T'ai-tsun said: "Yes. When Fu Chien first obtained Wang Meng, he truly knew how to employ the army and subsequently took the central plain. When Wang Meng died, Fu Chien was decisively defeated, so is this what is meant by an 'entangled army'? When Wu Han was appointed by Emperor Kuang Wu, the army was not controlled from a distance, and the Han were able to pacify the Shu area. Does this not indicate that the army did not fall into the difficulty of what is referred to as being a 'solitary regiment'? The historical records of gains and losses are sufficient to be a mirror for ten thousand generations."

The T'ai-tsun said: "I observe that the thousand chapters and ten thousand sentences [of the military teachings] do not go beyond 'Use many methods to cause them to make errors,' this single statement."

After a long while Li Ching said: "Truly, it is as you have wisely said. In ordinary situations involving the use of the military, if the enemy does not make an error in judgment, how can our army conquer them? It may be compared with chess where the two enemies [begin] equal in strength. As soon as someone makes a mistake, truly no one can rescue him. For this rea-
son, in both ancient and modern times, victory and defeat have proceeded from a single error, so how much more would this be the case with many mistakes?”

The T’ai-tsung said: “Are the two affairs of attacking and defending in reality one method? Sun-tzu said: ‘When one excels at attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense. When one excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack.’ He did not speak about the enemy coming forth to attack me and me also attacking the enemy. If we assume a defensive posture and the enemy also takes up a defensive position, if in attacking and defense our strengths are equal, what tactic should be employed?”

Li Ching said: “Cases such as this of mutual attack and mutual defense were, in previous ages, numerous. They all said: ‘One defends when strength is insufficient, one attacks when strength is more than sufficient.’ Thus they referred to insufficiency as being weakness and having an excess as strength. Apparently, they did not understand the methods for attack and defense. I recall Sun-tzu said: ‘One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks.’ This indicates that when the enemy cannot yet be conquered, I must temporarily defend myself. When we have waited until the point when the enemy can be conquered, then we attack him. It is not a statement about strength and weakness. Later generations did not understand his meaning, so when they should attack they defend, and when they should defend they attack. The two stages are distinct, so the method cannot be a single one.”

The T’ai-tsung said: “I can see that the concepts of surplus and insufficiency caused later generations to be confused about strength and weakness. They probably did not know that the essence of defensive strategy is to show the enemy an inadequacy. The essence of aggressive strategy lies in showing the enemy that you have a surplus. If you show the enemy an insufficiency, then they will certainly advance and attack. In this case ‘the enemy does not know where to attack.’ If you show the enemy a surplus, then they will certainly take up defensive positions. In this case ‘the enemy does not know where to mount his defense.’ Attacking and defending are one method, but the enemy and I divide it into two matters. If I succeed in this matter, the enemy’s affairs will be defeated. If the enemy is successful, then my aims will be defeated. Gaining and losing, success or failure—our aims and the ene-

my’s are at odds, but attacking and defending are one! If you understand that they are one, then in a hundred battles you will be victorious a hundred times. Thus it is said: ‘If you know yourself and you know the enemy, in a hundred battles you will not be endangered.’ This refers to the knowledge of this unity, does it not?”

Li Ching bowed twice and said: “Perfect indeed are the Sage’s methods! Attacking is the pivotal point of defense, defending is the strategy for attack. They are both directed toward victory, that is all! If in attacking you do not understand defending, and in defending you do not understand attacking, but instead not only make them into two separate affairs, but also assign responsibility for them to separate offices, then even though the mouth recites the words of Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu, the mind has not thought about the mysterious subtleties of the discussion of the equality of attack and defense. How can the reality then be known?”

The T’ai-tsung said: “The Ssu-ma Fa states that ‘even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish’ and that ‘even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will inevitably be endangered.’ Is this also one of the ways of attacking and defending?”

Li Ching said: “If one has a state and family, how could he not discuss attacking and defending? For attacking does not stop with just attacking their cities or attacking their formations. One must have techniques for attacking their minds. Defense does not end with just the completion of the walls and the realization of solid formations. One must also preserve spirit and be prepared to await the enemy. To speak of it in the largest terms, it means the Tao of rulership. To speak of it in smaller terms, it means the methods of the general. Now attacking their minds is what is referred to as ‘knowing them.’ Preserving one’s ch’i [spirit] is what is meant by ‘knowing yourself.’”

The T’ai-tsung said: “True! When I was about to engage in battle, I first evaluated the enemy’s mind by comparing it with my mind to determine who was more thoroughly prepared. Only after that could I know his situation. To evaluate the enemy’s ch’i I compared it with our own to determine who was more controlled. Only then could I know myself. For this reason, ‘know them and know yourself’ is the great essence of the military strategists. Contemporary generals, even if they do not know the enemy, ought to be able to know themselves, so how could they lose the advantage?”

Li Ching said: “What Sun-tzu meant by ‘first make yourself unconquerable’ is ‘know yourself.’ ‘Waiting until the enemy can be conquered’ is ‘knowing them.’ Moreover, he said that ‘being unconquerable lies with your-
self, while being conquerable lies with the enemy. I have not dared to neglect this admonition even for a moment.159

The T'ai-tsung said: “Sun-tzu spoke about strategies by which the ch'i of the Three Armies may be snatched away: ‘In the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; and at dusk their ch'i is exhausted. One who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted.’ How is this?”

Li Ching said: “Whoever has life and a natural endowment of blood, if they die without a second thought when the drums are sounded to do battle, it is the ch'i which causes it to be so. Thus methods for employing the army require first investigating our own officers and troops, stimulating our ch'i for victory, and only then attacking the enemy. Among Wu Chi’s four vital points, the vital point of ch'i is foremost.161 There is no other Tao. If one can cause his men themselves to want to fight, then no one will be able to oppose their ardor. What [Sun-tzu] meant by the ch'i being ardent in the morning is not limited to those hours alone. He used the beginning and end of the day as an analogy. In general, if the drum has been sounded three times but the enemy’s ch'i has neither declined nor become depleted, then how can you cause it to invariably become indolent or exhausted? Probably, those who study the text merely recite the empty words and are misled by the enemy. If one could enlighten them with the principles for snatching away the ch'i, the army could be entrusted to them.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “You once said that General Li Chi162 is capable in military strategy, but can he be employed indefinitely or not? If I am no longer around to control and direct him, [I fear] he cannot be used. In the future, how should the heir apparent direct him?”

Li Ching said: “If I were to plan on behalf of your Majesty, nothing would be better than [for you] to dismiss Li Chi and have the heir apparent reemploy him. Then he would certainly feel grateful and think how to repay him. In principle, is there any harm in this?163

The T'ai-tsung said: “Excellent. I have no doubts about it.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “If I order Li Shih-chi and Chang-sun Wu-chi164 to take the reigns of government together, what do you think?”

Li Ching said: “[Li] Chi is loyal and righteous. I can guarantee that he will uphold his duties. [Chang-sun] Wu-chi followed your commands and made great contributions. Because he is a relative, your Majesty has entrusted him with the office of Deputy Minister. But while in external demeanor he is deferential to other officials, within he is actually jealous of the Worthy. Thus Yü-chih Ching-te165 pointed out his shortcomings to his face and then retired. Hou Chün-chi hated him for forgetting old [friends], and as a result he revolted and turned against you.166 These were both brought about by Wu-chi. Since you questioned me about this, I did not dare avoid discussing it.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “Do not let it leak out. I will ponder how to settle it.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “Emperor Han Kao-tsu was able to command his generals, but later on Han Hsin and P'eng Yué were executed, and Hsiao Ho was imprisoned.167 What is the reason for this?”

Li Ching said: “I observe that neither Liu Pang nor Hsiang Yu were rulers capable of commanding generals.168 At the time of Ch'in’s collapse, Chang Liang originally wanted to gain revenge for his [old state of] Han, while Ch'en P'ing and Han Hsin both resented Hsiang Yu’s failure to employ them.169 Therefore they availed themselves of Han’s strategic power. Hsiao Ho, Ts’ao Ts’an, Fan K’ai, and Kuan Ying were all fleeing for their lives.170 Han Kao-tsu gained All under Heaven through relying upon them. If he had caused the descendants of the Six States to be reestablished, all the people would have embraced their old states.171 Then even if he had the ability to command generals, who could the Han have employed? I have said that the Han gained the realm through Chang Liang borrowing [Kao-tsu’s] chopsticks and Hsiao Ho’s achievements in managing water transportation. From this standpoint, Han Hsin and P’eng Yué being executed and Fan Tseng not being used [by Hsiang Yu] are the same.172 I therefore refer to Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu as rulers incapable of commanding generals.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “The Later Han Emperor Kuang-wu, who restored the dynasty, was thereafter able to preserve complete his meritorious generals and did not entrust them with civil affairs. Is this being good at commanding generals?”

Li Ching said: “Although Emperor Kuang-wu availed himself of the glories of the Former Han and easily attained success, still Wang Mang’s strate-
Li Ching said: “They cannot. The military is the Tao of deceit, so if we [apparently] put faith in yin and yang divinatory practices, we can manipulate the greedy and stupid. They cannot be abandoned.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “You once said that selecting astrologically auspicious seasons and days are not methods of enlightened generals. Ignorant generals adhere to them, so it seems appropriate to abandon them.”

Li Ching said: “King Chou perished on a day designated as chaia-tzu. King Wu flourished on the same day. According to the astrologically auspicious seasons and days, chaia-tzu is the first day. The Shang were in chaos, the Chou were well governed. Flourishing and perishing are different in this case. Moreover, Emperor Wu of the Sung mobilized his troops on a ‘going to perish day.’ The army’s officers all felt it to be impermissible, but the emperor said: ‘I will go forth and he will perish.’ Indeed, he conquered them. Speaking with reference to these cases, it is clear that the practices can be abandoned. However, when T’ien Tan was surrounded by Yen, Tan ordered a man to impersonate a spirit. He bowed and prayed to him, and the spirit said Yen could be destroyed. Tan thereupon used fire oxen to go forth and attack Yen, greatly destroying them. This is the deceitful Tao of military thinkers. The selection of astrologically auspicious seasons and days is similar to this.”

The T'ai-tsung said: “T’ien Tan entrusted their fate to the supernatural and destroyed Yen, while the T’ai Kung burned the milfoil and tortoise shells yet went on to exterminate King Chou. How is it that these two affairs are contradictory?”

Li Ching said: “Their subtle motives were the same. One went contrary to the practices and seized the enemy, one accorded with them and implemented his plans.”

“In antiquity, when the T’ai Kung was assisting King Wu, they reached Mu-yeh where they encountered thunder and rain. The flags and drums were broken or destroyed. San I-sheng wanted to divine for an auspicious response before moving. This, then, is a case where because of doubts and fear within the army, he felt they must rely on divination to inquire of the spirits. [But] the T’ai Kung believed that rotted grass and dried-up bones were not worth asking. Moreover, in the case of a subject attacking his ruler, how could there be a second chance? Now I observe that San I-sheng expressed his motives at the beginning, but the T’ai Kung attained his subsequently. Even though one was contrary to and the other in accord with divinatory
practices], their reasons were identical. When I previously stated these techniques should not be abandoned, it was largely to preserve the vital point of ch'i before affairs have begun to manifest themselves. As for their being successful, it was a matter of human effort, that is all!"

The T'ai-tsung said: "At present there are only three real generals—Li Chi, Li Tao-tsung, and Hstueh Wan-ch'e. Apart from Li Tao-tsung, a relative, who can undertake great responsibility?"

Li Ching said: "Your Majesty once said that when employing the army, Li Chi and Li Tao-tsung will not achieve great victories, but neither will they suffer disastrous defeats, while if Wan-ch'e does not win a great victory, he will inevitably suffer a serious defeat. In my ignorance I have thought about your Sagely words. An army which does not seek great victory but also does not suffer serious defeat is constrained and disciplined. An army which may achieve great victory or suffer horrendous defeat relies upon good fortune to be successful. Thus Sun Wu said: 'One who excels at warfare establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy.' This says that constraint and discipline lie with us."

The T'ai-tsung said: "When two formations approach each other, should we not want to fight, how can we attain it?"

Li Ching said: "In antiquity the Chin army attacked Ch'in, engaged in battle with them, and then withdrew. The Ssu-ma Fa states: 'Do not pursue a fleeing enemy too far nor follow a retreating army too closely.' I refer to those retreating as being under the control of the reins. If our army already is constrained and disciplined while the enemy's army is also in well-ordered rows and squads, how can [either side] lightly engage in combat? Thus when they [both] go forth, clash, and then withdraw without being pursued, each side is defending against loss and defeat. Sun-tzu said: 'Do not attack well-regulated formations, do not intercept well-ordered flags.' When two formations embody equal strategic power [shih], should one lightly move he may create an opportunity for the enemy to gain the advantage and thereby suffer a great defeat. [Strategic] principles cause it to be thus. For this reason armies encounter situations in which they will not fight and those in which they must fight. Not engaging in battle lies with us; having to fight lies with the enemy."

The T'ai-tsung said: "What do you mean 'not engaging in battle lies with us'?"

Li Ching said: "Sun Wu has stated: 'If I do not want to engage in battle, I will draw a line on the ground and defend it. They will not be able to engage us in battle because we thwart their movements.' If the enemy has [capable] men, the interval between the clash and retreat cannot yet be planned. Thus I said that not engaging in battle lies with us. As for having to fight lying with the enemy, Sun Wu has stated: 'One who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them; with his main force he awaits them.' If the enemy lacks talented officers, they will certainly come forth and fight. I then take advantage of the situation to destroy them. Thus I said that having to fight lies with the enemy."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Profound indeed! The constrained and disciplined army—when it realizes appropriate strategies—flourishes, but when it lacks them perishes. My lord, please compile and record the writings of those through the ages who excelled at constraint and discipline, provide diagrams, and submit them to me. I will select the quintessential ones to be transmitted to later ages."

[Li Ching said: "I previously submitted two diagrams of the Yellow Emperor's and T'ai Kung's dispositions together with the Ssu-ma Fa and Chu-ko Liang's strategies for the unorthodox and orthodox. They are already highly detailed. Numerous famous historical generals employed one or two of them and achieved success. But official historians have rarely understood military matters, so they were unable to properly record the substance of their achievements. Would I dare not accept your Majesty's order? I will prepare a compilation and narration for you."]

The T'ai-tsung said: "What is of greatest importance in military strategy?"

Li Ching said: "I once divided it into three levels to allow students to gradually advance into it. The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven and Earth, and the third Methods of Generalship. As for the Tao, it is the most essential and subtle, what the I Ching refers to as "all-perceiving and all-knowing, [allowing one to be] spiritual and martial without slaying." Now what is discussed under Heaven is yin and yang; what is discussed under Earth is the narrow and easy. One who excels at employing the army is able to use the yin to snatch the yang, the narrow to attack the easy. It is what Mencius referred to as the 'seasons of Heaven and advantages of Earth.'"
The Methods of Generalship discusses employing men and making the weapons advantageous—what the Three Strategies means by saying that one who gains the right officers will prosper, and the Kuan-tzu by saying that the weapons must be solid and sharp."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Yes. I have said that an army which can cause men to submit without fighting is the best; one that wins a hundred victories in a hundred battles is mediocre; and one that uses deep moats and high fortifications for its own defense is the lowest. If we use this as a standard for comparison, all three are fully present in Sun-tzu's writings."

Li Ching said: "We can also distinguish them if we scrutinize their writings and retrace their undertakings. For example, Chang Liang, Fan Li, and Sun Wu abandoned the world to withdraw into lofty isolation. No one knows where they went. If they had not penetrated the Tao, how could they have done it? Yueh I, Kuan Chung, and Chu-ko Liang were always victorious in battle and solid in defense. If they had not investigated and understood the seasons of Heaven and the advantages of Earth, how could they have succeeded? Next would be Wang Meng's preservation of Ch'in and Hsieh An's defense of Chin. If they had not employed [outstanding] generals and selected talented men, repaired and solidified their defenses, how could they have managed? Thus the study of military strategy must be from the lowest to middle and then from the middle to highest, so that they will gradually penetrate the depths of the teaching. If not, they will only be relying on empty words. Merely remembering and reciting them is not enough to succeed."

The T'ai-tsung said: "Taoists shun three generations [of a family] serving as generals. [Military teachings] should not be carelessly transmitted, yet should also not be not transmitted. Please pay careful attention to this matter."

Li Ching bowed twice and went out, and turned all his military books over to Li Chi.
Appendix A: The Chariot

The role and importance of chariots as well as the date of their introduction have been the subject of several articles in recent decades. Unquestionably, the chariot was introduced from the West through central Asia around the fourteenth century B.C., and then the transmission route was probably severed because subsequent major Western developments were never reflected in China. (Hayashi Minao confidently asserts that the Shang had chariots by 1300 B.C. and that they were used in hunting.) Edward L. Shaughnessy holds that the chariot's introduction should be dated to 1200 B.C.\(^1\) Support for the theory of diffusion rather than indigenous origin is seen in the absence of any precursor, such as oxen-pulled wagons or four-wheeled carts, although horses were domesticated prior to this period.\(^2\)

Although the construction of the Chinese chariot was substantially the same as its Western prototype, the earliest chariots unearthed thus far have several distinctive characteristics: Each wheel has many more spokes—sometimes as many as forty-eight; wheel shape is conical; and the chariot box is rectangular and larger than is the case in the West and can accommodate three men standing in triangular formation.\(^3\) (Some of these developments are also seen in an intermediate stage in the Trans-Caucasus versions discovered in this century.\(^4\)) No major alterations occur after its introduction, although there was a historical tendency toward stronger, heavier, swifter vehicles. Significant minor innovations and refinements naturally continued over the centuries, such as in the method of mounting the chariot box on the axle and in the yoking, with a continuing differentiation into types by use. (Even the Shang apparently had specialized chariots or carriages for ordinary transport, chariots designed for combat and the hunt—perhaps in limited numbers—and something similar to wagons for conveying goods.\(^5\))

In the Shang the chariot was a highly visible symbol of rank and power and was elaborately decorated, often being covered with imperial gifts of insignia. However, perhaps because of their greater numbers, chariots in the
Chou were more pragmatic and functional, although they still conspicuously displayed marks of royal favor. Finally, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, highly specialized chariots and other wheeled vehicles were created to suit the requirements of siege warfare and other specialized assault tasks; they were equipped with large shields, towers, battering rams, movable ladders, and multiple arrow crossbows.

Tradition holds that Hsi Chung—either as a minister under the Yellow Emperor or in the Hsia dynasty—created the chariot. The Shang reputedly employed either seventy or three hundred chariots to overthrow the Hsia, but this is improbable. The actual degree to which the Shang employed chariots remains somewhat controversial; some scholars find no evidence that the Shang employed chariots as a battle element, whereas others—especially traditionally oriented experts such as Ku Chieh-kang—maintain qualified opposing views. However, certain facts are known. For example, even in the later years of the dynasty, Shang knights were apparently fighting on foot as infantrymen rather than from chariots. Some of their enemies, however, seem to have employed them in substantial numbers compared with their overall forces.

The Chou are traditionally noted for increasing the horsepower of their assault chariots, using four rather than two horses. (Shang tombs also have chariots with four horses, but these may have been for funerary display rather than for actual use.) One explanation for the Chou's startling victory—apart from their superior Virtue and the support of the people—is the swiftness of their movement and their unexpected crossing of the Yellow River to the south, thereby avoiding Shang defenses to the west. (According to the Shih chi, the Shang ruler significantly furthered the Chou's efforts by consciously ignoring their approach until they were suddenly upon him.) In the actual battle three hundred chariots were probably employed, which matches the reported three thousand members of the Tiger Guard, assuming the ten-to-one ratio that is frequently suggested. The swiftness and ferocity of the assault surprised the Shang and might be attributed to the Chou's superior and perhaps first effective use of chariot power.

Significant clashes between the Chou and their steppe neighbors in which considerable numbers of chariots were employed apparently commenced in the first centuries of Chou rule; in one such encounter 130 enemy vehicles were reportedly captured. Massed chariot battles were occurring by the ninth century B.C. and continued throughout the Western Chou era and into the Spring and Autumn period. However, the effectiveness of the chariot under actual combat conditions has been questioned in recent decades by Creel and others. Although the chariot promised power, speed, and mobil-
stantly failed of their own accord—suffering broken axles, becoming mired, getting tangled in branches, and falling into unseen gullies. Perhaps because of these limitations, coupled with their cost and extensive training requirements, the only effective way for armies to expand was with infantrymen. However, the growth of infantry divisions obviously reflected changing social and political conditions as well as a number of other factors, and experts such as Yang Hung explicitly deny that the problems of chariot employment caused them to be replaced.\textsuperscript{20}

Appendix B: The Horse and Cavalry

The horse was domesticated in China in neolithic times but was not ridden. The indigenous breed, which had a distribution through the steppe region, was apparently rather small—especially compared with the mounts of the nomadic peoples who appeared on China’s western borders around the fifth century B.C. (Creel dogmatically asserts that no evidence exists for mounted riders in China prior to about 300 B.C.,\textsuperscript{1} but Shaughnessy suggests the Chinese were encountering mounted riders by the end of the Spring and Autumn period in 484 B.C.\textsuperscript{2} Some traditional scholars, on the basis of scant archaeological evidence, have argued for a long indigenous development period and for the existence of riding and hunting as early as the Shang, but this view is largely discredited.\textsuperscript{3} Others claim that a Tso chuan entry indicates that barbarians were waging mounted warfare by 664 B.C.\textsuperscript{4} Pulleyblank\textsuperscript{5} and Yetts\textsuperscript{6} basically concur with Creel. However, there are historical references to the famous general Wu Ch‘i [440?–361 B.C.] riding on horseback; a similar passage is found in the Wu-tzu [which is conveniently employed to discredit the work’s authenticity]. Passages in the Six Secret Teachings that discuss the tactical employment of cavalry are also consigned to a late Warring States date on the basis of King Wu-ling’s innovation in 307 B.C.\textsuperscript{7}"

Prior to the fifth century B.C. the nomads were still on foot and fought as infantry or employed chariots. In the fourth century the Hu peoples initiated the first mounted incursions against the northern border states of Chao and Yen. Their horses offered them the obvious advantages of speed, mobility, and freedom in targeting, immediately spreading the requirements of static defense over much larger areas. Consequently, King Wu-ling of Chao resolved to force his warriors to imitate the barbarian mode of dress (trousers and short jackets) because he believed such attire was critical in unleashing the cavalry’s power. Apparently, his intent was to increase the army’s aggressive potential rather than simply to cope with the Hu, who were not particularly formidable, because he subsequently attempted to flank and invade
Ch'in from the north. Thereafter, the horse and cavalry grew in importance but until the Han dynasty, they remained a minor element in the army despite the tactics proposed by strategists such as Sun Pin and the T'ai Kung (of the Six Secret Teachings rather than the historical figure). According to their works, the cavalry provides mobility; frees the army from having its main assault weapon (hitherto the chariot) confined to level terrain; and permits the development of unorthodox maneuvers. Throughout the Warring States period, chariots remained more important than the cavalry (although in terms of power and numbers, the infantry came to play a greater role). Even the conquering Ch'in army, however, only included about ten percent cavalry. Liu Pang, founder of the Han, created an elite cavalry unit to turn the tide in his final battles with Hsiang Yu, but this still only amounted to twenty percent of his total forces.

Subsequently, Han Wu-ti, the great expansionist emperor of the Former Han—determined to secure the famous, superior horses from the distant nomads—dispatched major campaign armies into central Asia to subjugate recalcitrant peoples and seize the horses by force. One hundred thousand cavalry, accompanied by as many supply wagons, embarked on the campaign of 128 to 119 B.C. From this time on the chariot ceased to have any tactical fighting role (although there was an abortive attempt by Fang Kuan in the T'ang era to reconstruct and follow the antique ways). From perhaps the middle of the Former Han era, the cavalry became an independent battle element that provided focal power for orthodox tactics and flexibility for executing unorthodox tactics. With the invention of stirrups and the development of an effective saddle, heavy cavalry became possible, although it was displaced again by light cavalry with the approach of the T'ang. T'ang Tai-tsong made particularly effective use of the cavalry in wresting control of the empire and was famous for his horsemanship. He was perhaps of nomadic ancestry and well understood the effectiveness of cavalry (as is seen in the military work bearing his name and the accompanying translator's introduction).

Appendix C: Armor and Shields

The primitive armor of the predynastic neolithic period and the Hsia probably consisted of animal skins, including those of the fearsome tiger, with little alteration. From the Shang through the end of the Warring States, leather—generally fashioned from cowhide, although sometimes from rhino or buffalo—comprised the basic material. When employed in conjunction with large shields, leather armor apparently provided adequate protection against the bronze weapons of the period. Based on evidence from the Chou (and assuming essential continuity between the Shang and Chou), the mighty Shang warriors wore two-piece leather armor that covered the front and back as well as bronze helmets. As the scope and intensity of conflict increased in the early Chou, construction techniques changed dramatically—shifting from two large pieces to multiple small rectangles strung into rows with leather thongs, the rows then being overlaid to create a lamellar tunic. The individual pieces were cut from leather that had been tanned, lacquered, and finally colored (frequently with red or black pigmented lacquer or perhaps decorated with fierce motifs). Due to the perishable nature of such materials, the exact course of their evolution remains indistinct, but such armor probably displaced two-piece models by the Spring and Autumn period.

Armor was apparently specialized, suited to the warrior’s function and his mode of fighting. For example, that for charioteers—who remained basically stationary once ensconced in their vehicles—was generally long and cumbersome, protecting the entire body while primarily leaving the arms free. However, the infantry—which was heavily dependent on agility and foot speed for both its survival and aggressiveness—obviously fought with shorter leather tunics, fewer restrictive leg protectors, and far less overall weight. When the cavalry developed, although they could easily sustain more weight than infantrymen, their legs had to be unrestricted (but protected against outside attacks), which accounts for the adoption of barbarian-style trousers and short tunics. Furthermore, until the invention of the stirrups, excess weight would also contribute further to the rider’s instability.
Thus heavy cavalry did not develop until the post-Han, only to be again displaced by swifter, lighter elements within a few centuries.

Even after the development of iron and its application for agricultural implements and weapons, iron armor—which was necessary to withstand the greater firepower of the crossbow as well as perhaps stronger iron swords—did not displace leather until well into the Han (coincident with the replacement of the bronze sword). Bronze armor may have existed in the early Chou, and the use of some combination of leather with perhaps a reinforcing bronze outer piece (particularly for the shield) is evident. However, until the advent of iron plates imitating the leather lamellar construction—thus ensuring flexibility and endurable weight—metal appears to have been extremely rare. Even in the Han and thereafter, leather never entirely disappeared, being employed in a supplementary fashion.

Shields—an essential adjunct to every warrior’s defensive equipment—were generally constructed on a wooden frame over which lacquered leather or various lacquered cloth materials were stretched. All-wood shields as well as those made from reeds and rushes obviously existed in some regions and in different eras, although their history has yet to be reconstructed. But as with body armor, leather was the material of choice, sometimes with additional protective layers of bronze. With the rise of iron weapons and the crossbow, iron shields also appeared but apparently not in great numbers until late in the Warring States or the Han dynasty.

Helmets were fashioned from bronze throughout the period, although iron helmets had appeared by the beginning of the Warring States. However, as with the iron sword and armor, they did not dominate until at least the Han.

Chariots, which evolved little over the period, also used lacquered leather for reinforcement, as is noted in Wu Chü’s initial interview with the king in the Wu-tzu. Protection for the horse—the prime target—was also considered important and may have originated late in the Warring States period. However, again it was not until the Han that equine armor became both massive and extensive, reflecting the newly dominant role of the cavalry and the need to protect the valuable steeds. Outside stimuli from the mounted, highly mobile steppe peoples may have also contributed to the development of armor (and perhaps some weapons), but most developments were indigenous rather than imitative.

Appendix D: The Sword

Although there are a few dissenting voices and much controversy about the origin, evolution, and numbers of swords, it appears that the true sword—one with the blade more than double the length of the haft—did not really develop in China until late in the Spring and Autumn period. Prior to this time warriors carried daggers, spear heads, and sometimes a short sword—all of which were fashioned from bronze. (However, based on recent archaeological evidence, some traditionally oriented scholars have deduced that Western Chou warriors carried bronze swords. An occasional artifact from the Shang is also classified as a “sword” in the literature, but when its dimensions are considered, the blade rarely exceeds the length of the haft by much—consigning it instead to the category of short swords or long daggers.)

Swords in the Western Chou and Spring and Autumn periods were designed for piercing and thrusting, not for slashing and cutting attacks. With the advent of the infantry, weapons for close combat necessarily supplemented and then began to displace the halberd and other chariot-oriented war implements. In addition to the sword, the short or hand chi (spear-tipped halberd capable of thrusting attacks much like a spear) became very common among Warring States infantrymen—particularly in states where chariots were tactically unsuitable, such as Wu and Yüeh.

Some scholars have coupled the final evolution and proliferation of the sword to the development of the cavalry in the late Warring States period and subsequently the Han dynasty. Extremely long swords, especially double-edged ones, would be both dangerous and unwieldy for cavalrymen; therefore, the excessively long swords that developed in the late Warring States and early Han were probably exclusively for infantrymen and were simply ceremonial.

Theories of origin range from imitation of steppe weapons to totally indigenous development without any nonmetallic precursors. One theory holds that warriors in the Shang and Early Chou carried spearheads as a sort of
short dagger and that from these—especially as the spearheads became longer and stronger—the short dagger with a handle and then the elongated sword, evolved. As the technology of metalworking progressed, improvements in shape, durability, sharpness, and appearance rapidly followed. However, whatever their origin, swords with slashing power and considerable length in comparison with the handle really only flourished in the late Warring States, Ch'in, and Han.  

As the cavalry became the dominant battle element in the armed forces, the sword evolved to match its requirements. Thus from the Han onward, a single-edged sword with a ring handle—actually termed a “knife”—gradually displaced the long swords of the Warring States. Thereafter, metalworking continually improved, especially layering and surface treatment; and two distinctive trends emerged—one toward higher-quality, shorter, functional-edged weapons; the other toward purely ceremonial and elaborately decorated symbolic swords. Steel “knives” became the sword of choice for both infantrymen and cavalrymen as the T'ang—the era of the last of the Seven Military Classics—approached.

(Although this brief sketch is inadequate for any true understanding of the sword and its history, a more extensive consideration requires a separate book. Readers with a command of Asian languages should consult Hayashi Minao’s detailed but somewhat dated work and similar writings in Chinese.)

Appendix E: Military Organization

Military organization in all its aspects—such as the development of administrative districts, population registration, and universal military service obligations—requires a separate study. Opinions on many aspects—including fundamentals, questions of origin, and early history—are far from unanimous. However, because knowledge of the basic organizational methods and principles is helpful to understanding much of the Seven Military Classics, a brief overview is undertaken here.

The critical problem in characterizing organization in the Shang dynasty is the uncertain role the chariot played because some scholars believe the chariot comprised the core element around which the company—the basic military unit—was formed. If chariots were insignificant or only played a transport role, this would obviously not be possible. Consequently, two theories must be considered: chariot-centered and clan-centered. In the former, the chariot—manned by three members of the nobility—would be accompanied by conscripted commoners, probably ten men per chariot. Their function was strictly supportive; because they would be drawn from the state’s farming and artisan populations as well as from each noble’s personal retainers—in an age when bronze weapons were expensive and limited in numbers—they were only minimally armed. Based on burial patterns, this line of thought holds that the chariots were organized into squads of five, either three or five squads to a company. Each squad would be supported by a one-hundred-man infantry company with (in some views) a complement of twenty-five officers. A battalion composed of three or five squads with associated infantry would constitute an operational unit. (Conclusive evidence for these reconstructions is lacking.)

Another view—based on excavated tombs—suggests the total number per tsu, or company, was one hundred: three officers for the chariot and seventy-two infantry organized into three platoons, supported by a supply vehicle staffed by twenty-five. However, this conceptualization seems to derive from
the later idealization found in the Chou li and more likely describes the state of affairs late in the Spring and Autumn.\(^4\)

Considerable textual evidence suggests that the clan composed the basic organizational unit, with the tsu (a different character than that above) again numbering one hundred men.\(^5\) The members would all be from the nobility, under the command of the clan chief—who would normally also be the king, an important vassal, or a local feudal lord. Thus organized, they probably fought as infantry units, although chariots could also have been integrated for transport and command purposes. (According to Hsi Cho-yin, clan units [tsu] still actively participated in the pitched battles of the Spring and Autumn.\(^6\) Ten such companies probably comprised a shib, which was basically an army of one thousand men; in fact, the term shib should be considered synonymous with “army” in this period.\(^7\) The word normally translated as “army”—ch'in—does not appear until the Spring and Autumn.\(^8\)

Early Western Chou military organization would have been essentially the same, but with the units definitely chariot-centered. As discussed in a footnote to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings, the three thousand famous Tiger Warriors at the epoch-making battle of Mu-yeh would appropriately work out to a ratio of ten men per chariot. Thereafter, the infantry expanded as the number associated with each chariot gradually increased, until by the early Spring and Autumn the ratio was perhaps twenty, twenty-two, or even thirty foot soldiers per vehicle.\(^9\) In the Spring and Autumn period—the classic age of chariot warfare depicted in the Tso chuan—the systematic grouping of men into squads of five, with a vertical hierarchy mapped out on multiples of five, seems to have developed and become prevalent.\(^10\) This is the period described by passages in several of the Military Classics and the Chou li, during which seventy-two infantrymen accompanied each chariot, deployed in three platoons characterized as left, center, and right (these designations were nominal; actual positioning depended on their function. For example, on easy terrain the center platoon would follow the chariot, whereas on difficult terrain it would precede it—both as a defensive measure and to clear obstacles.\(^11\) Whether the officers were included among the one hundred also seems to be a matter of debate.\(^12\)

From the Chou li and some of the military writings, the following chart can be constructed, with rough Western equivalents as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Possible Western Equivalents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liang</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tsu</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>li</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>battalion (regiment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shib</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>regiment (brigade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ch'in</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>army (corps)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Western equivalents are relative; their definition depends on the era and country of organization.\(^13\) The columns represent a set of alternatives, so that if regiment is used for li, then brigade (or perhaps division) should be used for shib. The term li is an ancient one; it was originally used by the Shang to designate a military unit that reportedly expanded to ten thousand for one campaign, but it also may have referred to the standing army.\(^14\) Subsequently, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it was combined with the character for army—ch'in—as ch'in-li to indicate the army or military units in general. In its original meaning, it apparently referred to “men serving under a flag.”

As already noted, the term for army—ch'in—appeared only in the Spring and Autumn and then only in the central states because the peripheral states, such as Ch'u, had their own distinct forms of organization.\(^15\) The term “Three Armies” (san ch'in) encountered throughout the military texts normally refers to the army in general, not just to three units of army strength according to the above chart.\(^16\) Early Chou theory asserted that the king alone had the right to maintain six armies (shib); a great feudal lord, three armies; lesser lords, two armies; and the least of them, one army. All of the vassal armies could and would be called on to supplement the royal forces and support the dynasty in the military campaigns that were generally mounted to suppress either rebellious states or nomadic peoples. With the rise of the hegemons in the Spring and Autumn period, states such as Chin simply disregarded both the Chou house and its prerogatives, eventually fielding as many as six armies.\(^17\)

In the earliest stage of the Shang and Chou, force size was apparently irregular; it was enumerated, constituted, and organized to meet the situation and the demand. However, with the vastly augmented scope of conflict in the Warring States and the imposition of universal service obligations, military hierarchy and discipline became essential, as is evident from the emphasis on them in the Seven Military Classics. Actual service demands made on the newly registered populace also increased from the Spring and Autumn into the Warring States; at first, only a single male in each family was required to serve, then all males were so required. This mirrored early Chou trends when all the people who dwelled within the state (kuo) trained and were obligated to fight but were universally mobilized only in the most dire circumstances.\(^18\)

With the creation and imposition of hierarchical administrative systems for the populace (both variants—the village and district—began late in the Spring and Autumn in Chin and Ch'u, perhaps originating with Kuan Chung), the male population could be quickly summoned for active duty. The village and district groups of five and twenty-five were immediately
translated into squads and platoons. Local officials at all levels would immediately become officers at the respective unit level, although there were professional military personnel for the higher ranks and a standing army to form the army's core. This meant that the total qualified populace could be mobilized for military campaigns, and that virtually an entire country could go to war.

Notes

Abbreviations Used in the Notes
(See also the lists at the beginning of the notes to individual translations.)

AA Acta Asiatica
AM Asia Major
BIHP Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology
BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CC Chinese Culture
CCY Ch'eng chu chiu-i editions
EC Early China
GSR Grammatica Serica Recensa (Bernhard Karlgren, BMFEA 29 [1957])
HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
JAS Journal of the American Oriental Society
JAS Journal of Asian Studies
JCP Journal of Chinese Philosophy
JCNCBRAS Journal of the North Central Branch, Royal Asiatic Society
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
KK K'ao-ku hsieh-pao
MS Monumenta Serica
PEW Philosophy East and West
TP T'oung Pao
WW Wen-wu

General Introduction and Historical Background of the Classics

1. The Confucius (551–479 B.C.) of the Analects demands courage and resoluteness in the practice of righteousness and requires that his disciples always do what is appropriate. He cultivated the six arts, which included chariot driving and archery, and in other texts refers to the terrible visage of the righteous man when he dons his armor. He also indicated that the chün-teu, or perfected man, does not compete, which was taken by later Confucians as evidence that conflict and warfare are inappropriate for civi-
lized men. Other early Confucians, such as Mencius (371–289 B.C.) and Hsun-tzu (a Confucian of the late Warring States period who wrote extensively on military affairs), were cognizant of the inescapable necessity of wars and armies. Only after several centuries, as the Confucians became further removed from the pristine spirit of their founder and the realities of the early century, did the tendency toward pacification, or (perhaps more correctly) the evil, emerge and gain ascendancy. This is a complex topic that requires an extensive separate analytic work.

2. The dates assigned to the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods vary somewhat depending on the writer's predilections. The Ch'un chi (or Spring and Autumn Annals, which chronicles events from 722 to 481 B.C.), was traditionally held to have been edited didactically by Confucius and was one of the essential Five Classics. (Confucius no doubt used the work for educational purposes and may have emended it to some extent, but he cannot be considered the compiler or editor in any real sense.) The Tso chuan, purportedly a commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals but in actuality a self-existent work that portrays the period in considerable detail, covers the years 722 to 468 B.C. (or 464 B.C.; opinion seems to vary). The Intrigues of the Warring States contains some material from the early fifth century B.C., but it basically records the people and events of the period 403–221 B.C., when the Ch'in officially assumed the mantle of imperial rule. Thus the Spring and Autumn period should refer to 722 to 481 B.C. and the Warring States era to 403–221 B.C., traditional dates that are adopted herein. However, there is also considerable logic to dating the Spring and Autumn period from the movement of the Western Chou capital to the east in 771 B.C. and extending the Warring States period to cover the interval between the end of the Tso chuan material and 403 B.C. This gives dates such as those Herreli G. Creel (The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 47) adopts: 770–464 and 463–222 B.C.

3. Lord Shang (died 338 B.C.), although much reviled by Confucian tradition, had great impact in reforming the laws and institutions of the state of Ch'in. Among his important contributions were imposing stringent laws; advocating and implementing a severe but certain system of rewards and punishments; restricting the conferring of rank to military achievements; organizing the entire populace as well as the military into groups of five and ten, thereby creating a dual-purpose, mutual guarantee system that facilitated immediate conscription; and eliminating the boundary paths between fields, making land a salable commodity. (Some of these reforms may have antecedents, including those involving the military. For example, see Fu Shao-chieh, Wu-tzu chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, p. 17.)


5. "Virtue," although encompassing the basic meaning of moral virtue, was the object of much complex thought in ancient China and came to have numerous nuances and technical meanings, including "power" and "potency." Some of these are discussed briefly in the footnotes to the translations. In general, "Virtue" (capitalized) is used to translate the term te whenever the transcendent dimensions are critical—when the cultivation of te (virtue) leads to Virtue, which is synonymous with moral achievement and the inner power that accompanies it. Within the context of Taoist texts and to a certain extent military writings influenced by them, the term te indicates inner potency or power—generally as contrasted with and distinguished from the moral and ethical realm because the artificial constraints of rites, morals, and ethics were anathema to most Taoist-oriented thinkers (neo-Taoism and eclectic works excepted). A specialized body of literature has developed in recent years, due partly to the discovery of previously unknown manuscripts; these writings offer various conceptualizations and systematizations under the rubric of "Huang-Lao" thought, although there is by no means universal accord that these trends constitute a school or an affiliation. Specialists are no doubt aware of them, but the general reader may find Arthur Waley's classic comments on the term te in his introduction to The Way and Its Power (Grove Press, New York, 1958), or D. C. Lau's thoughts in his translation of the Tao Te Ching (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1982) of interest. (Also see the notes to the translator's introduction to the Art of War translation in the present volume, especially number 24, for further discussion and sources, and Aat Vervoorn's article "Taoism, Legalism, and the Quest for Order in Warring States China," JCP, Vol. 8, No. 3 [September 1981], pp. 303–324.)

Throughout we translate te as "virtue" when it refers to morals and ethics and as "Virtue" when it connotes the attainment of a special status—with inherent power—through the cultivation of virtue, which is not unlike the original meaning of virtus. The questions of its transcendent dimensions, relationship to potency, and metaphysical realization in warfare command must be left to another book and the studies of experts.

6. Every "civilized" dynasty, including the Shang, appears to have exploited "barbarian"—defined by reference to the dynasty's own self-perceived level of civilization—peoples against others, similar peoples. In many cases they were even settled in the frontier regions, just within state borders, and shouldered the burden of dynastic defense. However, this first appeared as an articulated policy in the Han era and was symptomatic of the steppe-sedentary conflict. Discussions may be found in Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Beacon Press, Boston, 1962); Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967); and Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989).

7. This discussion of the Shang is based on standard Western texts and monographs, such as Kwang-chih Chang's Shang Civilization (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980) and Cheng Te-k'un's Shang China (Heffer, Cambridge, 1960), supplemented by the normal range of articles from specialist journals, such as Early China and Wen wu. They are listed in the bibliography under the sections for historical materials.

8. A major point of contention is whether slaves were used solely for domestic work and perhaps occasional agricultural activities or whether the entire Shang edifice was based on the systematic use and exploitation of a slave class of agricultural workers. Depending on whether a Marxist or another synthetic framework is employed, the evidence is defined and interpreted differently. However, it appears that enslaved prisoners and their descendants were found largely in domestic work rather than agriculture.
9. In the Shang and Chou dynasties, the presence of the lineage's ancestral temple virtually constituted the defining feature of a capital city. Naturally, various deities, spirits, and animistic forces were also worshipped, depending on the period, state, and beliefs of the time. The ruler's ancestral temple always played a critical role in prewar discussions and in prebattle ceremonies, as is evident in the Seven Military Classics.

10. In the past decade a number of lengthy, minutely detailed articles based on historical records, recently recovered bronze inscriptions, calendrical reconstructions, and celestial phenomena have discussed the probable date for Chou's conquest of the Shang. The traditionally held date of 1122 B.C. proposed by the Han dynasty scholar Liu Hsin has been invalidated emphatically by David Pankenier's proof that the rare five-planet conjunction recorded in the Bamboo Annals actually occurred on May 28, 1059 B.C. (See David W. Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," EC 7 [1981-1982], pp. 2-5.) Various other dates previously proposed—such as 1111, 1075 (T'ang Lan), 1027, 1025, and 1023 (Bernhard Karlgen)—have also been discarded. Current arguments, based on essentially the same evidence—excluding the critical five-planet conjunction—variously supplemented or interpreted, produce three theories: Pankenier's January 20, 1046 B.C. (Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates," p. 2-37, in particular p. 16); David S. Nivison's January 15, 1045 B.C. (originally proposed in his article "The Dates of Western Chou," HIAS, Vol. 43, No. 2 [December 1983], pp. 481-580); and 1040 (according to his note revising the JAS article published almost simultaneously in Early China [EC 8 [1983-1984], pp. 76-78]) and Edward Shaughnessy, who supports Nivison's first date of January 15, 1045 (see "New Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," EC 6 [1980-1981], pp. 57-79) and "The Current Bamboo Annals and the Date of Zhou Conquest of Shang," EC 11-12 [1985-1987], pp. 33-60, especially p. 45). Chou Fa-ka, also supports the 1045 date in a Chinese review article ("Wu Wang k'e Shang te nien-tai wen-t'ieh," in Li-shih Yü-ren Yen-chiu-so chi-k'an [BIHP], Vol. 6, No. 1 [1989]), Taipei, pp. 5-41. It appears 1045 B.C. appears well-founded, though adopted here. However, for further discussions, see Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 15-19; Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, pp. 487-491, who suggest accepting the traditional date of 1122 B.C. even though acknowledging it may be inaccurate; Tung Tso-pin, "Hsi-Chou nien-li-p'u," BIHP 23 (1951), pp. 681-760; Chu Wu-li, "Hsi-Chou shin-hvi kai-shu," BIHP 42 (1971), pp. 775-802; Ming Jhen-yuan, "Shih-t'an Hsi-Chou chin-nien," Chung-hua wen-shih lun-t'ang 1 (1980), pp. 16-20; Ho Yu-chen, "Chou Wu-wang fa-Chou te nien-tai wen-t'ieh," Chung-shan Ta-hsieh hsieh-pao 1 (1980), pp. 64-70; and Edward L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," HIAS, Vol. 46, No. 1 (June 1986), pp. 149-180.

11. The casting of massive ritual cauldrons, some weighing several hundred pounds, and the production of bronze weapons required hundreds of skilled artisans engaged in coordinated activity.

12. It is well-known that in the plains area of central China—the locus of the Shang dynasty—the soft yellowish earth can easily be dug with a sharpened wooden stick or other nonmetallic object. Naturally, agricultural efficiency improves with metal plows and hoes, but they were not essential and were rarely if ever, used in the Shang era. (See Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 223; Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 75 and 353; and T. R. Treger, A Geography of China, Aldine, Chicago, 1965, pp. 30-51.) A contrary view is taken by the traditionalist Ch'en Liang-ts'o in a lengthy, detailed review of the archaeological evidence. He concludes that the Shang already had bronze agricultural implements, which were used concurrently with those made of inexpensive materials such as stone and bone. Moreover, in his view, these implements were employed extensively throughout the Chou period until they were finally displaced by iron in the Warring States era. (See Ch'en Liang-ts'o, "Wu-kuo kai-tai te ch'ing-tung nung-chu," Han-hsieh yen-chu, Vol. 2, No. 1 [June 1984], pp. 135-166, and Vol. 2, No. 2 [December 1984], pp. 363-402.)


14. The enormous numbers of animals used in the almost continuous sacrifices, which went to feed the priestly caste and the nobility, is cited as evidence that cattle and other animals must have been raised. Cf. Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 142-145, 230.

15. See ibid., pp. 195-196. The king's wives are also recorded as having commanded troops and as having personal forces.

16. Cf. Cheng Te-ch'un, Shang China, pp. 208-212; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249. The total number in the army during warfare is sometimes estimated at thirty thousand (Cheng, Shang China, p. 210), which would be more than the number of troops reported as having engaged in battle of Mu-yeh. This suggests that the more limited figures apply only to the early to middle Shang era—perhaps with significant expansion later—as well as overstatement.


18. A later term, the Three Armies (san chiu), was used constantly to refer to a campaign army. Whether it originated with these three divisions (san shih) or was simply an organizational creation (such as for upper, middle, and lower) is not clear. (Cf. Ch'in Hsiao-hung, "Ts'un chiu ku-pu tsu yen-chu Yin Shang chiu-lu chung chih wang-tsu san-hsing san-shih," Chung-kuo wen-t'ang 52 [1974], p. 1-26; and the material on military organization in Appendix E.)

19. A basic distinction in the Shang and early Chou was made between the people who dwelled within the kuo, the "state," and those who lived outside it. At this time a state was essentially a city fortified by surrounding walls, with the privileged class residing within its protective confines. The city dwellers furnished the warriors, whereas those outside the walls were not required to serve or were merely conscripted as military support (if they were not alien peoples under the control of the kuo). This distinction declined as the scope of warfare eventually expanded in the Spring and Autumn period. (See, for example, Hsu Hsi-ch'en, "Chou-tai ping-chih chi tu-lun," Chung-kuo shih yen-chu 4 [1985], pp. 4-5.)

20. On warfare objectives, see Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i lun-t'ang, Ming-wen shu-chu, Taipei, 1983, p. 8. Although agriculturally based and accordingly prosperous, the Shang ruling house required vast riches to distribute to the nobility,
whether directly or indirectly (through allowing them to retain the plunder of war). Because the Shang domain was extensive and the nobility counted in the tens of thousands of families, it was rather voracious. For example, in one battle the Shang reportedly took thirty thousand prisoners (see Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 194).

21. Among the peoples particularly chosen for sacrifice were the Ch'iang, from whose Chiang clan many of the principal wives of the Chou royalty came. The Tai Kung, advised to Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou, was also of Chiang origin. It seems that the Shang's enmity toward the Ch'iang drove them to an alliance with the Chou, although this is not known. See E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times," in The Origins of Chinese Civilization, pp. 420-421; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249.

22. In the Shang and probably the Early Chou, weapons were generally stored in government armories and were distributed only when required for military campaigns. (See Yen I-p'ing, "Yin Shang ping-chih," Chung-kuo wen-tzu, NS 7 [1983], p. 39.) This reflects the considerable cost of weapons and diffused any threat of an armed political revolt against the ruling family. Furthermore, because of the cost factor, some researchers believe conscripted infantrymen were generally not furnished with serious weapons until the infantry grew in significance and less expensive iron weapons became available. (For example, see Chung-kuo chin-shih-shih Pien hsieh-tsu, Chung-kuo chin-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-shie, Pe-king, 1988, p. 2.)

23. The dagger-ax derives its name from the dagger-like blade horizontally affixed near the tip of a long wooden shaft, but it is primarily a hooking weapon. Wounds are inflicted by swinging down and pulling forward, with the curved knife-like blade cutting in and hooking the enemy (rather than delivering a crushing, chopping blow directly into the soldier as an ax blade would. The ancients also had axes, but their role seems to have been limited and perhaps largely ceremonial.) See Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-chi shih-kao, Ming-wen shu-chi, Taipei, 1980, pp. 64-88; Hayashi Mino, Chigoku insha jidai no buki, Kyoto Daigaku Jimbin Kagaku Kenkyusho, Kyoto, 1972, pp. 3-96; Lao Kan, "Chan-kuo shih-tai te chan-cheng-fa," BIHP 37 (1967), pp. 53-57; and Shih Chang-ju, "Hsiao-tsun Yin-tai te ch'eng-tao ping-chih," BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 59-65. A number of specialized articles have discussed this indigenous weapon, including Ma Heng, "Ko chih chia yen-chu," Yenching hsieh-pao, No. 5 (1929), pp. 745-753; Kuo Pao-chun, "Ko chih-yu-lun," BIHP, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1935), pp. 313-326; and Li Chi, "Yu-pei ch'u-tu ch'ing-tung kou-piung ten-li tu-chieh," BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 1-31.

24. The spear was already extant in Shang times and no doubt dates back to the neolithic period. Shang spears boasted bronze spearheads (as well as those made of materials such as stone and bone), but with the development of iron technology, iron tips appeared by the Warring States period. In addition, the longer spears suited to use with the chariot (and thus also employed by infantry) in the Shang and Early Chou tended to be too unwieldy for infantrymen and consequently were shortened somewhat in the Warring States period. Conversely, the blades tended to become longer and sharper in the early Spring and Autumn period and continued to undergo similar modifications thereafter. For detailed discussions, in addition to references listed in the bibliography, see Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-chi shih-kao, pp. 98-102; and Hayashi Mino, Chigoku in-sha jidai no buki, pp. 97-130.
33. The Chou's "barbarian" origin was generally recognized in antiquity, and the
Shih chi explicitly records Tan Fu—the Chou progenitor—as deliberately abandoning
nomadic ways after his people resettled with him in the south to avoid conflict with other
barbarians. (See the "Chou Annals." Further discussion is found in the transla-
tor's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)

34. King Chou of the Shang was persuaded by opulent bribes not only to release
the future King Wen from detainment but also to name him "Lord of the West." Under
this title he was entrusted with responsibility for defending Shang's flank and thereby
afforded an excellent pretext for developing and exercising his own military powers.
(See the translator's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings for
additional information.)

35. It is generally thought that speed, mobility, and surprise marked the Chou cam-
paign, with the chariot playing a key role. However, there are dissenting views, such as
Hsu and Linduff (Western Chou Civilization, p. 88), who consider other factors more
important (such as the effective deployment of infantry, longer swords, and superior
armor) (see Hsu and Linduff, p. 81). For further discussion, see the translator's intro-
duction to the Six Secret Teachings and Appendix A.

36. According to the Shih chi, the Shang had a one-hundred-thousand-man campa-
ign army in the south, which could have amounted to a third or more of their total
available forces and perhaps included some of their best units. King Chou of the Shang
compounded his difficulties by ignoring repeated warnings about the potential danger
posed by the Chou and notice of their actual advance. (Numbers from this period are
extremely unreliable and should only be understood as indicative of comparative size.)

37. Because the antiquity of the Six Secret Teachings is almost universally denied, it
seems possible that this revolutionary impulse may have been directed toward the im-
perial Ch'in by writers very late in the Warring States period. Their hatred of the brutal
Ch'in would account for the ferocity of the policies, with such fervor being evidenced
in the stories of the ancient Chou as they gambled everything to overturn the vile despot.
Whether the combatants observed any civilizing rites (such as in the early Spring and
Autumn period) in the centuries prior to the battle at Mu-yeh is doubtful, but the
traditional view assumes that they did. (This is discussed further in the translator's in-
troduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)

38. See Edward L. Shaughnessy; "New Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 66-
67.

the most extensive reconstruction and discussion of these measures as well as of the
Chou military. However, also see Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization.

40. See Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 113-119; and Tu Cheng-
sheng, "T'ieh-lun Yin-i-min to tsao-yü yü t'ai-wei," BiHP, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December

41. For a discussion of the meaning of "army" in this period, see Appendix E.

42. See Cho-yun Hsu's extensive analysis, Ancient China in Transition, Stanford

43. See the translator's introduction and notes to the Sau-ma Fa translation.

44. The realization of the limitations of chariot warfare is clearly shown by the necessity
they felt to abandon their own chariots and engage the enemy in confined valley terrai.
The reluctance of at least one high official to relinquish his honored position as a char-
ioteer and descend to the state of a foot soldier (for which he was summarily executed)
also illustrates the prevailing attitude even this late in the Spring and Autumn period.
(See Legge's translation of the incident, The Chinese Classics: Volume V, The Ch'ün
Ts'e' with the Tso Chuen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1872 [reprinted Chín-
hsiüeh shu-chü, Taipei, 1968], p. 579.) Wei Shu initiated the conversion and formu-
lated a plan whose effectiveness was augmented by its deceptiveness. To confuse the
enemy he deployed the combined chariot and accompanying infantry forces in an un-
usual, unbalanced formation, provoking the enemy's laughter and ridicule—until the
Chin forces sprang into action and routed them. "Be deceptive" was a dictum clearly
in the minds of commanders in this era, a century or two before Sun-tzu's Art of War. (For
further discussion and analysis, see Ping-fa, p. 36, and the Wu-pei-chi 53, pp. 22B-
24B.) As the infantry expanded, officers from the nobility were assigned to command
them, and rank was granted to everyone—regardless of status—for military achieve-
ment. Consequently, the status of the foot soldier improved dramatically, and
although the old attitudes (which disdained foot assignment against the prestige of being
assigned to the chariot) were never completely erased, their amelioration marked a sig-
nificant change (see Ping-fa, p. 58).

45. It should be noted that chariots were not employed at this time in such peripheral
southeastern states as Wu and Yüeh. Initially, this might have been because of igno-
rance and unsuitable terrain, but even after they were taught the skills of chariot driv-
ing and the tactics of warfare deployment, these and several other states fielded only
infantry units. (For further discussion, see Appendix A and also Tu Cheng-sheng,
"Chou-tai feng-chien chieh-i-hou to ch'in-cheng hsin-chi-hsin," BiHP, Vol. 53, No. 1
[1984], pp. 74-75, 82-89; Ping-fa, p. 58; Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-chu' in Ch'ian-kuo-
chien," p. 11; and Yang Hung, Ch'ung-kwo ku-ping-ch'i, p. 126.)

46. Another weapon, the chi, probably began to appear in some numbers around this
time. The chi, or "spur-tipped dagger-ax," differed from the dagger-ax in one for-
midable aspect: It had a metal point at the top of the shaft to allow thrusting and stab-
bning. With the addition of this spur tip, the weapon could be used for an initial stab-
ning thrust, but if the target were missed, it could be pulled back or swung to catch the
enemy with the knife-like horizontal blade. In the early stages it was probably made
from two separate bronze parts, which were secured to a pole; this has prompted some
archaeologists to argue that the chi has a longer history than is generally acknowl-
dged. (After the wooden shaft had completely disintegrated, the two parts, which
would be found separately, would be misinterpreted as having come from two weap-
on—dagger-ax and a spear—rather than being parts of an integrated, composite
one.) However, it appears that the chi was primarily a foot soldier's weapon, perhaps
developed to better equip them to attack chariots; thus it grew in popularity as infantry
forces were augmented. In Shang tombs only ko (halberds, dagger-axes) are found, whereas Han excavations yield only chi, or spear-tipped dagger-axes. In the thousand years between the demise of the Shang and the flourishing of the Han, chi were probably created in the early Chou or Spring and Autumn periods, gradually becoming more popular until proliferating in the Warring States era. For detailed discussions, see Kuo Pao-chuan, “Ko chi yu-lun,” pp. 313-326; Kuo Mo-jo, Yin Chou ch'ing-t'ung-ch'ai ming-wen yen-chen, Jiang bin ch'ueh-p'an-shih, 1954, pp. 172-186; Ma Heng, “Ko chi chih yen-chiu,” pp. 745-753; Chou Wei, Ch'ung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, pp. 88-98; and Hayashi Mineo, Chigoku in-Sha iji no buki, pp. 10-13 and 78-96.

In an article examining a multiple-blade chi excavated from a Warring States tomb, Sun Chi concludes that this sort of weapon was probably wielded by charioteers against foot soldiers and thus represented a response to the growth of infantry forces and their mounting threat to the chariot. (The attachment of knife blades to the wheel hubs served a similar function, as his article discusses on p. 83.) This implies further questions about the evolution of the chi—whether it was developed for infantrymen or for chariot-mounted warriors contending with other chariots or infantry—and the answers are unavailable. See Sun Chi, “Yü-chen ch'e-wei yu to-ko-chi,” WW 1980, No. 12, pp. 83-85.

46. See Appendix D for details and also note 85 below.

47. Some of these qualifications are recorded in Hsün-tzu and itemized in the Six Secret Teachings; further discussion is found in the footnotes to the translations.

48. The Seven Strong States at the start of the Warring States period, as identified by Liu Hsiang's classic list, were Chi, Yen, the Three Chin (Han, Chao, Wei), and the newly powerful, originally peripheral states of Chu and Ch'in. Wu and Yueh, two other so-called barbarian states, also emerged as significant forces.

49. The Su-ma Fa discusses the distinctions that mark the form and spirit of the civilian and military realms and advises against their becoming confused or intermixed. Most of the Seven Military Classics discuss the qualifications necessary for generalship, reflecting the rising concern with professionalism and a turning away from the preoccupation with moral qualifications found in the Tao chuan. Ironically, in earlier times the Shang and Chou kings as well as the local vassal lords not only governed their respective realms but also commanded the army and exercised supreme military power. Over time they became divorced from the complexities of battle.

50. Strategic points, such as passes and major road intersections, were increasingly guarded and fortified. The northern states, such as Yen and Chao, sought to diminish the mobility of nomadic tribes by creating static defense systems (“walls”) along their lengthy, exposed borders. See Yang K'uan, “Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien fung-chien te chin-shih tsu-chih ho chan-cheng te pien-hua,” p. 12. Also note Arthur Waldron's work on “walls”; “The Problem of the Great Wall of China,” H/FAS, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1983), pp. 643-663; and The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

51. See Yang Hung, Ch'ung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 140-141; and Ping-fa, pp. 78-89. The Mohists were famous for their doctrine of not making distinctions in one's love for his fellow man. Under the direction of Mo-tzu (fl. 479-438 B.C.)—their founder and leader—they actively practiced their doctrine of opposing warfare, rushing to aid the defense of the besieged. See Robin D. S. Yates, “Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology,” in Explorations in the History of Science and Technology in China (ed. Li Guohao et al.), Shanghai Chinese Classics Publishing House, Shanghai, 1982, pp. 409-451, for a discussion of the technology that appeared in this period. For the medieval period, which includes the T'ang (the era of the Questions and Replies), see Herbert Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, pp. 151-194.

52. Although early Chinese compound bows were extremely powerful, crossbows provided dramatically even more formidable firepower; their strength and effective killing range generally increased over the centuries as their mechanisms were perfected. The earliest type was probably hand-cranked, using only arm strength. More powerful versions required leg strength, and the strongest used a rope attached to the waist to pull the string back. (See Hsü Chung-shu, “T'she yu nü,” pp. 435-438.) By the end of the Warring States period, crossbows had come into extensive use, although their strategic value was probably not exploited fully until the Han dynasty. Hand-held crossbows, which fired two bolts simultaneously, and repeating models (as well as repeating double-bolt models) dating from the Warring States period have now been excavated, reflecting the crossbow's technological sophistication and importance. (See Ch'en Yüeh-chun, “Ch'ang-ling Ch'u-mu ch'u-t'u shuang-shih ping-shie lien-fa-nu yen-chhu,” WW 1990, No. 5, pp. 89-96.) Larger, winch-powered models mounted on chariots or carriages, also capable of shooting multiple bolts, are described in the Six Secret Teachings and are discussed in the translation. (Also see Robin D. S. Yates, “Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology,” pp. 432-443.)

Tradition holds that the Yellow Emperor invented the crossbow, and Hsü Chung-shu, analyzing linguistic evidence, strongly believes that both the bow and crossbow are indigenous developments dating from pre-Shang times. (See Hsü Chung-shu, “I she yu nü chü su-yüan chi kuan-yü tzu'ü lei-ming-wu kiao-k'ao-shih,” pp. 417-418 and 438.) However, Hsü's classic view not withstanding, based on textual references and other linguistic evidence it appears the crossbow probably originated outside the central states area of China, perhaps in Chu or the southwest. (See Jerry Norman and Tsui-lin Mei, “The Austronesian in Ancient South China: Some Lexical Evidence,” MS 32 [1976], pp. 299-304; Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'ü, pp. 143-144; and Ch'en Yueh-chun, “Lien-fa-nu,” p. 96.) Remnants of crossbows with bronze trigger mechanisms have been found in tombs from the middle Warring States period, prompting scholars such as Kao Chih-hsi to argue for a much earlier (indigenous) invention—probably in the Spring and Autumn period—using wooden components. (See Kao Chih-hsi, “Ch'i Ch'ang-sha, Ch'ang-te chü-t'u nu-chü te chin-kou-mu-chien tan-yu-kuan nu-ch'i, chi-shih ts'ieh-ke wen-t'ien,” WW 1964, No. 6, pp. 41-44. Also see Ch'en Yueh-chun, “Lien-fa-nu,” p. 96. Note that as of this writing, no pre-Warring States crossbows have been discovered. See Hayashi's Mineo's extensive, although dated, summary, Chigoku in-Sha iji no buki, pp. 301-330.) The first recorded tactical use appears to have been at the battle of Ma-ling in 344 B.C., as depicted in the Shih-chi and the text of the Sun Pin's Ping-fa. The Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh also contain numerous references to crossbows, but they only extensively employed the weapon to deal with the Han, who exploited their superior firepower and range.

53. See Appendix B for an annotated discussion of the cavalry in Chinese history.

54. The speed and mobility of the cavalry in all but the most impenetrable forests and marshes allowed the development of unorthodox tactics (ch'i) versus orthodox (cheng) methods. Although infantry forces can also be employed in unorthodox ways,
an essential aspect of the unorthodox is its unexpectedness, its exploitation of surprise, for which the cavalry is ideally suited. Sun-tzu is generally credited with advancing the idea of the unorthodox, and it is extensively discussed and expanded in the Questions and Replies (based on actual employment by T'ang T'ai-sung and General Li in decisive battles when they were struggling to establish the T'ang). The Six Secret Teachings also analyzes the relative methods for employing infantry, chariot, and cavalry forces.

55. Iron was used extensively for the agricultural implements—generally manufactured and distributed under government monopoly—during the Warring States period. The Japanese scholar Sekino Takeshi has advanced the idea that cheap, readily available, mass-produced iron swords provided Ch'in's conscripted infantry with their great killing power. (Cf. Sekino Takeshi, "Chōgoku shoki bunka no ikkosatsu—dōtetsu karōki no kaikei ni yoseste," Shōgaku zasshi, Vol. 60, No. 10 [October 1951], pp. 867-907.) However, others strongly dispute his contention for a variety of reasons. First, the sword had always been a weapon of the nobility and was generally carried by officials rather than ordinary infantrymen. (Cf. Noel Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," EC 1978-1979, pp. 62-63.) They would naturally have preferred the familiar elegance of the bronze weapon over the cruder iron sword. Second, bronze swords were probably still superior to iron in the hands of the skilled warrior, and complex metal-working technology (such as layering with different alloys) produced very sharp, fine weapons. Third, few iron swords have been unearthed—even from the famous tombs of Ch'in Shih-Huang-ti, where most of the warriors are armed with bronze rather than iron weapons. (Cf. Noel Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," p. 63; David N. Keightley, "Where Have All the Swords Gone?" EC 1976, pp. 31-34.) This position has been supported by many scholars, including those who question the Han era as a period of iron weapons, the bronze sword becoming an archaic phenomenon. (For a dissenting view, see Li Xueqin, Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, chapter entitled "Iron Objects," pp. 315-329, who notes that Han had cast iron, wrought iron, and steel by the Warring States era, which suggests a long prehistory in the Spring and Autumn period.)

56. See Wu Chi's biography in the translator's introduction to the Wu-tzu translation.

57. The battle of Ma-ling is apparently the first recorded conflict in which crossbows were employed. (There are also different versions regarding who exercised ultimate command—Pang Chuan, who may have been killed at the earlier battle, or the imperial prince, who sallies forth with the home defense forces. General Pang's character flaws and rashness were frequently cited by Chinese military analysts as evidence of the need for a constellation of virtues in any supreme commander.)

58. The complex process of analyzing language, concepts, and historical events to create a systematic textual chronology has been both complicated and simplified by the writings discovered in various tombs in recent decades. The detailed textual studies of Ch'ing dynasty scholars, although valuable for understanding the texts themselves, have led to conclusions that must now be reexamined and revised. Discussions of the provenance of the individual Seven Military Classics are found in each translator's introduction. For a general discussion, see Robin D. S. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts," TP 74 (1988), pp. 211-248.
ing and integrating new characteristics themselves. The concept of the Central States and the Hua-Hsia identity arose with them (although the surviving states in the Warring States period still retained distinctive regional personalities and characteristics). For a general discussion, see Cho-yun Hsu and Katharyn M. Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988, Chapters 4-6.

5. Historical materials from the Chou period and thereafter, such as the *Shih chi*, were clearly influenced by the effective propaganda efforts of the Chou both prior and subsequent to the conquest. Their vile portrait of the evil Shang ruler was amplified by later writers—especially the Confucians—for didactic purposes, although not without an occasional dissenting voice (for example, Tzu Kung, *Analects* XIX.20). This is not to deny that the Shang oppressed the people or that King Chou of the Shang was not a villain. Rather, it should simply be understood that the Chou's self-portrait depicting the cause of Virtue as naturally attracting allies and politically dominating the realm was underpinned in actuality by extensive military achievements and persuasive power.

6. The Shang's triumph over King Chieh, the last evil ruler of the Hsia, was traditionally portrayed in terms similar to those describing the Chou's conquest of the Shang, but much simplified. King T'ang—the founder of the Shang dynasty—cultivated his Virtue, pursued benevolent policies, and garnered his strength on the fringe of the Hsia empire until finally engaging in a decisive battle. There was even a sage counterpart to the T'ai Kung, the famous minister Yen Hwa, who may have created the indirect striking tactics that proved successful for the Shang. (See Hsi Peiken et al., *Chung-kou h-tai chen-cheng-shih*, 18 vols., Li-ming, Taipei, 1976, revised edition, Vol. 1, pp. 49-53, and also the early chapters of the *Shang shu* [Book of Documents]. The *Shang shu* also portrays Shang dynasty kings acting as strong supporters of virtue and as punitive agents against the unrighteous.)

7. Although the parameters of the dynastic cycle postulate an essentially continuous decline in the power of the imperial house, with allowances for temporary resurgences, recently discovered historical materials indicate that the Shang kings continued to be vigorous monarchs, mounting military expeditions and conducting tours of inspection throughout the year. Even though the last ruler—who is recorded as having being enthroned for more than sixty years—considerably debauched the image of the king, earlier kings, such as Wu Ting, were both effective and powerful.

8. The archetypal seductress played an extensive but tragic role throughout Chinese history, with several famous examples bringing success to the imperial house. The less famous seductresses were constant sources of tension because the emperors—despite having numerous concubines, consorts, and other ladies in waiting—were easily persuaded by their favorites to grant state favors administratively or military power to their own relatives, thereby weakening the imperial house and creating sources of dissatisfaction. The displacement of an old consort by a new beauty or the replacement of an heir was also caused by personal strife and intrigue.


10. Hou (ruler) Chi (millet) was one of the legendary deified figures traditionally credited with creating China's culture and civilization. He is identified particularly with agricultural developments, such as the domestication of wild grains, and is recorded in the "Chou Annals" as having been appointed minister of agriculture by Emperor Shun.

11. "Chou Annals," *Shih-chi chin-chu*, Vol. 1, p. 101. It should be noted that the Chou were already prepared for this confrontation with the barbarians; therefore, the traditional account is obviously highly simplified.


King Wu Ting of the Shang is recorded as having conducted military campaigns against the Chou before they descended to the Wei River valley. Chi Li apparently acted on behalf of the Shang against troublesome tribes from the northwest quarter before being perceived as too great a threat himself. The fact that the Shang could command and imprison both Chi Li and King Wen is testimony of their regional power and the Chou's continued submission, even though Shang rulers could not completely control the outer quarters. Because both Chi Li and King Wen were married to Shang princesses and members of the Shang nobility, they also appeared to have married women from the Chou royal house; marriage relations were another aspect of their political policies.

14. His detention is variously said to have lasted anywhere from one to six or seven years. During this period he reputedly devoted himself to serious contemplation, ordering the sixty-four hexagrams of the *I ching* and appending the Judgments—activities befitting a future cultural legend. (The texts for the individual hexagram lines are attributed to the Duke of Chou, one of his sons, and Confucius is closely identified with the book as well.) His reign, which began when he was fifty, is recorded in the *Shih chi* as having lasted fifty-five years; he died nine years after being released by the Shang. However, such great longevity (which he apparently shared with the T'ai Kung and the evil King Chou) is extremely problematic, particularly in an age when people had short life expectancies. For discussions of the Shang and Chou chronologies, see, among others, David N. Keightley, "The Bamboo Annals and the Shang Chou Chronology," *HJS*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1978), pp. 423-438; Edward J. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," *HJS*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1986), pp. 149-180; and Chou Fu-kao, "Chronology of the Western Chou Dynasty," *Hsiung-kang Chung-wen Ta-his-tieh Chung-kou Wen-hua Yin-chu-so hsieh-pao* (Vol. 4, No. 1, 1973), pp. 173-205; Ch'ueh-T'ung, "Shih-chi Yin-chen chi ch'i t'o chi-ku-chung so ta-yen Shih-shi-tai te shih-shih," *Taipei Ta-his-teh wen-shih-chieh hsieh-pao* (Vol. 14, No. 11, 1965), pp. 87-118; Jung Meng-yan, "Shih-ta Tsin Hsi Chou chi-nien," *Chung-shou wen-shih hsien-tung* (1980), No. 1, pp. 1-21; Ch'ueh Wen-li, "Hsi Chou shih-shih kai-shu," *BHP* 42 (1971), pp. 775-802, and Tung To-ping, "Hsi Chou nien-li-pu," *BHP* 23 (1951), pp. 681-760, and Hsu Yoo-ch'i, "Chou Wu-wang fa-ch'ou nien-tai wen-t'i," *Chung-shan ta-his-tieh hsieh-pao* 1981, No. 1, pp. 64-70.

15. Several Chinese military historians have stressed the importance of the location because it exposed them to constant military challenges. Not only did the Chou train for and mount military campaigns against their enemies, but they were also forced to always be prepared to instantly ward off sudden incursions. Their leaders, including the king, personally supervised them in the fields and directed their responses to such military emergencies. This experience nurtured unity, a strong spirit, and an unflinching commitment to battle. It also symbolizes the farmer-soldier ideal later bureaucrats felt characterized the practices of antiquity and came to be frequently cited whenever they sought to disparage the need for professional military men and studies. (However, as discussed in the general introduction, it should be remembered that at this time the
nobility rather than the peasants were the active members of the fighting forces.) See, for example, Hsu Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo ko-fang ssu-hsiang-shih*, p. 276.

16. Career military men turned historians, such as Hsu Pei-ken, see the long preparatory period as not just providing the time necessary to cultivate Virtue and slowly develop the economic basis for a power state with a satisfied populace but also as being the minimum interval required to create—in accord with the Tai Kung's strategy—the revolutionary military weapons that would permit the Chou to effect radical new strategies against their vastly superior enemies. General Hsu is a particularly strong advocate of the chariot's decisive importance at Mu-yeh, the first battle in which it was employed en masse. Based on his estimates, the Chou could probably not have constructed more than a score of chariots per year—particularly armored ones—and at least three thousand horses had to be bred and trained. Charioteers also had to be trained in the requisite individual skills and coordinated in integrated battle tactics. Furthermore, a large number of bronze weapons had to be manufactured; thus the Chou became more skilled in metalworking techniques and developed their own styles of weapons. (See Hsu Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo ko-fang ssu-hsiang-shih*, pp. 284–286, and Tai Kung Liu-tao chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, pp. 14–26.)

17. According to the Lu-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, he was a shih (lowest rank of noble) of the Eastern I people. Chi'ang people with the Chi'ang surname apparently were early allies of the Chou after an earlier period of conflict.

Recent scholars have questioned the veracity of the Tai Kung's eastern origin. Yang Yun-ju, for example, noting the Chiang clan's early marriages relationships with the Chou, concludes that both the Chiang and the Chou were originally members of the northwestern barbarian peoples and that the Chiang did not venture eastward until after the Chou conquest. (See "Chiang-hsing te min-tsu ho Chiang Tai-kung te ku-shih," in *Ku-shih pien* [ed. Ku Chieh-kangl], Vol. 2, Shanghai ku-chi, Shanghai, 1982 [original copyright 1930], pp. 113–117.)

18. In all the stories about the Tai Kung found in the various Warring States and later writings, he is invariably portrayed as old, retired, and poor. For example, the Shuo-yian frequently uses his late, meteoric rise to power after an undistinguished life to illustrate that talent and merit alone are inadequate unless one meets the proper moment. One passage states, "When Lu Wang was fifty he sold food in Chi-chin; when he was seventy he butchered cows in Chao-ko; so it was when he was ninety he commanded the army for the Son of Heaven, it was because he mer King Wen." (Shuo-yian CCCY, p. 581, and an additional reference on p. 562.) His "lands were inadequate to repay the cost of the seeds, (the yield from) his fishing inadequate to repay the cost of the nets, but for governing All under Heaven he had more than enough wisdom." (Shuo-yian CCCY, p. 569.) "He was an old fellow whose wife had put him out, who had worked as a butcher's assistant in Chao-ko and as an inn employee in Chi-chin who welcomed guests." (Shuo-yian CCCY, p. 234.) In the Han-shih wai-chuan he is laboring as a boatman when he encounters King Wen. (This incident is translated in James R. Hightower, *Han shih wai chuan*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 140–142.)

19. The term "hegemon" does not appear until centuries after the events recorded in this biography, thus suggesting the dialogue is a late fabrication.

20. The story about how the Tai Kung received his name is more than a little dubious; however, completely satisfactory explanations are lacking. He was apparently known by several names, perhaps depending on the recorder's perspective and location. "Tai Kung" should refer to his enfeoffment as king of Ch'i and thus the state's official progenitor. "Lu" in "Lu Wang" probably refers to his place of origin, whereas Wang may have been his personal name; this is also the case for "Lu Shang," "Shih," in "Shih Shang-fu," perhaps referred to his command position, "Tai Shih," rather than to his role as preceptor (shih) to Kings Wen and Wu (see note 21 below). "Shang-fu," or "Father Shang," may be an honorific referent from the two kings toward their army's commander in chief or perhaps their strategist-adviser. (See Yang Yün-ju, "Chiang-hsing", pp. 109–112.)

21. The Shi shih biography states he was appointed as a shih, which generally means "commander" but can also include didactic functions, as in "preceptor" or "teacher." Clearly, the Tai Kung's role was far more encompassing and was related more to strategy than command. Historical references apart from the Shi shih do not record him as being commander in chief (normally a role the Chou king should personally have filled), but he seems to have commanded a force at the battle of Mu-yeh and led the initial charge to instigate the conflict. (See the Chou Annals in the Shih shih. Also note his superior role in the command of forces securing the area after the conquest of the I-Chou shu.)

Traditional sources indicate that subsequently, King Wu married the Tai Kung's daughter and that she became one of the ten great ministers of his reign. (See Wei Ju-lin, *Chung-kuo li-tai ping-chiang ch'i yung-ping ssu-hsiang*, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying-shu, Taipei, 1981, p. 2.)

22. The practice of traveling about to seek receptive rulers on whom to exercise one's persuasion is identified with the Warring States period and should be considered anachronistic. However, he may have traveled about in disguise, trying to perceive a single opportunity, or he may simply have been exceptional.

23. Mencius twice mentions that the Tai Kung dwelled on the coast of the Eastern Sea to avoid King Chou (Mencius, IVA:14, VIA:22) and also refers to him and San-i Sheng as having known King Wen (Mencius, VIIIB:38). The Hsin shu mentions him "coming from the sea coast to give his allegiance" (Hsin shu, 10:9B).

24. Because the concept of unorthodox (ch'i) stratagems is attributed primarily to Sun-tzu, it is interesting to note the Shi shih's appraisal of the Tai Kung's achievements in this regard. (This concept is discussed in the translator's introduction and notes to the Art of War translation.)

25. For a brief discussion of ch'uan, see the notes to the Art of War.

26. These conquests and alliances secured their base of operations and allowed them to expand toward the Shang domain. For further discussion, see Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chin Civilization*, pp. 89–92.

27. This very famous sentence is cited repeatedly by the Tai Kung's detractors to support their contention that Virtue alone, rather than the Tai Kung's despicable machinations, was enough to win the empire for the Chou.

28. Whether "Tsang-su" refers to a green, nine-headed river animal (originally based on a rhinoceros?) and is being invoked as a spirit to lend power to the oath or scare the men or refers to an officer for the boats is the subject of speculation.
31. The "Shang Annals" records the manner of the king's death rather differently: "On chia-tzu King Chou's troops were defeated. King Chou raced back in and mounted the Deer Tower. He clothed himself in his treasures and jade, went into the fire and died. King Wu of the Chou subsequently chopped off Chou's head, hanging it up with a white pennon" (Shih-chi chin-chu, Vol. 1, p. 96). The I-chou shu account in the "Shih-fu" chapter similarly records that King Chou immolated himself, whereas in the "Chang Annals" King Wu symbolically shoots King Chou with three arrows, then decapitates him.

32. The nine great bronze cauldrons symbolized imperial authority, and possessing them was deemed a matter of great consequence in establishing dynastic power and legitimacy.

33. An analysis and discussion of the battle of Mu-yeh merits a separate chapter. Among the many unresolved questions, perhaps the most important concerns the relative strength of the respective forces. According to the Shih chi and some other accounts, the Shang fielded seven thousand men, whereas the Chou only had three thousand chariots, three thousand Tiger Guards, and forty-five thousand armored soldiers. The number for the Shang is extremely suspect and is subject to various explanations: It may be a general expression of size; an error for what should be seventy thousand or one hundred seventy thousand; or the total troops of the entire Shang force, including all their allies—many of whom were already committed in other areas. The numbers for the Chou seem more reasonable but in fact may only refer to their core forces without including those of their allies. (Clearly, however, the forces of the Chou were vastly outnumbered by those of the Shang.)

Depending on the source consulted, the actual battle either required little expenditure of forces—with the Shang troops offering minimal resistance to the Chou's morally superior enemy—or the carnage flooded the fields with blood. (Both the Shang shu and the Shih chi assert that the Shang troops "inverted their weapons" and otherwise offered little resistance.) The I-chou shu lists 177,779 killed and 310,230 captured as a result of the entire campaign, which are astounding figures. (For brief discussions, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "New" Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 57-61.)

Notwithstanding the above evidence, the actual battle appears to have quickly turned into rout and ended within a few hours of the initial clash. Among the factors favoring the Chou was their commitment to the cause and consequent great fighting spirit, in contrast to the apparently reluctant, dispirited Shang troops. The Chou forces were thoroughly trained and prepared, whereas the Shang were said to be deficient in both respects. The Chou unleashed an initial charge of one hundred elite chariots, headed by the T'ai Kung, and immediately followed with a chariot attack that moved swiftly across the plains. The combined effect both startled and terrified the Shang troops, who had not previously encountered massed chariot assaults. (Skeptics, however, such as Hsu and Lindahl [Western Zhou Civilization, pp. 81-88] believe superior infantry played the critical role and that the chariots were unimportant.) King Chou reportedly turned and fled, and his command immediately disintegrated. Because the Chou had strongly publicized (through charges possibly similar to those in the Shang shu) that King Chou—rather than the people—was the designated enemy, any compulsion to fight on the part of the Shang was seriously undermined. The battle and choice of battlefield were forced on the Shang because the Chou had crossed to the south—avoiding the bulwark of standing Shang defenses—and swiftly advanced. Finally, the Chou had prepared in secret, established a series of power bases, and either neutralized or gained the allegiance of states and peoples along the attack route and around the Shang. Although the Shang had obviously engineered their own self-destruction by alienating the people and eliminating effective administrators, the Chou may also have used many of the measures advocated in the Cultural Warfare chapter of the Six Secret Teachings to further subvert them. (For general discussions of these factors, see Chang Shao-sheng and Liu Wen-chen, eds., Chung-kuo ku-tai chan-chen t'ung-lan, 2 vols., Ch'ang-chen ch'u-panshe, Peking, 1985, pp. 7-10; Li Ch'en, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-chen shih-hua, Li-ming, Taipei, 1985, pp. 13-19; Hsu Pei-chen, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-siang-shib, pp. 282-290, and Chung-kuo li-tai chan-chen-shib, Vol. 1, pp. 71-84.)
34. Being in accord with local customs while still influencing the people is one of the keystones of the T'ai Kung's military thought and is consonant with postconquest Chou policies. Its wisdom was proven subsequently by numerous historical incidents, including military disasters.

35. These measures are all associated historically with the state of Ch'i and with its heritage of Legalist thought.

36. King Wu died about two years after the conquest, providing an opportunity for his brothers-in alliance with the Shang prince who was retained in heavily circumscribed, essentially symbolic power—to revolt. The Duke of Chou together with the Duke of Shao and possibly the T'ai Kung required three years to subdue the dissident peoples.

37. This charge appears in the Tso chuan. Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics: The Ch'un Ts'ue with The Tso Chuen, Vol. 5, pp. 139-140.

38. "Expansive" should probably be understood as outgoing, energetic, active.


40. The authenticity of Shang shu chapters is much debated; the consensus is that some portions may be early Chou material but that the bulk represents later composition.


42. See Sarah Allan, "The Identities of Taigong Wang in Zhou and Han Literature," MS. 30 (1972-1973), pp. 57-99. Allan concludes that the T'ai Kung commanded the forces in the famous battles and was also accorded a special status in ritual affairs that was essentially equal to that of the royal clan members (p. 67). Her conclusion is based in part on early Book of Odes verses, which she notes as the only Western Chou references to the T'ai Kung (p. 59). However, Shaughnessy's article has proven the authenticity of the "Shih-fu" chapter of the I-Chou shu (which is not mentioned in Allan's article), and additional contemporary evidence shows that the T'ai Kung commanded troops and was entrusted with critical security duties. (See Shaughnessy, "New Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 57 and 67. Also see Ku Chieh-kang, "I-Chou shu 'Shih-fu' p'ien chiao-chu hsii-hsing yu p'ing-lun," Wen-shih 2 [1963], pp. 1-42.

43. Allan, "Taigong Wang," pp. 68-72. The Chiang, as previously discussed, were allies of the Chou and furnished troops in the decisive battles. (Unfortunately, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory because it fails to account adequately for the T'ai Kung's early, apparently menial status—one hardly befitting an important ally. Allan suggests that the motive of recognition may underlie these legends [see discussion, pp. 89-98], and it is an important theme in Chinese thought. For example, see Eric Henry, "The Motif of Recognition in Early China," HFAS, Vol. 47, No. 1 [1987], pp. 5-30; and Ralph D. Sawyer, Knowing Men, Kaifeng, Taipei, 1979. Henry only mentions the T'ai Kung in a footnote.)

44. It need hardly be mentioned that all of the contemporary military historians in both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China whose works have been cited in the notes above not only accept the fact of the T'ai Kung's existence but also attribute the major strategic and command role to him. Accordingly, they tend to see his thoughts as being preserved in the Six Secret Teachings, even though they have either been much revised over the centuries or were actually composed at a late date. (Western scholars, such as Hsu and Linduff, generally tend to ignore him altogether, although, in his Origins of Statecraft, pp. 343-344, Creel posits his authenticity.)

References to the T'ai Kung are found throughout pre-Han writings—such as Mencius, Sun-tzu's Art of War, Hsin-tzu, Han Fei-tzu, Li-shih ch'un-chiu, Hui-nan tzu, Kuo yu, and Shuo yian. Extensive dialogues attributed to the T'ai Kung and King Wu also appear in the Shuo yian, and several pages of quotations are preserved in the Tung tien. That his historical authenticity has been doubted seems remarkable and perhaps symbolizes much about the nature of thought in China.

45. It is a fundamental Confucian teaching that without adequate material welfare, the development of moral behavior cannot be expected (see Mencius, 1A7, 3A3). Although the Legalists stressed enriching the state to make it powerful and nurturing a robust population that had the energy to fight, the military thinkers generally seem to represent a synthesis of both positions. (See Kung Tse-chi's views on these policies as reflective of Legalist thought, LT CS, pp. 27, 64-65.)

46. The intent of these introductory sections is simply to provide convenient summaries of the main thoughts and principles that may act as guides in reading the text. No abstracted quotations are provided because the issues should be easily apparent in the translated material. Occasional footnotes raise additional contextual issues, but in general the introduction and explication of philosophical thought and its relationship to the material found in the Seven Military Classics must be left for separate works.

47. The attainment of this idealized objective is synonymous with concretely embodying Virtue. Some states will revere the aspect of Virtue; others will respect the military power it entails and therefore refrain from aggressive actions. (Unmentioned and apparently inconceivable is the possibility that yet others will greedily plot the subjugation and seizure of such a rich objective with a well-ordered populace.)

48. The universal implementation of punishments is a hallmark of Legalist thought—much in contrast to the oft-cited, simplistic reduction of the Confucian position on the idea that punishments should not extend up to men of rank nor the li (forms of propriety) down to the common man (see Book I of the Li chi). However, Lord Shang's draconian spirit is markedly absent from the Six Secret Teachings—evidence that, as Chang Lieh suggests, the work is an amalgamation of Confucian, Taoist, Legalist, and other viewpoints. (Cf. "Liu-tao te ch'eng-shu ch'i nei-jung," Li-shih yen-chiu 3 [1981], pp. 125-126.)

49. Such preparedness especially reflects the preoccupation of sedentary, agrarian civilizations with sudden incursions by highly mobile, mounted, nomadic steppe peoples as well as the standing threat of surprise invasions by belligerent states. It also mirrors the Chou's original position in the midst of barbarian territory, perhaps contributing to the heritage of Ch'i military thought and possibly being the remote origin of this view.
European military planners, such as in the U.S. “Air-Land Battle 2000” doctrine (which emphasizes indirect assault); copies of Sun-tzu’s Art of War were issued to U.S. marines serving in the 1991 Gulf War. However, deception and surprise have been neglected by the West in favor of frontal assault, attrition, and technological sophistication. For insightful discussions, see Ephraim Karmel, *Stalemate: The Art of Deception in War*, and David and Charles, New York, 1989.


58. The Han shu “Treatise on Literature” lists a work in the Confucian category entitled Chou-shih liu-t’ao, or Six Cases of Chou History. Although the meaning of the character t’ao in this title is also “bowcase,” it is a completely different character from the t’ao in the Secret Teachings (see Karlsgren, GSR, entry 1046C). Chang Lieh, among others, disagrees with Yen’s identification of the two works as identical. (See “Liu-t’ao,” p. 123; Ch’ao Wan-li, *Hsien-Chin wen-shih teu-liu k’ao-pien*, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 479.)

59. Karlsgren, GSR 1078G, defines it as “to wrap, cover,” whereas Morohashi (entry 43189) and the *Chung-ween ti-su-t’ien* (entry 44153) add the extended meanings of covering a bow or sword, bowcase and scabbard, and storing away. What is stored away, of course, is also concealed. (This character is apparently more recent than the one noted above, leading to the conclusion that the title could not have existed in the Tai Kung’s era.)


62. For numerous examples of this view, see the pages collected on pages 791-797 of the Wei shu t’ung-k’ao (Chang Hsin-ch’eng, ed.), Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint, original edition, 1939). Among them, only Ts’ui Shu points out that in antiquity, the civil and martial were balanced and were viewed as equally necessary and appropriate (p. 796). However, he still finds the concepts and language of the book inferior—unworthy of a figure such as the historical Tai Kung, who is cast in the role of major adviser. (Also see Hsi Pei-ken, *Liu-t’ao*, pp. 17-18.)

63. This appears to be Hsi Pei-ken’s position at various points in the introduction to his modern Chinese translation, *Tai Kung Liu-t’ao chin-chu chin-i* (see pages 6-7, 18, and 31). Also see his *Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih*, p. 283.

64. Most of the military writings cited in note 30 above adhere to this view (for example, Li Chiu-jui, *Chung-kuo ch’u-shih ssu-hsiang-shih*, pp. 101-102). The question of accretion and loss is too complex to be considered within the scope of a note. However, in his “Treatise on Literature” included in the dynastic history of the Former Han (written in the Later Han), Pan Ku noted three writings associated with the Tai Kung: “Plans” in eighty-one sections; “Words,” or “Sayings,” in seventy-one sections; and “Military,” or “Weapons,” in eighty-five sections, for a very large total of two hundred thirty-seven sections. The present *Six Secret Teachings* only contains sixty sections or chapters, although many possible remnants are scattered about in other works. Even though a partial text has been recovered from a Han tomb, textual reduc-
Notes to T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings

other chapters as well: “All under Heaven is not the property of one man but of All under Heaven.” Because it also appears in the Lui-shih ch'un-ch'iu, an eclectic work that dates to the late third century B.C., critics claim the Lui-tao authors must have copied it. However, this is simply an assumption posited as fact, and there is no independent, concrete evidence for such an assertion. Instead, it seems likely that this was a saying commonly handed about in the third century B.C. when such concepts were flourishing. Thus in our opinion, although it is correct to date the Six Secret Teachings to this period on both internal and contextual grounds, dogmatic assertions about the direction of borrowing are extremely suspect (cf. LT CS, pp. 9–10).

69. Ch'ü Wan-li notes that because both the Wu-tzu and the Wei Liao-tzu are held to be forgeries, the question of borrowing remains open. (Hsiien-Ch'in wen-shih tsu-liao k'ao-pien, p. 479. However, note that the Wei Liao-tzu was also recovered from the Han tomb, proving it, too, existed early in the Han, which is contrary to previous opinion.)

70. Also see the notes to the translator’s introduction of the Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung for further discussion in conjunction with the other writings attributed to the T'ai Kung.

71. Chang Lieh is the most visible proponent of this view. See “Liu-t'ao to ch'eng-shu chi ch'ii-n'ei-jung,” p. 124, and his brief section in Cheng Liang-shu, ed., Hsi Wu-shih t'ung-k'ao, Hsiieh-sheng shu-chü, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1595–1597. In contrast, Hsü Pei-ken (KTCL CCCY, pp. 29–31) believes the Three Strategies was in fact the work passed along to Ch'ü Yang and that it crystallized his intentions to overthrow the Ch'in rather than just seek personal revenge.

72. For example, see Hsü Pei-ken, Liu-t'ao, pp. 16–19. However, K'ung Te-ch'i classifies the first three together because they focus on planning for warfare, whereas only the last three fall under the rubric of tactical discussions (see LT CS, p. 152). K'ung offers extensive analyses of each of the various teachings, although with no speculation as to the significance of the last four names. Useful but brief overviews are also provided in Ping-fa, pp. 104–107.

73. This is seen by some contemporary historians as expounding a concrete program for attaining Sun-tzu's nebulous objective of unifying the people with the ruler (Ping-fa, p. 104).

74. See note 50 above.

Notes to the Text

1. Emended from Sage Emperor Yu to Sage Emperor Shun, based on history and Liu Yin's correction (LTCC WCCS, I3A).

2. The chin-tzu, translated here as “True Man of Worth,” which reflects the Confucian concept of the “perfected man” as embodying the dimensions of the ideal—including the moral and political ideal. (Originally, chin-tzu referred to a ruler's son and eventually designated any “gentleman” of aristocratic birth; but Confucius preempted it as a vehicle for concretely expressing the critical virtues, and it underwent further sophisticated philosophical expansion thereafter. As thus understood, the passage obviously postdates the early Confucians.)

3. Fishing may be understood as an analogy for weighing, reflecting the primary use of the term “ch'iu-tzu”—to weigh or balance (translated as “authority” in this passage). Depending on the size of the bait, the fisherman can entice and control larger fish.
4. Chün-tzu, “True Men of Worth,” should not form parties or cliques, according to Confucian orthodoxy. However, when the world is in turmoil, they spontaneously gather together out of sympathy for All under Heaven, and thus the enterprise of revolution may be born.

5. Jen, without doubt one of the two defining virtues of Confucianism, has been variously translated as “benevolence,” “true humanity,” and “humaneness.”

6. Perhaps an echo of Sun-tzu’s “Vacuity (emptiness) and Substance.”

7. Although the passage appears to discuss Yao’s personal practices, all of which express the spirit and ideals found in many sections of the Tao Te Ching, by implication, of themselves the populace equally embraced these values and customs. Thus, the passage could well be translated more generally—“they did not adorn themselves”—as some contemporary Chinese translators have done.

8. Or possibly, “tranquilized their hearts.”

9. The sentence in brackets has dropped out of the Ming edition and is restored from the Sung version.

10. The li—“forms of etiquette,” or “forms of propriety”—were one of the cornerstones of Confucian thought and the foundation for hierarchical social organization and interaction. Far more than simply ritual forms or practices of etiquette, they both defined and reflected human relationships and directed as well as constrained the expression of human emotions.

11. By effectively confining each of the three treasures to its own area, its members were less likely to be distracted and contaminated by external stimuli and thus were not tempted to abandon their own occupations. (From the Legalist perspective, they would also be easier to monitor and control.)

12. This dictum is closely associated with Legalist thinkers but is commonly found in eclectic works as well as in the military writings. Normally, the “handles of state” are rewards and punishments, the means by which to wield authority and control power.

13. The concept of material goods being critical to the establishment and maintenance of family relations represents an extension of the generally acknowledged Confucian idea that maintaining morality and harmony becomes difficult without minimal material sustenance.

14. This is the military corollary to not loaning the handles of state to other men.

15. Out of the darkness and secrecy, overt (yang) actions to overthrow the government suddenly manifest themselves. However, for the enterprise to prove effective, a true leader must appear to direct it along the proper path. (The history of China constantly witnessed the unfolding of such tragic dramas, with few centuries ever enjoying the tranquility associated with its glorious history.)

16. Several commentators understand this sentence as referring to those in whose employ the ruler employs, but the scope clearly includes the entire populace. (Cf. TKLT CCCY, p. 72; LT CS, p. 53; and Okada Osamu, Rikuten, Sanriyaku, Meitoku shuppansha, Tokyo, 1979, p. 45.)

17. Bravados, or “knights-errant,” gradually appeared in the Warring States period; they became a socially and politically disruptive factor but also captured the imagination of the populace and furnished the material from which numerous romantic stories came to be fashioned. (For background, see James Liu, The Chinese Knight-errant, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.) Their mention further attests to the Warring States composition of the text.

18. The concept of ch'i, integral to discussions in many spheres—including philosophy, medicine, metaphysics, and science—is fundamental to the enterprise of military action. Ch'i—often identified with and translated as “spirit” or “moral”—is in fact the basis of both, being the essential energy of life, the “pneuma” or “vital breath” that circulates within the body. The military thinkers understood the difficulty of forcing men to enter battle and engage in combat, of compelling them to kill other men, and identified ch'i as the component whose development and surge made such actions possible. Sun-tzu, whose work follows the Six Secret Teachings in our chosen translation sequence, was apparently the first to realize and describe the critical role of spirit and courage in combat; he described the danger in terms of the eb and flow of ch'i. The other military classics all consider ways to develop, manipulate, and ensure the proper combative spirit, the ch'i of their men and armies. Among the philosophers, Mencius is especially known for the cultivation of overflowing ch'i, although his conception differed significantly from that of the military thinkers.

The definitions, dimensions, and dynamics of ch'i are quite complex, entailing both metaphysical and psychological aspects. Although there are subordinate discussions in the secondary literature, the only two monographs that seriously consider the history and nature of the concept are both in Japanese: Onozawa Seichi, Fukunaga Mitsuiji, and Yamanori Yu, eds., Ki no shiso, Tokyo Daigaku shuppansha, Tokyo, 1978; and Kuroda Yoshiko, Ki no kenkyu, Tokyo Bijustedo, Tokyo, 1977.

19. The concept of name and reality matching each other is associated primarily with the great Legalist synthesis proposed by Han Fei-tzu, a late Warring States philosopher, but it apparently originated with Shen Pu-hai. (For background, see Herrlee G. Creel, Shen Pu-hai, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, and “The Meaning of Hsing-ming,” in Soeren Eriksen and Else Glahn International Booksellers, Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata, Copenhagen, 1959, pp. 199–211.)

20. Hsu Pei-ken (TKLT CCCY) places this chapter at the start of the Martial Secret Teaching as Chapter 12.

21. The “subtle” (as discussed in Questions and Replies), or the “vital point,” as employed by Wu Ch'i in the Wu-tzu, rather than just “opportune time” or “opportunity.” (See note 32, Book I, Questions and Replies.)

22. All tactics advocated by Sun-tzu in the Art of War.

23. Another famous tactical principle from Sun-tzu (Art of War, Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance.”)


25. The translation follows Liu Yin’s understanding of “from” in parallel for each political level; otherwise, the sentences would become contradictory. Thus the ruler who does not take “from” the people, the state, or All under Heaven gains the support of these respective polities and thus “takes” them. (See LITC WCSS, I:58; and compare TKLT CCCY, p. 84, and LT CS, pp. 70 and 72.)


27. Emending the text according to the Sung edition, as Liu Yin’s commentary indicates it to be correct.

28. This sentence and the passage in general reflect several concepts central to the Tao Te Ching, especially those expressed in Chapters 2, 7, and 51.
29. As long as the state imposes few burdens, the people will prosper. However, it is also possible to understand this as "the ruler does not give anything to the people, yet they are enriched of themselves." Because the general context of these chapters discusses the ruler providing food and clothes to the people to gather them in, both readings seem possible.

30. The civil, as distinguished from the "martial," consisted of diplomatic measures as well as political programs that clearly encompassed psychological warfare, disinformation, spying, and the creation of disension. As noted in the translator's introduction, these measures were widely condemned by orthodox scholars, including Liu Yin, because they could not imagine that such historical paragons of Virtue as Kings Wen and Wu would need them—especially when presumably they had already gained the willing allegiance of two-thirds of the realm.

31. This passage is somewhat problematic, and the modern translators—both Chinese and Japanese—tend to elide portions of it. The general intent appears to be that by delaying his emissaries, they will appear to have been remiss in their duties, particularly when their replacements quickly succeed in their missions. (The commentators generally take year as meaning "be strictly respectful toward" or "treat generously," as translated, but this seems forced, and the text may be corrupt.) Subsequently, the recently estranged officials can be used to further political objectives by playing on their disaffection and satisfying their greed. (Cf. LT CS, pp. 77-78; TKLT CCCY, p. 93; and Okada Osamu, Rikuto, pp. 70-71.)

32. This passage reflects fundamental concepts found in the Tao Te Ching, especially in Chapter 36.

33. Various interpretations are offered for how these methods are to be employed against themselves: Increasing someone's strength stimulates him to arrogance; enfeebled officials can best be employed to cast doubt on loyal ministers; and successfully attracting the allegiance of population segments will prove infectious, drawing ever-increasing numbers of discontented souls. However, other possibilities obviously exist. (Cf. TKLT CCCY, pp. 102-103.)

34. The analogy comparing people with cows and horses is highly unusual and appears to suggest that if the ruler provides for the people, they will docilely follow and love him—just like horses and cattle. However, the commentators understand the sentence as translated; the ruler should follow his bestowal of material goods with more abstract measures. (Cf. LT CS, p. 82; TKLT CCCY, p. 105 [note that "the people are like cows and horses" has dropped out of the text]; and Okada Osamu, Rikuto, p. 80.)

35. The names of some terms, such as Fu-hsin, or "belly-heart" (indicating a close relationship, close confidants), in some cases are best rendered with approximate functional equivalents indicated in brackets.

36. Their positions apparently integrated the functions of both astrologers and weather forecasters, casting an eye equally toward the interpretation of natural phenomena and the indications of baleful and auspicious moments.

37. Literally, "secret-pennants-drum." 

38. All these terms probably derive from, or at least are common to, Sun-tzu's Art of War.

39. The first words from Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations," the Art of War (later echoed in Questions and Replies and many other military writings), Sun-tzu discusses the general's qualifications in this and other chapters.

40. Another quotation from the Art of War, Chapter 3, "Strategies for Attack."

41. Fu and yueh axes in bronze date from at least the Shang dynasty, and stone precursors have also been discovered. Although the yueh axe is frequently described as a larger version of the fu (such as by Chou Wei in his Ch'ung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, (Ming-wen shu-chi, Taipei, 1981, p. 106), based on archaeological discoveries of numerous examples, there are additional class distinctions. The fu frequently resembles a wood-splitter's axe, with the shaft passing through a hole in the upper portion. The yueh resembles a Western executioner's great ax, with a wide, curved blade and a head fastened by binding the tang to the shaft. It symbolized power and authority—particularly the authority to conduct punitive expeditions—and was also employed for actual executions. (For examples and discussion, consult Ch'eng Tung and Chung Shao-i, eds., Ch'ung-kuo ku-tai ping-ch'i t'u-chi, Chieh-fang chin ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990.)

42. "Vacuity" (deficiencies, weaknesses, voids) and "substance" (strength) are probably derived from Sun-tzu's Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

43. These practices are strongly associated with the historical Wu Ch'i and are frequently found in the military writings. (For further discussion, see the translator's introduction and notes to the Wu-tzu.)

44. This ceremony is reviewed by Li Ching on behalf of T'ang T'ai-tsung in Book III of Questions and Replies.

45. The title of this chapter, "Yin-fu," is identical with a cryptic book associated with the T'ai Kung's name, although nominally attributed to the legendary Yellow Emperor. A Yin-fu ching, with commentaries by other military figures such as the mysterious Kuei Ku-tzu, is presently found in the Taoist canon. However, its contents are unrelated to the material discussed in "Secret Tallys," and the brief text probably bears no relation to the T'ai Kung.

46. Because this chapter goes on to explicitly discuss military communications between the ruler and his generals, the sentence is translated as "I want to communicate" rather than "my general wants to communicate." (This differs from the start of Chapter 25, for which see note 47. Also observe the active role presumably being played by the ruler, King Wu, in directing the army, in contrast to the rise of professional commanders and the growing advocacy and acceptance of the principle of noninterference in the Spring and Autumn period. The text is clearly anachronistic in this regard because Sun-tzu and other chapters such as "Appointing the General" emphasize the general's necessary independence.)

47. Here the text clearly reads "the commanding general."

48. Echoes Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 1.

49. These sentences appear to be misplaced. Although the referents are not specified, "plans," "deployment," "situation," and similar aspects of intelligence are clearly intended and thus are variously interpreted by the commentators.

50. Defeating them before they have deployed their forces and manifested themselves. This echoes Lao-tzu's Chapter 64.

51. As Sun-tzu advises in Art of War, Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains."

52. The image of attacking from above the Heavens, secret oneself below Earth, is frequently found, however, in the military writings, including the Art of War.

53. This appears to be an application of Sun-tzu's principle to throw the men into a desperate position in which there is no defense except fighting to the death.
54. The concept of unorthodox (ch’i) tactics, made prominent by Sun-tzu and still a focal topic in Questions and Replies, barely appears in the Six Secret Teachings except for this chapter and an occasional reference in chapters that clearly describe unorthodox tactics—although not explicitly so—such as the “Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains.” However, much of the material in the last four secret teachings clearly falls within the category of unorthodox tactics—especially Chapter 51, “Dispersing and Assembling,” which essentially amplifies the principle: “One who cannot divide and move [his troops about] cannot be spoken with about unorthodox strategies.” (The entire paragraph actually paraphrases Sun-tzu.) Why the authors of the Six Secret Teachings failed to include such discussions, particularly after Sun Pin had further developed the application of unorthodox tactics and the cavalry had provided the mobility that made the realization of these tactics possible, remains unknown. (For a discussion of the unorthodox and orthodox, see the notes to the translator’s introduction for the Art of War.)

55. The “moment” (chü), the subtle shifting of events.


57. The Sung edition and the modern LT CS include an additional phrase not found in the Ming edition, “by which one can know the enemy.”

58. “Six chia” is variously understood by the traditional commentators. (Unfortunately, the modern Chinese translations—such as the LT CS edition—either ignore the difficulty or, as Hsu Pei-ken in his CCC edition, deprecate the chapter as being a late interpolation of the yin-yang school and thus apparently not worth translating and annotating (cf. LT CS, p. 111, and TKLT CCCY, p. 138). The most common explanation is that the term stands for the entire sixty-element cycle created by sequentially pairing the ten stems with the twelve branches. (For general information about the cycle, see Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 3, 1970, section 20h, especially pp. 396-398. There is also an extensive, readily accessible secondary literature on the origin and concepts of five phase thought.)

Alternatively, the six double characters headed by chia within the cycle of sixty may be the subject of this passage (see Okada, Rikuto, p. 118). In this case the sentence should be understood as stating that the division into six chia provides the categories for the associations with the six subtle, marvelous spirits (which are themselves associated with the five phases. Cf. LTCC WCCS, I:83B).


59. Ch’i, previously encountered in discussions of “spirit” or “morale,” was also associated with five phase theory and various prognosticatory practices and even had military applications, as seen in this chapter. (For further discussion, see Onozawa Seichi, Fukumaga Mitsuji, and Yamano Yu, eds., Ki no shiso, pp. 146-162; and Kuroda Yoshiko, Ki no kenkyû, pp. 165-172.)

60. The Sung edition has “stop” rather than chia—“rule”—and the sentence would accordingly be translated as “without stopping” instead of “without any direction.”

61. The six domesticated animals were the horse, oxen, sheep, chickens, dogs, and pigs.

62. This chapter and the previous one on agricultural implements, which are historically important and merit separate research articles or monographs, describe the variety of equipment—especially chariots—employed by late Warring States armies. Whether this chapter is an amalgamation of earlier materials and not all the equipment was current at the time of final composition or additional sections were added in the Ch’in-Han period is not immediately clear. Similarly, many of the terms remain to be properly studied and explicated because later commentaries have not been particularly helpful in this regard and the reconstructions of the T’ang and beyond are frequently misleading and unreliable. Our translation therefore must be considered tentative, although many weapons and previously nebulous pieces of equipment are becoming increasingly clear as archaeological discoveries provide concrete verification of the details. (For an introductory discussion, see Robin D.S. Yates, “Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology.” Further light should be cast by the volume on military technology in Needham’s Science and Civilization series.)

63. Based on numerous sources, each chariot was supposedly accompanied by seventy-two men, with three officers manning the chariot. Thus there would be a platoon of twenty-four for each flank and a third platoon for the rear (or front, depending on the deployment and mode of action). However, Liu Yin reads the text as indicating twenty-four men in total (LTCC WCCS, II:2A), as does K’ung Te-ch’i (LT CS, p. 132), who also has them pushing the vehicle—thereby implying that it is a cart rather than a chariot. However, others concur with seventy-two men in total per chariot. (Cf. Okada, Rikuto, p. 129; and TKLT CCCY, p. 148, where Hsu Pei-ken suggests that four horses were hitched to it.)

64. The name suggests it had spear tips protruding from the body of the chariot.

65. Winch-powered linked crossbows capable of firing multiple arrows in a repeating mode, presumably deriving their cocking power from the chariot’s axle, only developed very late in the Warring States period. Thus this passage clearly indicates both the advanced state attained by Chinese military technology and the late composition date of this chapter. (For a discussion of such weapons based on recent archaeological discoveries, see the references included in Appendix C.)

66. The intermixed use of both bronze and iron arrowheads is to be noted.

67. According to Liu Yin (LTCC WCCS, II:3A), they were specifically designed for flank attacks.

68. As noted by Liu Yin (LTCC WCCS, II:3B), the text seems to be corrupt. The use of baggage wagons for “lightning attacks” is highly incongruous, and parts of the passage have clearly been lost because there is no mention of the number of such vehicles to be employed.

69. The text appears corrupt because the devices being described have no intrinsic relationship to chariots, yet the term fu-hui appears in conjunction with them. (The translation follows Okada, Rikuto, p. 138.)

70. This formulaic phrase seems out of place because it is difficult to imagine the caltrops being used in anything more than a passive role, to impede attacks and constrain the direction of an enemy’s flight rather than to “urgently press an attack against invaders.”
71. Following the Ming edition, which has ts'ou—“to flee” or “run off”—rather than the Sung edition, which has pu—“infantry.”

72. Although termed “small,” they must have been fairly large and been mounted on wheels or carts so as to be pushed by several men. The shields would have been essentially vertical, presenting a daunting front to aggressors. (It is also possible that they were some sort of small watchtower mounted on chariots and that instead of being accompanied by spearmen and halberdiers, as in the previous passages, speartips and halberd tips were affixed to their walls to repel invaders.)

73. Following suggestions to revise the order of the text in parallel with the previous descriptions, rather than having eight winches on each section.

74. Presumably, the chains are stretched across the water from shore to shore.

75. Lengths of rope with iron rings at each end for linking together.

76. Although the translation indicates “stars and planets” in general, it is also possible that the “morning star” is intended, which would provide exactly four items with which to orient the deployment. Modern commentators, however, tend to demphasize what they apparently perceive as the nonscientific aspect of this chapter, preferring to interpret these phenomena in terms of winds and weather—contrary to the rich tradition of military formations and heavenly phenomena (cf. TKLT CCCY, pp. 150-151; LT CS, p. 154).

77. Liu Yin, in accord with principles found in the Art of War and the Six Secret Teachings, expands this sentence as “To the right and rear mountains and mounds, to the fore and left water and marshes, to seize convenience and advantage. This is what is meant by the Earthly Deployment” (LTCC WCCS, II:8A).

78. As Liu Yin points out, the civil is employed to attach the masses, the martial to overthrow the enemy (LTCC WCCS, II:8A).

79. Throughout our translation of the Six Secret Teachings, which the authors have purported to be an ancient text dating from Early Chou times, the term shih—originally a minor rank of nobility—is frequently translated as “officer.” This is to correspond to the shih’s status in the Early Chou era, especially when compared with the commoners who made up the “troops” in support. As the infantry grew in importance, members of the nobility gradually assumed command roles rather than simply engaging in individual combat, as discussed in the general introduction; and the shih especially grew in professional competence, being too low on the feudal hierarchy to benefit much from the family’s wealth and power or receive any substantial inheritance. With the further passage of time into the Warring States period and the displacement and disenfranchisement of a large portion of the nobility, the scope of the term broadened even further to include “warriors” in general—especially men with military qualifications that distinguished them from the common infantryman—and also to encompass what might be termed noncommissioned officers, such as squad leaders. Thus, depending on context, the term will be translated as “officers,” “warriors,” or just “men” and “soldiers”—preserving wherever possible distinctions the authors may have assumed or intended in the various passages.

80. Techniques from Sun-tzu’s “Nine Terrains” designed to create the ultimate commitment to “fight to the death” and thereby live.

81. Literally, set up a “cloud of fire” to act as a highly visible marker for the troops to orient themselves while escaping through whatever natural cover might be available.

82. Following the Ming edition, which has “mountain stream,” bsi. The Sung edition has chi, “valley” or “deep gorge.”

83. The intent being to make it seem they have truly gone off. However, a hundred li seems excessive, especially when they are to return surreptitiously and assume positions in close proximity to the enemy.

84. Emending the Ming edition from “and stop” to the Sung’s “without stopping,” “incessantly,” in the light of the succeeding sentence, which directs a retreat of three li before turning about. Because beating the gongs is the signal to retreat, incessant beating would presumably lure the enemy into assuming an uncontrolled, massive flight is underway.

85. The reason for this title is obscure because there is no mention of either gongs or drums in the chapter.

86. The term translated as “detachment” (t’un) apparently indicates an integral unit for temporary defensive purposes rather than the usual “encampment” because the siege presumably confines the army in a single location.

87. That is, the evil ruler whose actions have brought about the punitive actions directed toward him. The phrase reflects Chou history because it is associated with Chou’s attack on the tyrannical Shang king.

88. Although Sun-tzu devotes a chapter to incendiary warfare, his focus is on aggressive actions rather than the defensive employment of fire in desperate situations. Surprisingly, the use of fire and water is little discussed in the Seven Military Classics.

89. For ease in understanding, we have translated bsi—rendered as “vacuous” in the Art of War—as “empty.” (Normally, kung is translated as “empty.”)

90. “Advantages,” following the Ming edition. The Sung edition has “principles” instead. The former echoes Mencius and is perhaps more common.

91. As defined by the T’ai Kung at the end of the next chapter, “The Crow and Cloud Formation is like the crows dispersing and the clouds forming together.” Flexibility is stressed in its realization.

92. Echoing Sun-tzu’s concepts of the unending changes and transformations of the five notes in the Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.”

93. According to Sun-tzu in the Art of War, Chapter 9, “Maneuvering the Army,” this would be a disadvantageous position.


95. “Dispensing and assembling,” or “dividing and combining,” reappears as a key topic in Questions and Replies, where it is seen as essential to the execution of orthodox strategies. The concept’s significance was perhaps first realized by Sun-tzu (see the Art of War, Chapter 7, “Military Combat”).

96. Sons adopted through marriage assumed their wife’s surnames, thereby abandoning their own families, betraying their ancestral responsibilities, and generally violating common Confucian beliefs. Normally forced to take such drastic action because of lowly status and poverty, they would be especially motivated to escape their living ignominy by distinguishing themselves in combat.

97. A central concept in several of the military writings, including the Sun-ma Fa, Wu-tzu, and Questions and Replies.

98. The Sung edition has “selected warriors” for “assimilate and become practiced.”
99. The concept of training men by extending the teachings is seen in several other writings as well, including the Wu-tzu (“Controlling the Army”) and Questions and Replies (Book II). In the latter the focus is on instructing the officers first, as appears to be the case here (see notes 84 and 85, Book II).

100. This chapter is significant for its unique discussion of the equivalency of various types of forces, which was possible only late in the Warring States period when all three types—chariots, infantry, and cavalry—were actively employed, although the role of chariots was increasingly diminished (cf. LT CS, pp. 199–202). Li Ching cites these equivalences in his discussions with T’ang T’ai-tsung in Questions and Replies.

101. A number of unusual terms are used in this chapter, whose precise position in a military hierarchy remains nebulous. Approximate functional equivalents have been used wherever possible.

102. Five feet seven inches tall in modern terms.

103. “Fatal terrain” is one of Sun-tzu’s categories, advanced in “Nine Changes” and “Nine Terrains.” Sun-tzu, Wu Ch’i, and others all discuss types of terrain and the tactics appropriate to them and to exploiting weaknesses in the enemy’s condition.

104. Although the text states “terrain”—apparently paralleled with the ten deadly terrains described just above—seven of the eight simply characterize enemy weaknesses in the enemy that can be exploited to advantage, as discussed earlier in the book and in other military writings. Whether sections have been inadvertently juxtaposed or the original lost and supplements provided is unknown.

105. Literally, “terrain.”

106. Reflecting Sun-tzu’s theory of striking the enemy when his spirit—his ch’é—has abated (see Art of War, Chapter 7, “Military Combat”).

107. As most of the commentators have noted, only eight situations are described; two have apparently been lost over time.

108. Literally, “terrain.”

109. “Heavenly Well” or “Heaven’s Well” is among the deadly configurations of terrain Sun-tzu warns against in the Art of War, Chapter 9, “Maneuvering the Army.”

The Methods of the Ssu-ma

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books


Notes to the Translator’s Introduction

1. Determining exactly how far back the materials may date requires systematic study, including comparison with passages from the Spring and Autumn Annals and

the T’ao ch’uan. Some writers assert that the current book includes pre-Western Chou source material, but this seems doubtful unless the passages have been reworked into the style of the later Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. (Cf. Chung-kuo Chü-shih-shih Pien-hsiu-tsu, Chung-kuo chü-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-chêh ch’u-panshe, Peking, 1988, pp. 48–53.)

2. Liu Chung-p’ing cites Sun Hsing-yen in asserting that the thoughts and strategies of the Duke of Chou together with those of the T’ai Kung provide the basis for the book. SMF CCCY, p. 4 (of the introduction).

3. T’ien Shu, another of T’ien Wan’s descendants, was granted the surname Sun by Duke Ching for his achievements. Sun Wu (the famous Sun-tzu) and thereafter Sun Pin were descendants and therefore were all members of the same clan as T’ien Jang-chu. (Cf. Li Hsieh-ku’s introduction, SMF CS, p. 1, and also pp. 16–17.)

The tradition of Ch’i’s military studies requires a separate extensive work as well as resolution of the thorny problems of verbal transmission and family specialization. Because the Han tomb containing the military works belonged to a person surnamed Ssu-ma, it has been suggested that this provides evidence of the continuity of Ch’i’s studies right into the Han. (Parts of the Ssu-ma Fa were also recovered, proving it could not have been a forgery of the Sui or T’ang dynasties. Modern Western scholars, to a large degree following Ch’ing skeptics, vehemently deny the possibility that the T’ai Kung’s or the Duke of Chou’s thoughts provide the foundation of any of these works, if only because of the style and characteristics of the language. However, this ignores the possibility of gradual rephrasing over centuries of oral transmission. Further epigraphic materials will perhaps provide additional answers.


6. King Wei, originally a member of the T’ien clan, is also noted in the Shih chi biography (translated below) as being related to Ssu-ma Jang-chu.


8. T’ien Wan, who was originally surnamed Ch’en, had served Duke Huan of Ch’i and been enfeoffed for his contributions, taking the name T’ien. T’ien Jang-chu was a third- or fourth-generation collateral descendant of commoner status.

9. Ch’i declined precipitously after Duke Huan’s hegemony, due primarily to a succession of debauched and incompetent rulers, becoming easy prey for the other feudal states. Duke Ching proved no exception to the other rulers and was saved from immediate doom only through the efforts of T’ien Wen-tzu and members of the Pao and Kao clans. T’ien Wen-tzu apparently practiced benevolent policies on behalf of the government, but the duke continued his dissolute ways until shaken by the appearance of a comet in the northwest, which presaged the invasion and collapse of Ch’i. (Cf. Ch’en Wu-t’ung and Su Shuang-pi, eds., Chung-kuo li-tai ming-chiang, Vol. 1, Honan jenmin ch’u-panshe, Honan, 1987, p. 3.)
10. Some Shih chi commentaries identify Pin as a district rather than a city. Obviously, the surrounding territory as well as the cities would have been occupied. (The Shih-chi k'ao-ch'eng suggests that these place names did not exist at such an early period, thereby throwing into question the authenticity of the entire story or at least its association with Duke Ching.)

11. Literally, the area above the Yellow River.

12. At this time the supervisor apparently served just below the commander in chief and therefore above all other generals.

13. A staff set up to observe when the shadow of the sun was longest and thus determine midday.

14. The commander would impose his rules for discipline, the measures for camp order, and the meaning of the various directions and commands.

15. One of the fragments of the Su-ma Fa is a three-character phrase: “Behold in order to instruct” (SMFC, p. 132).

16. This statement—which appears in several of the Seven Military Classics—reflects the growing independence, professionalism, and power of the commanding generals and the realization that military campaigns were becoming so complex that the ruler—who previously, in the Shang and Early Chou, usually commanded in person—should not interfere. A similar story appears in Sun-tzu’s biography. The Su-ma Fa fragments include the statements: “Affairs outside the gate (of the state’s outer wall) are administered by the general” (No. 40, SMFC, p. 131).

17. He apparently tested and evaluated the men in order to remove the weak and sick from the active ranks.

18. So as not to enter the state as an armed host, thereby keeping separate the martial and civilian, as discussed in the text itself. He simultaneously defused any threat his loyal army might be seen as presenting to the political ruler.

19. They were the powers behind the throne of the disolute ruler and thus enjoyed his confidence.

20. A Su-ma Jang-chu is also mentioned in the Chan-kuo ts’ae as holding power under King Min of Ch’i (reigned 300 to 284 B.C.) and refusing to countenance his overthrow. (Cf. Yang Chia-lo, ed., Chan-kuo ts’ae, Vol. 1, Shih-chieh shu-chü, Taipei, 1967, p. 243 [chiian 13, Book 6 of the state of Ch’i].)

21. One hundred fifty-five represents the total number of sections collected, perhaps before collation and elimination of duplicates. Although much has undoubtedly been lost, if the sections were fairly brief, their rearrangement might reduce the number considerably without any actual sacrifice of material.

22. Cf. note 1, above; SMFC, p. 4. Also note the general discussion, pp. 4-22, and the conclusion, p. 22, in SMFC.

23. Notwithstanding, each chapter is organized around an ostensibly theme.

24. The Chou li discusses the offices and duties of the Chou dynasty in great detail. Although it paints a very idealized, systematic portrait, it does have a substantial basis—one that is being confirmed with each new archaeological and epigraphic discovery. The fragments collected by Ch’ing scholars—collated and further analyzed in the SMFC—contain extensive material on military organization not found in the present text. With their inclusion, the ancient book would become an even better candidate for classification under the li (cf. SMFC, pp. 6-12). Liu Chung-p’ing (SMFC CCCY, p. 2) asserts that the title should not contain the word “ping,” or military, because it should be considered a book of laws or standards rather than a book of strategy, or “methods of war.”


26. This is expressed despite their emphasis on benevolence as the foundation of the state and thus as the basis of citizen support, which is therefore synonymous with power. Note also the last paragraph of Chapter 3, where the parallel imposition of strong measures—the law—occurs in the absence of proper obedience: “When upright methods do not prove effective, then centralized control of affairs must be undertaken. If the people do not submit to Virtue, then laws must be imposed.”

27. The recognition, even advocacy of employing force to stop force, war to halt war, is not unique to this text. Mencius was a strong advocate of military activism, and such eclectic texts as the Kuan-tzu contain similar materials. One of the Su-ma Fa fragments states: “If men, for a reason, kill men, killing them is permissible” (SMFC, p. 136).

28. Leaders in the very early years were still confronted with rebellion, barbarian challenges, and the problems of consolidation, but under the first few rulers the state enjoyed relative stability and tranquility.

29. Part of this passage is also repeated at the start of Chapter 2.

30. The danger of martial values predominating, affecting individuals who pursue their own paths and wield power, is also raised in Chapter 2 under the subject of “excessive awesomeness.”

31. “In antiquity they did not pursue a fleeing enemy too far nor follow a retreating army too closely. By not pursuing them too far it was difficult to draw them into a trap; by not pursuing so closely as to catch up it was hard to ambush them. They regarded the li as their basic strength” (Chapter 2).

32. The commentators suggest it can be explained by concern for the cold that would affect the men. Campaigns in antiquity, although generally of short duration, were initiated after the fall harvest and could easily extend into the winter.

33. This contradicts the policy of having the army forage for food and the Su-ma Fa’s advocacy of confiscating rations from the enemy. For example, “To increase material resources rely on [seizing them from] the enemy” and “take advantage of [the enemy’s] material resources” (Chapter 3).

34. A list of concrete justifications for undertaking a campaign of rectification is found at the end of Chapter 1.

35. These formalities are described in the middle of Chapter 1.

36. This does not imply that the general commands simply at the whim of his soldiers or that he is a passive element. Rather, through preparatory activities—such as education, drills, and training—he must ensure that their spirit is disciplined, that their martial capabilities are fully honed. However, in particular circumstances they may still not be prepared, or they may be confronted by situations beyond their skill and spirit. The astute commander must accurately discern these difficulties and react accordingly, such as by whipping up the army’s enthusiasm or employing delaying tactics.

37. The repeated emphasis on measure, control, and quiet is seen as indicating material describing—or at least based on—antique forms of warfare wherein the chariots
and accompanying infantry had to be closely coordinated because gaps or disorder (which would be induced by haste) would doom the army to defeat. Cf. Ping-fa, pp. 48-49. (Please refer to the passage notes for further historical observations.)

38. Tien Hsi-tung stresses this point (cf. SMF CS, p. 72).

39. "If their masses are beset by uncertainty, you should take advantage of it." [5] "Mount a sudden strike on their doubts. Attack their haste... Capitalize on their fears." [5]

40. As discussed in the first third of Chapter 4.

41. That is, the prospect of life, of being spared when they would normally be executed for delinquency or desertion.

Notes to the Text

1. This contrasts sharply with the idealized view that a Sage King need only cultivate his Virtue to achieve rulership of the world, as discussed in the translator's introduction.

2. Such as by imposing corvée labor duties on mounting military campaigns during the prime agricultural seasons. Military actions in themselves would also violate the natural cycle of growth if undertaken during spring and summer, the period when yang is ascending and peaking.

3. The "Great Peace" or "Great Joy," apparently a triumphant musical performance that included dance, was held to welcome the victorious troops who had just pacified the realm and to simultaneously redirect the people's anger—the emotional basis of warfare—into happiness and joy (SMF WCHC 3:4-5A). Thereafter, to remain vigilant against the necessity of reluctantly employing the army against external enemies, the emperor held great hunts in the spring and fall, which the feudal lords were mandated to attend. In the early Chou, these not only provided opportunities to reinforce feudal bonds and secure a considerable meat supply but were also the chance to install organization, practice command, and exercise the feudal members in wielding arms. Because the nobility made up the military class, even with their retainers and servants there would not be more than a few thousand participants.

4. One of the collected fragments describes how the various feudal lords would be ordered to pay court on a seasonal basis, with the intent and objective of each season varying (cf. SMF CS, p. 107). Another seems to reflect archaic remnants, correlating seasons with directions and military activities: "In the spring do not conduct campaigns of rectification in the east; in the fall do not undertake attacks in the west. If there is a lunar eclipse withdraw the army. In this way one is cautious (or reduces) warfare" (SMF CS, p. 99).

4. The li, the forms of proper behavior (also frequently translated as "rites"), evolved and became detailed systematically much later than the idealized period being portrayed. However, the code of chivalry ostensibly governing combat should be well noted because it disappears with the rise of infantry armies and the maturation of large-scale warfare. (The Ch'ung-kuo chin-shih-shih notes that at the battle of Han Yuan in 645 B.C., the commander felt the correct execution of the li took precedence

over capitalizing on a tactical opportunity to attack an enemy that had not yet formally deployed in battle lines. In 638 B.C., the same scrupulous observation of the li resulted in a glorious victory suffused with an aura of righteousness but ignominious defeat. Thereafter, the turn toward realism accelerated, until by the end of the Spring and Autumn period—when the li were becoming more important in all aspects of life and were later given theoretical foundation by early Confucians—such self-imposed restraint became a mark of idiocy (cf. Ping-fa, pp. 49-50).

5. In contrast with the Warring States period, when rank and rewards were based on the number of heads taken, and prisoners were routinely killed. (Unmentioned is the historical fact that prisoners were generally enslaved in the ancient period, including the Shang, and were often sacrificed.)

6. Offices were established to control and supervise productive activities, such as farming and the skilled crafts.

7. With a view to eliminating differences and harmonizing practices among the various states.

8. This includes those among the ranks, standards of the state, observances of the realm.

9. Initiating activities in disarray with the natural tendencies, such as executing in spring, the season of growth; holding military drills or hunts in summer; or perhaps wearing black in summer, when red or yellow would be appropriate.

10. Throughout the Seven Military Classics the importance of announcing military plans in the ancestral temple, before the spirits and before the ancient kings, is constantly emphasized.

11. Such as dikes and irrigation ditches, both of which would have required extensive, onerous labor service and if damaged would have seriously impoverished the people.

12. They constrained the feudal lords with territorial boundaries (as well as by location), thereby limiting their resources and power.

13. Literally, "profits." The Legalists emphasized the motivational power of profits, whereas Confucians such as Mencius vociferously disdained them.

14. Fragment N.24, SMF CS, pp. 122-123, also states that one mobilizes to attack the unrighteous—defining the latter as those who violate the proper order in laws, disregard the rites, and offend the hierarchy under Heaven.

15. The ruler should actively study the traces of the Former Sages with a view to employing them himself. This is the classical Confucian view subsequently denounced by the Legalists.

16. The cryptic text states that "state deportment did not enter the military; military deportment did not enter the state." In antiquity, as discussed in the general introduction, "states" consisted basically of walled cities that encompassed the ruler, his family members, other members of the feudal nobility, and the artisans. The fields were normally outside the walled city, and state affairs were administered from within the city. However, as several books and articles have pointed out, in the Shang and early Chou states, rulers—including the king and the local feudal lords—governed and participated in military and civil affairs equally. Accordingly, the reference to "within the state" should be taken as "within the court," within the administrative center. The military would be mobilized for campaigns outside the state (unless the city itself were un-
31. Such as the “Ta K’ai” mentioned in the first chapter.

32. The Spirit Terrace was supposedly first erected by King Wen of the Chou dynasty. Beneath it he greeted the triumphant army and welcomed those returning from border and other service. Thus it was associated with welcoming men back from labor, military or otherwise. (Another tradition holds that the tower allowed the king to look out over the four quarters and observe the conditions of the people. Cf. Liu Yin’s notes, SMF WCCS, 27B; and SMF CCCY, p. 56.)

In general, terraces were an anathema to the people in antiquity, enslaving their labor without providing them with any visible benefit or enjoyment. They therefore symbolized the ruler’s conspicuous consumption and generally became focal objects for hatred. For example, in his famous interview with King Hui of Liang, Meng Tzu develops his theme of sharing wealth with the people around a reference to King Wen’s ponds and terraces (IA2).

33. Some commentators take these as mendicant persuaders, whose ideas and talents could also be drawn on to develop policies and strategies (cf. SMF WCCS, 28B). However, persuaders or sophists did not really appear until the rise of social mobility toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period. The Spring and Autumn conflicts disenfranchised many members of the nobility, creating a class of stateless wanderers with a wide array of talents—martial, technical, and administrative.

34. The ruler should enquire about the people’s hatreds to ensure they are directed toward the enemy, not toward annoying policies in government.

35. A phrase or two appears to be missing from the text. One other possible translation is: “If advancing and withdrawing are without doubt, it is because plans have been settled. If [the commander] sees the enemy and lacks plans, then listen to his case and punish him” (following Liu Yin, SMF WCCS, 38A). Another possibility would be: “When advancing and withdrawing are without doubt, one can make plans when the enemy is seen.” However, because creating false impressions is a cornerstone of Chinese military thought, we prefer the translation given in the text.

36. Liu Yin understands this as referring to the enemy, preventing them from advancing, which seems doubtful (SMF WCCS, 38B).

37. This appears to be a disconnected fragment discussing techniques similar to those found in the Six Secret Teachings.

38. It is unclear who should not forget it—the ruler, superiors, people in general, or the person who performed the action.

39. Some commentators take this as referring to policies rather than individuals.

40. The chapter takes its title from the first line; however, the main theme is controlling the spirit (ch’i) of the men.

41. Liu Yin understands this as “establish officers for the companies and squads” (SMF WCCS, 43A).

42. This appears to mean the number of paces between each man in both the rows and files, such as four paces horizontally and five vertically. However, it may also be understood as establishing the direction of their movement (cf. SMF WCCS, 43A; SMF CS, p. 78; SMF CCCY, p. 98).

43. The translation of this and several subsequent sentences is extremely tentative due to the apparently corrupt state of the text. In the context of what follows, some commentators suggest this line describes the performance of military courtesies, even
light force against a light enemy, you will be endangered. If you advance with a heavy force against a heavy enemy, you will accomplish nothing. If you advance with a light force against a heavy enemy, you will be defeated. If you advance with a heavy force against a light enemy, you will be successful. Thus in warfare the light and heavy are mutually related. It is also possible to consider the passage as discussing methods for employing the forces, such as the light in a light fashion, but this seems less likely.

54. That is, maintain vigilance; do not simply cast aside weapons and armor while resting.

55. Following Liu Yin, SMF WCCS, 47B. However, the text simply says “the light will be heavy,” perhaps referring to the army’s power.

56. A dictum that several commentators note is rather impractical. The commander would have to maneuver the men into developing the spirit for victory and discern ways to take advantage of the conditions of season and weather.

57. In an earlier passage, the same wording indicated confinement as a measure of discipline. This raises questions about the meaning of both paragraphs.

58. The foundation would be benevolence, civil measures; the ends would be the exercise of righteousness, the martial, force.

59. Liu Yin, writing during the Ming dynasty, understands the horses as referring to cavalry. However, this is unlikely if the text was composed prior to 300 B.C. and is describing earlier conditions of warfare (cf. SMF WCCS, 49B).

60. Drums for the head apparently referred to drums that directed attention of the troops (and therefore their movements) in one direction or another.

61. Drums for the feet would no doubt have indicated the beat or speed of advancing.

62. The various editions record a critical difference in one character, which changes the understanding of the entire passage. The translation follows the reading of ci, “already” victorious, rather than jiao, “whether” victorious. The import of the second reading would carry throughout, translating as “if one may be victorious or not; if one cannot speak about the sharpness of the weapons; cannot speak about the sturdiness of the armor; cannot speak about the sturdiness of the chariots; nor speak about the quality of the horses; nor can the masses take themselves to be many, then the Tao has not yet been attained.” (Cf. SMF WCHC, p. 154 [3:67]; SMF WCCS, 50B [where Liu Yin’s commentary indicates the character was originally “already”]; SMF CCCY, pp. 117-118.)

63. Here the Tao refers to the ultimate objective of pacifying the realm, gaining final victory. Understanding as in note 62, the Tao would then refer to the Tao of Warfare, the realization of a victorious army.

64. Liu Yin indicates that this refers to the upper ranks, but it need not be so restricted (cf. SMF WCCS, 52A).

65. Some of the modern Chinese translators believe this sentence refers to assuming a defensive position. However, the context does not so limit it, and in fact the text just below discusses harassing the enemy with a small force (cf. SMF CS, p. 92).

66. “Unorthodox” tactics (ch’i) are not specifically mentioned in the Ssu-ma Fa, although there are references to using craft and subterfuge in the fragments (cf. No. 31, SMF CS, p. 127) and a few brief discussions of unusual tactics applicable to special circumstances. The concept of the orthodox/unorthodox received its greatest theoretical expression in Sun-tzu’s Art of War and was refined and expanded thereafter.
including both scholarly renditions and extremely simplified popular editions—even comic book versions—in this century. Although several have been consulted for our translation, they will be noted only where they differ significantly from the traditional Chinese texts.


5. For example, see Chi’s Su-ho, in Hsu Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, 3 vols. (Cheng Lianshu, ed.), Hsu-heng-shu-ch’i, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1599, 1602-1603. Subsequent historical events and later concepts are both noted within the Art of War. The former include references to Su Ch’in, and the development of the five phase theory (as now explained by the Lin-i text entitled “The Yellow Emperor Conquers the Red Emperor”)—which is necessary to understand one passage—should be counted among the latter. (See Li Ling in Hsi Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, pp. 1606-1607. Also see Chi Wan-li, Hsien-Ch’in wen-shih tzu-lao k’ao-pien, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, pp. 433-435; and Chang Hsin-ch’eng, ed., Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, 2 vols., Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 [reprint of 1939 edition], Vol. 2, pp. 797-801.) Other examples are cited in the notes to the translation.

6. For example, see Li Ling in Hsi Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, pp. 1614-1617; Chi’s Su-ho in Hsi Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, pp. 1598-1599; and Chang Hsin-ch’eng, Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, Vol. 2, pp. 797-800. The absence of Sun Wu’s name and accomplishments from the Tso chuan, which is well noted for portraying Wu’s events in comparative detail, is considered fatal to any claim of historicity. However, a few scholars argue that many persons and events pivotal to the history of various minor states went unrecorded, so the absence of Sun-tzu’s name should not be considered remarkable.

7. For example, see Li Ling (Hsi Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, pp. 1608-1613) and Chi’s Su-ho (Hsi Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, pp. 1599-1602.) Chi asserts that the scope of warfare described in the Art of War, such as mobilizing one hundred thousand men and one thousand chariots for a single battle, did not occur until the middle of the Warring States period; protracted sieges were not known in the Spring and Autumn because cities were small and had little fortification, whereas in the Warring States they had become important, strongly fortified economic and strategic centers. It was not until the Warring States period that military offices became distinct from the normal hierarchy of nobility and personal command was relinquished by the ruler. Li Ling also avers (p. 1612) that deceit and the use of chi (unorthodox) tactics never characterized Spring and Autumn conflicts. Others have also pointed out that the forms of organization and the extensive emphasis on speed and mobility characterize infantry rather than chariot warfare and therefore reflect another transition that did not occur until the Warring States period. (Also see Chang Hsin-ch’eng, Wei-shu’tung-k’ao, Vol. 2, pp. 797-801; and Chi Wan-li, Hsien-Ch’in wen-shih tzu-lao k’ao-pien, pp. 424-425.

The contrary view is also held—namely, that this specialization, the growing use of infantry, and a new emphasis on speed all mark events found in the last years of the Spring and Autumn period. (See, for example, Wu Ju-sung, STPF CS, pp. 8-12.) Tsun
Hsin interprets these factors similarly: He feels speed is indicative of the growing use of infantry; assaults on cities were neither desirable nor sustainable because even in the developing economy of the late Spring and Autumn period, cities were not yet significantly profitable targets; and the bronze weapons of the era were designed for close combat and thus were inadequate to undertake sustained assaults against cities. Furthermore, state economies of that era could not sustain protracted campaigns; therefore, Sun-tzu emphasized speed, not duration. In contrast, the increased value of cities—which grew rapidly into major economic and strategic centers in the Warring States period—is witnessed in Sun Pin's treatise, which analyzes the types of cities and provides rudimentary tactics for both defending and besieging them. (See Tsun Hsin, "Sun-tzu ping-fa te-so-che chi ch'i shih-tai," WW 1974, No. 12, pp. 20-24. The Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu also consider the tactics of siege warfare, as does the Mo-tzu.)

8. See, for example, Cheng Liang-shu's analysis of the terms, concepts, and passages borrowed from Sun-tzu in two relatively early works, Sun Pin's Military Methods and the Wei Liao-tzu, in Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1617-1625.

9. Wu Ju-sung, in the introduction to his Ch'ien-shuo, briefly notes some important military events that historically predate Sun-tzu (see STPF CS p. 14). In The Art of War Sun-tzu also quotes from preexisting military works.

10. The question of the Art of War's placement within a fairly continuous evolution of written styles is also the subject of debate. For example, Li Ling (Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1613-14) and Robin D.S. Yates ("New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on Their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," TP 74 [1988], pp. 218-219) view the text as somewhat advanced over the basic verb+com, summary format of the Analects, with some conjoined passages and a logical division of topics but less so than Sun Pin and far less than Hsin-tzu and other later Warring States-period philosophers. They note its similarities with the Mo-tzu's style, and Yates believes some of the connectives are later additions that were provided in an attempt to interpret the text. Yates suggests a date of approximately 453-403 B.C., with later additions, whereas Li Ling ascribes the book to a somewhat later date—roughly the middle of the Warring States period. (Yates also advances the thought that the military works were perhaps the first private books to appear in China.) However, Ch'i Shuo-ho and others—concurring with the general view that private books did not really appear until the Warring States period—observe that Sun Wu should have been approximately contemporaneous with Confucius, but the language and presentation are more sophisticated than is apparently characteristic of this early period. Ch'i believes Lord Shang and Wu Ch'i initiated the first books, followed by Sun Pin and others, and that the Art of War represents the confluence of Confucius's theory of kingship, Lao-tzu's concepts of nonaction and unorthodox/orthodox, and Mo-tzu's defensive strategies. He therefore concludes that it is not the work of a single person but that it evolved over a considerable period and was composed in the middle to late Warring States period (see Ch'i Shuo-ho in Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1604-1605).

11. Skeptics abound from the Sung dynasty onward. Some, based on Tu Fu, accused Ts'ao Ts'ao (the first commentator) of butchering the text; others doubted Sun-tzu's existence or felt the work must be a later forgery (see citations in note 6, above). Their skepticism was based in part on the Han shu bibliographical notation of a Sun-tzu in

eighty-two pien (sections, or chapters), despite the Shih chi reference to thirteen sections, which gave rise to the charges against Ts'ao Ts'ao. The discovery of the bamboo slip edition in the tomb at Lin-i in 1972, although it comprises only a third of the present edition, at least proves conclusively that the book existed in roughly its current form early in the Han dynasty. Ch'u Wan-li and others therefore suggest that the thirteen-section work had to be complete before Sun-tzu's interview with the king of Wu because the king mentions this number; the additional sections—if thirteen is not an outright error—probably consisted of materials such as those found at Lin-i, including further dialogues between the king and Sun-tzu (see Ch'i Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tszu-liao k'ao-pien, pp. 433-434). For further fragmentary materials, including possible evidence for a sixteen-section version of the text, see "Ta-tung Shang-sun-chia Han-chien shih-wen," WW 1981, No. 2.) Later notations describe the Sun-tzu in three chuan, or rolls, indicating the difficulty of reconstructing textual lineages with such obscure materials.

Because of its realistic approach (employing spies and deception) designed to ensure the state's survival, the Art of War was also vehemently condemned by Confucian literati throughout late Chinese history (and by numerous Westerners early in this century who unfortunately displayed the same attitude as that of Secretary of State Stimson in his unimaginable quashing of code-breaking activities in a hostile world). Sun Wu's existence and role as well as the book itself accordingly were viewed as late fabrications, unworthy of consideration except by the morally reprehensible.

12. After studying both traditional and newly recovered materials, Cheng Liang-shu concludes that the Shih chi account is basically accurate and that the Art of War was probably composed between 496 and 453 B.C. (see Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1617-1626).

13. See, for example, Ch'i Shuo-ho, who consigns it to the late Warring States period (Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1598-1600).

14. Yates, for example, accepts the view (which is based on internal evidence in comparison with historical events) that the text was composed between 453 and 403 B.C. (see "New Light," pp. 216-219).

15. Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun-tzu, was a brilliant strategist whose achievements have been dramatically preserved in the Shih chi and essentially corroborated by the Lin-i texts. His work, entitled Ping-fa, is best translated as Military Methods to distinguish it from Sun-tzu's work by the same name. Although early bibliographical data indicated the existence of these two distinct works, Sun Pin's book was apparently lost by the end of the Han, and confusion arose as to which Sun actually penned the traditionally transmitted text of the Art of War. (A separate, otherwise unknown chapter on cavalry has been preserved in the T'ung-tien.) Numerous modern Chinese and Japanese translations have already appeared; primary reports of the find appeared in Wen wu in 1974 and are largely contained in the articles cited in note 26, below.

16. Sun Wu and Sun Pin's connected biographies in the Shih chi, ch'uan 65, are translated by Griffith in his introduction (The Art of War, pp. 57-62).

17. Wu Tzu-hsi, who is largely credited with playing the major role in Wu's ascendance, became the subject of a popular cult and numerous stories because of his achievements and perverse execution. (See David Johnson, "The Wu Tzu-hsi Pien-wen and Its Sources," Part I, HJAS 40.1 [June 1980], pp. 93-156, and Part II, HJAS 40.2 [December 1980], pp. 465-505.) The fact that Sun-tzu is not mentioned in the
Tsao Ch'uan is sometimes justified by pointing out that Wu Tsu-hsu was such a dominant figure as well as Sun-tzu's direct superior—he simply eclipsed Sun-tzu when credit for Wu's military success was apportioned (cf. Wei ju-lin, ST CCCY, p. 5).

18. According to most other writings, Sun Wu was actually a native of Ch'i, as is discussed below.

19. Ch'i's Su-ho, among others, does not believe Sun-tzu would ever have been allowed to commandeer palace women to illustrate his theories of military discipline nor that the execution of the two captains would have been understood as having proved anything. He therefore views the entire episode as an exaggeration (see Hsü Wu-shu t'ung-k'ao, l. p. 1598). Wu Ju-sung believes that rather than being a lesson about discipline, the incident illustrates Sun-tzu's fundamental teaching that a general—once he is in command of the army—does not accept orders from the ruler; this is in accord with his particular understanding of Sun-tzu's major contribution as having been the isolation and characterization of the professional general (STPC CS, p. 3).

20. This and similarly worded phrases appear frequently in the Seven Military Classics as well as in the Art of War. Essentially a quotation from the Tao Te Ching, it is generally taken as evidence of Taoist influence on military thought. However, perhaps this single saying was simply adopted by various military strategists because of its sobering experience in actual warfare, without reference to or acceptance of any other aspects of philosophical Taoism.

21. Yang Chia-lo, ed., Wu Yieh ch'un-ch'i, chüan 4, "Ho-lu nei-chüan." The translation follows the 1967 SPKY edition reprinted as Wu Yieh ch'un-ch'i, 2 vols., Shih-ch'ien shu-chu, Taipei, 1980, Vol. 1, pp. 91-95. The biography contains with Sun-tzu advising the king not to press the attack against Ch'i because the people are already exhausted. Although his name is mentioned several more times in the chapter, except in a single case where he briefly offers tactical advice, it is always coupled with that of Wu Tzu-hsiu. Insofar as the Wu Yieh ch'un-ch'i is attributed to the first century A.D., nearly two centuries after the Shih chi, it is not considered reliable evidence for Sun-tzu's activities. However, recent PRC popular military histories frequently contain biographies of Sun-tzu that are based on such remote material (including many writings from the late Warring States and Ch'in periods) reconstructed in some detail. For example, see Ch'en Wu-t'ung and Su Shuang-pi, eds., Chung-kung li-tai ming-chiang, 2 vols., Honan jen-min ch'u-pan-shu, Honan, 1987, Vol. 1, pp. 13-18. Virtually every modern edition and translation cites the Shih chi biography and assumes Sun-tzu's authenticity, although the Chung-kung ku-t'ai ch'ang-ch'eng t'ung-lan (Chang Shao-sheng and Liu Wen-ch'ian, eds., Ch'ang-ch'eng ch'u-pan-shu, Peking, 1988, Vol. 1, pp. 74-81) never even mentions his name in its account of the war between Wu and Yueh.

22. Based on the Shih chi account, Wu Ju-sung believes—despite intrigues and treachery—the historical Sun-tzu was active in Wu for roughly thirty years, from 512 to 482 B.C. (see STPC CS, p. 4). Chan Li-po suggests a more limited period, 512 to 496 ("Lueh-t'an Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa," WW 1974, No. 12, p. 15).

23. Later reconstructions of Sun-tzu's life trace his lineage back to the T'ien clan, which had risen to power in Ch'i after the period of Duke Huan, the first hegemon. Sun Wu's grandfather, as a reward for military achievement in a campaign against Lu, was granted the surname Sun. Although the T'ien lineage was among the four major ones contending energetically for power in Ch'i, they were largely successful, and skeptics thus question why Sun-tzu would have ventured into Wu and then remained unknown for some period—during which he befriended Wu Tzu-hsiu. Clearly, his family background in military studies would have provided him with expertise that would have been equally useful to his lineage, which was immersed in Ch'i's turmoil.

24. The monumental issue of the relationship between Taoist and military thought in antiquity—including questions of origins, modification of concepts, and direction of influence—obviously requires a voluminous study in itself. Many secondary works in Chinese contain at least brief ruminations on the subject, but almost all of them tend to treat it simplistically and ineffectually. (Hu Wen-chu's chapter "Sun-tzu hou Lao-tzu" sun-hsiang pi-chiao, found in his book Sun-tzu yen-chü (Kuang-tung ch'u-p'an-shu, Taipei, 1980, pp. 192-208) is an exception.) In the West, Christopher C. Rand has initiated the analytical effort with an intriguing, if complex, article that provides a conceptual framework for dissecting the various approaches to certain felt problems. (See "Chinese Military Thought and Philosophical Taoism," MS 34 [1970-1978], pp. 171-218, and "Li Ch'üan and Chinese Military Thought," HJAS, Vol. 39, No. 1 [June 1979], pp. 107-137.) Insofar as it is impossible to compress a meaningful, comparative presentation of Taoist ideas and military thought into a few pages of closely packed notes, we have opted to introduce appropriate comments at relevant points in the translations and other introductory material. (Ch'en Ch'i-tien's Sun-tzu ping-fa chiao-shih (Chung-hua shu-chu, Taipei, 1955 [reprint of 1944 edition]) contains a succinct analysis of the major philosophical schools' attitudes toward warfare that corrects some general misimpressions found throughout Chinese history [see pp. 231-251]. Kagurakacho Masato's article "Sonshi to Roshi" (Toho shokyō 37 [April 1971]), pp. 39-50) also includes specialist studies of this nature.

25. The Art of War is classified by the Han shu under the subcategory "ping ch'iu-t'ien mou," roughly "military (imbalance of) power and planning." (See notes 39 and 37 for further discussion of ch'iu-t'ien and concepts of shih, to which it is closely related.) Ch'iu-t'ien is frequently identified with expediency, with military measures that stress volatile tactics, swiftness, and direction to achieve their aims. Books in this category are aptly described as follows: (Experts in) ch'iu-t'ien and mou preserve the state with the orthodox (ch'eng, the upright) and employ the army with the unorthodox (ch'i)." Only after first estimating (the prospects for victory) do they engage in warfare. They unite the disposition of troops (hsing) and strategic power (shih), embrace yin and yang, and utilize (those skilled in) technology and the crafts." (A similar partial statement is found in Verse 57 of the Tao Te Ching: "Govern the state with the orthodox, employ the army with the unorthodox.") Other works found in this section are Sun Pin's Military Methods and the Wu-tzu; books by Lord Shang and the T'ai Kung were deleted from the original Ch'i shih list (cit. Yates, "New Light," pp. 214-224).

26. The bamboo slip edition discovered at Lin-i constitutes slightly more than one-third of the present Art of War arranged in thirteen sections with many chapter headings identical to those in the current text. Although some discrepancies in extant versions (such as those found in the Ten Commentaries edition and the Seven Military Classics edition) have long been noted, they are essentially the same as—although more extensive than—the Lin-i reconstructed text. Additional material uncovered in the tomb, including a brief conversation recorded between the king of Wu and Sun-tzu (which is generally felt to be a reasonably authentic record of their initial interview), sustains the opinion that the original form of the Art of War was in thirteen sections, as
recorded in the Shih chi, and suggests that Su-ma Ch’ien drew on materials now lost when writing the Sun’s biography. (The bamboo slip edition, of course, only proves that this particular version existed prior to—or at least early in—the Han dynasty. Scholars continue to argue about the further implications, including whether the section now entitled “Interview with the King of Wu” provides evidence for Sun Wu’s existence and the early origin of the text. See, for example, Li, Ling, Hsi Wei-shu t’ung-k’ao, pp. 1606–8.) For a brief English overview, see Yates, “New Light,” pp. 211–220.

Among the most important original reports are the following: Shantung Sheng Po-wu-kuan Lin-i Wen-wu-tsu, “Shantung Lin-i Hsi-Han-mu fa-hsien Sun-tzu ping-fa ho Sun Pin ping-fa teng chu-chien te chien-pan,” WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 15–21; Hsiu Ti, “Lueh-tan Lin-i Yin-ch’u-han Han-mu ch’u-tu te ku-tai ping-shu ts’an-chien,” WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 27–31; Lo Fu-i, “Lin-i Han-chien kai-shu,” WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 32–35; and Chan Li-po, “Lueh-tan Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa,” WW 1974, No. 12, pp. 13–19. (Chan Li-po points out several instances in which the bamboo slip edition’s reading is completely opposite of that of the present text. In these sentences this radically alters the meaning, resolving otherwise contorted and opaque constructions. These, and other views, such as those of Chu Ch’un, are cited in the notes to the translation.) Also see Li’s summary reprinted in Hsi Wei-shu t’ung-k’ao, pp. 1605–1608. (Li concludes that the discovery is not adequate evidence to revise a much later dating that has been derived from internal evidence.)

27. D.C. Lau, in a rather critical review of Griffith’s translation, has discussed several of the main ideas and problems of the text. See “Some Notes on the Sun Tzu,” BSOAS 28 (1965), pp. 317–335. (Lau’s views, although preliminary, are important to understanding the text and are taken into account in the translation.)

28. Wu Ju-sung emphasizes Sun-tzu’s dictum that warfare is the greatest affair of state, as distinguished from the Shang-Chou tradition, which identifies both sacrifice and warfare as equally important matters. Wu feels that Sun-tzu’s view reflects the new reality emerging late in the Spring and Autumn period and the clash of economic interests between the newly landed class and the old nobility, which had monopolized military power and authority (see STPF CS, pp. 9–12).

29. The Art of War, although expressing the basic view found throughout the Seven Military Classics that the state must always be prepared for warfare and must nurture adequate material welfare, advocates keeping the people essentially ignorant and manipulating them in battle as though they were sheep. Accordingly, SRC scholars in particular have concluded that the author lived after the rise of early Legalist thought because such measures were characteristic of that approach, and they even termed him a Legalist strategist. See, for example, Tsun Hsin, “Sun-tzu ping-fa te ts’o che chi chi shih-tai,” pp. 22–24; Ch’i Shu-ho in Hsi Wei-shu t’ung-k’ao, p. 1603; Li Ling in Hsi Wei-shu t’ung-k’ao, p. 1613; and Chan Li-po, “Lueh-tan Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa,” pp. 14–15. (Keeping the people simple and ignorant is also a pronounced doctrine in the Tao Te Ching. However, also see note 173 of the translation.)

30. Extensive, detailed calculations were performed in the ancestral temple prior to mobilizing for a campaign, and presumably similar, although more limited, calculations were performed by the commander before individual engagements in the field. These calculations apparently were based on quantified estimates that assigned numerical values to the strength of systematically examined aspects (as discussed in note 32 below and listed especially in the first chapter of the book itself) for both the enemy and oneself. (Cf. Lau, “Some Notes on the Sun Tzu,” pp. 331–332; and Hsiu Wen-chu, Sun-tzu yen-chiu, pp. 168–169.)

31. Sun-tzu’s discussion of the critical qualities that should mark a general is viewed as evidence that professional commanders had already appeared on the historical stage, displacing personal field command by hereditary rulers (see note 19 above; and STPF SY, p. 12). Further confirmation is provided by his insistence that the ruler should not interfere with the commander once the latter has assumed the mantle of authority and ventured forth, as is illustrated by the famous incident from his biography.

32. Sun-tzu’s descriptive method for analyzing the tactical aspects of battle is founded on around forty paired, mutually defined, interrelated categories. (This may reflect Taoist thinking about names and their mutual, interrelated definitions, as is sometimes claimed, or simply be the product of his own analytical reflection.) Among these are Heaven-Earth, offense-defense, advance-retreat, and unorthodox-orthodox. (Cf. T’ang Ching-wu, Sun-tzu ping-fa ts’u-hsin-ch’ieh, self-published, Taipei, 1981 [rev. ed.], pp. 25–27 for an extensive list.)

33. The military concepts and applications of the unorthodox (ch’i) and orthodox (cheng) probably originated with Sun-tzu, although the Art of War does not discuss them extensively. (Note that the text always orders them as ch’i cheng, unorthodox/orthodox, rather than as prioritized in the West—orthodox/unorthodox. The implications, if any, remain to be explored, although against a background of correctness and uprightness, the choice seems deliberate. The military was generally regarded as ch’i, in accord with Lau-tzu’s dictum: “With the orthodox govern the state; with the unorthodox employ the army.”) The later military classics—such as the Wei Liao-tzu, Six Secret Teachings, and especially Questions and Replies—devote considerable energy to discussing ch’i and cheng and their employment.

Although the subject clearly requires a separate article or book, in essence “orthodox” tactics include employing troops in the normal, conventional, “by-the-book,” expected ways—such as massive frontal assaults—while stressing order and deliberate movement. “Unorthodox” tactics are realized primarily through employing forces—especially flexible ones—in imaginative, unconventional, unexpected ways. Therefore, instead of direct chariot attacks, unorthodox tactics would mount circular or flanking thrusts. Instead of frontal assaults, they would follow indirect routes to stage unexpected, behind-the-lines forays. Their definition, of course, is dependent on normal expectation within a particular battlefield context as well as on the enemy’s actual anticipation; therefore, they are mutually defining, mutually transforming, and circular in essence. Thus, as discussed in the other military classics, the orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, and an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when it is unexpected because it is orthodox—whereas a flanking or indirect assault would thereby be considered normal and therefore orthodox. A frontal feint by a large force, designed to distract or lure an enemy, would be unorthodox.

The concept lends itself to extreme complexities of thought and has often been misunderstood throughout Chinese history or dismissed as simplistic, when in fact it is quite the opposite. However, in essence it remains a descriptive tool for tactical conceptualization, for characterizing and manipulating forces within and exploiting an enemy’s matrix of expectations, rather than a transformational mode to be actualized in the concrete reality of men and weapons the way a military formation is deployed. (There is nothing mysterious or mystical about ch’i and cheng and their mutually pro-
 ductive realtionship, yet later commentators and strategists have sometimes become seriously confused. Under such circumstances, a useful tactical conceptualization becomes an unnecessary obstacle to clear, strategic thinking.

The concept's origins remain unclear, although speculation tends to identify it with the conflation of thought that crystallized as Taoism or as originating in divinatory practices. The interrelationship of ch'i and cheng mirrors that of yin and yang, and at least one writer attributes the concept's roots to the yin-yang principles found in the I Ching. The orthodox is identified with the firm or hard, whereas the unorthodox correlates with the soft or yielding. (See Hsiao T'ien-shih, Sun-tzu ch' an-cheng-lun, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-shu, Taipei, 1983 [reprint; original, 1942], pp. 197-199.) The observation that this relationship characterizes the natural world figures prominently in the Tao Te Ching, which is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tzu. Cheng turns into ch'i, things revert to their opposites (in complementary, dynamic tension) after reaching their pinnacle, as do yin and yang. (Cf. Hsu Wen-chu, Sun-tzu yen-ch'ü, Kuang-tung ch'u-pan-shu, Taipei, 1980, pp. 206-208. Hsu observes that although Sun-tzu speaks about the mutually productive relationship of ch'i and cheng, he emphasizes the unorthodox. Also see Kaga Kurooka, "Sons to Rashi," especially pp. 44-46.

In the introduction to his translation, General Griffith states that cheng forces engage or engage and fix the enemy, whereas ch'i forces defeat him, often through flanking and rear attacks (see The Art of War, pp. 34-35). He also characterizes cheng forces as the normal or direct and ch'i forces as extraordinary or indirect, similarly, as fixing and flanking (or encircling) or again as "the force(s) of distraction and the force(s) of decision" (see p. 42). He goes on to stress that ch'i operations are always strange, unorthodox and unexpected, and cheng also notes the reciprocal relationship between ch'i and cheng. Finally, Griffith adds that the realization of ch'i and cheng is not confined to tactical levels but may also be implemented on strategic levels (p. 43).

D. C. Lau's criticism of Griffith's translation emphasizes the abstract nature of these two terms, as opposed to invariably identifying them with forces, and suggests that they might best be translated as "straightforward" and "crafty" (see Some Notes on the Sun-tzu, pp. 330-331).

Benjamin E. Wallenacker—in a brief, often-cited etymological article—concludes that cheng refers to military operations that pin down or "spike" an enemy, whereas ch'i operations are maneuvers that force the enemy off balance and thus bring about his defeat. (He further speculates that Sun-tzu's " formulations seem likely to have been derived from experience with cavalry forces. This would require revising the date of composition to roughly the dawn of the third century B.C.) See "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought," Language, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1966), pp. 293-299.

Roger T. Ames conceptually translates the terms as "irregular deployments" and "regular deployments" (The Art of Rulership, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 68). "Irregular" is perhaps an unfortunate choice because it is inherently burdened with adverse military connotations. Extreme order and control are necessary to employ forces in ch'i maneuvers. Thus Rand's choice of "extraordinary" and "normal" seems to be better phraseology (see "Chinese Military Thought," p. 118).

The Chinese secondary literature on Sun-tzu is overwhelming; however, for ch'i/ cheng most analysts essentially repeat the definitions found in the Art of War and later military classics, emphasizing the realization of these abstract concepts in concrete forces. Flexibility, maneuverability, and swiftness are stressed especially when discuss-
posed on essentially tactical military vocabulary under the influence of newly formulated Legalist views.

A complicating factor is the cryptic nature of many of the texts. Statements and even complete sections are generally brief and often enigmatic and apparently represent only notes or cursive summaries of extensive, complex, systematized thought—most of which has either been lost or was never cohesively formulated in writing. The development of private books may have largely coincided with the rise of specialist military studies. See note 10 above and for general background—although military books are not discussed—Burton Watson’s early study, Early Chinese Literature, Columbia University Press, New York, 1962; Tsun-hsien Tsin, Written on Bamboo and Silk, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962; and Joseph Needham et al., Science and Civilisation in China, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Vol. 5, Part 1: Paper and Printing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.) Moreover, the assumption that concepts are used in a consistent and precise way in these early books, although necessary for analytical studies, is not invariably valid and also needs to be sustained.

The scope of these issues precludes incorporating an intensive examination of the nature and function of shih in an already massive book directed to presenting translations of the Seven Military Classics. However, a brief characterization of the dimensions of the concept, a short review of previous studies, and an assessment of various translation possibilities remain unavoidable. Although we must defer any systematic justification of the terms chosen to translate shih and its related concepts, some indication of our reasoning is warranted. (Additional notes that briefly explicate the concept within concrete contexts, drawing selectively on the extensive classical commentaries, are appended to the translations.)

Giles (see note 2 above) tends to be criticized severely for his mistranslation and misunderstanding of the Art of War, although not always justifiably. His English equivalents for shih include “circumstances,” “energy,” “latent energy,” “combined energy,” “shape” (where the usage is synonymous with bing—“shape,” or “form”), and “strength”; he also simply elides the term by not translating it. None of these seems particularly appropriate, although “latent energy” characterizes situational potential most accurately in several contexts.

General Griffith—an experienced military officer with expert knowledge of strategy and tactics as well as their conceptions and precise vocabulary—also uses a number of distinct, context-dependent terms. (Note that he is generally criticized by D. C. Lau for a lack of consistency in his terminology, as mentioned in note 33 above, but the sense of this term definitely varies within the Art of War.) These terms include “circumstances,” “situation” (including at least one instance in which it seems highly inappropriate), “momentum,” “strength,” and “tactical power” (which merits serious consideration as an equivalent for shih). He also offers a valuable note to the title of the fifth chapter: “Shih, the title of this chapter, means ‘force,’ ‘influence,’ ‘authority,’ ‘energy.’ The commentators take it to mean ‘energy’ or ‘potential’ in some contexts and ‘situation’ in others.” (Griffith, Art of War, p. 90). In contrast, for his 1988 translation (see note 4), Cleary selected “force of momentum,” “formation,” “conditions,” and “forces.”

The concept appears in the Book of Lord Shang and the Kuan-tzu, both of which probably (for the most part) date to somewhat after the Art of War. For the former,
weight. Clearly, a stone will transfer less energy at the moment of impact than a much larger boulder, and the total destructive potential is inherently related to the mass of the object.

Accordingly, after studying the nature of the concept in the Seven Military Classics, especially in the Art of War, two equally important factors appear to be integrated within this concept and should be expressed by any translation: first, the strategic advantage conveyed by superior position; and second, the power of the forces involved. (“Power” refers to the army’s overall capability in all aspects—including endurance, spirit, discipline, equipment, command, and physical condition—rather than strength of numbers alone.) Obviously, as the commentator Chiang P'ai-li has noted, strategic advantage has a pronounced temporal character; therefore, it should not be confused to exploiting the advantages of terrain, as it is usually characterized.

Strategic advantage in essence is a comparative term, not an absolute one, although a vast force will naturally possess great power. (In an extreme case the advantages of terrain perhaps become negligible. A minimal force, such as a platoon or company, represents one extreme, a vast army the other.) Accordingly, we have chosen to translate the term shib as “strategic configuration of power” and will use this meaning throughout except where a different sense, such as shape or circumstances, seems to have been intended. Although “strategic power” is basically an acceptable abridgment and perhaps is adequate in itself, “configuration” will generally be added as a reminder that the power results from configuring the military’s armed might in accord with and to the exploitation of the terrain in order to gain strategic advantage. However, when the term is conjoined with others—such as “military” or “army”—or the text would read awkwardly, “strategic power” will be used by itself, with “configuration” understood. Finally, in the context of confined battlefield situations, where “strategic” is inappropriate in scope, shib is translated as “tactical configuration of power” or “tactical power.”

Insofar as two military forces may be described comparatively, there are some difficulties, and the question might be posed: Does shib exist in the absence of an enemy? Is it inappropriate to refer to the shib of an army if the two forces are equally matched and poised across a valley, with both in their static positions—enjoying equal positional advantage relative to a potential battlefield between them and each other? Because Sun-tzu refers to shib chuan, “strategic power that is equal,” the term would seem to refer to a general evaluation versus terrain—and thus configuration of power—rather than specifically confined to being defined relative to an enemy’s position and deployment. (“Ch’uan,” which is discussed below, refers to this relative imbalance of forces.) To facilitate such inquiry, which we intend to address in a separate article, “shib” will generally be added parenthetically whenever the term is translated.

(Shib also also noted that shib and hsing—central concepts in the Art of War—are also found in an important verse of the Tao Te Ching, which can be translated as follows: “The Tao gives them birth, Te [Virtue] nurtures them, things give them form [hsing], shib [power] completes them” [Verse 51].)

38. Hsing primarily means shape or form and thus should generally refer to the disposition of the troops or the configuration of forces. However, it also appears in other uses, such as situation or context, and may be nearly synonymous with shib at times. We will normally translate the term as “disposition of forces” when it appears alone to avoid confusion with “configuration of power.” When in compound use, such as hsing

Notes to the Text

Insofar as the Art of War has been the most studied of the Seven Military Classics, numerous editions and commentaries are readily available, with additional modern works appearing annually. Therefore, in contrast to the notes for the other translations, in general only a single reference or two—if any—is provided for the commentators’ views. Scholars with expertise in the relevant languages can easily refer to the passages in such standard works as the Shih-chiao chu, Shih-i-chiao chu, or those listed in the abbreviations at the beginning of the notes to the Art of War.

The discovery of the Han dynasty bamboo slips (hereafter abbreviated BS) has occasioned close scrutiny of the traditionally transmitted texts, including the Sung/Ming Seven Military Classics edition. However, although many contemporary scholars uncritically accept the BS as preserving the original text of the Art of War, many questions remain. A more balanced view is provided by Chu Chun and is cited in the notes as appropriate. Variations in meaning caused by character differences are also noted, but not simple differences caused by the presence or absence of connectives or particles or minor inversions in textual order. Furthermore, given the fragmentary nature of the text, phrases and sentences missing in the BS are not cited unless they radically affect the meaning.

1. “Estimations” in the sense of objectively estimating the relative strength and weakness of oneself and the enemy for a series of factors. Although twelve such factors are discussed in this chapter, as noted in the translator’s introduction there are several
tens of paired factors that could be employed equally well in making such determinations.

The character translated as “estimations”—chi—also has the meaning “plans,” leading some to translate the title as “Initial Plans,” or “First Plans.”

2. It is frequently assumed that the factors to be compared are the seven enumerated several paragraphs below because the five that immediately follow are already subsumed under “structure it according to [the following] five factors” (cf. ST SCC, p. 2; and STPF CS, p. 30). However, it seems clear that the “five factors” define the domain for comparative calculations.

Historically, some commentators did not accept the addition of “affairs” following the world “five,” the correctness of which has been sustained by the BS, which also lack “factors.” (Ch’en Ch’ao-ch’en, Sun-tzu ping-fa chiao-shih, Chung-hua shu-chi, Taipei, 1955, p. 65. Chu Tzu [STPF SY, pp. 2-3] believes “factors” should not be excised, despite its absence in the BS.)

3. Not the metaphysical Tao of the Taoists but the Tao of government, understood as legal and administrative measures and policies. Liu Yin (SWTC WCCS, I:2A) understands it in terms of the usual array of Confucian virtues. However, Kuan Feng has observed that the concept is never made explicit in the Art of War. See Kuan Feng, “Sun-tzu chün-shih che-hsiu shu-hsiang yen-chiu,” Che-hsiu yen-chiu 1957, No. 2, p. 72.

4. The character translated as “ruler”—shang—may also be understood as “superiors,” and the commentators espouse both possibilities. Although Liu Yin is somewhat ambivalent (SWTC WCCS, I:2A), the translation follows STPF CS, p. 30; and SS AS, p. 26.

5. “Thus” is added from the bamboo slips, although it is implied in any case. The BS conclude the sentence with the phrase “the people will not deceive/contrive him” rather than the traditional “not fear danger.” However, Chu Tzu believes the traditional reading is preferable (STPF SY, p. 3). Note that the term “deceive” also occurs in the famous sentence somewhat later: “Warfare is the Tao of deception.”

Commentators who stress the Legalism in Sun-tzu’s thought understand the sentence as “they will die for him, they will live for him.” They especially cite Sun-tzu’s directive to the commanding general to manipulate his troops in combat like sheep, keeping them ignorant (cf. STPF CS, pp. 30-34). Although Sun-tzu does not advocate positive measures directed to fostering the people’s welfare—such as are found in the other Military Classics—he does discuss gaining the allegiance of the masses before they can be employed, not impoverishing them, and the importance of benevolence in a commander. Most scholars thus have understood the ideal as being exemplified historically by King Wu of the Chou, who had garnered the willing support of the people. (For further discussion, see Wu Shu-p’ing, “Ts’ung Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Wu-wen k’an Sun Wu te Fa-chiu shu-hsiang,” WW 1975, No. 4, pp. 6-13.)

6. The BS add: “according with and going contrary to, [the basis of] victory in warfare.” Neither STPF CS nor STPF SY includes it. (STPF HC, p. 150.)

7. Terrain classification is one of the keystones of Sun-tzu’s strategic analysis, as will become clear from the extensive materials in Chapters eight, ten, and eleven (where these terms are further defined).

The BS add “high or low” at the start of the classifications (STPF SY, p. 3).

8. These terms are variously understood by the commentators. “The Tao of command” may refer to the exercise of command or to the establishment of military hierarchy, the chain of command. “Management of logistics” probably encompasses everything from the types and nature of the army’s equipment to the provision and management of that equipment in campaigns. (For summaries, see SS AS, p. 27; STPF SY, pp. 9-10; and STSCC, p. 8.)

Wu Ji-sung also equates the “laws” with the last four items in the series of questions for comparative evaluation: the implementation of laws and orders, strong forces, well-trained officers and troops, and clear rewards and punishments (See STPF CS, pp. 37-38).

9. “Forces” could also be translated as “weapons and masses” rather than understood as “army masses” or “infantry and masses.” However, “masses” emphasizes the contrast with the next criterion for evaluation, the trained “officers and troops” (cf. STPF SY, p. 11; STPF CS, p. 30).

10. Ch’en Hao early interpreted this passage as referring to Sun Wu himself staying or leaving, rather than retaining or dismissing a general. In addition, he identifies the “general” as the king of Wu, because he frequently commanded the army himself, and interprets Sun-tzu’s statement as a barb to gain employment (SWTC SCC, pp. 11-12. Cf. SS AS, p. 34. However, “retaining him” as a translation seems more reasonable than the sense of “remaining with him”).

Liu Yin (SWTC WCCS, I:6B) makes an odd distinction between the first “general” in the sentence, which he believes refers to the Grand General in his consultations with the ruler, and the second general, which he sees as referring to any subordinate general appointed to implement the chosen strategy (also see STPF SY, p. 12).

11. Liu Yin believes this should refer to the subordinate generals entrusted with field command, “listening to the estimations” and resulting plans (SWTC WCCS, I:6), but others believe it refers to the king of Wu—the “you” in the translation (cf. SS AS, p. 35; STSCC, p. 12). Shih is discussed in the introductory notes.

12. This is also understood as “outside the normal realm of tactics,” using the unorthodox (cf. STSCC, p. 12; SS AS, p. 36).

13. The imbalance of power should be created with the objective of facilitating and attaining the “gains to be realized.” Merely creating an imbalance of power would be pointless, and such an imbalance is already inherently dependent on the advantages one possesses (cf. STPF SY, pp. 13-14, for a similar view and an example). Ch’u-t’ien is discussed in the introductory notes.

14. The term “deception” here inadequately conveys both the positive and negative aspects of the matter. We prefer to translate as “deception and artifice” because much craft is involved in not only concealing appearance, which is the simplest form of deception, but also in creating false impressions.

The fourteen sentences that follow should be understood as tactical principles flowing from this realization. They are also believed to reflect or to be a distillation of tactical experience gained through combat situations in the Spring and Autumn period (STPF CS, pp. 39-40).

15. Translators often take this as “when you are nearby make it appear as if you are distant,” but this would clearly be contrary to reality. It would be impossible for the enemy not to know—through reconnaissance and observation—an army’s actual position, although attempts were initiated routinely to diminish the accuracy of such per-
ceptions (such as by dragging brush and increasing or reducing the number of cook fires at night). More likely, the position to which the army is about to move, an objective that is about to be attacked, is intended as translated (following Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, I:9A. Compare ST SCC, p. 14). Chu Chin notes this might also be understood temporally, as immediate future and some distant time (STPF SY, p. 14).

16. Two readings of these laconic sentences are possible. The critical question is whether the first term in each of them and the several that follow below should be read in the light of the Tao of Warfare and thus as explications of craft and deception and ways to manipulate the enemy, as Sun-tzu discusses extensively, or simply as a series of individual items. In the latter case, it is possible that they were simply conflated here—rather than being the product of Sun Wu's systematic analysis—from preceding rubrics about military action. It is tempting to read them all parallel, with the first term always describing an aspect of the enemy and the second an action to be applied, but in our opinion the imposition of such parallelism—which is frequently invalid even for two phrases within a single short sentence—is too artificial.

Accordingly, for the first sentence, one reading would be that "if the enemy [desires] profit, entice them"—understanding "with the prospect of profit," which is somewhat redundant. The translation emphasizes the active approach because we should assume that armies will generally move for tactical advantage. At the same time we must remember that a frequently discussed (and readily exploitable) flaw in some commanding generals is greed.

For the second sentence, two additional renderings are variously suggested: "If they are disordered, seize them," and "Show [apparent] disorder [in your own forces] and seize them." The commentators cite a number of historical examples in support of the latter, but the former has adherents as well, and decisive evidence for a definitive reading is lacking. (Measures such as enticing them with profits, sowing rumors, and fostering their licentiousness would all cause the sort of disorder that could easily be capitalized on.) The translation follows Liu Yin. (SWTCC WCCS, I:9B. Cf. ST SCC, p. 15. Also note the extensive analysis, with examples of these and the following sentences, in Tzu Yu-ch'i, ed., Mou-lieh k'u, Lan-t'ien ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 70–76.)

The term "take them" is said to indicate an easy victory rather than a difficult conflict (cf. ST SCC, p. 15).

17. The "substantial" and the "vacuous" (or empty) form a correlative pair that is closely identified with Sun-tzu's thought, although the terms may have predated him. One of his fundamental principles is exploiting voids, weaknesses, fissures, and vacuities. The opposite, the "substantial" (shih)—corresponding roughly to strong, well-organized, disciplined, expertly commanded, entrenched forces—is generally to be avoided rather than attacked with inept and wasteful frontal assaults. (Wang Chien-tung, STPF WC, p. 31, notes the phrase can also be understood as "be substantial and prepare for them," although this appears less appropriate.) The theme of Chapter 6 is "Vacuity and Substance."

18. The military thinkers generally advocate fostering and exploiting anger because it blinds the general to the realities of the battlefield and takes away the troops' judgment. Consequently, suggestions that jao means "avoid them" are probably not accurate, even though Sun-tzu does recommend avoiding an army when it is at the peak of its fervor. (An alternative translation would be "anger and perturb them.")

19. Again, two readings are possible, the alternative being "if they are humble/lowly, make them arrogant" (cf. Tau, ed., Mou-lieh k'u, pp. 71–73; STPF SY, p. 15). The translation follows Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, I:10B–11A. Logically, if they are "humble" they already lack combative spirit, and it would be foolish to raise their anger to no purpose. (On the other hand, they may also simply be restrained and composed.)

20. The text appears to suggest the general cannot transmit or divulge his determinations with regard to these factors before the battle. However, it may also entail the idea that they cannot be rigidly or arbitrarily determined before the situation develops. Commentators embrace both views (cf. ST SCC, pp. 20–21; STPF CS, p. 31).

21. The procedure for strategic analysis in the ancestral temple apparently assigned relative values to the various factors, including those discussed in this chapter. D. C. Lau (see "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 331–332) suggests that counting sticks were used for each factor and then the totals taken. Some form of relative weighing was probably used because certain factors would be more significant than others, and a simple total is probably misleading. (The translation follows Liu Yin. Also compare STPF CS, p. 31; Ch'en's Chiao-shih, pp. 72–73; Kuan Feng's comments on the various factors in "Sun-tzu-chun-shih che-hsueh su-hsiang yen-chu," pp. 71–73; and Yu Tse-min, "Shih-isi Chung-ku ku-tai te chan-lueh hai-men," in P'ing-chia shih-yen [ed. Chun-shih li-shih yen-chu-hui], Chun-shih k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, Vol. 2, pp. 221–226.) Giles errs in understanding "no points" as simply failing to perform any strategic calculations.

22. D. C. Lau ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 321–325) has pointed out that initial phrases in Sun-tzu passages are often captions or summaries. The five-character phrase introducing this section appears to be one of these; however, others are less clear. Traditionally, such introductory captions have simply been made the subject of a sentence, understanding a term such as "requires" to bridge the subject and its expansion (cf. ST CCCC, p. 86; STPF WC, p. 52; and STPF CS, p. 42). Our translation generally adopt Lau's insight whenever captions apparently precede material of any length.

23. Griffith (The Art of War, p. 73) and some modern Chinese editions (such as STPF WC, p. 33) insert a character meaning "to value" or "esteem" in this sentence, citing (in Griffith's case) the Seven Military Classics edition, however, neither the latter nor the ST SCC edition contains it; Liu Yin merely uses it in his commentary explaining the passage (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:15A; and ST SCC, p. 23).

24. This and similar sentences, as discussed in the translator's introduction, are cited as evidence for the undeveloped state of offensive and siege warfare and the relative economic unimportance of cities.

25. This sentence has various interpretations. Generally, it is agreed that the campaign should be won with only a single mobilization and conscription, which would be reasonably possible given the nature and short-limited scope of warfare in Sun-tzu's era (cf. STPF SY, pp. 27–28). Not transporting provisions a third time is understood in two distinct ways: The army is provisioned only once—when about to depart—and thereafter it must plunder and forage, securing provisions on the march and in the field. Moreover, when the troops return they are not re provisioned (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:16B). A second, more common, and more logical interpretation holds that they are provisioned at the commencement of the campaign and supplied again on returning
of Germany nourishing its rancor and hatred subsequent to World War I until militarily reasserting itself in World War II. See, for example, STFP WC, pp. 76–83.)

However, D. C. Lau (“Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” pp. 333–335) argues that the sentence should be translated as “It is best to preserve one’s own state intact; to crush the enemy’s state is only a second best.” Although he advances a cogent argument, the traditional understanding appears more appropriate. Whether from a Confucian, Taoist, or Legalist perspective, the idea of gaining victory while inflicting the least amount of damage on the enemy is generally fundamental. Except perhaps when blindly exacting revenge, all commanders seek to minimize their own losses while maximizing the gains that can be realized. Occupying a thoroughly devastated state was never espoused by any ancient Chinese military thinker, although scorched earth policies were prominently exploited by “barbarian” tribes later in Chinese history, and mass slaughter accompanied by wartime rampages that resulted in the wholesale destruction of cities did characterize the late Warring States period.

34. Unit force levels are discussed in Appendix E.

35. These earthworks are variously identified as mounds for overlooking and assaulting the city and as protective walls that allow the besiegers shielded movement outside the city’s walls, beneath potentially withering fire (cf. STFP SY, p. 44).

36. This continues the thought of the first passage because a ruler whose objectives include “preserving” others is more likely to be welcomed by the populace. (It also accords with the Confucian ideal of King Wu, previously noted.)

37. Following Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, I:24B–25A; and SS AS, p. 74. D. C. Lau (“Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” p. 320) believes this sentence refers to dividing the enemy, which is equally possible. However, with double strength, as Liu Yin (following Ts’ai Tsao notes), one can mount a frontal assault with one part to fix them and then deploy a flanking (i.e., unorthodox) attack to overwhelm them. This understanding also seems more congruent with the next sentence, which still allows for engaging the enemy if you are merely equal in strength. Forcing the enemy to divide his troops is a hallmark of Sun-tzu’s thought. By dividing one’s forces to launch a secondary front, the enemy would be forced to respond or face the loss of his other position. Thus he would also have to divide his forces, thereby accomplishing Sun-tzu’s objective. (See Tu You’s commentary and also the divergent views in ST SCC, p. 44, and Chu’s analysis, STFP SY, pp. 47–49.)

38. Such as by assuming a desperate position to fight to the death or mounting a defense when flight would be appropriate.

39. As discussed in the translator’s introduction, Sun-tzu is writing after the early rise of the professional commander and the increasing estrangement of many rulers from field command. The distinction between the forms of administration, discipline, and temperament appropriate to the civil and the martial is more pronounced in the other Military Classics, such as the Ssu-ma Fa. (For discussion, see the introductory section to the translation.) However, even here Sun-tzu is already warning the dangers posed by inappropriately intermixing them.

Some editions have ssu—“direct” or “manage”—rather than t’ung—“the same as”—which resolves a somewhat awkward passage. However, both the Sung and Ming editions have t’ung, which can be understood as translated. (The next sentence also contains “same as [the civil],” which has been left untranslated because it can also be understood as the ruler uniting the authority for the joint command in his own
hands. Cf. STPF SY, pp. 51-52; and STPF CS, p. 47. Also note the explanations in SS AS, pp. 79-80.)

40. The BS have chih, “to know” or “to understand,” rather than “recognizes.”

41. The BS read “Thus, in warfare, one who knows them, (the enemy) and knows himself...”

42. The BS contain two versions of this chapter, the second basically somewhat shorter than the first.

43. “Unconquerable,” rather than “invincible” because the latter tends to connote a permanence inappropriate to fluctuating battlefield conditions. The invincible are never conquerable, whereas an army—due to its disposition, exploitation of terrain, and other factors—may be temporarily unconquerable.

44. The BS lack “in warfare.”

45. Contrary to our usual practice, in this rare case the translation is based on the Han bamboo text rather than the traditional Seven Military Classics. The latter has perturbed commentators because of its apparent inconsistency with Sun-tzu’s thought and the logical development of the paragraph. The traditional text simply reads: “If one defends then he is [will] be insufficient; if he attacks then he will [have] a surplus.” This is understood by commentators such as Liu Yin to mean that one defends because his strength is inadequate and attacks because his force is more than abundant (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:30). However, this contains the grammar because it requires that the term be reversed: “Insufficient one defends” (cf. ST SCC, p. 56; STPF CS, p. 59. Also note Chu Shih’s balanced approach, STPF SY, pp. 58-59).

46. The phrase “One who excels at offense” does not appear in the BS. The sentences would then be elided to read: “One who excels at defense buries himself away below the lowest depths of Earth and moves from above the greatest heights of Heaven.” There are also unimportant, minor variations in the BS versions (cf. STPF CS, pp. 60-61; STPF SY, p. 60).

47. The BS lack “the ancients.”

48. From the two BS versions, the original sentence apparently read: “Thus the battles of those who excelled did not have unorthodox victories, nor fame for wisdom, nor courageous achievements of courage” (cf. STPF CS, pp. 58-59; STPF SY, p. 60).

49. The BS have “Thus one who excels cultivates the Tao.”

50. “Tao” is variously explained by the commentators as referring to such Confucian virtues as benevolence and righteousness—implimented to attract the people—or the military principles essential to being unconquerable. Cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:32B; ST SCC, pp. 61-62.

51. The BS have cheng—“upright,” “to rectify,” “to regulate”—instead of cheng—“government.” However, as Chu Shih notes, the former could have been a loan for the latter because the two were somewhat interchangeable at that time. He therefore rejects the emendation suggested by the bamboo slips. The translation reflects the traditional text, but with the character for government understood as “regulator,” rather than following commentators that read it as “government” and produce a translation that reads “Therefore he is able to conquer defeated governments” (cf. STPF CS, p. 59; STPF SY, pp. 60-61; and ST SCC, pp. 61-62).

52. The caption for this sentence, literally “military fa,” is considered to be a book title by Tadokoro Yoshiyuki (SSTY, p. 118) and Ch’en Ch’i-tien (Obia-shih, p. 105), translatable as the “Art of Methods.” This is the same title as the Art of War (which is best translated as “Military Methods,” but we have adopted the traditional rendering). Fa encomasses the meanings of “laws” and “methods,” with the latter more appropriate here. Rather than the title of a preexistent book or section of a work (which is also referred to in several other military classics), it should be understood as the fundamental methods for warfare, the measures that then follow (cf. STPF SY, p. 61; SS AS, p. 104). In the BS only the term fa appears, but Chu Shih retains “military methods” (STPF SY, p. 61).

53. “Measurement” is generally understood by the commentators as referring not only to the extent and dimensions of the terrain but also its classification according to the categories advanced in the various chapters that follow.

54. “Estimation” is variously described as referring to types of forces suitable for segments of the terrain, such as crossbowmen for the hills, or the quantities of materials required to sustain the battle. All these terms are not otherwise discussed in the Art of War, and their referents thus remain a matter of speculation.

55. The BS add “weighing” and “the people” to the traditional text, producing “weighing the victory of a combative people.” Although this is accepted by Wu Jung-sung (STPF CS, p. 58), Chu Shih appears correct in opting for the traditional text (and thereby avoiding an awkward grammatical construction). Cf. STPF SY, p. 61.

56. As D. C. Lau has pointed out (“Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” pp. 332-333), the use of hsing (shape, configuration) here is nearly identical to shih (strategic power).

57. The BS merely have Shih, “Strategic Power,” for the title.

58. The terms translated as “configuration” and “designation” are hsing—“form” or “shape”—and ming—“name.” Within the context of Sun-tzu’s thought, the first seems to indicate the form or configuration of forces, as in formations and standard deployments. The second appears to refer to naming the units, designating them in such fashion—such as by flags with specific symbols. However, the earliest commentary, which is by the great general T’ao T’ae, equated hsingform with flags and ming/name with gongs and drums. Liu Yin and others extrapolate on this thought, but some scholars—such as Tu Mu—identify hsing with deployments and ming with flags (see SWTCC WCCS, I:35; ST SCC, pp. 66-67; STPF CS, pp. 67-68; and Wang Chien-tung’s overview, STPF WC, pp. 144-146). Robin D. S. Yates (“New Light,” pp. 220-222), based on his extensive research on the Mo-tzu, believes both terms refer to flags and that the historically and philosophically significant term hsing-ving originates with the military thinkers. (For an early discussion of hsing-ving—often translated as “performance and title”—as well as the issue of which character is appropriate for the term hsing, see Herlee G. Cree, “The Meaning of Hsing-ving,” reprinted in What is Taoism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 79-91.)

59. For “invariably” the BS have “entirely altogether” (Cf. STPF CS, p. 65; and STPF SY, p. 74. Chu Shih [STPF SY] does not accept the revision.)

Unorthodox (ch’i) and orthodox (cheng) are discussed in the notes to the translator’s introduction. An intriguing view is also advanced by Kuang Feng, equating the orthodoxy with movements designed to realize advantage and the unorthodox with actions that turn disadvantageous situations into advantageous ones. See “Sun-tzu chun-shih che-hsii,” pp. 81-82.

60. See note 17 for an explanation of the vacuous and substantial.

61. The BS have “Heaven and Earth” rather than just “Heaven.”
62. The BS have “rivers and seas” or “Yellow River and the seas” rather than the “Yangtze and Yellow rivers.”

63. The Sung and Ming editions have keng rather than fu. Although Sun-tzu does not continue the explicit comparison, all the commentators make it clear that the unorthodox and orthodox are mutually related just like these further examples of cyclic phenomena (SWTCCC WCCS, I:36B; ST SCC, p. 69).

64. Although the character pien, “change,” has generally been translated as “transformation,” we have opted to preserve the (possibly artificial) distinction between pien (“change”) and hua (“transformation”) throughout our translation of the Seven Military Classics. As a tentative basis for employing “change” rather than “transformation,” it might be observed that musical notes are not transformed in substance when producing new sounds, only changed in effect. Similarly, the composition of a military force is untransformed when its employment is changed from orthodox to unorthodox. However, this is a topic that requires further study, and an illuminating paper by Nathan Svirn should appear coincident with the publication of this book.

65. The BS version is slightly different; it lacks the character shun but adds another buan, so it would read: “The unorthodox and orthodox in circle (fashion) mutually produce each other, just like an endless circle.” (cf. STPF CS, p. 65; and STPF SY, p. 75).

66. The BS lack “pent-up” (or “accumulated”) water. Most translators use the term “turbulent” to describe the flow, but the essential idea in the Sung/Ming edition is that water has been restrained and has accumulated and then—when suddenly released—flows violently, turbulently, carrying even stones along. (This is not to deny that some swift currents can tumble stones, but the pent-up water image is more appropriate to the idea of potential power unleashed and is used in many other military writings—perhaps quoted from Sun-tzu—in this fashion.)

67. The term translated as “constraints” is chih, commonly used to indicate constraints or measures imposed on troops. The term lacks a satisfactory English rendering because it encompasses the concepts of “control,” “limitation,” and “measure.” The commentators generally agree that it refers to the modulation of both time and space. Sun-tzu apparently intends “constraints” to encompass the deliberate structuring of actions to ensure that the timing is precise and that the impulse of strategic power is imparted at the proper moment to the objective at a critical position. When the target is moving, such as a bird or an enemy, controlling action to attain this objective becomes more difficult. The final stage should be kept short so as to minimize the enemy’s ability to avoid the onslaught or effect countermeasures, as Sun-tzu states below. Liu Yin notes it also refers to the control or measurement of strength so that the objective will be reached and not missed. (SWTCCC WCCS, I:37B. Also see ST SCC, pp. 71-72; ST CCCY, p. 94; and SS AS, pp. 119-120.)

68. The same term as for the “onrush” of the water, although “to attack” is clearly assumed.

69. Literally, “short.” Whether in a temporal or spatial dimension, briefness is synonymous with precision and effectiveness.

70. The meaning of the circular formation has stimulated voluminous commentaries. Essentially, the army seems to be involuntarily compressed into a circular formation and is therefore vulnerable. However, such a formation presents no exposed points or positions yet offers the possibility of numerous fixed deployments and the employment of both orthodox and unorthodox tactics through unfolding. Consequently, in some views it is chosen deliberately rather than forced on the army to allow flexibility while creating the similitude of difficulty and apparent defeat (cf. SWTCCC WCCS, I:38A; ST SCC, pp. 72-75).

71. The translation follows Liu Yin’s commentary, understanding the sentence as expressing some bases for practicing the art of deception (SWTCCC WCCS, I:38A). However, there are other possible frames of reference for “Chaos is given birth from control,” among them that one’s own troops may become chaotic despite being well controlled. This might result from overcontrol, lack of flexibility, too fragile an organization, a shift in battlefield conditions, or laxity in maintaining discipline and organization (cf. ST SCC, pp. 74-76; STPF SY, p. 84; SS AS, pp. 122-123).

72. “Foundation,” following the Sung/Ming text. However, many other texts—including the BS and the SCC—have “troops,” which most modern commentators feel is correct. “Foundation” presumably refers to the general’s well-disciplined, well-organized army, so indirectly it means “forces.” (cf. SWTCCC WCCS, I:39A; ST SCC, p. 78; STPF SY, p. 75. Wu Jung-sung retains pén, “foundation,” and translates it as “heavy forces.” STPF CS, p. 67.)

73. Liu Yin comments: “Thus one who excels at warfare seeks (victory) through the certain victory of the army’s strategic power, not through reliance on untalented men. Thus he is able to select the talented among men and entrust them with strategic power” (SWTCCC WCCS, I:39A). Although many others follow Liu Yin’s thoughts, a second line of commentary observes that by relying on strategic power, men can be employed according to their talents in the quest for victory. Within the context of surpassing power, even the timid will become assertive and perform their roles—something rewards, punishments, and the laws may not be able to accomplish. Furthermore, men will not be forced to attempt actions they are unable to perform (cf. ST SCC, pp. 79-80; SS AS, p. 127; STPF SY, pp. 59-577).

74. The chapter is so named because key paragraphs advance the concept of striking and exploiting any voids or weaknesses in the enemy’s deployment. The substantial should always be avoided rather than confronted. (In the BS, the title characters are reversed: “Substance and Vacuity.”)

75. Controlling others, rather than being controlled by others, is one of Sun-tzu’s fundamental principles, and many of his tactical measures are devoted to appropriately manipulating the enemy.

76. The Seven Military Classics reads “Go forth to places he will not race to,” whereas the ST SCC edition emends the “not” to “must” (cf. SWTCCC WCCS, II:2B-3A; ST SCC, p. 87). D. C. Lau also supplies a perceptive note on the error of this emendation (“Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” p. 321), but the recovered bamboo text indicates the original reading is “must,” and collateral evidence appears in the “Tai-p’ing yu-lan” (hereafter TPYL) quotation. (However, Chu Chih prefers the traditional text. See STPF SY, pp. 90-91, 96.) This coheres well with the preceding sentence, and the traditional text has been altered accordingly. Also note that some commentators and translators would understand the traditional sentence as “Go by way of places he will not race to.”

77. Because this sentence does not appear in the bamboo text, some modern commentators view it as a later, inappropriate accretion. (see STPF CS, p. 78). However, these coupled sentences are frequently quoted in other military works and have an inherent parallelism that tends to suggest their correctness. (cf. SS AS, p. 134).
78. STFP CS, based on the BS, emends “will not attack” to “must attack” (STFP CS, p. 73). There is also collateral evidence for this reading in the TPYL. However, “will not attack” accords with the chapter’s trend of thought, particularly in light of such sentences below as “When someone offends at the expense of the enemy does not know where to attack” and “I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on the ground and defend it, they will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements.” If the defense is impregnable, the enemy will be deflected from foolishly attacking and uselessly expending his forces. (Cf. STFP SY, p. 91; SSM AS, pp. 137-138, and ST SCC, pp. 88-89.) Wu Ju-sung notes that tacticians of Sun-tzu’s generation valued defense over offense, although his text accepts the BS version “must attack” (see STFP CS, pp. 77-78).

79. Formless, “not bising,” having no form or discernible configuration.

80. The BS have “an advance which is unresistant to” rather than “unhampered” (or “not repulsed”).

81. There are two differences in the BS: “stopped for” “pursued” and “distance for speed.” Thus it would read “To effect a retreat that cannot be stopped, employ unreachable distance.” These are variously accepted or rejected by modern commentators. (Cf. STFP CS, p. 73; STFP HC, pp. 91-92; and the traditional commentaries, ST SCC, pp. 90-91.)

82. This sentence has occasioned rather divergent views. Although the translation reflects the chapter’s progression, another possibility is understanding the “bising chih” at the beginning of the sentence in a causative sense, as causing them to betray their form (STFP SY, p. 99). A radically different view—expressed by Liu Yin, among others—suggests that through the employment of unorthodox and orthodox tactics, one creates and displays a deceptive form or disposition to the enemy while actually being formless (SWTCW CCWSCS, II:5B). Others simply interpret it as displaying a form to the enemy (see STFP CS, p. 73; ST SCC, p. 93; and SSM AS, p. 144).

In the BS the sentence begins with “Thus those who excel at command …”

83. Note that D. C. Lau also understands the sentence in this way, as do several commentators. Cf. “Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” pp. 329-330.

84. The BS invert the sequence of “field of battle” and “day of battle” and also lack the character for “Assemble.”

85. The sequence of left/right and front/rear is reversed in the BS.

86. Presumably a comment directed to the king of Wu by Sun-tzu. However, Chang Yu comments that “I” is an error for Wu, the state’s name (which seems unlikely). SWTCW CCWSCS, II:8A; ST SCC, p. 97.

87. The BS have “solely” or “monopolized” for “achieved.” Accordingly, “Thus I say victory can be monopolized.”

88. Predictability means having form; therefore, repeating previously successful tactical methods would completely contradict Sun-tzu’s principle of being formless. Through flexibility and variation the configuration of response attains to the inexhaustible.

89. The BS have “move/moving” rather than “configuration.” Because “configuration” is used consistently throughout the chapter, it seems preferable.

90. The BS have “victory” rather than “configuration.”

91. Again the BS have “move” rather than “flow.” (Chu Chun, among others, preferable to the traditional text. See STFP SY, p. 93.)

92. The BS have “complete,” so the phrase would be translated as “completed (fixed) configuration of power.”

93. The BS lack “water,” so the last part of the sentence would also describe the army.

94. The BS only have “transform” rather than “change and transform” and also lack “victory.”

95. The BS have two characters at the end, shen pao—perhaps an additional comment by an unknown hand with the meaning “Spiritual Essentials.”

96. The title does not refer to actual combat but to achieving the conditions that make contention possible. The main themes are therefore the considerations of rapid versus measured advance; exploitation and avoidance of terrain and obstacles; and the critical element of ch’i, the army’s spirit.

97. “Tactics” or “plans,” but also the same character as “estimations” and therefore suggestive of comparatively valuing the effects of various routes.

98. The translation follows the Military Classics edition (SWTC CCWSCS, I:14B). However, other editions (such as the ST SCC, p. 106; STFP CS, p. 81; STFP SY, p. 109) and the BS all have the character for “army” (ch’i) rather than “masses” (chung), so both parts read in parallel: “Thus combat between armies can be advantageous; combat between armies can be dangerous.” Both readings are congruent with the chapter’s content because fighting with an undisciplined mass is dangerous, whereas it is the nature of warfare to entail both gain and loss.

99. Following STFP WC, p. 215, and SSM AS, p. 169. They literally “roll up their armor” and presumably leave it behind with the baggage train so as to allow greater foot speed. (Heavy equipment is implied from the sentences below, which all couple the baggage and heavy equipment.)

100. In the Art of War and the Sun-ma Fa, the concept of plundering and then dividing the spoils among the troops remains evident. In contrast, the later Military Classics strongly advocate a policy of neither harming the general populace nor seizing their possessions.

101. Night battles did not commence until late in the Spring and Autumn period, and we are not common because the confusion wrought by the darkness made the results uncertain. The exact reason for multiplying the numbers of flags and fires is a subject of debate among the commentators. It was done either to ensure that their effect as tools for communication and signaling literally overwhelmed the soldiers or (and possibly as well) to confuse the enemy by confronting it with a myriad stimuli (cf. SWTC CCWSCS, II:19B-20; ST SCC, pp. 117-118).

In the BS, this passage immediately follows from the quotation from the Military Administration (STFP CS, p. 81).


103. Or “majestic formations.”

104. The BS have ni—“go against,” “go contrary to”—rather than ying—“to meet,” “to confront.” This reading is also preferred by Chu Chun (STFP SY, p. 112).

105. The BS have “leave an outlet;” the Ming text has “must/oulet,” “the leave” being understood. (Cf. STFP SY, p. 112, for Chu’s rejection of the Ming edition.)

106. Liu Yin notes that this last paragraph is apparently repeated from the next chapter. However, only the Ming edition has the passage in the next chapter as well, where it is apparently an accidental accretion.
The BS have “masses/large numbers” for “military.”

107. Chapter titles in the extant editions of the ancient classics have frequently been appended by later hands—whether compilers, subsequent authors adding material, or commentators. Many were simply drawn from the first few words of the chapter, others from a salient sentence within it; therefore, they may be largely unrelated to the chapter’s overall subject matter. “Nine Changes” forces the commentators to somehow justify “changes” because the chapter’s admonitions against certain courses of action on particular terrains do not constitute changes. For example, Chang Yu asserts that the chapter refers to employing the expedient—the “usual” rather than the “normal”—in these situations, but his view lacks justification. Although the concept of flexible response is critical to Sun-tzu’s tactics, it hardly seems to be the topic of this chapter. Others—including Liu Yin—suggest the chapter is badly mangled, and because the BS preserve only about forty words, they offer little help. In addition, the BS fragments lack a title. Finally, “nine” may simply be used here as a cognomen for “many” or “numerous,” such as “Nine Heavens” (STFF CY, pp. 128–129). A minority view holds that “nine” might also be an error for “five” because five terrains are discussed (see SWTCC WCCS, II:24–25; ST SSC, p. 131; SS AS, pp. 194–195; and STFF CY, pp. 89–91).

108. This repeats the formula used previously to introduce the topic. Five classifications of terrain follow, all of which also appear in subsequent chapters in similar descriptive lists—frequently with definitions. Although some notes are provided below, also refer to Chapters 10 and 11 for further explanation. (For additional discussion of the terms together with comments on previous translations and a full translation of the relevant material on terrain classification from the Art of War that is preserved in other texts, see Ralph D. Sawyer, “The Missing Chapter of Sun-tzu,” IIFK 6 [1987], pp. 77–78.)

109. “Entrapping terrain” is traditionally understood as low-lying ground, perhaps surrounded by hills or mountains and characterized by bodies of water such as marshes or swamps. It is thought to be land that can be inundated, possibly by heavy rains or by breaking restraining banks (as was done in China in World War II) and consequently involves heavy slogging for the chariots and men. However, there is considerable disagreement as to its defining characteristics (see STFF CY, pp. 125–126; ST CCMY, p. 165; ST SSC, p. 131). The Six Secret Teachings, among other works, discusses the dangers posed by similar terrain in Chapter 58. The BS have fan “overflow” or “inundate” rather than p’i, which means “subvert(ed)” or “defeated.” Chu Chün prefers the original because the scope is wider and is capable of encompassing any terrain through which passage is difficult (STFF CY, pp. 125–126). There is another, nearly identical character, which means “bridge” or “embankment”; its existence raises further, although unexplored, possibilities.

110. “Focal” terrain (following Griffith’s apt term) is defined in Chapter 11 as “land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that whoever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven.” The characters literally mean “terrain where highways intersect”; therefore, narrowly defined it would be land that is accessible from several directions over prepared roads.

111. Several sentences follow in the Ming edition of the Seven Military Classics that have been duplicated erroneously from other sections. Neither the Sung dynasty edi-
121. Life-supporting terrain is obviously ground that has sunlight, grass for the animals, brush and trees for firewood, and especially potable water. Liu Yín and others equate the "substantial" with high ground (SWTCC WCCS, II:38A. Cf. ST SCC, p. 150, and STPF SY, pp. 142-143).

122. The BS lack "is said to be certain of victory," so the sentence is read as being linked with the start of the next passage (cf. STPF SY, p. 137).

123. Chu Chun points out that observing the presence of bubbles or foam on the river, which indicates rain upstream, exemplifies Sun-tzu's approach to analyzing and fathoming the enemy and battlefield situations. From the bubbles one can deduce that it has rained and can anticipate a surge in the river's flow and level. Such a surge could prove disastrous for an army encamped too close to the shore or caught suddenly in midstream (STPF SY, p. 137).

124. Although the commentators differ somewhat on the details of this and the following dangerous, natural configurations of terrain—several of which are concrete cases of Sun-tzu's more general classifications—their defining characteristics are clear (cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:38B-39A; ST SCC, pp. 151-153).

Heaven's Well is so named because it is a significant depression, such as a valley, surrounded on four sides by hills or mountains. It is dangerous because the runoff of rainwater from unexpected storms can inundate the lowlands.

125. Heaven's Jail is a valley with steep hills or mountains on three sides. Forces that carelessly enter it can be easily bottled up, unable to escape the sides to escape.

126. Heaven's Net refers to any area of extensive, dense growth—including heavy forests or dense vegetation (including jungle-like growth of underbrush and vines) that will obstruct the passage of vehicles or entangle the men.

127. Heaven's Pit refers to an area characterized by soft, possibly muddy terrain, perhaps marked by wetlands, that will mire both men and vehicles.

128. Heaven's Fissure refers to terrain that suggests a fissure in the earth. Therefore, it encompasses long, narrow passages constrained by hills or forests from which an enemy might advantageously dominate the passage.

129. The BS have "small forests," or woods.

130. The BS have "which could conceal hidden (forces)" right after "entangled undergrowth" and "places of evildoers" at the end of the sentence. (Neither the STPF CS nor the STPF SY takes note of these.)

131. The occupation of ravines was of particular interest to the classical strategists (as evidenced by material in both the Six Secret Teachings and Wei Liao-tzu); this is generally seen as indicating weakness and the need to avoid oneself of advantages of terrain.

132. Easily visible obstacles have been made deliberately detectable in order to create the illusion of ambush or the emplacement of entangling devices and thereby beguile the ordinary commander to divert his forces to the enemy's advantage.

133. Presumably, to define the field of battle and pre-position for the infantry advance.

134. They lack military discipline, grumble and move about, are noisy, and obey orders reluctantly.

135. The translation follows the Seven Military Classics edition. Other editions (cf. ST SCC, pp. 161-162) are somewhat different, combining this and the following sentence to read: "If they feed grain to the horses and eat meat while the army does not hang up its cooking utensils nor return to camp, they are an exhausted invader."

136. These are all signs that they are preparing to launch a desperate attack; otherwise, they would need the horses and draft animals as well as their cooking utensils. (In Chapter 11 Sun-tzu advises breaking the cooking utensils and similar measures to dramatically impress on the soldiers the hopelessness of their situation and increase their determination for a last-ditch engagement.)

137. The commander, through his ill-conceived measures, has lost control over them and fears they will revolt.

138. This sentence probably refers to one's own troops. That is, it is not important that you be more numerous than the enemy because if you are not, you merely have to conceive good tactical measures. The BS lack "esteem," which accordingly is understood. "Aggressively" or "in martial fashion" (t'ou) is thought here to refer to actions taken without basis, manifesting bravado without forethought (cf. ST SCC, pp. 164-165; STPF SY, p. 147).

139. Another dimension to the civil-martial relationship.

140. Generally translated as "certain victory" or "certain conquest," the characters do not contain "victory/conquer." Rather, this is the term encountered previously for easily seizing the enemy (see note 16 above).

141. Configurations (hsiing) of terrain, with their tactical implications. Unfortunately, the configurations are named rather than defined; parts of the text have apparently been lost, and none are preserved in the BS. Each configuration correlates the topography with the basic maneuvers possible in the situation on the assumption that two armies are confronting each other.

142. "Suspended," or "hung up." Although the text seems simple enough, there is a hidden question of perspective that the commentators have not noticed. If the situational analysis refers to the army's present position, when it goes forth it will not be able to return. Accordingly, the terrain it initially occupied would best be termed "irrecoverable." From the perspective of the position to which it advances, it becomes "hung up." Presumably, the "suspended configuration" encompasses both the initial and final positions across the terrain. (Cf. ST SCC, pp. 169-170; STPF SY, p. 154; SS AS, p. 246; and STPF CS, p. 105.)

143. "Stalemate" describes the tactical situation, although the exact character is chih—"branch," or "to support." Both sides are supported, so they are in a stalemate. The commentators suggest a lengthy standoff (cf. ST SCC, p. 170).

144. This might also be understood as to "draw off (our forces) to make them (i.e., the enemy) depart." That is, by withdrawing one compels the enemy to depart from his entrenched, advantageous position. Withdrawing one's forces and departing is the means through which the enemy's departure is accomplished in either case, but the conclusion—of stimulating them to movement—is implicit in the text translation and is necessary for the next sentence—striking when the enemy is half out.

145. "Constricted" configurations are generally described as extensive mountain valleys. Others also identify them with river or lake crossings. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:48B; STPF SY, p. 154; STPF CS, p. 106; and ST SCC, p. 171.) Furthermore, the commentators generally understand the sentence as referring to occupying the mouth; however, there is no textual reason to so restrict it because the sentence simply advises to "fully occupy it. (By leaving the entrance unobstructed, enemy forces can be lured
into the killing zone created by deploying forces on both sides throughout the valley, as in several famous historical battles.  

146. “Precipitous,” invoking the image of steep mountain gorges or ravines (“ravines” being the translation in other contexts). It is difficult terrain to traverse; therefore, occupying the heights is paramount. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:48B; STPF SY, p. 154; ST SCC, pp. 171-172.)

147. Following Liu Yin, taking “strategic power being equal” as an additional condition. (See SWTCC WCCS, II: 49a. Cf. STPF CS, p. 106.)

148. The odds are so insurmountable that any sort of direct attack can only result in failure and the retreat of the forces so foolishly flung at the enemy (SWTCC WCCS, II:49B).

149. Following SWTCC WCCS and ST SCC. The T’ung-tien has “estimating the fullest extent of the difficult and easy, advantageous and harmful, distant and near” (cf. ST SCC, p. 176; and Lau, “Some Notes on the Sun-tzu,” p. 328). “Ravines” is the same character translated previously as “precipitous” for the configurations of terrain.  

150. Here—unlike the earlier passage, which is open to some interpretation—the text clearly means “with” rather than “for” (refer to note 5 above).

151. Following the Sung, Ming, and SCC editions. However, some others have “inexhaustible” rather than “complete” (cf. STPF SY, p. 153; SS AS, pp. 261-262).

152. The nine terrains analyzed in this chapter appear in two sequences, with some variation. In addition, some of the terms appeared previously in Chapters 8 and 10; others are new but apparently overlap with earlier configurations. This suggests that essential materials have been lost, the text has been corrupted, or the concepts were in a state of flux and not yet rigidly defined.

153. Following Giles and Griffith, who use the appropriate term “dispersive.” The commentators generally understand “dispersive” as referring to the tendency of the men, while fighting within their native state, to think of their homes and families and to be inclined to return there. Consequently, they are neither united nor aroused to a fighting spirit. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:56A; ST SCC, p. 182; and STPF SY, p. 168.)

154. This is ground for which one contends, therefore “contentious” terrain. (Giles also translates as “contentious,” Griffith as “key ground,” and it is unquestionably a strategic point.) The configurations of terrain previously warned against in the last chapter are probably prime objectives under this category because of their great tactical potential if they can be seized and exploited. (Cf. ST SCC, pp. 183-184; STPF SY, p. 169.)

155. In Chapter 10 this is termed “accessible” terrain. Army movement is unhindered.

156. Following Griffith’s apt term, “focal.” Presumably, this is territory in which major highways intersect and is accessible to major powers on various sides. Its occupa-
175. Analogous with releasing the trigger of a cocked crossbow. In some editions, such as the ST SCC (p. 203), the following sentence appears: “They burn their boats and smash their cooking pots.”

176. This paragraph again discusses the nine types of terrain, but from the perspective of acting as an invader. Some commentators believe it is redundant or erroneous, but others—such as the modern military historian General Wei Ju-lin—stress the difference between principles for general combat and those for invading another’s territory (see ST CCCY, pp. 222-224).

177. The BS are somewhat different: “If you have strongholds behind you and the enemy before you, it is ‘fatal terrain.’ If there is no place to go, it is ‘exhausted terrain.’”

178. Some commentators take this as referring to the enemy’s rear, but the context of the preceding statements indicates it should refer to actions taken with regard to one’s own army. (Cf. STFC CS, p. 115; and STFC WC, p. 370.) The BS have “I will cause them not to remain.”

179. The actions to be taken for four of the terrains are somewhat reversed in the BS. In this case the BS have the conclusion to the next sentence: “I solidify our alliances.”

180. The BS have “I focus on what we rely on.”

181. The BS have “I race our rear elements forward.”

182. Liu Yin explains this as meaning that the general closes off any openings deliberately offered by the enemy to lure his forces out of their encirclement (SWTCC WCCS, II:69A). Leaving such an opening was a common way to keep the defenders from mounting a last-ditch, pitched defense. (Both the Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu discuss this technique.)

183. The BS preface the sentence with a fragment that apparently means “It is the nature of the feudal lords...”

184. Reading pa wang as two distinct terms rather than “hegemonic king” (cf. STFC CS, p. 115).

185. This is sometimes understood as not contending with others to form alliances, which would miss the main point of the passage.

186. This sentence is somewhat problematic. Most of the commentators interpret it in the light of Sun-tzu’s policy of being deceptive, and in fact the character for “details” might also be an error for a similar character meaning “to deceive.” Thus they understand it as “accord with and pretend to follow the enemy’s intentions.” (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:73A; ST SCC, p. 212.) The translation essentially follows STFC SY, p. 184. Wu Ju-sung (STFC CS, p. 115) understands it as simply finding out the details of the enemy’s intentions.

187. Literally, “grind (it out)” in the temple, which presumably means somberly work out the plans and estimations. The SCC text has “incite” rather than “grind.” (SWTCC WCCS, II: 73B-74A; ST SCC, p. 214. Compare STFC SY, p. 183.)

188. The fifth objective is variously interpreted as shooting flaming arrows into an encampment, burning their weapons, or attacking their formations, as translated (cf. ST SCC, p. 218).

189. When the deceit is discovered, they are murdered or executed.

190. The BS have “relationship” rather than “affairs.”

191. The BS add “Shuai Shih-pi in the Hsing. When Yen arose, they had Su Ch’in in Ch’i.” Because Su Ch’in was active in the second half of the fourth century B.C.—al-
found at the end of Wu Chi's translated biography in the translator's introduction, thereby attesting to the Wu-tzu's circulation in the former Han dynasty. The fact that it was the focus of such attention provides evidence for the book's continuous transmission through the centuries, starting with the original work composed by Wu Chi and his disciples. (Constant interest should have ensured that the book was preserved in exemplary condition, but the bibliographic descriptions in successive dynasties indicate that either a major portion was lost or it was continually edited and revised, perhaps deliberately producing a very compact edition.)

Second, concepts and actual passages from the Wu-tzu are found in several Warring States military writings, including Sun Pin's Military Methods, the Wei Liao-tzu, and the Six Secret Teachings. This suggests that it preexisted them, especially because Sun Pin's work had been lost for two thousand years and passages thus could not have been lifted from it to forge the Wu-tzu just prior to the Tang dynasty. (Obviously, this does not preclude a former Han dynasty forgery date, for which see Kuo Mo-jo's theory below.)

Third, the philosophical content reflects the integration of the Confucian and Legalist perspectives—the Confucian humanistic values and the Legalist emphasis on the unremitting, equitable implementation of rewards and punishments that developed in the Warring States period and found expression especially in the military writings.

Fourth, as noted in the translator's introduction, Wu Chi's was both a civilian and military administrator, a historical figure who excelled brilliantly in both realms. This dual capability quickly vanished in the Warring States period with the necessarily increased specialization of military and civilian offices and officials. Thus his life and the book's approach reflect the earlier period.

Finally, Ch'ing scholasticism criticizes the text based on claims of historical anchormomism, such as the playing of pipes in camp or the inclusion of terms whose origins presumably postdate Wu Chi's era, can be dismissed because evidence to the contrary is available. Moreover, recent archaeological discoveries have confirmed the early existence of items such as astrological banners, which the Ch'ing pedants could not have known about.

Li and Wang thus present a cogent argument, although they fail to resolve one particularly troubling criticism: The Wu-tzu prominently discusses employing the cavalry and refers to a cavalry force of three thousand. This indicates that one of the authors lived not only after the cavalry's appearance but also after it had become at least a supplementary force. The first mention of cavalry has previously been attributed to Sun Pin's book, and supposedly the cavalry did not become an active military element until near the end of the Warring States period. Therefore, if the authenticity of the Wu-tzu is accepted and its main authorship is attributed to Wu Chi—albeit revised by his disciples—use of the cavalry must have started in China much earlier than is now generally believed. If the cavalry dates to after 300 B.C., then at least parts of the Wu-tzu are later accretions or the entire text is a later Warring States or Han dynasty creation. Li and Wang do not address this problem satisfactorily. (See Appendix B for a discussion of the history of the cavalry in China. Some of the horse's equipment listed in the Wu-tzu, including the saddle, did not develop until the Later Han.)

The Han tomb, which contains so many other military works, does not include any portions of the Wu-tzu. This in itself is not fatal to claims of early origin because there are many possible explanations and other writings are also absent. However, on the basis of its absence from the tomb, the presence of references to the cavalry, and other anachronisms in terms—such as mentioned above—Kuo Mo-jo concludes that the original Wu-tzu has been lost and that the extant work is a later, probably Han forgery. (See Chung-kuo chu-tzu shih-shih shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-ch' u-p'an-shu, Peking, 1973, pp. 149ff.)

In view of the cavalry's significant appearance in the Wu-tzu, our own provisional conclusion is that contents of the work are substantially from Wu Chi himself but that in the course of transmission and revision, later Warring States strategists (and probably Han students)—perhaps in an effort to "update" the work—added passages on the cavalry and otherwise edited some of the terminology. Furthermore, it appears that a portion of the book has been lost or deliberately excised, but whether this loss is an extensive as claimed is somewhat doubtful, given that Wu Chi was clearly a man of action with little time for writing voluminously. (Cf. Wang Hsien-ch' en and Hsü Pao-lin, Chung-kuo hu-tai ping-shu ts'ai-tan, Chieh-fang-ch' u-p'an-shu, Peking, 1983.)

5. Readers interested in another translation of this biography are encouraged to consult Chauncey S. Goodrich's article in Monumenta Serica (35 [1981-1983], pp. 197-233) entitled "Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Biography of Wu Chi," hereafter referred to as "Biography." Goodrich analyzes the text and provides extensive footnotes on critical references, figures, and historical questions. Kuo Mo-jo's "Shu Wu Chi" (pp. 506-533) also has extensively analyzed the various stories and legends surrounding Wu Chi and has critically dismissed many of them, including the reported killing of his wife. Although many of the accounts are obviously suspect, perhaps some truth underlies them.


6. Or "loved weapons."

7. Because Confucius died about 479 B.C. and Tseng-tzu (505-436 B.C.) was one of his original disciples, it is generally assumed that Wu Chi's studied with Tseng-tzu's son, Tseng Shen, about seventy years thereafter. For further discussion, see Goodrich, "Biography," note 6, p. 218; Li-shih ch'un-ch' u (hereafter LSCC), 2:16b; and WT CCCC, pp. 10-11, where Fu Shao-chieh suggests that Wu Chi's, Marquis Wen, and Li K'o all studied with Tzu Hsia—one of the original disciples known coincidentally for great longevity. (Kuo Mo-jo similarly concludes that it was Tseng-tzu's son and that Wu Chi may have studied with Tzu Hsia. See "Shu Wu Chi," pp. 506-509.)

8. A Chi's high official had arranged for Wu Chi to marry his daughter after meeting him in Lu and being strongly impressed. Cf. Chung-kuo li-tai ming-chiang, p. 28.

9. Although this incident is also cited in Chapter 34 of the Han Fei-tzu (Han Fei-tzu chi-ch' ieh [hereafter HFTCC], Shih-chueh shu-chu, Taipei, 1969, p. 232) as an illustration of action "against emotions," its veracity has long been questioned, as is discussed below. Cf. also Goodrich, "Biography," pp. 203-204, for his view that the story was fabricated by Wu Chi's detractors. (Goodrich concurs with Kuo Mo-jo. See "Shu Wu Chi," pp. 511-515.)
10. Tseng-tzu was identified particularly with the development of theories about filial obligations and their emotional expression in the Li, the forms of propriety. Authorship of the Classic of Filial Piety was frequently attributed to him as well, a view that is no longer accepted. For further discussion, refer to Goodrich, "Biography," note 9, p. 219; and some of Tseng-tzu's pronouncements in the Analects: I:9, XIX:17, and XIX:18.

11. Marquis Wen typified the strong rulers who forged powerful states through the implementation of enlightened policies and the active solicitation of knowledgeable advisers. He governed at Wei's inception when the great state of Chin fragmented into Han, Wei, and Chao—also termed the Three Chin. Cf. also Goodrich's note 12, "Biography," pp. 219-220.

12. Li K'o and Hsi-men Pao were two famous Worthies who assisted Marquis Wen in reforming the state and formulating new policies. Their actual scholarly affiliations and political orientations—nominally Confucian but visibly activist—are subjects of considerable speculation.

13. The famous general Ssu-ma Jiang-chü is discussed in the translator's introduction to the Ssu-ma Fa.

14. This reference to Wu Ch'i riding a horse is cited as perhaps indicating an earlier mastery and use of horses on the dramatic introduction by the state of Chao later in the fourth century. Cf. Goodrich, "Biography," note 16, p. 212.

15. This story also appears in the Han Fei-tzu, HFTCC, p. 206; and Shuo yian, 6:19b.


17. This incident is also recorded in the Shuo yian, 5:3b-4a; and Chan-kuo ts'e, 22:2b.

18. Literally, the "hundred surnames"—members of the original nobility, as opposed to the serfs and mean people.

19. As scholars have long noted, this statement is problematic. If it really refers to the proponents of the "horizontal and vertical alliances," it is anachronistic because they did not appear for another fifty years (cf. Goodrich, "Biography," note 36, p. 224). This passage is frequently cited as evidence of the Wu-tzu's late composition.

20. Capital political offenses inevitably entangled entire families, with the most serious resulting in the extermination of all family members through the third degree of relationship. These policies reflected Chinese conceptions of the extended family and mutual responsibility.

21. Sun Pin—a descendant of Sun-tzu—was a famous strategist, military adviser, and the author of the recently discovered work, Military Methods. He suffered severe, mutilating punishment as the victim of an intrigue spawned by jealousy.


23. HFTCC, p. 214.

24. Ibid., p. 246.

25. Ibid., p. 246.

26. This phrase is not found in all editions. The ta-fu would be a member of the nobility who was holding a high government rank.

27. HFTCC, p. 171. There is a similar story about moving a post in LSCC, 25:15.

28. As discussed in note 7.

29. The mass mobilization of farmers to serve as combat infantrymen rather than simply as support troops meant the volitional consent had to be sought as well as coerced. They could easily flee to other states, most of which were beginning to welcome people to bring new lands under cultivation and increase the state's agricultural wealth.


31. LSCC, 11:15b-16a; repeated, with slight character variations, in LSCC, 20:30b-31a.

32. HFTCC, p. 67.


34. The clearest expression in the Tao Te Ching is found in Chapter 31: "Now weapons are inauspicious implements. There are things that abhor them." The first part is subsequently repeated. Please refer to the discussion in the introductory material for Sun-tzu's Art of War and also note the last passage of Questions and Replies.

35. Shuo yian, 15:2.

36. The brush was already being used to write characters on bamboo and other wooden slips, whereas the knife was used to excise errors (by scraping them off).


38. For a general discussion of the limitations of chariots, please see the general introduction.

Notes to the Text

1. The chariots are so numerous that they even block the palace doors. An alternative reading would be that their doors as well as the hubs, are protected. The wheels were probably covered to prevent enemy soldiers from inserting a pole between the spokes or otherwise seizing them, whereas the hubs had to be protected from being forced off. Impressions of wooden chariots with such protective coverings have been discovered in recent tomb excavations. These measures indicate how vulnerable chariots were to infantrymen except on the most level ground, where their speed would exceed that of swift runners.

2. Another version of this passage, but with only three disharmonies, is found in TPYL, 272:2B.

3. The psychological and ritual importance of seeking the sanction of departed ancestors by formally announcing the planned commencement of military activities to them in the temple is reiterated in other military texts. Resorting to divination, however, is clearly opposed by some texts, and this passage seems to express the beliefs of a previous age, possibly suggesting an earlier date for the composition.

4. Confucius observed the importance and the role of shame in human behavior (Analects, II:3, XIII:20, IV:22, and V:25), and the Confucian school turned the development of a sense of shame into the foundation of the philosophy and psychology of the li—the forms of propriety—in such works as Li chi. The military strategists also
seized on its catalytic power, playing on a man's fear of disgracing himself before his comrades. Wu-tzu clearly felt rewards and punishments alone would be inadequate to ensure the requisite battlefield performance. (For a discussion of the role of shame in the Greek phalanx, compare Chapter 10 in Victor Hanson, The Western Way of War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1989.)

5. An alternative but nontraditional reading of the first sentence would be “Being victorious in battle is easy, but being victorious through defensive [nonaggressive] measures is difficult.” Although the passage continues by focusing on the number of battles, thereby supporting the traditional interpretation, gaining the world through a single victory would be the conquest of Virtue over the unopposed. It could only be accomplished through preserving one’s stance rather than by waging external, violent warfare.

6. Or possibly “warfare.” However, from the view of the virtuous, fighting against a “contrary army” is still a righteous cause.

7. Not just a simple enumeration of men or a discrete population count but rather the classification and numbering of men according to their abilities, such as great strength or speed. Their selection and employment is discussed below and in the next chapter.

8. The famous Duke Huan was the first of the hegemons—strongmen who ruled under the guise of supporting the Chou.


10. This well-known passage is also found in the Han Fei-tzu, HFTCC, p. 360.


12. Some commentators understand this to mean “they will not run off.”

13. Some commentators suggest this means “light troops” rather than as translated. However, it seems clear that the manner of provocation is being described because the enemy is being slighted, treated “disdainfully.” “Lightly advancing” is also parallel to “quickly retreating.”

14. The identification of the “five weapons” varies. Fu (WT CCCY, note 46, p. 73) suggests they may have been the bow and arrow, halberd, spear, fighting staff, and the spear-tipped halberd. (The identification of the “fighting staff” is a matter of some disagreement. According to the Chou li, it was a composite weapon made of bamboo and was octagonal in shape. However, this probably represents a later [Han dynasty] idealization because examples found in tombs are round and formed from a single wood.) For a detailed discussion, consult Hayashi Mino’s extensive work, Chagaku In-Shih i dai no buki, Kyoto Daigaku Jimun Kagaku Kenkyusho, Kyoto, 1972, pp. 237-241. Other lists include both offensive and defensive implements; the Hsun-tzu mentions the knife (or dagger), sword, spear, spear-tipped halberd, and arrows. In the earliest periods the halberd and ax figured most prominently.

15. This and the following paragraph suggest an age when divination still had believers, but the rationality of military strategy should dominate battlefield decisions.

16. This sentence is somewhat problematic. It may also mean “They have arisen early and are still on the march late.” Similarly, they may be deliberately breaking the ice to ford rivers or perhaps to use boats on a lake, as translated, or they may unwillingly be breaking through the ice as they attempt to cross. The former seems more likely, given the apparently severe conditions of wind and cold.

17. Similar material is also found in the Six Secret Teachings.

18. Also found in the TPYL, 313:6.

19. Literally, “governing” or “administering”—here translated as “control” because for Wu-tzu it subsumes all aspects of organization, discipline, and training.

20. The troops and their commander (and ruler) are characterized by a relationship similar to the idealized one between father and son: it is characterized by benevolence, righteousness, beneficence, good faith, and love from the parent with the reciprocal virtues of trust, love, respect, and obedience from the son.

21. This passage, which closely echoes one in Sun-tzu’s Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance,” is evidently misplaced here.

22. Cf. TPYL, 297:4A.

23. Passages such as these are cited as evidence that the Wu-tzu must be a spurious work because cavalry—to the best of available evidence—had not yet been introduced in Wu Ch’i’s era. However, cavalry tactics are not discussed, only the use of horses for riding. As already noted, Wu Ch’i’s biography preserves his reputation for walking rather than riding when the men are weary, providing further evidence that riding existed at the start of the fourth century.


25. The character used is “to divine,” but the subsequent discussion focuses solely on the rational evaluation of character and ability.

26. The use of pipes and whistles at night is cited by T’ao Nai as evidence that the text must have been composed in the Six Dynasties period because music did not include this use until after the Wei-Chin period (Ch’iu Wan-li, Hsien-Ch’in wen-shih tzu-hsiao k’ao-pien, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 480). This of course presumes their function was identical, rather than simply sounding as signals, and that someone revising an earlier text did not simply fill out a phrase to reflect contemporary practice. (However, note that Li and Wang deny the validity of this claim, asserting that evidence exists that these instruments were used in such fashion much earlier. See note 4 above to the introductory section and the citations contained therein.)

27. The tactical exploitation of confined spaces to restrict the movement of both chariots and men is advanced in many military writings. This might suggest a common body of tactical knowledge, extensive cross-borrowing, or simply common sense developed through bitter experience.

28. This is obviously an explicit reference to employing cavalry as a battlefield force rather than just using horses to perhaps carry the officers. Similar references follow in this chapter.

29. This passage is commonly understood as referring to Wu Ch’i, the speaker, suggesting that if it (the state of Wei) fails it will be laughed at; therefore, he has forged a force that has the total commitment of the enraged bandit in the marketplace. However, this runs contrary to the logic of persuasion because if Wei fails with only a limited force, although its audacity might be laughable, defeat would be expected. However, if—contrary to all expectation—the mighty Ch’i should be vanquished, they would certainly be laughed at, and Wei’s army would be correspondingly glorified for its great accomplishment.

30. Also cited in TPYL, 33:7.
Wei Liao-tzu

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books

BS  Bamboo Slips: The text as given by the bamboo slips, which may be cited from the YCS CP or other texts and commentaries.

RT  Reconstructed Text: the text reconstructed by Hsu Yang in WLT CS, based on the traditionally transmitted texts, revised and supplemented by the materials preserved in the Ch'iu-shu chih-yao and the bamboo slips (YCS CP). The RT generally follows the work of Chung Chao-hua, as recorded in the latter's extensive footnotes in the WLT CC.


Notes to the Translator's Introduction

1. These and other issues regarding the historical Wei Liao and the evolution of the text are discussed at the end of this translator's introduction.

2. The interrelationship of these texts, especially the Wei Liao-tzu and Six Secret Teachings, remains to be clarified. Their sequence of completion and whether they incorporate passages from other, now-lost works cannot be resolved until the discovery of new textual materials. The Wei Liao-tzu clearly postdates Sun-tzu's Art of War, the Mo-tzu, Sun Pin's Military Methods, and the Wu-tzu; it adopts and advances many of Wu Ch'i's concepts and principles. (In his notes to the individual chapters, Hsu Yang discusses Wei Liao-tzu's thought in relation to Sun-tzu and Wu Ch'i, but oddly neglects the numerous materials borrowed from the Six Secret Teachings. Some points regarding the latter and many other common concepts are found in our notes to the translation, but space precludes more than cursory references.)


4. The dates for King Hui's reign are discussed in the section on textual history.

5. The first book of the Mencius begins with several interviews between Mencius and King Hui (and King Hui's son, King Hsiaz, after he ascends the throne) and therefore has traditionally been entitled "King Hui of Liang." Mencius strongly condemns King Hui in VI B1.

6. A main theme of the Wei Liao-tzu is relying on human effort rather than looking to the Heavens or spirits, as is discussed in textual notes 1-9 below.


8. The style of the characters and the presence of characters that should be avoided if the scribe were copying the text after the Han's ascension indicate that the slips, and thus the Wei Liao-tzu, are pre-Han.

9. The Wei Liao-tzu thus reflects the massive population displacements resulting from the large-scale warfare seen in the middle and especially the later Warring States period.

10. The Wei Liao-tzu also incorporates Taoist concepts, although Legalism—somewhat modified by Confucian concerns with benevolence and virtue—predominates. Key passages are noted in the translation as they arise.

11. In contrast to the Wei Liao-tzu, from the Legalist view concepts of virtue, righteousness, and shame are detrimental.

12. Wei Liao recognized the importance of cities as economic centers and the vital need for trade and other commercial activities to create the wealth required to finance military forces and campaigns. Thus his policies differed radically from Lord Shang's condemnation of commercial enterprise (see Ch'ung-kuo Ch'in-shih Pien-shih-tsu, Ch'ung-kuo chun-shih shih, Vol. 5: Ping-chia, Chieh-fang-ch'un ch'u-pan-shue, Peking, 1990, p. 140). At the same time, these activities must be directed to the state's benefit and not be permitted to injure the people and their primary occupations. His tactics include principles for attacking and defending cities and further advancing concepts found in Mo-tzu's and Sun Pin's writings while clearly reversing Sun-tzu's advice to avoid becoming entangled in sieges and city assaults (as discussed in the translator's introduction to the Su-ma Fa). Wei Liao also identified economic conflict as the root cause of war (see WLT CS, pp. 40-41).

13. The first chapter of the Su-ma Fa advocates identical concepts and measures.

14. Bonding into squads of five remained the foundation of military organization throughout Chinese history. Contemporary Western military theory, based on behavioral analysis of performance in World War II, recognizes small groups of six or seven men as constituting the basic identifiable and motivational unit—essentially validating the ancient insight.

15. Also see Tung Chien's discussion, "Ch'ien-t'an Wei Liao-tzu te 'ping-chiao' suhsiang," pp. 283-291.

16. These issues are considered extensively in the Su-ma Fa as well. Military historians will recognize contemporary Western theory in these powerful manipulations.

17. See Wu Ju-sung's foreword to Hsu Yang's Wei Liao-tzu ch'ien-shuo, pp. 5-12. For the concepts of hsing (form, shape) and shih (strategic configuration of force or power), advantage conveyed by the strategic deployment of force, which largely originate with Sun-tzu, refer to the translator's introduction to the Art of War.
18. The text rarely mentions unorthodox tactics by name, but Hsu Yung's detailed analysis identifies them in Wei Liao-tzu's concrete tactics and measures. (See WLT CS, pp. 34-35, and his notes to the individual chapters. Also see the translator's introduction and notes to Sun-tzu's Art of War for an elucidation of chi and cheng.) The absence of any mention of the cavalry in the Wei Liao-tzu, evidence for a fourth-century composition date, confines the possibilities for implementing unorthodox tactics to chariots and infantry. However, note that Sun Pin already employs cavalry, which raises further questions about the chronological relationship of the texts—although cavalry may have been considered in the now-lost portions of the extant Wei Liao-tzu.

19. As Hsu Yung points out, Wei Liao valued a spirited, highly trained, and disciplined force over large numbers. See WLT CS, p. 38.

The "miscellaneous" category contains books whose contents were not attributable to a single school, such as the Confucians or Taoists. Thus "miscellaneous" refers to the amalgamated contents of an individual work, not to a collection of various books.

The Han shu bibliography (Chapter 30), based essentially on Liu Hsiang's and Liu Hsin's earlier Chi lieh, contains a "military" section subdivided into four classifications: "Ping mou-ch'ian," or "Military Plans and Balance of Power"; "Ping hsing-shih," or "Military Shape (or Disposition) and Advantage Conveyed by Strategic Deployment of Force"; "Yin-yang"; and "Ping Chi-ch'iao," or "Military Techniques and Crafts." (For further discussion, see Robin D. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on Their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," TP 74 [1988], pp. 211-247.)

20. For example, see Yao Chi-heng's comments collected in the Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao (ed. Chang Hsin-ch'eng), Shangwuyin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint) (original ed., 1939), p. 803. Yao also opportunely comments that some historical commanders deliberately sought out transgressions immediately prior to battle so as to dramatically execute up to one hundred soldiers and vividly affect the troops.

Note that Hsu Yung vigorously disputes the traditional understanding of this phrase, believing it refers to a commander fighting with forces reduced by the indicated amount—such as half or 30 percent—in comparison with the enemy. (See WLT CS, pp. 167-175. Also see notes 174-177, which accompany the translation for this passage.) Hua Lu-tsun, among contemporary scholars, embraces the view that this "killing" refers to the degree to which the commander is willing to inflict capital punishment to enforce discipline and compel his troops to fight fervently (Wei Liao-tzu chu-i, Chung-hua shu-chu, Peking, 1979, p. 6).

21. Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 803. This is hardly a crippling criticism because Mencius is not necessarily the originator of the saying, whereas Wei Liao may have been reacting to and appropriating a statement that accords with his own thoughts. See, for example, the contemporary view advanced in Ping-ch'ia, p. 144.

22. Yen Shih-ku cites a statement from Liu Hsiang's (no longer extant) Pie lieh. However, if Wei Liao had his interview in King Hui's last year (320 B.C.), unless he were already over forty it is unlikely that he could have studied with Lord Wang, who died in 338 B.C. Furthermore, Lord Shang was active in the foreign state of Ch'in, whereas Wei Liao was presumably from Wei.

25. The recent Chung-kuo chien-shih-shih (Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988), for example, focuses mainly on the continuation of Lord Shang's ideas in its brief analysis. See Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 102-103.

26. Hsu Ying-lin is prominently identified with this view. Chung Chao-hua, in an article emphasizing the distinctiveness of the descriptions for each category, concludes that all the extant texts are variants of the same original and that the miscellaneous text has been lost. (See Chung Chao-hua, "Kuan-yü Wei Liao Tzu mou-hsien wen-ti te shang-ch'üeh," WW 1978, No. 5, pp. 60-63, or the slightly abridged reprint in the Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao [ed. Cheng Liang-shu], Hsieh-shing shu-chu, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1639-45.)

27. For example, see Hsu Lu-tsung's introduction to his modern edition, WLT CY, pp. 1-4. (An abridged abstract is also found in the Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1631-1632.) Also see Chng Chao-hua, WLT CC, pp. 3-5; and Hsu Yung's summary of this position, WLT CS, pp. 16-17. All historical references are confined to individuals who lived before King Hui's time; the absence of famous generals thereafter is presumed to indirectly establish the latest date of composition. Another issue is the question of "shih chang" or hereditary generals. Their mention is considered evidence of early composition; however, Yates has pointed out that this view appears mistaken (see "New Light," pp. 226-227. Also see Hsu Ying, WLT CS, pp. 24-25).

28. These issues are discussed below. For a comprehensive overview, see Hsu Ying, WLT CS, p. 17. Among the main contentions is that Wei Liao's reference to armies of two hundred thousand would only be accurate late in the Warring States period. However, as Hsu points out, armies varied in size, and the sentence might refer to a state's entire standing army rather than a campaign force (see WLT CS, p. 25).

29. This view apparently originated with Chien Mu. See Ch'en Wan-li, Hsien Ch'ien wen-shih tsu-liao k'ao-pan, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 489; and Hsu Ying, WLT CS, p. 23.

30. Obviously, if it were not for the distinct character of the two halves of the present book, the issue of authorship could be simply resolved by attributing it to the original Wei Liao, allowing for accretions and revisions and perhaps assuming the second historical figure is simply an erroneous reference.


32. Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1647. In support of the text being properly attributed to the earlier Wei Liao, Hua Lu-tsun makes a similar argument: Ch'in's historical enmity with Wei would have (theoretically) prevented Wei Liao from illustrating his thoughts with references to Wu Ch'in when speaking to the king of Ch'in (WLT CY, p. 3; also see Ping-chia, pp. 139-140).

33. Hsi Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1648-50. Note that other scholars dismiss Hsi-tsun's view as incomplete, as idealistically favoring benevolence while neglecting the realities of military power and operations (see Wu Jung-sung's foreword to the WLT CS, p. 8).

Whether the military texts first synthesized benevolence and military might—perhaps on a Confucian basis in response to the growing scope of warfare and social upheaval rather than simply incorporating a preexisting position—seems to be an interesting open question. Hsi-tsun could equally well have borrowed from the Wei Liao-
date of his arrival at the Ch'in court, 236 B.C., as eighty-two years. Chang Lieh dates the arrival to 237 B.C. (Hsü Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1652).

50. WLT CS, pp. 18-20.

51. Ibid., p. 23.

52. Ibid., pp. 27-28. Hsü Yung also discusses extensively the questions of accretion and loss raised by many historians over the years and the variations in the number of sections found in the different texts. For details of this specialized question, see ibid., pp. 26-30.

Notes to the Text

1. The title of this chapter, “Heavenly Offices,” appears several times within it—apparently with two different referents. Although some commentators (WLT CCCY, p. 2) take it simply as a book title, most consider that in some instances, it refers instead to a body of astrological judgments and proclamations based on assigning auspicious and inauspicious interpretations to celestial phenomena. The translation follows the consensus in demarcating such occurrences. (Cf. WLT CY, pp. 2-3; WLT CC, p. 2. Note that in WLT CS, it is never considered a book title. See WLT CS, pp. 46-47.)

2. “Punishments and Virtue” is also subject to different interpretations. Although Hsü Yung (WLT CS, p. 46) takes it as a book title, as such joined, the terms are generally thought to refer to a system of beliefs about auspicious and inauspicious times. Hsing—“punishment”—is associated with yin, the dark (hsien), and the (Earthly) branches in the double character cycle of days; whereas Tse—“Virtue”—is associated with yang, the bright, and the (Heavenly) stems in the cyclic sequence. Each would have portents associated with it and in the military realm, appropriate times for the initiation of activities; the initial direction and orientation for the campaign could also be specified. “Punishment” is also associated with death, “Virtue” with life.

3. The author of the Wei Liao-tzu thus defines punishment and virtue in terms of government action, thereby focusing exclusively on human effort—human affairs—rather than on structuring actions in accord with metaphysically auspicious phenomena. (All references to “Wei Liao-tzu” hereafter should be understood as generic, indicating the author or authors of the Wei Liao-tzu text rather than a specific person.)

4. Many of the commentators take this occurrence of Heavenly Offices as a book title. The Sung edition includes additional characters meaning “According to the deployments in the Heavenly Offices, …”

5. Literally, “severed terrain,” here translated as “isolated terrain” consistent with our translation of the term in the Art of War, where it appears in Chapter 8, “Nine Terrains.” By deploying in this orientation, forces are arrayed inauspiciously with their backs turned to the water. This differs conceptually from a purely strategic evaluation that presumably would fault any deployment that lacked the possibility of ordered withdrawal.

6. This is an example of inauspiciously facing toward, being turned toward.

7. Probably an error for the Ch'ing River because the former does not flow through the Mu-yeh battlefield region, whereas the latter does (see WLT CC, note 11, p. 3).

8. There appears to be some logical inconsistency in this sentence, and the commentators offer several different understandings. Clearly, Kung is expressing the thought that the comet is irrelevant and that despite its baleful omen, they will be victorious.
However, another interpretation is “If we were to employ the comet to fight, we would have to turn the tail over before we could be victorious” (WLT CS, p. 47).

9. The Sung edition has “seasons of Heaven” instead of “Heavenly Offices.” The thought expressed in this chapter reflects the theme of the entire work and is also picked up by Li Ching in Book III of Questions and Replies.

10. These sentences echo a passage in Chapter 4 of the Art of War. This chapter is particularly complex, not because of the ideas expressed or any shortage of textual materials but because of the extensive reconstructions possible with the recovered tomb materials (YCS CP) supplemented by the Ch'in-shu ch'i-hao. In this instance, the RT reads: “Measure the fertility and barrenness of the earth, and then establish towns and construct city walls. In accord with the city walls, determine the appropriate terrain” (WLT CS, p. 53).

11. The RT: “In accord with the terrain, determine the appropriate number of men” (WLT CS, p. 53).

12. The RT: “These three have been mutually determined, when one withdraws he can thereby be solid in defense, and [when he advances can thereby] be victorious in battle” (WLT CS, p. 53).

13. The bamboo slips read “fu” (blessings, good fortune, prosperity) rather than “pe” (preparations). In full, the RT: “Being victorious in battle externally, prosperity being produced internally, victory and prosperity respond to each other ...” (see WLT CC, notes, p. 6; WLT CS, p. 53).


15. An image from Chapter 4 of the Art of War.

16. Hsu Pei-ken believes “open” is an error for “closed” because military affairs should be secretive and obscure (cf. WLT CC, p. 15). The RT: “Closing it, it is small but not ... Thus, for one who is king, the people turn to him as flowing water, look up to him as the sun and moon, return to him like their father and mother. Thus it is said ...” (serial periods indicate a damaged or lost portion in the text).

18. Understood as opening the path to life, nourishing the people (cf. WLT CC, p. 15).

19. Liu Yin understands “stopping up” as referring to stopping the excessively harsh correction of minor transgressions (ibid.). Others see the efforts directed toward stopping extravagance and profligate customs (cf. WLT CY, p. 5; WLT CS, p. 56). The RT adds: “His taking of All under Heaven will be like a transformation. One whose state is impoverished he will be able to make rich” (cf. WLT CS, p. 53).

20. The RT adds: “Those who do not respond to the [constraining of the four seasons, he will be able to bring about that they respond to them” (WLT CS, p. 53).

21. Both phrases in the RT use a double negative for emphasis: “cannot but be wealthy,” “cannot but be governed” (ibid.).

22. The RT: “As for a state that is well governed and moreover wealthy, even though they do not remove the blocks from the chariots, nor is the armor taken out from the bags, their awesomeness causes All under Heaven to submit” (ibid.).

23. In accord with Sun-tzu’s approach to warfare. However, the RT adds a series of phrases indicating that victory comes in the fields, marketplaces, and so forth (ibid.).

24. As the sentence stands, the implication is that once the army is in the field, any victory is attributable to the general. However, the RT adds phrases that change the meaning somewhat: “If one engages in battle and then is victorious, it is the high officers’ victory. If one is victorious a second time, it is equivalent to a defeat. If an army of a hundred thousand goes forth, the daily expenses will be a thousand pieces of gold. Therefore, attaining a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence” (ibid.). These phrases reflect Sun-tzu’s admonition against protracted fighting and Wu-tzu’s emphasis on winning decisively and avoiding numerous battles.

25. This echoes Sun-tzu’s admonition in the Art of War, Chapter 12.

26. Unfortunately, this relatively simple sentence is subject to several interpretations by the commentators. Literally, “do not mobilize one day’s army” can be understood as translated; as meaning do not mobilize for only a day (because this would be negligent and haphazard and would doom the forces to defeat); and as meaning do not mobilize in just a day because again this would be too hasty. (The translation follows Liu Yin’s emphasis on acting quickly and decisively so as not to lose an opportunity. See WLT CC, p. 56; WLT CY, p. 6; and WLT CCY, pp. 18–19.) The RT adds a long, supplementary passage.

27. The RT adds a lengthy, broken passage on the general and the senses.

28. The RT adds, “Deployed in an elongated formation it will be victorious” (WLT CS, p. 54).

29. Another, broken passage follows in the RT that appears to have inappropriate sentences as well.

30. A paraphrase from the Art of War, Chapter 11. The RT adds, “Those whose heads are bowed cannot raise them; those whose heads are raised cannot bow them” (WLT CC, p. 54).

31. Another paraphrase from the Art of War, Chapter 6. (Note that this describes the plight of a general who lacks intelligence and knowledge of the battlefield.) The RT adds, “Wise officers cannot offer plans, courageous officers cannot (take action)” (ibid.).

32. Liu Yin understands the image as “like a whirlwind” (WLT CC, p. 18A).

33. Drums were used to sound the advance, pennants to direct the troops.

34. The Sung edition has “harms” instead of “diminishes.”

35. Following Liu Yin (WLT CC, p. 19) and WLT CCY (p. 29), shih chuang is understood as “generals through the ages.” However, other interpretations are “hereditary generals”—those whose families have served as generals for generations (with the implication that they are unqualified)—and “contemporary generals” of their age. The latter seems least likely. (Cf. WLT CS, p. 62; WLT CY, p. 10; WLT CC, p. 13.)

36. Some editions have t’o, “to drag,” rather than pao, “to embrace.”

37. The concept of ch’i (“unorthodox”) forces is discussed in the translator’s introduction and notes to the Art of War.

38. Following the consensus of the commentators that “commander” should be understood in parallel with the succeeding phrases referring to the shu-ma and the general.

39. See note 5 to Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung.

40. Duke Huan, who ruled Ch’i from 685 to 634 B.C., was the first of the five hegemons, or strongmen who exercised de facto power over the entire realm in the name of supporting the now-weakened hereditary house of Chou.
41. Analogies from Sun-tzu’s “Strategic Military Power” (Art of War, Chapter 5).
42. The Sung edition has “Heaven” for “man,” changing the sentence to “Do not be the first under Heaven to engage in battle.”
43. Reading “disposition,” “shape,” or “form” in accord with the Sung edition, rather than the Ming edition’s “punishment.”
44. The modern commentators generally understand this sentence as translated. However, it may also refer to receiving the Mandate of Heaven to go forth and punish the evil. (Cf. WLTC CCY, p. 51; WLTS C, p. 72; WLTY C, p. 16; WLCC C, p. 19.)
45. For other possible interpretations, such as “speed,” see WLTS C, p. 72; WLTC CC, p. 19; and WLTY C, p. 16.
46. “Unity” is implied and is also found in several of the variant editions.
47. The RT adds considerable material from the Ch’u-shun chih-yao, with the important sentences then reading as follows: “Military affairs rely on the strength of the masses. If you are not extremely careful about actions taken, you will have to change them several times. When you change them several times, then even though affairs are initiated, the masses will be perturbed” (WLTS C, p. 71). The fostering of certainty in the general’s orders and avoiding doubt in both their minds and in the mind of the commander are important themes in most of the Seven Military Classics.
48. The translation follows the Ming text (note WLTC CCY, pp. 53–54; and WLTC C, p. 17). However, the RT provided by the WLTS C is somewhat more consistent: “In antiquity, among those who led the people it never happened that they were unable to gain their minds and yet able to gain their strength” (WLTS C, p. 71).
49. The RT variant merits note: “Only after the people will die for their ruler just as for their families should you constrain them with regulations. Thus in antiquity those who engaged in warfare would invariably take ch’i as their foundation in order to stimulate the will, and stimulate the will in order to employ the four limbs, and the four limbs in order to employ the five weapons. Thus when the will is not stimulated, the soldiers will not die for honor. When the soldiers will not die for honor, even though they constitute a multitude, they will not be martial” (WLTS C, p. 71).
50. As Liu Yin discusses, the ruler should accord with the people’s desires and social affairs to further structure and direct their activities (WLTC CCY, L20).
51. Following the Ming text and the understanding of WLTS CC, p. 59, and WLTY C, p. 16, which assume the terms are correct as they stand—meaning a “company” and a “po,” the officer for the company. However, note that WLTS CC emends the text to the terms for the paths crossing (and defining) the ancient agricultural fields and therefore, by implication, referring to the organizational cohesiveness of the agricultural community (cf. WLTS C, pp. 71–72). However, this seems contextual inappropriately. The WLTC CC (p. 22) understands po as a larger unit, perhaps something like a double company or regiment, but the appearance of the term in Chapter 13 of the Wei Liao-tzu clearly shows it to be one hundred men, a company.
52. The RT prefixes the passage with “the former Kings” (WLTS C, p. 71). In this case the remaining sentences would continue the description of the ancient practices by discussing their results rather than stating a general conclusion, as translated; the latter would be appropriate for a contemporary listener such as King Hui.
53. An “old” army is a prominent concept in the “Superior Strategy” of Huang Shih-kung. The proper behavior for a general exercising personal leadership is discussed in many military writings, including Chapter 23 of the Six Secret Teachings
54. The BS read “The military is solid through being quiet and victorious through being united.” (WLTS CC, p. 78; WLTS C, p. 22; WLTC CC, p. 27.)
55. This clearly continues the observations and principles of the last chapter.
56. In Sun-tzu’s conception, one of the commander’s aims is to create a tactical balance of power (ch’i-pan) that dramatically favors him, resulting in an easy, overwhelming victory. Failing to effect this imbalance, the victory can only be viewed as fortuitous. (Cf. Sun-tzu’s Art of War, Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.” Also refer to the notes to the translator’s introduction and translation for a brief discussion of ch’i-pan, which is translated as “tactical balance of power” or sometimes “imbalance” of power to emphasize the desired orientation.)
57. The BS have “die for the Tao/Way” rather than “able to implement the Tao/Way” (WLTC CC, p. 28). Note the discussion of the general’s awesomeness and the problem of doubt in the “Superior Strategy” of Huang Shih-kung, where the analogy of the mind and limbs is also used.
58. There are several interpretations of this seemingly simple sentence. Rulers frequently, and generals sometimes, are spoken of as “loving their people” or “loving their men.” However, the phrase “loving and cherishing the minds of their men” is unusual and in the context of the passage that follows, seems to require understanding in a causative sense: “causing the minds of the men to love and cherish them,” just as “causing their minds to fear and respect them.” (Liu Yin’s comment agrees with the simple “loving the minds of the men”; our translation agrees with WLTS C, pp. 23; and WLTC CCY, p. 78.) Another possibility is “Those who are not able with love and solicitude to cause their officers and troops to cherish them and submit cannot be employed by me; those who are unable with awesomeness and severity to cause the officers and troops to respect and fear them cannot direct the army for me” (see WLTS C, p. 82).
59. Possibly reflecting Sun-tzu’s concepts in Art of War, Chapters 3 and 4, insofar as the wise general will not undertake an assault unless he can be victorious.
60. The term translated as “occupies ravines” is also the title of Chapter 50 in the Six Secret Teachings, “Divided Valleys.” Throughout the Six Secret Teachings the authors advocate seizing and occupying such strategic points when outnumbered or otherwise at a disadvantage. The BS read somewhat differently: “Those imprisoned in a ravine have no mind to fight.” (WLTS C, p. 28. See Chung’s note 19 for a discussion of relevant ideas from Sun-tzu. However, he does not consider whether this situation is desperate enough to force the men’s spirits to ultimate commitment.)
61. Following the Ming edition and Liu Yin, WLTC CCY, L27B. Armies marching forth under the banner of righteousness, such as the effort led by King Wu of the Chou dynasty against the Shang, presumably have fervent public support and should therefore initiate action. Those contending over less “nationalistic” state issues should respond rather than initiate action, probably to generate public support. The BS are completely contradictory: “One who awaits the enemy values being first” (WLTC CC, p. 29, followed by WLTS CC, p. 80).
62. BS have “During the conflict you must be timely” (WLTS CC, p. 29).
63. This directive emphasizes speed in reaching the marshaling point for the offensive, apparently to take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; this is similar to the concept found in Art of War, Chapter 2, “Military Discussions.” However, note that
Sun-tzu clearly advised against this sort of exhaustive employment of military forces because it would make them susceptible to being defeated by any well-rested forces that might await them (see Art of War, Chapter 7, “Military Combat”). Although minor advances in transport technology may have occurred between the writing of the Art of War and the first chapters of the Wei Liao-tzu, even if two or more than two centuries had passed, without the advent of the cavalry, chariots and infantry would still only be able to cover roughly thirty li a day on an extended march.

64. Following WLT CCCY, p. 88; WLTCC WCCS, I:30A (Liu Yin’s commentary); and WLT CS, p. 84. Two editions understand “fa,” translated as “to construct,” as “broken” or “destroyed,” which seems unlikely (WLT CY, p. 22; WLT CC, p. 30). Confronting points of land (possibly “ferries”) and bridges would facilitate the general movement of defense forces; however, destroying them could thwart an enemy’s advance, particularly in a concrete situation in which the invader’s objective might be clear.

65. Literally, “guests,” which should probably be understood as forces invading another state’s territory—thus generally called “guest” in military terms—or perhaps stationed inside foreign territory, just beyond the border, to prevent incursions.

66. Although these sentences certainly reflect Sun-tzu’s thinking, they are not found in the Art of War.

67. Following WLT CCCY, p. 92. The commentators generally understand the term yī as “borders” or “border defense works.”

68. The context clearly describes policies designed to deny all material aid and shelter to the invaders, forcing them to carry the provisions extreme distances and thus expend great energy to maintain their siege. (Compare the ideas in the “Superior Strategy” of Huang Shih-kung.) Therefore, although a certain amount of preparatory destruction and loss is entailed, in general the defenders expend only a fraction of the enemy’s energy to collect their foodstuffs, bring in their knocked-down shelters (rather than destroyed, as the commentaries have it), and prepare for the siege. The translation follows Liu Yin’s commentary, WLTCC WCCS, I:31A, with which both the CCCY and CY editions agree. However, Hsi Yu’s CS edition, apparently misunderstanding it completely, views it as a discussion of hû (understood as spirit rather than effort or energy). Thus he translates it into modern Chinese as “In this fashion it causes the aggressor’s spirit (hû) to grow and expand and the defenders’ spirits to drop” (WLT CS, p. 89). Apparently in the belief that the passage continues the initial condemnation of inferni actions, based on the YCS BS, he then translates the next sentence as “Once they encounter the enemy’s advance and attack, the defending army will then sustain great losses” (WLT CS, p. 89).

69. From the earliest period down into the Warring States era, walls were generally made from tamped earth, sometimes packed within a permanent retaining form built of stones that then made up the exterior faces. Consequently, great effort was required to move the dirt necessary for a wall of any functional dimensions, and such walls—if never put to defensive use—would appear to be a wanton waste of energy.

70. Emending “wall” to “defend,” according to the Sung edition.

71. The YCS CP have “the soldiers, people, and masses selected” (WLT CS, p. 88; WLT CC, p. 32).

72. Here the YCS CP text resolves a murky passage quite well, adding to the number of besieging forces the critical words “to balance,” “to be suitable.” Thus the sen-

tence would read “The attackers must not be less than a mass of more than one hundred thousand to be suitable [as a task]” (cf. WLT CS, pp. 88–89).

73. Liu Chun-ch’ing interprets this as shielding and protecting the somewhat fragile earthen walls against damage from the natural elements, such as wind and rain (WLT CCCY, p. 97).

74. Strength broadly construed rather than simple numerical superiority, as some commentators suggest.

75. The YCS CP have a connective “then” between the two halves of the sentence. Accordingly, the weak would be incited by the strong taking their stance at the forefront, and would willingly assume positions at the rear (cf. WLT CS, p. 88).

76. The BS version differs significantly: “If a mass of fifty thousand ... [the city] mustingly be rescued. Contain their rear, go forth through their strategic points. Lightly strike their rear, do not allow provisions to pass through.” Hsi Yu’s assumes the fifty thousand refers to the rescuing forces. (cf. WLT CS, p. 88. His text, p. 86, differs slightly from the annotations in the CC edition, p. 33, including “truly not be rescued” instead of “truly must be rescued.”) The tactical concerns raised here reflect those found in Chapter 4 of the Six Secret Teachings, “Occupying Enemy Territory,” although in the latter the perspective is that of the besieging forces.

77. Tao, literally “turn over,” generally taken as “to confuse,” as in confuse the enemy (cf. WLT CY, p. 26; WLTCC WCCS, I:33B). However, the ruse of a half-hearted effort can also be understood as “turning their army around” because they reverse their deployment, putting their stalwarts to the rear.

78. The primary meaning of the second word in the title is “mound,” and its secondary meaning is “insult.” The basic idea appears to be that if one is conscientious about following the twelve recommended practices, the state will become strong and therefore will be able to display an attitude of superiority toward others and to “insult” its enemies. Similarly, if a state falls into the twelve ill habits, other states will soon be able to insult it as it grows weaker and becomes easy prey for its enemies. The chapter thus contains the thoughts found in Chapter 5, “Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks.”

79. The twenty-four practices are couched in a formulaic phrase, “X lies in Y,” the term “lies in” being tsui yû. The latter can also be translated as “be at,” “depends upon,” “consists in,” and “be present in.” Our translation adopts slight variations in accord with the implications of the terms. In all cases the fundamental idea is that the root of a certain condition lies in a certain practice.

80. The government should avoid interfering with the people’s seasonal occupations and should also actively foster and observe ritual practices that accord with the activities of the seasons.

81. The commentators generally take chû as “planning,” “making strategy.” However, the term’s fundamental meaning is “the subtle,” “the moment,” and therefore sensitivity to the small, or perceptivity. (In Wu-tzu it means “vital point.” See Chapter 4, “The Tao of the General.” Also see note 32 of Questions and Replies.)

82. By penetrating the external form and then formulating plans to take advantage of the situation.

83. The first passage can be understood as a normative description of how a righteous army should behave, or how the ideal armies of antiquity—in particular, those of the Chou dynasty—actually managed their campaigns and constrained their behavior.
84. These are among the justifications stated in Book I, "Benevolence the Foundation," of the *Ssu-ma Fa* for undertaking a punitive expedition. (Also see note 55 of *Questions and Replies.*

85. The title of the chapter is apparently derived from this phrase, which appears here and elsewhere in the text. However, the title can also be understood as "Martial Discussions" or "Military Discussions," as Liu Yin suggests in his commentary (cf. WLTCC WCCS, I:35B).

86. Hua Lu-tsun notes that another interpretation is that all these plans are directed toward a single objective—the evil ruler. Although this would accord with the Chou's pronounced theory of exterminating only the evil, it seems unlikely here (cf. WLT CY, p. 32).

87. Some commentators understand the phrase as "rescuing oneself," but this seems unlikely. (Compare the modern Chinese translations in WLT CY, p. 34, and WLT CS, p. 98.)

88. Following WLT CCCY, p. 112. However, Liu Yin notes that a small state "takes pleasure in nourishing the people" (I:37A), and WLT CY (p. 34) understands the state as nurturing itself rather than serving others. However, in the reality of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, a small state would have to subjugate itself to a significant power in order to exist, and therefore "serve and support" seems more likely.

89. Emending the text according to an identical sentence in essentially the same paragraph in the *Six Secret Teachings* (Chapter 22, "The General's Awesomeness"). Both the Sung and Ming texts have "execute" instead of "reward," and the paragraph proceeds to draw conclusions about both punishments and rewards in parallel, justifying the emendation.

90. The last sentence is restored from the Sung edition.

91. Emending "furnishing" in the Ming edition to "exist" from the Sung version.

92. Some commentators have identified this as a form of boat or other vessel as well as various types of assault vehicles for attacking cities. Cf. WLT CC, p. 39, for a summary.

93. This might equally refer to a "sundry goods official" and could also be understood as "markets manage the sundry goods." Cf. WLT CCCY, p. 118; WLT CY, p. 33; and WLT CC, p. 39.

94. A *tou*—at least in the Han dynasty—is generally taken as having been equivalent to 1,996 modern liters, or slightly more than two quarts. This would presumably have been the minimum dry rations (before cooking) for a month. The amount for a horse, however, would be completely inadequate unless computed on a per-day basis and supplemented with hay. (Note that in Chapter 11 Wei Liao-tzu condemns feeding grain to horses as an extravagant practice.)

95. A star's name (WLT CY, p. 34).

96. For a discussion of these sentences and their origin in the Taoist classic, the *Tao Te Ching,* see the translator's introduction and notes to the *Three Secret Strategies.* A similar passage appears in the third section, "Inferior Strategy."

97. Clearly sentences and an analogy from Lao-tzu's *Tao Te Ching,* Chapter 78. Sun-tzu also uses the power and imagery of water to illustrate his principles in *Art of War,* Chapters 5 and 6.

98. The radical difference between the perfunctory obligations of the civil realm and the brusque, unfettered martial realm, including this concrete example, are discussed in the second chapter of the *Ssu-ma Fa,* "Obligations of the Son of Heaven."

99. The commentators offer various explanations for this sentence, although generally taking it to mean that on the second day the army will complete an additional three days' distance. However, this runs contrary to every principle advanced by virtually every military strategist, including Sun-tzu. (See especially *Art of War,* Chapter 7, "Military Combat," where Sun-tzu specifically condemns rushing forward a hundred li to engage in combat; the *Ssu-ma Fa,* Book II, "Obligations of the Son of Heaven"; and Wu Ch'i, *Wu-tzu,* Chapter 2, "Evaluating the Enemy.") Covering double the normal distance in a single day would have already exhausted the troops and animals; a triple days' march would be virtually impossible and would ensure that the army would be easy prey for any forces that follow Sun-tzu's principles and await them well rested. (Probably only a regular day's march, or roughly thirty li, could be accomplished on the first day due to the normal disorganization at the outset, whereas a double pace would be possible on the second day because presumably the men would still be fresh. The author is obviously stressing the realization of speed to surprise the enemy relatively unprepared, as Sun-tzu also strongly advocates in *Art of War,* Chapter 9.)

100. The pent-up river analogy also appears in the "Superior Strategy" section of the *Three Secret Teachings.*

101. The text couches it in terms of applying a mineral of the same color to them. This is generally understood as being as responding in kind to their strength, such as employing chariots to confront chariots (presumably to cause their rapid disintegration by confronting and smashing their strength), or as using banners of identical colors to cause confusion. (For the former, see WLT CCCY, p. 133; for the latter, WLT CY, p. 37; and WLT CS, p. 101.)

102. In accord with Wu Ch'i's dictum, "Execute anyone who does not follow orders" (Chapter 5, "Responding to Change," *Wu-tzu*). Only through careful measures could the army be unified and realize its potential effectiveness.

103. The title of the chapter, *Chiang Li,* by itself would normally be understood as "Principles of Generalship" or the "General's Principles." However, the chapter opens with a discussion of the general's role as an impartial administrator of the law and proceeds with a strong condemnation of the criminal practices of his day, including the system of extended guilt or culpability. (In the latter the criminal's relatives and associates are implicated in various ways and are also severely punished or executed.) The first sentence identifies the general with this role of administrator (of the law) (cf. WLT WCHC, 5:57).

104. The commentators and modern Chinese translators have produced much simplified and very contorted versions of the first two sentences of this paragraph. The first problem arises with determining the appropriate meaning for *ch'in,* translated as "stop" but found primarily with the meaning "help," "aid," or "assist" as well as "to stop" and "to correctively manage." (It may also be an error for a somewhat similar character, "to seek," or for another, "to pursue." Most of the modern editions simply state the apparent implications of the sentences: namely, that in his administration of law cases, the perfected man does not seek for evidence or crimes beyond the case that is immediately present. Thus, even if the criminal has shot at him in the past, this
does not implicate him in the present. However, such explanations are not very satisfactory. (Cf. WLTCC WCS, 1:4; WLT CY, p. 106; WLT CC, pp. 39–40; WLT CC, p. 44.)

105. The BS edition concludes rather differently and much less effectively for the point of Wei Liao-tzu’s argument: “A state hero would overcome [the false accusation], while the mean man would [falsely accuse himself]” (WLT CC, p. 45; and WLT CS, pp. 104–105). This fragment obviously assumes a great capacity for enduring pain on the part of the state hero.

106. This describes a situation exactly contrary to the ideal just portrayed in Chapter 8.

107. Although somewhat similar expressions occur in isolation in Chapters 2 and 13 of Sun-tzu’s Art of War, the entire sentence does not.

108. The four groups were the officials (aristocrats), farmers, artisans, and merchants.

109. The BS text has “calculate the migrant peoples” (cf. WLT CC, p. 48; and WLT CS, pp. 109–110). This would reflect Wei Liao-tzu’s advocacy of state policies to attract immigrants and displaced persons, as discussed in earlier chapters.


111. The BS have “root” rather than “authority,” which changes the last part of the sentence to read “is the root/basis of ruler and ministers” (cf. WLT CC, p. 48; WLT CS, p. 110). There is disagreement as to whether the term ch’ en chu refers to “the ministers and the ruler” or just the ruler (cf. WLT CCCY, p. 149; WLT CY, p. 43).

112. “Opening and closing” (or “stopping up”) was encountered in Chapter 3, “Discussion of Regulations.” The “single Tao” may refer either to the combination of agriculture and warfare or to those policies designed to unify the people and integrate the government and the people (also see note 18).

113. Understood by Hsu Yung as “this is the basis for ensuring that resources will have a surplus” (WLT CS, p. 110).

114. Because the government’s domestic policies are being discussed, some commentators take this sentence as referring to the status of the activities within the state (WLT CY, p. 43). However, it is generally understood as referring to evaluating the enemy, knowing the enemy’s weakness and movement (WLTCC WCS, I:52B; WLT CCCY, p. 150; WLT CS, pp. 110–111).

115. The li (rites) defining the relationship between ruler and subject, king and feudal lord. [The Chou li (under the Office of the Su-su ma) and the Su-su ma Fa contain similar justifications in terms of abetted behavior, in accord with the li understood as furnishing the parameters of government, for mounting a punitive expedition. Two are mentioned in Chapter 8, above (see note 84).]

116. The state is apparently so ideal that people concentrate on basic occupations and are neither contentious nor motivated by rewards. However, this depiction markedly contradicts Wei Liao-tzu’s advocacy of markets and commercial activity as the essential foundation of the state’s prosperity and the bulwark of military financing.

117. The five grains are variously identified, even in antiquity. Millet was the basis of northern diets, and one early list includes two types of millet. Other grains were rice, wheat, barley, and legumes. (See Francesca Bray, Agriculture, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 6, Part II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 432ff.)

118. The ruler’s Virtue and enlightened rule shine throughout the world.

119. Presumably on the proper structure for human relations. Liu Yin refers to “The Great Plan” in the Shu Ching in illustration, in which case the ruler’s discourse would be all-encompassing (WLTCC WCS, I:56A).

120. These sentences do not appear in the present text of Sun-tzu’s Art of War.

121. Reflecting Sun-tzu’s principles, particularly as expressed in the Art of War, Chapter 1.

122. This quotation, which is not found in the present text of the Art of War, has as many interpretations as there are commentators and modern translators. Our translation largely follows Liu Yin (WLTCC WCS, I:61A), but for other variations compare WLT CS, p. 120; WLT CY, p. 50; and WLT CCCY, pp. 176–177.

123. The last phrase can also be understood in the past tense, as “those who suffered a defeat [in reality] had no men.”

124. The analogies of rushing water and lightning are commonly found in the military writings, normally to advocate and describe the swiftness and effect of an overwhelming, onrush attack. Although most of the strategists also raised the specter of the chaos and disorder inherent in such precipitously (and advised capitalizing on it whenever possible), in general they still emphasized employing it.

125. As described in Chapter 4, “Combat Awesomeness.” (The commentators and translators erroneously tend to ignore “discussions,” interpreting the character as “plans” or simply deleting it altogether. This misses Wei Liao-tzu’s emphasis on planning and detailed discussions, as Sun-tzu advocated, to realize victory without engaging in combat.)

126. The term translated as “company commander” is po, which was encountered previously in Chapter 4, “Combat Awesomeness” (see note 51). In the passage that follows, the number of men under his command is explicitly recorded as one hundred men, making the unit a company.

127. Throughout this chapter we translate chu, which means “punish” or “execute/kill,” as “execute” in accord with the general—although not unanimously—view of the commentators. Military law was strict, and the tradition from Shang Yang on down embodied the belief that only thoroughness in implementing the severest punishments would cause the people and soldiers to follow the laws and orders.

128. The commentators differ on whether these are guard posts—possibly kiosks or watchtowers—or simply some sort of marker, such as posts or pennants. (Cf. WLT CCCY, p. 195; WLT CY, p. 57; WLT CC, p. 58; WLT CS, p. 130.)

129. Possibly other provisions of the law that would cover the offenses committed by the officers, as described in “Orders for Severe Punishment,” Chapter 13.

130. Presumably, the feathers are affixed to their caps or helmets to provide a marker that puts into the air and is more easily visible than any marking on their uniforms.

131. Many commentators assume this means that the soldiers in the first line of five wore their emblems on their heads, those in the next line wore them on their necks, and so forth. However, this would be redundant because the members of the lines would already be clearly distinguished by the color of their emblems. It is more likely that it applies to the subgroup of five squads within the company of one hundred, as our translation expresses. (Compare WLTCC WCS, II:3B; WLT CCCY, p. 203; and WLT CY, p. 61.)
Notes to Wei Liao-tzu

Others suggest they were a sort of marker post that functioned similarly (cf. WLTC WCCS, II: 88-9A). Still another view is that piao refers to a prearranged schedule and that actions should be taken in accord with it (cf. WLTY, p. 68). Finally, some feel that they conveyed a prearranged signal or command and were possibly a pennant or flag of some sort (cf. WLTC, p. 136). In the latter case, ho piao might refer to uniting the halves of the command, thereby authenticating it.

140. Raised, or possibly presented to the commander.

141. The soldiers are not just fed but are ceremoniously feasted to raise their morale for battle.

142. This sentence is thought by some commentators to be a misplaced fragment because it bears little relation to the context. The explanations for the four unorthodox forces include the main army, advance army, vanguard, and the division of troops. (The latter is clearly forced, as is the whole explanation. Any force can be used in unorthodox tactics; they are not inherently unorthodox despite a force perhaps having special training.) Others suggest they are four main types of battle array (WLTC CC, pp. 65-66) or corner positions on the formation (WLTC CS, pp. 9-10.).

143. The commentators differ on the meaning of kisang tsam; some take it as “to participate in planning military affairs,” others as “to investigate and check each other,” and still others as translated. (Cf. WLTC CMC, p. 232; WLTC CS, pp. 146-147; WLTC CC, p. 66.)

144. Although the text is ambiguous, clearly both the squad leader—who is responsible for the behavior and attainments of his men—and the instructor will be liable to punishment.

145. The term translated as “falls ill” is variously understood—from leaving formation and thus not participating in the drills to falling down, lying on the ground. In the latter case the soldier would obviously not need to report his illness himself. (Cf. WLTC CY, p. 70; WLTC CC, p. 68; and WLTC CS, p. 151.) Liu Yinh suggests that the term is not clear but may mean “commit an offense” (WLTC WCCS, II:11B; also see WLTC CMC, p. 236).

146. As discussed in Chapter 17, “Orders for Regulating the Troops.”

147. A mid-echelon officer apparently in charge of eight hundred men (WLTC CS, p. 151).

148. Following the commentators who gloss chueh as to engage in archery or weapons practice rather than as a term designating foot-speed measure (WLTC CC, p. 69; WLTC CY, p. 70).

149. No doubt the rewards—which would be based strictly on objectively quantifiable battlefield achievements such as the number of heads, prisoners, and flags captured—also included the awarding of flags of rank. Thus everyone would be able to observe the basis for such awards and also the promotions themselves.

150. The commentators generally understand lu li as “uniting strength,” probably based on a kou yu gloss. However, in this case the meaning of the original character—kill, “slay in war,” “massacre”—would perhaps be more appropriate. The sentence would then read “Establishing awesomeness lies in [attaining] killing power.”

151. Following WLTC CY, p. 70; WLTC CC, p. 69.

152. Certain variant texts have “army” for “chariots.” However, the passage is more comprehensible if it refers to the three chariot officers and the squads of five, reflecting the stage of growing chariot and infantry cooperation (WLTC CC, p. 71).
153. These terms have been encountered previously with a different meaning. See note 19, the text of chapter 3, and note 112.

154. Or possibly to stop in the sense of encamping. (Cf. WLT CC, WCCS, II:16A; WLTCC, p. 71; and WLT CS, p. 154.)

155. As in ascend a wall, mount a parapet.

156. Emending “first” to “cause,” as Liu Yin’s commentary suggests (WLTCC WCCS, II:16B).

157. Apparently the aim is to make the formation as dense as possible, with the spears almost touching (cf. WLTCC WCCS, II:17A). Some have understood this as referring to their deployment when encamped, but it need not be so restricted (cf. WLT CY, p. 75).

158. The Sung edition has “strong” rather than wise. However, because the chariot also served as a command platform, “strong” is not invariably correct.

159. Emending “their” to “flags,” following the Sung edition.

160. This passage is similar to those found in several texts describing the commitments required of generals being commissioned.

161. Following the Sung edition rather than the Ming, although both can mean “within a short period.” (Liu Yin explains the Ming text as “a few spies,” which seems rather inappropriate to the context [WLTCC WCCS, II:19A].)

162. This presumably refers to the ruler in his implementation of the system of rewards and punishments.

163. Based on the context, these two sentences could also be understood as referring to those who presumed to interfere with the implementation of the law. Thus, “If someone should be punished, execute anyone who requests that he be spared. If someone should be rewarded, execute anyone who requests that he not be rewarded.”

164. Their internal changes, deviations from the ideal and the proper. The sentences that follow suggest using probing stimuli to elicit changes, similar to the techniques used by the T’ai Kung in evaluating men discussed in Chapter 6 and 20.

165. A principle espoused in Chapter 40 of the Six Secret Teachings, “Occupying Enemy Territory.” The prospect of achieving an opening or some other advantage will presumably lead them to commit their forces to the enterprise, thereby wearing them down without throwing them into such a completely hopeless situation that they will fight a desperate, pitched battle. (Much of the earlier material in the chapter on attacking cities while sparing the people also reflects Chapter 40.)

166. They are thinking of leaving, escaping.

167. Literally, “their minds have been lost,” to which Liu Yin adds the interesting comment that when they have “lost their minds, how can they possibly make plans?” This explains the problem of “distorted plans,” noted in the chapter’s last sentence.

168. Either this chapter has been deliberately condensed during the course of transmission, or significant portions have simply been lost. The Ch’i-mu-shu chih-yao and the bamboo slips supplement the received Ming (Sung) text in numerous places but do not represent sufficiently radical changes to necessitate revising the latter in view of our objective of translating the integral Sung/Ming text. However, for the convenience of readers interested in this material, rather than appending a confusing array of sentences section by section, we provide a tentative complete translation after the notes for this chapter. (The translation follows the reconstructed text found in the WLT CS, pp. 159-160.)
and suitability. Constant orders are not for pursuing a fleeing enemy or suddenly striking a city. If the front and rear are disorderly, then [the army] loses [its integrity]. If the front loses [their order], the rear beheads them.

"As for the army's constant formations, there are those which face toward the enemy, those which are internally oriented; standing formations, and sitting formations. Formations which face toward the enemy provide the means to prepare against external threats. Internally oriented ones are the means to preserve the center. Standing formations are the means to move, sitting formations the means to stop. Mixed formations—with some soldiers standing, others sitting—respond to each other in accord with the need to advance or stop, the general being in the middle. The weapons of the seated soldiers are the sword and ax; the weapons of the standing soldiers are the spear-tipped halberd and crossbow; the general also occupies the middle.

"Those who excel at repulsing the enemy first join battle with orthodox troops, then [use unorthodox ones] to control them. This is the technique for certain victory.

"Generals and their troops do not have the closeness of fathers and sons, nor the intimacy of blood relationship nor the personal connections of the six degrees of family relationship. Yet, although before them there is a thousand-fathom-deep valley or the abyss of a precipitous mountain gorge, when they see the enemy they race at them as if returning home, and when they see the enemy entering water or fire they follow them, it is because before them they see the clarity of rewards and punishment, while behind them they see the punishment of certain death. If in front of them the general is not able to make clear his [rewards and behind them he is not able to make his punishments severe], then it defeats the army, causes the death of the general and the capture of the troops. The general who is able to control his officers and troops, [both] within the encampment and when practicing formations, makes his corporeal punishments and fines severe, and makes his various rewards clear. Then, when they issue forth they will realize complete achievement.

"Array the fu and yiueh axes [for punishment], make a display of the emblems and flags [used as rewards]. Those who have merit must be rewarded; those who contravene orders must die. When the point is reached that the two enemies are confronting each other, the deployed formations are pressing close upon each other, and the general takes up the drumsticks and drums the advance, then surviving and perishing, life and death, lie in the tips of the drumsticks. Even though there are those under Heaven who excel at commanding armies, [no one] will be able to repulse them after the great drumming. When the troops have gone forth, the armies have been deployed, and the arrayed formations see the enemy—looking across at each other's emblems and flags, before the arrows have been shot and cross in flight, before the long blades have clashed—those who yell out first are termed 'vacuous,' those who yell out afterward are termed 'substantial,' and those who do not yell are termed 'secretive.' Vacuous, 'substantial,' and 'secretive' are the embodiment of warfare."

174. As with "Army Orders I," a tentative translation of the RT found in the WLT CS (pp. 160–161) follows the chapter notes below.

175. The punishment for men involved in such flight is thus an extended three-year tour of duty on the border, in contrast to the earlier-mentioned single year's obligation.

176. The double expenditure is generally understood as referring to the rations for an empty position plus those consumed by a man at home or, more likely, to two rations covering only a single man at the front. (Cf. WLT CS, p. 165; WLT CY, p. 83; WLT CCCY, p. 291.)

177. Although the text seems straightforward, this sentence has caused considerable discussion over the centuries. As mentioned in note 22 to the translator’s introduction, it has frequently been taken as referring to administering capital punishment to the troops, apparently to put them in greater awe of their own commander than of the enemy. More likely, it should be understood as translated: "The general is able to bear having half of his men killed to achieve victory." (See Hsi Yung’s lengthy discussion in the WLT CS, pp. 166–175.)
it will have an empty name and no substance. Outside the state it will be inadequate to repel enemies, while within the borders it will be inadequate to defend the state. This is the way in which the army becomes insufficient, in which the general has his awesomeness taken away.

"I believe that when soldiers abandon their units and return home, the other members of their squad in the same barracks and their officers take their rations for their own consumption while the person is eating at home. Thus a person is nominally with the army, but in reality double the ration is expended. The resources of the state are then empty and completely exhausted, and the harvest is outside. [Alternative reading: (The troops) are outside for years.] How can the number fleeing to the interior be reduced?"

"If they can be stopped from returning home, it prevents the loss of an army and is the first military victory. If the squads of five and ten are caused to be mutually bonded to the point that in battle the troops and officers will aid each other, this is the second military victory. If the general is able to establish his awesomeness, the soldiers to master and follow their instructions, while the commands and orders are clear and trusted, and attacking and defending are both properly executed, this is the third military victory.

"In antiquity those who excelled in employing the army could [bear to] kill half of their officers and soldiers. The next could kill 30 percent and the lowest 10 percent. The awesomeness of one who could sacrifice half of his troops is established within the Seas. The strength of one who could sacrifice 30 percent could be applied to the feudal lords. The orders of one who could sacrifice 10 percent would be implemented among his officers and troops. I have heard that a mass of a hundred ten-thousand that does not fight is not as good as the corpses of ten thousand men. Ten thousand men who do not die are not as good as the ghosts of one hundred men.

"When rewards are as clear as the sun and moon and as credible as the four seasons; when orders are as strict as the fu and yihe axes and as sharp as [the famous sword] Kan-chiai, it has never been heard of that there were officers and troops who would not die in the lists!"

### Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung

#### Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books

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#### Notes to the Translator’s Introduction

1. For an extensive discussion, refer to Hsu Pao-lin, HSK CS, pp. 26–33, and especially pp. 29–30 for the history of the text in Japan.
2. For a general discussion, see ibid., pp. 1–18.
6. A Sung scholar, Chang Shang-ying—who is closely identified with the Su shu (for which he wrote an introduction and a commentary)—claimed that the famous work given to Chang Liang was neither the Three Strategies nor the Six Secret Teachings but instead was the Su shu. He further asserted that Chang Liang had ordered the book embossed with him to prevent the unworthy from obtaining it and that it had resurfaced only when discovered by grave robbers in the Chin dynasty. Although it is generally accepted that Chang forged the Su shu himself, the concept of burying works to prevent their transmission is worth noting. For a brief discussion of the Su shu, see Ch’ü Wan-li, Hsien-Ch’in, p. 481; and Chang Hsin-ch’eng, ed., Wei-shu t’ung-k’ao (hereafter Wei-shu), Vol. 2, Taiwan Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint) (original edition, 1939), pp. 805–809.
10. The former Han officially ended with Wang Mang usurping the throne and declaring himself the first emperor of the Hsin dynasty in A.D. 9. He was a member of the imperially related Wang family who exploited the family’s power and influence, became regent for two youthful emperors, and finally reigned under his own authority. Accordingly, Hsu Pao-lin believes the Three Strategies describes the conditions leading to this usurpation, itemizing the dangers of powerful imperial relatives monopolizing power and of skilled politicians controlling affairs. However, rulers at every level of the old feudal hierarchy were equally confronted with such problems throughout ancient Chinese history, and many other strategists and intellectuals—including Han Fei-tzu—decried the situation. Hsu’s argument that the passage about reducing the power of commanding generals after a campaign refers to the period following the establishment of the Han also lacks the singularity of uniqueness. Clearly, the Ch’in had also been confronted with demobilizing a tremendous force—a mass no longer bound to the land (cf. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Beacon Press, Boston, 1960, pp. 441–443) as had other states after massive efforts and significant strategic victories during the Warring States period.

11. Hsu Pao-lin perceives a new realization of the value of strategic strongpoints in the Three Strategies, one that results from experiences gained in the increasingly vast
scope of conflict leading to the establishment of the Han dynasty. This may, however, be a case of projecting historical events into strategic thought. The Six Secret Teachings had already advanced tactical methods for systematically exploiting configurations of terrain (as Hsu acknowledges), and the passage on which his view is based consists of only three four-character phrases. Cf. Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 22, 74-75.

12. See Wei Ju-lin’s running comments throughout the HSK CCCY; and Hsu Pao-lin, HSK CS, especially pp. 10-13, as well as his running commentary and analysis. Hsu has perhaps artificially isolated Legalist elements that are an integral part of prior strategic thought. Wei’s commentary tends to emphasize the book’s continuity with previous military writings, especially the Six Secret Teachings.

13. Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 87-88, does not accept the possibility that it might be an interpolation.

14. Hsu believes the Three Strategies expresses a new, significantly advanced attitude toward the people because they are seen as being as essential as the general to attaining victory. Moreover, the general should have his intentions penetrate to the masses rather than simply commanding them while keeping them ignorant, as Sun-tzu advocated (see Sun-tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 11). Effective government presumably responds to the people’s problems and needs, so a new relationship is thereby created (see Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 20-21, 57-58). However, Wei Ju-lin takes the opposite view (HSK CCCY, p. 39).

15. HSK CS, pp. 52, 108-111.

16. This spirit clearly pervades the entire Tao Te Ching. Readers unfamiliar with this Taoist classic can consult the readily available translations by D. C. Lau (see note 17), Wing-tsit Chan, or Arthur Waley.

17. This famous passage is from Verse 31 and may also be translated “Weapons are inauspicious implements.” It is followed by a second phrase, “There are things that abhor them” rather than “The Tao of Heaven abhors them.” In his translation (Tao Te Ching, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1982, p. 49) D. C. Lau notes that this verse lacks Wang Pi’s commentary, leading to the suspicion that it may be a commentator’s interpolation. At the same time the concept appears elsewhere, as in Kou Chien’s biography of the Shih chi, 41 (Takigawa, Shiki, p. 654), and Chapter 12 of the Six Secret Teachings (cf. HSK CCCY, p. 123).

18. See Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 64, 96-97. It seems doubtful that the Three Strategies represents the most advanced conceptualization of character usage up until that time, as Hsu asserts.

19. Note how the concept of shame—which is vital to Confucian thought, the Writings, and other military writings—has been superseded.

20. The pivotal expression is found in the Tao Te Ching, Verse 78, “Under Heaven nothing is softer or weaker than water, but for attacking the firm and strong nothing is able to surpass it.” Also note Verse 76.

21. The Three Strategies does not really expand on the referents of the hard and soft, the weak and strong, but merely mentions them in two passages. Once the duality is established, prolific speculation is possible.


Notes to the Text

1. Although this sentence is usually taken as referring to the “commander in chief” rather than the ruler, the subsequent content of the passage suggests it might be translated as “The ruler’s method for command focuses on winning the minds of the valiant.”

2. “All living beings” is actually expressed as “the category of [beings] containing ch’i.” The conceptualization of men in terms of ch’i underlies the military psychology of courage, discipline, and ch’i manipulation, as can be seen in the other military classics as well.

3. “Pronouncements” appears to be the best English rendering for the term ch’ien (Matthews #181, where the pronunciation is given as “ch’ien’; Morohashi, #36144; and Ta Ch‘ung-wen ts‘u-tien, #36986), which basically means prophecy or verification. However, these “pronouncements” generally seem to be based on military experience and common sense rather than on prophecies about the future. They predict the results that will be obtained from following particular courses of action in certain situations and also provide abstracted wisdom. The original source for these quotations, if one existed, has been lost. As discussed in the translator’s introduction, Hsu Pao-lin cites the use of this term as evidence that the text was composed in the Han period, based on his assertion that the character ch’ien does not appear before the Ch’in dynasty (HSK CS, p. 15). Also note HSK CCCY, p. 40.

4. This sentence is cited as evidence of the Taoist influence in the text. The Three Strategies obviously differs from a purely passive posture in advocating the appropriate use of both the hard and soft, even though in a relativistic sense, the soft can overcome the hard. Accordingly, Hsu Pao-lin asserts that the work is a product of Huang-Lao Taoism and therefore could not have been written until Huang-Lao thought developed and flourished in the Former Han era (HSK CS, pp. 10-13).

5. “Brigand” appears to be the best translation for the term tsei, which originally carried the strong meaning of harming or killing people and committing crimes against the established order (such as an officer killing his superior or ruler). It also had a class or status basis because presumably the mean or common people could only commit tao, which primarily meant robbery but also included the murder of officials. Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, “Ch’uan-t’ung fa-shih shih-yüan—chien lun Li Fa-ching te wen’ti’,” in Hsu Cho-yun, Chung-kuo li-shih lun-wen-chi, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1986, pp. 433-438. Tsei may also be translated as “bandit” and “murderer.”

6. Wei Ju-lin believes there must be an error in the text because basic military thought dictates seizing the active role rather than responding. See HSK CCCY, p. 42. (However, permitting affairs to begin to unfold may also allow taking control and therefore still being the manipulator.)

7. This four-character phrase is somewhat problematic. According to the Ming commentator Liu Yin (HSKCC WCCS, 8), the enemies who harm and insult the ruler are to be overturned. (However, the character may be a loan for “investigated” rather than overturned.) Those whose offenses are not serious are to be tolerated to see whether they reform. Hsu Pao-lin glosses it as “to warn” (HSK CS, pp. 35 and 42). Alternatively, this may be a fragment that means “restore the decimated.”
8. Some commentators, including Hsu Pao-lin (HSK CS, p. 35), interpret this causatively—make the enemy depart so as to tire him. Others read it more simply, as to depart yourself. The latter seems preferable, even though it is a general principle of the military works that one should exhaust an enemy by moving him about. Note Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapters 5 and 6.

9. Liu Yin elaborates this as “Accord with the desires of the people to initiate appropriate measures” rather than simply responding in an active fashion to his plans and movements. See HSKCC WCCS, I:9B.

10. Another interpretation would be “Spread accusations and point out his errors,” which would be a basic propaganda measure in psychological warfare.

11. Liu Yin believes this sentence should be understood as “Set out a set of principles to catch the Worthy” (HSKCC WCCS, I:9B). Hsu's modern translation has “Establish ambushes on all four sides to encircle and destroy them” (HSK CS, p. 43).

12. Wu Chi’s both advocated and embodied this principle.

13. This incident (circa 375 B.C.) involved Kou Chen, king of Yueh, prior to the war that annihilated the state of Wu. Consequently, it is argued that the Three Strategies must have been written after 375 B.C. (assuming the incident is not a later interpolation).

14. This is virtually a quotation from Wu Chi’s biography in the Shih chi, which has been translated in the translator’s introduction to the Wu-tzu. A similar passage is also found at the end of Chapter 4 in the Wei Liao-tzu.

15. This echoes, if not copies, Sun-tzu’s analysis in the Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Configuration of Power.”

16. There are two interpretations of this passage. One is expressed by the translation; the other would run “Thus officers can be treated with deference, but they cannot be treated arrogantly.”

17. Wealth may refer here to the general’s possessions, goods brought in by merchants, excessive materials for the army, or perhaps the gifts and bribes of other states. In all cases temptation arises, and evil follows.

18. This is essentially a summation of the allegory used by the T’ai Kung in his initial interview with King Wen of the Chou dynasty, as preserved in the first chapter of the Six Secret Teachings.

19. The Three August Ones are variously identified; however, they represent the ultimate embodiment of government through radiant Virtue and profound nonaction. The five legendary emperors, again variously identified, followed them and were much more active—creating culture and the essential artifacts of civilization. In the Taoist view, as civilization declined from Virtue into artifice, rulers became more active—increasingly interfering in people’s lives and creating laws, taxes, and bureaucratic burdens. The Confucians held a similar “decline from Virtue” view, attributing the world’s problems to a lack of such Sages and the failure of moral values to be practiced—not because of the activity of the great rulers but in spite of it.

20. The Army’s Strategic Power is presumably another lost text. Whether this was an actual book or merely a convenient title created by the authors to attribute sayings—actual or conveniently concocted—that justified their thoughts is unknown.

21. This hierarchy of armies allocated on the basis of feudal rank perhaps represented the conditions at the start of the Chou dynasty, but by the middle of the Spring and Autumn period, the stronger states had five or more such armies—assuming an army to be 12,500 men.

22. This sentence is cited as evidence that the work was composed after the Han dynasty had restored peace and tranquility. Hsu Pao-lin further asserts that it comes from a dialogue recorded in a Shih chi biography, proving a post-Shih chi date of composition (HSK CS, p. 13).

23. The character for “pleasure” and “music” is the same but with different pronunciations. Because the Confucians believed that the forms of propriety and music were essential elements of the foundation of personal development and education, the character is translated as music. However, “pleasure” would work equally well, reading: “Their physical submission is attained through the forms of propriety; their mental submission is attained through pleasure. What I refer to as pleasure is not the sound of musical instruments.” The senses are never mutually exclusive. Mengius has a famous discussion with King Hui of Liang on music, pleasure, and the responsibilities of ruler (Book I), which this passage clearly draws on. In addition, numerous passages in the Hsün-tzu and the Li chi couple the forms of propriety—the li—with music. Although proper volitional practice of the li results in self-cultivation and emotional alchemy, music is recognized as being truly influential in harmonizing and developing the emotions. Hsu Pao-lin’s comments agree with the present translation (ibid., p. 100). Most commentators simply avoid the question by merely repeating the character for music/pleasure in their notes without further elaboration.

24. Literally, “lost.” Some commentators, such as Hsu Pao-lin, take this as referring to the ruler’s errors in framing commands. Others understand it as failures in execution at the highest level, which then work down to affect even the lowest officials. See ibid., pp. 103 and 123.

25. The “discontented” might also refer to the source of discontent, the laws that are causing the problem (cf. Hsu, ibid., p. 105, who understands it in this way).

26. The four classes of people are the shih (officers, old nobility, members of the bureaucracy, literati), farmers, artisans, and merchants.

Questions and Replies Between T’ang Tai-tsung and Li Wei-kung

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books


Notes to Questions and Replies


2. The historical portrait of T'ang T'ai-tsung's role and activities in the founding and consolidation of the T'ang dynasty has been the subject of considerable reevaluation and revision in recent times. It is generally thought that the emperor heavily influenced the official records from which posterity would fashion the dynastic history. Thus his father's role—which is much diminished in the traditional accounts—should probably be augmented and his determination, intelligence, and overall abilities accorded significantly greater recognition. (See Twitchett and Fairbank, *Sui and T'ang China*, pp. 38–47 on T'ang sources and pp. 15ff.)

3. T'ang T'ai-tsung's six horses are especially famous; they have been memorialized by stone reliefs and even became the subject of early Western art (see the notes to Appendix B). His actions in deposing and imprisoning his father and murdering his elder brother were of course contrary to all the ethical dictates of Confucianism.

4. Unlike the earlier military classics, the textual history of *Questions and Replies* has not benefited from any startling discoveries or recently recovered renditions. Consequently, although analytical studies have become more incisive, the fundamental question of authorship and the period of composition remain essentially unresolved.

In the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, orthodox scholars reviled the text as a forgery characterized by uncoherent language, limited concepts, and erroneous interpretations of historical events. (For examples, see Chang Hsin-ch'eng, ed., *Wei-shu t'ung-k'a*, Vol. 2, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 [reprint of 1939 ed.], pp. 810–812; and LKW CC, pp. 84–96.) In the last century a few voices have begun to cautiously criticize these strident expressions of personal opinion, but no one has yet ventured to attribute the book to Li Ching or to assert that it constitutes an actual record of the conversations.

Briefly summarized, there are two main views: One holds that the book is a forgery of the Northern Sung period, the other that it was compiled by unknown scholars late in the T'ang or early Sung. These views are based mainly on the absence of any reference to a book by this title in the bibliographical sections in either the *History of the T'ang* or the *History of the Sung* (which does, however, suddenly contain the names of seven works associated with Li Ching) and on claims of Northern Sung military scholars to have seen a draft of the work by Yuan I, who purportedly forged it. The concurrence of several contemporaries regarding these claims prompted later generations of orthodox thinkers, who were already predisposed to view the text as an inferior work,
conclude that such concepts as “infantry dominating cavalry”—which are expressive of Sung thought—inevitably consign it to the Northern Sung.

Detailed, specialized studies of the text’s provenance are clearly required. However, we can tentatively conclude that final compilation probably occurred in the Northern Sung—perhaps under Emperor Shen-tsung’s mandate—from earlier materials. Whether the original materials were extensively supplemented or were simply rephrased in contemporary language and judiciously expanded upon remains unknown. (For further analysis and attribution of materials, see Chung-kuo Kung-i chih-i-shih, Vol. 4: P’ing-fa, pp. 158–162, 204–210; Chung-kuo kung-i chih-i-shih, Vol. 5: P’ing-chia, pp. 428–436; and Hsi Hsia-pin, Chung-kuo p’ing-shu t’ang-chien, Chieh-fang-chun ch’u-pan-shie, Peking, 1990, pp. 130–135.)


6. The Chiang River refers to the Ch’ang-chiang, best known in the West as the Yangtze.

7. Han Hsin, Pai Ch’i, Wei Ch’ing, and Huo Ch’a-ping. Pai Ch’i was a famous Ch’in general whose exploits are recorded in Warring States writings. Wei Ch’ing was an outstanding Han major general noted for his success against barbarian forces in remote regions. His biography appears in Chia 311 of the Shih chi and has been translated by Burton Watson (“The Biographies of General Wei Ch’ing and the Swift Cavalry General Ho Ch’a-ping,” in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New York, 1961, pp. 193–216). For Han Hsin, see note 11 below; for Huo Ch’a-ping, see note 15 to the translation.

8. The “K’o-han” (as phoneticized in Chinese) is better known as the “Great Khan,” or Qaghan.

9. Li Ling was a famous but ill-fated Han general who went deep into Hsiung-nu territory with a small force, fought heroically, and was finally captured (or surrendered) after protracted fighting against insurmountable odds for days in succession. A brief biography appears within the portrait of Li Ku-lang in the Shih chi (cf. Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 2, pp. 153–154), and a fuller record of his life is found in the Hsin shu, chian 54. (For translation, see Burton Watson, Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974, pp. 24–33.) Su-ma Chien’s verbal but ill-advised defense of Li Ling resulted in his own condemnation and punishment.

10. An interesting comment from the T’ai-tsung because the historical records do not portray the Wei River confrontation as the ignominious defeat (or coercion) it appeared to have been. In a.D. 626, shortly after the T’ai-tsung usurped the throne, the Eastern Turks advanced far down the banks of the Wei River, close to the capital. The T’ai-tsung failed to defeat them militarily and was probably forced to propitiate them through extensive bribes, perhaps even on the advice of Li Ching (see Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and T’ang China, pp. 220–221).

11. Han Hsin, a great general and strategist, was instrumental in the founding of the Han dynasty. The incident regarding T’ang Chien is similar in that the king of Han (the future Han Kao-tsu) had already dispatched an emissary to persuade Ch’i to submit to his authority, although without receding Han Hsin’s mandate to attack Ch’i. Han Hsin therefore proceeded with the campaign and—availing himself of Ch’i’s newly relaxed defenses—effectively defeated a considerable, victorious advance. Naturally, the envoy was killed when Han Hsin’s attacks materialized contrary to the promised truce. (Han Hsin’s biography, which preserves the outlines of his strategies and contains several interesting applications of principles from Sun-tzu’s Art of War, appears in the Shih chi [chian 92] and has been translated in full by Burton Watson (“The Biography of the Marquis of Huai-yin (Han Hsin),” in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 208–232).)

12. Li Ching’s encomium as duke of Wei (Wei Kung) is thus reflected by his formal name in the book’s title: Li, Duke of Wei.

Notes to the Text

1. During the Three Kingdoms period (57 B.C. to A.D. 668) in Korea, Koguryo (phoneticized as Kao-li in Chinese) occupied roughly the north, Paekche (Pa-chie) the southwest, and Silla (Hsin-li) the southeast. From the Han on, Chinese dynasties had attempted—with varying degrees of success—to exercise suzerainty over the Korean peninsula. At the outset of the T’ang, they were opposed by Koguryo in the north but received grudging recognition and requests for support from Silla, which was being militarily pressured by the alliance of Koguryo and Paekche. Silla eventually came to dominate when T’ang forces defeated Koguryo in a.D. 668; thereafter, it began to resist Chinese attempts to directly rule the area. (See LWK CCCY, pp. 31–36; and Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and T’ang China, pp. 231–235 for background.)

2. Yon Kae-so-ru—a charismatic leader who deposed the king—wielded despotic military power, fervently opposed the T’ang, and forged the alliance that challenged Silla.

3. The concepts of ch’i and cheng, “orthodox” and “orthodox,” dominate Li Wei-kung’s strategic thought. (For definitions and discussion of these terms, which perhaps originated with Sun-tzu, refer to the translator’s introduction and footnotes to the Art of War translation.) They are discussed concretely with reference to earlier historical conflicts and to the battles culminating in the T’ang’s overthrow of the Sui. (For a strategic overview of the T’ang conquest, see “T’ang t’ung-i Chung-kuo te ch’ang-cheng,” in Chung-kuo chien-shih, Vol. 2, Part 2: Ping-chieh, Chieh-fang-chun ch’u-pan-shie, Peking, 1988, pp. 43–75.)

4. The pacification campaign against the Turks is summarized in Li Wei-kung’s translated biography in the translator’s introduction.

5. The famous, often romanticized strategist in the Three Kingdoms period.
6. A famous general who was active in the mid- to late fourth century A.D. in the Western Chin period (see LWK CCCY, pp. 41-43).

7. A famous diagram created by Chu-ko Liang for deploying combined troops—including infantry, chariots, and cavalry. However, it also had precursors that were attributed to various figures.

8. Commentators disagree on whether the chariots were simply narrow chariots that were specially constructed or modified for use on constricted terrain or were a different type of vehicle, such as a cart (cf. LWK CCCY, pp. 44-45; and LWK CC, p. 3).

9. “Deer-horn chariots” apparently were named for the blades affixed to the front, which protruded out to prevent an enemy from approaching. The commentators differ as to whether these were permanently affixed or were mounted when the chariots were deployed in a circular formation to protect the encampment. In such a configuration, they would presumably be “head to tail,” perhaps mounting the blades just to the outside. However, because the commentators generally emphasize that this deployment equally constrained the men within the camp, the use of permanently mounted blades turning within cannot be completely ruled out. Yet another view holds that the name is derived from the overall formation, with the horns being spikes partially buried in the ground just next to the chariots. Because the number of spikes was apparently small, they probably did not constitute a palisade. (See LWK CC, p. 3; LWK CCCY, p. 45; and TLWT WHCH, IV:2-4.)

10. One of Sun-tzu’s main themes, techniques for which include manipulating the enemy as well as directly controlling one’s own activities and degree of movement. (Cf. LWK CC, p. 3; and TLWT WHCH, IV:2-4.)

11. “Defense to the fore” rather than “moving against opposition,” as sometimes suggested. The “deer-horn” chariots would be particularly effective in this regard. (Cf. LWK CCCY, p. 47; and TLWT WHCH, IV:2-4A.)

12. The term translated as “elite” cavalry originally meant “iron” cavalry, designating armored fighters (cf. LWK CC, p. 5).

13. Li Chien-ch’eng was the T’ai-tsung’s ill-fated elder brother, who was eventually murdered as a preliminary to the T’ai-tsung displacing his father from the throne.

14. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.” Also see note 16 to the text.


16. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 7, “Military Combat.” This is a common theme in the military writings.

17. Ibid., Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.”

18. Duke Ts’ao, popularly known as Ts’ao Ts’ao, was a famous general and eventually a warlord who was active in the disintegration of the Han dynasty and the subsequent rise of the Three Kingdoms. He wrote the first known commentary on Sun-tzu’s Art of War, and what remains of his thoughts are found therein, the Hsin shu being lost.

19. His statements are apparently based in part on Sun-tzu’s analysis of tactics appropriate to relative advantages of strength in the Art of War, Chapter 3, “Strategies for Attack.”

20. Ibid., Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.”

21. Ibid., Chapter 7, “Military Combat.” (In the Ming edition, “combining” has inadvertently dropped out but is retained in the Sung version.)

22. An image from Art of War, Chapter 11, “Nine Terrains.”

23. Ibid., Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance.” However, note that the translation differs from our translation of Sun-tzu: “Thus if I discern the enemy’s disposition of forces (hsing) while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate while the enemy is fragmented.” Li Ching clearly takes the sentence to refer to creating false impressions and feigning deployments. Although this is one of Sun-tzu’s basic techniques, in the Art of War this sentence refers to the contrast between fathoming the enemy and being unfathomable oneself, as the chapter emphasizes (also see note 82 to the Art of War translation).

24. This echoes Sun-tzu’s basic thought, especially as seen in ibid., Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance,” and is one reason People’s Republic of China scholars term him a Legalist thinker.

25. From Chapter 4 of the Wu-tzu, “The Tao of the General,” a chapter more oriented to fathoming enemy generals than to focusing on tactics. Li Ching’s memory of the text is unusually deficient; he has abridged and somewhat altered it.

26. His purported comment is recorded in Li Ching’s biography.

27. From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.”

28. Fu Chien was emperor of a consciously sinicized Tibetan “barbarian” state, who was active in the early part of the so-called “Five Barbarian and Sixteen Kingdoms period.” (The “Five Barbarians” refers to the five “barbarian” powers that established their authority over parts of China between 321 and 389, whereas the “Sixteen Kingdoms” refers to the successive states contending for power from 304 to 439.) At the battle of Fei River described in the text, Emperor Fu Chien—despite leading a million-man force—was defeated and his empire lost. A description of Fu Chien’s achievements and defeat is found in the History of the Chin. For further discussion, see LWK CCCY, pp. 80-85. (Also note Yeh Shih’s scathing comments on Li Ching’s evaluation of Fu Chien’s capabilities, LWK CC, p. 87.)

29. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.” This is the conclusion to the chapter and is translated differently from our Art of War version because the understanding appears different and the text is abridged. In the original, Sun-tzu is apparently discussing the use of tallies to calculate the probability of winning, whereas the T’ai-tsung’s rough recapitulation seems to stress the planning aspect rather than the calculations. (See note 21 to “Initial Estimations”; and LWK CC, p. 12, which reflects one traditional understanding, as does the T’ai-tsung.)

30. A terse, enigmatic text of approximately 360 characters associated with the legendary Yellow Emperor and also attributed to Feng Hsiu, his minister. A book with this title is preserved in several collections, generally with commentary by the Han scholar Kung-sun Hung. Although ascribed to the Yellow Emperor, it clearly predates Sun-tzu, even employing some phrases from the Art of War and perhaps originates late in the Warring States period. Ma Lung, who is highly regarded by Li Ching and the T’ai-tsung and who appears on the first page of this chapter, is also noted as having written
a commentary for it. (Note that there are some minor differences between the extant text and the portions quoted in Questions and Replies. Editions are found in the Pai-pu ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng from I-wen in Taipei and in a recent paperback from Shanghai ku-chi.)

31. The Chinese character for unorthodox—normally pronounced ch'i—has a less common second pronunciation—chi—when it refers to a “remainder” or “excess.” This second meaning and associated pronunciation are the basis for Li Ching's explanation.

32. Chi (Karlsgen, GSR 547C) is perhaps best understood as “motive force,” “spring of change,” “subtle change,” “moment,” or “impulse”—perhaps derived from the meaning of cbi (GSR, 547A), the same character without the wood radical, glossed as “small, first signs” in Chuang-tzu. Although it is generally understood by the commentators as referring to “opportunity,” this seems to be a derived meaning. Sun-tzu consistently speaks about change, both that the commander should effect and those found in the evolving battlefield situation. The commander needs to grasp such changes as they develop, thereby converting them into “opportunities” that can be exploited. (Cf. LWK CC, pp. 12–13; LWK CCCY, pp. 87–91; LWK WCCS, I:6B–17B; and TLWT WCHC, 4:15–16.)

33. “Remaining forces,” yì cbi, the second character being the character for “unorthodox” in the alternate pronunciation.

34. Sun-tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 9, “Maneuvering the Army.”

35. Essentially identical to a statement in Art of War, Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.”

36. Ibid., Chapter 8, “Nine Changes” (cf. note 114 to the Art of War translation). This dictum is not confined to Sun-tzu.

37. Literally, “grasps.”

38. T'ai, translated as “platoon,” a term the Classic of Grasping Subtle Change and Li Ching both use to designate a body of men. Although in most contexts it indicates a specific, small number, in some instances it stands as a more general reference to a “force” or “group.” From the Warring States period on, it consisted of fifty (frequently specialized) infantrymen, which was also its strength as a fundamental organizational unit in the Tang military system.

39. The overall orientation, which is both flexible and indeterminate, can be defined at will. Accordingly, “the front can be taken as the rear, the rear taken as the front.” One commentator suggests that facing south would be the “normal” orientation, with the north then being the rear (TLWT WCHC, 4:17B).

40. Liu Yin states that any of the four unorthodox or four orthodox formations can be the head. Similarly, any of the nine formations (deployed throughout the matrix)—including the general's in the center—can be the focus of an enemy attack, and the remaining eight will respond, thereby constituting the tails (LWK WCCS, I:19). This differs from the orientation of the entire formation, which is normally determined by the direction of its forward movement, and pertains instead to conditions of engagement.

An alternative explanation identifies the “four heads” as being the outer positions on the horizontal and vertical axes (or roads) that are formed by the four lines (cf. TLWT WCHC, 4:17).

41. “Five” refers to the main horizontal and vertical directions or axes in the “well” configuration (front, rear, left, and right) supplemented by the “center.” The forces de-

ployed in the outer boxes formed by the parallel lines defining the axes can be dispersed to fully occupy all eight outer positions. Thus formations occupying “five” positions can effectively cover all “eight” outer positions (Cf. LWK CC, pp. 8–12, 15; LWK CCCY, p. 92; TLWT WCHC, 4:17B–18A.) Note that the overall formation as well as contiguous positions react like the shuaijin in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 11, “Nine Terrains.”

42. A legendary administrative system to organize the people and promote agriculture—one of several variants found in or attributed to antiquity. The Chinese character for well (ching) resembles a tic-tac-toe board, with a slight outward curve in the downward left leg. (For further discussion, for example, see Li Chia-shu, “Ts'un Shih-ching k'an Hsi-Chou mo-nien i-ch'iu Ch'un-ch'ien-feng ch'ih, tsung-fa-chih, ch'ing-tien-chih t'ung-yao,” Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu-so hsii
tepao 19 [1985], pp. 191–216.)

43. Entire volumes have been written about this and similar formations, with extensive disagreement about their use (cf. Chuang-ko chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 67–78). However, in this case it appears the four corners were left open, with the army's forces filling the middle positions horizontally and vertically as well as the middle. However, the middle is not counted as being “filled” (as discussed in the text immediately following) because these are “excess” or “unorthodox” forces under the personal direction of the commanding general himself (cf. Liu Yin's comments, LWK WCCS, I:21).

44. This echoes a similar statement in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.”

45. As distinguished from the “well-field” system described by Mencius (III:3A) and the “village-well” system attributed to the Yellow Emperor just above. (Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, “Chou-tai feng-ch'ien ch'ien-t'i hou te ch'un-ch'ien hsing-chih-hsu,” BHP, Vol. 55, No. 1 [1984], pp. 96–109.)

46. Most historical sources state the number as three thousand rather than three hundred, as do some editions. (For a discussion of the T'ai Kung and the efforts of the Chou to construct the weapons of war, including the three hundred chariots, refer to the translator's introduction. Also note Yeh Shih's vehement criticism of Li Ching's ascription of monumental achievements to the T'ai Kung, LWK CC, p. 87.)

47. Quoted from the “Chou Annals” in the Shih chi and also found in the Shu ching. The concept of measured constraint, associated with the Chou scope of battle, is prominently preserved in the Su-ma Fa.

48. Translating from the Ming edition. Others have “incited the army.” Historically, the Annals record the T'ai Kung as leading this elite band of one hundred in the initial, sudden assault against the Shang army.

49. The Kuan-tzu, recently translated by W. Allyn Rickert (Guanzi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985) is an eclectic work associated with his name.

50. No longer extant in the present Su-ma Fa, only in fragments dispersed in other works. However, multiples of five were basic throughout the Chou. (For a brief discussion, see Appendix E; and, for example, Tu Cheng-sheng, “Chou-tai feng-ch'ien chieh-t'i hou te ch'un-ch'ien hsing-chih-hsu,” pp. 73–113, and especially 79–81; and LWK CCCY, pp. 102–103. There is an entire category of books on military organization, many noted in the recent work by Hsu Pao-lin, Chung-kuo ping-shu t'ung-chien, Chieh-lang-ch'un ch'u-p'a-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 217–280. Foremost among them is
the modern Li-tai ping-chih ch'i-en-shuo (ed. Wang Shao-wei and Liu Chao-hsiang), an extensive analysis and revision of the Li-tai ping-chih, Chieh-fang-ch'un ch'u-pan-shu, Peking, 1986.)

51. For a discussion of these categories, see note 20 to the translator's introduction to the Wei Liao-tzu. Li Ching is basically following Su-ma Chi'en's history of the Su-ma Fa as found in Su-ma Chang-chu's Shih chi biography. (The biography appears in full in the translator's introduction to the Su-ma Fa translation.)

52. These three works are now lost. For a discussion of the extant text and its relationship to them, see the translator's introduction to the translation.

53. Surprisingly, this appears to be erroneous. The extant Su-ma Fa discusses the "spring and fall hunts" near the beginning, not the "spring and winter" hunts. Although winter was considered the season of death, the Su-ma Fa decodes winter mobilization because of the extreme hardship the soldiers would suffer from the cold. Of course, the text reflects an early age of limited battles. (The Chou li, ch'iu 7, "Summer Offices, Su-ma," discusses hunts for all four seasons. However, in analyzing these regulations, Lao Kan notes that according to the Kuo-yi, military activities should be conducted in winter. See "Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun," Chung-kuo-shih yen-chiu 1985, No. 4, p. 10.)

54. The term used, "respectfully performed the affairs of," usually refers to a subject respectfully accepting and executing his ruler's commands. However, in reality, the feudal lords had simply usurped power and sought to legitimize their actions through such claims.

55. The Chou li (ch'iu 7, "Summer Offices, Su-ma") lists the nine reasons the ruler would rectify a subject state, such as harming the people or killing their own lord. This list is identical to the "nine prohibitions" the king should publicize before the assembled feudal lords, found at the end of the first chapter of the Su-ma Fa.

56. "Armor and weapons," the arts of warfare. At the same time, they would order and rectify the affairs of the submissive states, curtailing any impulse toward defiance or independence.

57. The practice of training in the intervals between the seasons is not found in the present Su-ma Fa. However, the concept of spring and fall hunting exercises providing such training, and thus the means by which "not to forget warfare," is prominent in the first chapter. Constant preparation and training are of course underlying themes in most military writings.

58. One of the five hegemons. The term translated here as "battalion" is kung. Generally, lu—normally a unit of five hundred men—is translated as "battalion" throughout this book. However, "battalion" is the lowest-strength Western military unit that is functionally equivalent to kung.

The paragraphs that follow are somewhat confusing because of the introduction of different organizational terms and the relative lack of English equivalent units. They are further complicated by Li Ching's sweeping overview of military history and his tendency to redefine terms. There is great disagreement among commentators on the original Tso ch'un text as well, and therefore in some parts the translation is somewhat tentative. For convenience in following the details of the argument, the Chinese unit term is indicated after the English translation.

59. Quoted from Shih Hui's appraisal of Ch'u (Chin's enemy) and Sun-shu Ao's selection of classic regulations to organize Ch'u's government and army. (Tso ch'un, twelfth year of Duke Hsuan. For a complete translation, see the sixth month: James Legge, The Ch'ün Tseu with the Tso Chüan, Oxford University Press, 1872 [reprint Ch'in-hsi ch'u-shih, Taipei, 1968], p. 312, tr. p. 317; Burton Watson, The Tso chüan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, p. 87.) Although the meaning of the second half of the sentence is clear (the military should always be prepared without having specific instructions or orders), the first part—"on the symbolization of things"—has elicited divergent comments. Essentially, each officer should act in accord with his designated responsibility, as symbolized and thus defined and directed by his pennant. (Apparently, the pennants had animals and objects depicted on them, with associated duties and responsibilities within the hierarchy of military command. Of course, insignia could also function in this manner, and there is no evidence to preclude this meaning as well—particularly because the narrative also discusses them.) Thus, whether in action or not, the officers knew their duties and would act accordingly. However, the commentators advance other views as well, including one that interprets the phrase as referring to officers commanded by flags with appropriate objects on them. (Thus Watson translates as "the various officers move in accord with the objects displayed on the flags," essentially the same translation as that of Legge. [See Watson, The Tso chüan, p. 87, including his note 10.] This follows Chang Peng-lin's understanding of the sentence as referring to the wielding of central command, which Wu and Wang also accept [LWK CC, p. 21].) If Yang Po-ch'un, Ch'in-chiu Tso-ch'un chü, Chung-hua shu-chu, Peking, 1990 (rev. ed.), Vol. 2, p. 724.

60. The commentators offer several interpretations for these sentences in an attempt to make sense of the numbers implied. The translation reflects Li Ching's apparent understanding, which may not be the original meaning. Thus the term for company, tsu, is taken as referring to the number of men accompanying each chariot rather than to a full battalion of chariots, and the problematic phrase "tsu shih chang liang" is understood as placing an additional company to the flanks. (This might have originally meant a company of twenty-five, so two companies for the two flanks would yield fifty for a total of one hundred fifty men per chariot, as Li Ching asserts. However, his definition of liang requires that it be fifty men, so one liang is obviously split between the two flanks of each chariot.)

Other views, derived solely from the Tso chüan, range from one hundred men per chariot to one hundred fifty men per kuan or battalion, which is variously accounted as thirty or fifteen chariots. Attempts are made to force these numbers to conform to figures derived from the Su-ma Fa (portions no longer extant), but Yang Po-ch'un believes they should all be thrown out because the discussion simply refers to chariots and the definition of a chariot battalion and has nothing to do with infantrymen. (See Ch'en-ch'u Tso-ch'un chü, pp. 731–732; Li Tsun-t'ung, Tso-chüan chu-shu chi pu-cheng, Shih-chieh shu-chu, Taipei, 1971, Vol. 1, 23:13B–14A; and Chung-kuo ch'ang-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 13–15.)

The original statement in the Tso chüan is perhaps translated as follows: "The ruler's personal guard is divided into two battalions. For each battalion there is a company [tsu] and a platoon [liang] to the flanks of the company." It is otherwise recorded in the Tso chüan that a battalion consisted of thirty chariots, although both Watson and Legge translate as if the entire guard corps was only thirty chariots, or one kuan (Legge: "Its ruler's own chariots are divided into two bodies of fifteen each. To each of them are attached 100 men, and an additional complement of 25 men" [Legge, The
66. Shih is the ancient term for army, later more equivalent to "regiment." Here company or battalion would more appropriately suggest its strength.

67. Wu Tzu-hsin's statement recorded in the Tso chuan, thirteenth year of Duke Chao, is cited as the source for this quotation (LWK CC, p. 25; Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 733, translation p. 735). However, it obviously summarizes Sun-tzu's approach to warfare and the thought of most traditional strategists thereafter.

68. Such as by employing deception, being formless, and preserving secrecy. (Note that the idea of Han Chinese pretending to be barbarians contravenes the most fundamental beliefs of many orthodox officials and therefore fell beyond the realm of possibility. See, for example, Yeh Shih's vehement denunciation of this tactic, LWK CC, p. 88.)

69. Following LWK CCCY, p. 124.

70. Chapter 10, "Configurations of Terrain." In the Art of War the sentence begins "If the general is weak and not strict, unenlightened in his instructions and leadership,..." Li Ching dropped the first phrase and changed "leadership" to "training."

71. Ibid., Chapter 3, "Planning Offensives." The Three Strategies ("Superior Strategy") also incorporates this belief.

72. Here the text matches the original, having the character for "leadership" rather than "training."

73. From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power." The original has "excels at warfare" rather than "excels in employing the army."

74. The section in brackets, to the end of Li Ching's comment, does not appear in the Ming edition but is preserved in the Sung version.

75. Two statements from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

76. The tradition of employing barbarians against barbarians, especially partially assimilated or submissive ones against more brutal hordes, was consciously attempted throughout Chinese history. Even the Shang had used the "barbarian" Chou as a military buffer against more aggressive peoples to the west. (For a discussion of the "barbarian against barbarian" policy, see Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 14ff.)

77. A concept advanced in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

78. The calculation of gain and loss is derived from Sun-tzu's first chapter, "Initial Estimations."

79. Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

80. "How can he bring it about?" This is understood as referring to manipulating the enemy, bringing them into a position from which victory can be effected (cf. Liu Yin's comments, LWK WCCS, II:2B).

81. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." Sun-tzu states, "Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men." (For further discussion of the phrase "compels men and is not compelled by men," see Tzu Yu-ch'u, ed., Mou-lueh k'u, Lan-tien ch'u-pan-shu, Peking, 1990, p. 171.)

82. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat."

83. Although the six do not comprise an actual quotation from Sun-tzu, most express his thoughts and principles---especially employing enticements to draw the en...
Notes to Questions and Replies

95. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, “Military Disposition.”
96. For chieh, “constraints,” see the notes to Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.” Chieh is used in two rather distinct senses in the ensuing discussion: first, in the sense found in Sun-tzu, which has the essential meaning of an “impulse” or “decisiveness” (Giles)—that which occurs in a brief, finite moment—and second, in the normal sense of “measure,” of imposing fixed measure on actions—whether spatial or temporal.
97. A quotation from Art of War, Chapter 5, “Strategic Military Power.”
98. Chieh.
99. The commentators generally take this to mean one beating of the drum for each shout; however, it has also been suggested that it means a thrust at the enemy for each shout.
100. Although this seems to refer to spatial dimensions, as front and rear, it could also refer to temporal order, as first and last.
101. A rather curious statement because such automatic responses could easily be exploited by enemy strategists.
102. This sentence paraphrases one from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 11, “Nine Terrains”: “He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep—they are driven away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going.”
103. The concept of “constraints” reappears here, more properly rendered as “measure” or perhaps “rhythm” in accord with its use in music and dance.
104. In accord with “five phase” concepts, each of the directions was correlated with one of the five phases, and a whole array of aspects was further grouped around each phase. (Cf. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. II, History of Scientific Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 232-265.) Liu Yin notes them as follows: east—green; south—red; west—white; north—black; center—yellow (LWK WCCS, II:15B).
105. Cf. TLWT WCHC, p. 190.
106. “San fu,” translated as “three covering forces,” refers to the division into three operational units that apparently have responsibility for “covering” or “protecting” each other (understanding fu in the sense of “overspread,” “cover.” [Cf. Karlgren, GSR, entry 1034m]). Whether they represent units available for executing flexible—including unorthodox—tactics or three ambushing forces is the subject of disagreement (cf. LWK CC, p. 39).
107. Through their own misunderstanding of the Hsin shu, not because of Duke Ts’ao’s ignorance of military tactics.
108. See note 64 to the text of Questions and Replies.
109. Following the Sung edition of the Seven Military Classics, which has fun rather than jen—the latter clearly a copyist’s error.
110. A partial quotation from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, “Military Disposition.” The original reads: “One who excels at defense buries himself away below the lowest depths of Earth. One who excels at offense moves from above the greatest heights of Heaven.” “Lowest depths” is literally “nine layers of Earth,” “greatest heights” is “nine layers of Heaven.”
111. Although the Six Secret Teachings discusses the selection and training of men, this passage does not appear in the extant writings.
112. Emending the text to read “hundred” instead of “twenty.” (See Appendix E for a diagram.)

113. “Three thousand” is definitely an error. “One hundred” would yield the historically appropriate force strength. (However, the discussion is even more complex. Cf. Liu Yin’s notes, LWK WCCS, II:20–21A.) The “Tiger Guards” are discussed in the translator’s introduction to the Six Secret Teachings; their role was apparently that of an elite force rather than officers in a command structure.

114. There are five changes rather than four because the fifth change is to reassemble the initial formation.

115. A famous dictum from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.” “Deceit” alone is inadequate; the phrase should perhaps be translated “The essence of warfare is deception and artifice.”

116. The five phases were systematically correlated into a number of relationships, principal among them the production and conquest cycles. For example, wood gives birth to fire, whereas fire conquers (i.e., melts) metal. (For further discussion, see Needham, History of Scientific Thought, pp. 253–265.) Once the formations are assigned phase names, they naturally fall into these patterns of relationships, suggesting various dynamics.

117. An analogy from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance”: “When the army controls [its measures] for victory in accord with the enemy,” the army will be victorious.

118. Fan Li was a thinker and political adviser in the Spring and Autumn period who evolved military theories based on the cyclical unending cycle of yin and yang. His writings—anything have been lost, although fragments have been preserved in other works from the period.

119. “Last” and “first” could also be understood spatially, as “in front” and “behind,” or “to the rear.”

120. As discussed in note 104 above, the five phases had many aspects correlated with them, including musical notes.

121. This echoes the Sun-ma Fa and early Legalist thinkers.

122. Emperor Kuang Wu succeeded in conquering all the dissident forces as well as Wang Mang to restore the Han dynasty, thereby known as the Eastern or Later Han.

123. Sun-tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 9, “Maneuvering the Army.”


125. This incident is recorded in his biography.

126. “The Red Eyebrows,” who derived their name from their custom of painting their eyebrows red to conspicuously distinguish themselves in battle, were among the groups that arose in opposition to the usurper Wang Mang (who held power from A.D. 8–23).

127. Yang Kan and Chung Chia were two minor figures in the Spring and Autumn period, preserved in the historical records for their offenses against military regulations. The former was spared although his driver was executed, but the latter was beheaded (LWK CC, p. 47).

128. Sun-tzu advanced the concept of the “expendable spy” in The Art of War, Chapter 13, “Employing Spies.” There he defines them as agents “employed to spread disinformation outside the state.” Literally, the term is “dead spy” because they are likely to be killed once the true situation is known. (Li Ching’s biography presumably records his decisions and actions in the case of T’ang Chien.)

129. A quote from ibid.

130. The Duke of Chou, who is discussed in the general introduction, was compelled by his great righteousness to command armies against his own brothers when they revolted against the enfranchise of King Wu’s son. (There were other contributing factors as well, including the revolutionaries’ apparent belief that the Duke of Chou was using the pretext of acting as regent for the underage king to seize power for himself.)

131. A “host” generally fights on his own terrain, usually on his own terms, whereas an invader is generally termed a “guest.” However, these terms are simplistic and often nominal, as Li Ching’s discussion shows.

132. This is one of Sun-tzu’s main themes, found especially in the Art of War, Chapter 2, “Waging War.”

133. A concept central to all the strategists in the Seven Military Classics as well as the Tao Te Ching.

134. Art of War, Chapter 2, “Waging War.”

135. Ibid. “One who excels in employing the army does not conscript the people twice nor transport provisions a third time.”

136. These policies were hallmarks of Sun-tzu’s approach and were markedly different from those of later theorists (although no doubt common practice).

137. A quote from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, “Vacuity and Substance.” The order of the phrases has been reversed from the original: “If the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is satiated you can make him hungry.”

138. Again the concept of “constraint” or “measure” appears.

139. An incident from the Sixteen Kingdoms period.

140. A quotation from Chapter 60 of the Six Secret Teachings, “The Infantry in Battle.” The original differs slightly, reading “mounds” rather than “funeral mounds.”

141. This sentence does not appear in the extant Art of War. However, Sun-tzu does discuss several classifications of terrain and their inherent dangers in various chapters. Tseng Chen has pointed out the wisdom of such seemingly obscure policies: Deserted places of former habitation as well as funeral grounds were more likely to harbor disease vectors and environmental poisons (LWK CCCY, pp. 190–191).

142. Many commentators understand ping as referring to “weapons” rather than “army,” but because all weapons are inherently “implements of violence” and the passage continues with a discussion about mobilizing the army, “army” seems more appropriate here.

143. The reference to t’ien-kuan is somewhat problematic, with some commentators understanding it as the title of a lost traditional text (Heavenly Offices) and others thinking it refers to the astrological interpretation of heavenly phenomena. (See the notes to Chapter I of the Wei Liang-foo, “Heavenly Offices,” and also LWK CCCY, p. 193; and LWK CC, p. 32.) Accordingly, the phrase t’ien kuan shih tih is translated throughout as “astrologically auspicious seasons and days,” thereby emphasizing the intentional structuring of actions to accord with auspicious times and avoid baleful moments.
This continues the discussion found in Book II of using animal names and such other designations as the five notes to obscure the actuality of military formations.

Previously discussed in Book I; see note 28.

Kung-sun Shu, a commandery governor under Wang Mang's reign, had proclaimed himself emperor in the chaotic period prior to the establishment of the Later Han. When Emperor Kuang-wu deposed Wu Han to dislodge Kung-sun Shu from his power base and vanquish him, he admonished him to avoid an immediate, direct confrontation (see LWK CCCY, p. 194).

Not found in the extant Six Secret Teachings. The term "entangling the army" also appears in Chapter 3 of the Art of War, "Strategies for Attack."

Wang Meng was a reclusive expert on military affairs who was accidentally discovered and eventually employed by Fu Chien. Just prior to his own death he advised Fu Chien against undertaking the doomed campaign against Chin, but his warning was obstinately disregarded. Fu Chien was subsequently defeated at Fei River.

Essentially a summation of Sun-tzu's approach to warfare.

From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

This is a quotation from the traditionally transmitted text of the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."

Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." The T'ai-tsun has expanded Sun-tzu's basic principles regarding relative force and manipulating the enemy to create new tactical principles.

Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 3, "Planning Offensives."

Ssu-ma Fa, Book I, "Benevolence the Foundation."

Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 7, "Military Combat."

Wu-tzu, Chapter 4, "The Tao of the General." (See note 32 to the text of Questions and Replies for a discussion of the concept of "vital points."

Li Chi, who had a distinguished military career, began as the leader of a small band of rebels and eventually threw his allegiance to the T'ang (whereupon he changed his original surname, Hsu, to Li. He was compelled to drop his middle character, "shih," because it was identical to that in Li Shih-min's name and thus was proscribed by imperial taboo. Accordingly, he became known as Li Chi instead of Li Shih-chi.) A highly successful military strategist and general, he commanded troops during the consolidation of the empire, undertook desert campaigns, and later supported the invasion of Koguryo—which he frequently directed in person. He also held a number of high civil positions when not deployed on military duties.

Although there may not be "any harm" in it, later commentators—such as Liu Yin—find it rather unbelievable, for a variety of reasons (see LWK WCCS, III:11-12).

Chang-sun Wu-chi was T'ang T'ai-tsun's brother-in-law, adviser, and confidant from childhood. Distinguished for his military achievements, he also furthered the T'ai-tsun's usurpation of the throne and was appointed to the highest civil offices.

Although instrumental in establishing Kao-tsun (Li Chih's) claim to the throne and entrusted with exercising the greatest power, he was eventually banished for "plotting against" the emperor through the machinations of Empress Wu.

An outspoken, apparently irascible but highly capable and successful general and administrator in the early T'ang.

Another high-ranking, meritorious official and general who eventually—apparently out of dissatisfaction—began a coup attempt in the internecine intrigues between Ch'eng-ch'ien and Li Tai to succeed the T'ai-tsun and was executed. He was particularly noted for his tenacity and success in the desert campaign against Karakhoja and the T'u-yu-hun (in conjunction with Li Ching).

As a strategist and commander, Han Hsin had been among those instrumental in Liu Pang's rise to power; but that same talent and success endangered him, and he eventually became entangled in rebellion. (See his biography in Burton Watson's translation of the Shih chi, "The Biography of the Marquis of Hua-yin," Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 208-323.)

As a commoner, P'eng Yueh gathered a band of men who sought to capitalize on Ch'in's disintegration. Eventually, he supported Liu Pang, and after several years of varying degrees of success, participated in the decisive battle against Hsiang Yu. Finally, he suffered the inescapable fate of the successful—he was accused of plotting to revolt and was executed. (See his biography in Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, "The Biographies of Wei Pao and P'eng Yueh," Vol. 1, pp. 191-195.)

Hsiao Ho began as a minor, but apparently conscientious and successful official under the Ch'in. His position allowed him to assist Liu Pang, and he later governed the Han dynasty's primary area of recruitment and supply, sustaining Liu Pang through his darkest days (thus the reference later in the text to his skill in utilizing the water transport system). Among his other achievements was seizing the chariot maps of the empire when Liu Pang first entered the Ch'in palaces, guaranteeing vital strategic information when others were greedily fighting over riches and jewels. Ironically, in his efforts to avoid even the appearance of becoming a threat to the emperor, he was eventually imprisoned. (See his biography, "The Hereditary House of Prime Minister Hsiao," in Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 125-133.)


Ch' en P'ing, a strategist who switched his allegiance to Liu Pang after Hsiang Yu failed to employ him, had significant tactical impact.

Ts'ao Ts'an served as a minor police official in Kao-tsun's native area and staunchly supported him from the early days. He participated in numerous battles and major campaigns and later held high civil positions. (His biography is found in

Fan K'uai and Kuan Ying both rose from menial backgrounds to become closely associated with Liu Pang very early in the revolt and dramatically assisted his campaign to gain control of all under Heaven. (Their biographies appear together in the Shih chi, chüan 93.)

171. The Six States Ch'in had systematically extinguished, as discussed in the general introduction. Members of their vanquished royalty still harbored hopes of restoring their houses to their former glory, and the inhabitants had closer emotional ties and regional identification with their local states than with an abstract empire. The restoration of these former states and the question of reestablishing feudal kingdoms as regional bastions for imperial support were heatedly debated topics and ambivalent events in the history of the Former Han. (There were similar echoes in the T'ang.}

In the “chopsticks incident” that follows in the text, Chang Liang reportedly borrowed Liu Pang’s chopsticks when the latter was at dinner. It might be imagined that he thereby illustrated the dangers of reestablishing the Six States because without them, the future emperor suddenly lacked the means to eat and should have realized dramatically the inherent dangers in restoring diffuse power bases. However, the historical record offers no explanation; perhaps, as Watson suggests, he somehow used them to punctuate his points. (Possibly there were enough chopsticks to “score” the estimation of the various factors raised in this discussion, as in Sun-tzu’s first chapter, “Initial Estimations.”) For the incident, see Watson’s translation of Chang Liang’s biography, Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 1, “The Hereditary House of the Marquis of Liu,” pp. 143-144.

172. Fan Tseng skilfully plotted military strategy for Hsiang Yu, providing him with several times with opportunities to slay Liu Pang. However, he eventually lost favor as the result of deliberate disinformation and became disaffected. (For the latter, see ibid., Vol. 1, “Prime Minister Ch’en,” pp. 157-158. He is also mentioned numerous times in the Annals cited in note 168, above.)

173. Two other famous generals and confidants from Liu Pang’s early days.

174. The extant Six Secret Teachings includes four chapters that focus on the qualifications, selection, and commissioning of generals. The quotation, which is slightly different, comes from Chapter 21, “Appointing the General.” (For the types of axes used, see the notes to the original translation.)

175. The ceremony skilfully preserved in the Six Secret Teachings does not contain any reference to pushing the hub of the general’s chariot (understanding “ku” as “hub” rather than “wheel” or “axle,” based on Hayashi Mino, “Chūgoku sen-shin jidai no hosa,” Tōhō Gakubu 29 [1939], pp. 216-222).

176. The practices or techniques of yin and yang encompassed classifying natural phenomena, including astronomical events and stellar objects, within a matrix of auspicious and inauspicious indications. (Some of this material survives in the traditional almanacs published annually in several Asian countries.) In addition, various divinatory practices were integral to these beliefs, including the interpretation of cracks induced on tortoise shells and animal bones and the use of milfoil stalks to cast the I Ching hexagrams.

177. Within the cyclic classification of days, one day was considered particularly baleful for initiating military engagements; it was a “going to perish” day. In the incen-
Appendix A: The Chariot

3. Cf. ibid., pp. 192 and 208.

Appendix B: The Horse and Cavalry

1. Creel, Statecraft, note 61, pp. 262-263.
7. These passages are discussed in the footnotes to the translations. For a summary of the current view, including comments on Sun Pin’s brief statements, see Chaunyce S. Goodrich’s article, “Riding Astride and the Saddle in Ancient China,” HJAS, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1984), pp. 280-281.

Appendix C: Armor and Shields


Appendix D: The Sword

Appendix E: Military Organization

10. Cf. ibid., pp. 75 and 78.
11. Cf. Ping-fa, pp. 15–25, for a discussion of basic deployment principles. Additional comments are found in the footnotes to the translations.
16. Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, “Hsin-chih-hsü,” p. 92. The term designates the armies of the left, center, and right; but when more than three armies are fielded, then it refers to the left and right flanks and the center force, depending on how they are integrated and commanded.
Selected Bibliography

Because full bibliographic information for all works cited in the introductions and annotations is provided in the footnotes, only selected items from among them—together with additional, essential books and articles—are included herein. For the convenience of readers interested in pursuing focal topics, the entries are divided into several categories. With the great proliferation of academic books and articles in both Asia and the West, works of a tangential nature and a myriad others that provide general contextual material cannot be included. Unfortunately, for every item listed several more are necessarily excluded, even though the bibliography must therefore be slightly less comprehensive. In addition, variant editions of other ancient texts and the extensive Japanese secondary literature on numerous historical topics—both well-known to scholars—are only minimally represented. Preference has been given to items that are reasonably available to interested readers and to Chinese scholarship on fundamental historical issues as well as to reports on selected archaeological finds and their interpretation. Writings on intellectual history by such famous scholars as Fu Ssu-nien, except where directly relevant or cited in the notes, also have not been included.

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景印明本武經七書直解，史地教育出版社，台北，2 vol., 1972.
Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AA</td>
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<td>AM</td>
<td>Asia Major</td>
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<td>BIHP</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology</td>
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<td>Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities</td>
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<td>BSOAS</td>
<td>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
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<td>GSR</td>
<td>Grammata Serica Recensa (Bernhard Karlgreen, BMFEA 29 [1957])</td>
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A-shih-na She-erb 阿史那社爾
Abandon the army 廢軍
Action 動
Administration 管, 治, 政
civil 文制, 文治
Military 軍制, 軍政, 軍治
Advance 進
Advantage 利
Afraid 恐
Agents (spies) 間
double 反間
Expendable 死間
Internal 內間
Living 生間
Local 鄰間
Agriculture 農, 耕
All under Heaven 天下
Alliances 交
Altars (of state) (國) 社
Ambush 伏
Ancestral temple 廟
Archers 弓者
Armor 甲
Army 軍, 師
Contrary 逆軍
Fierce 暴軍
Hard 剛軍

of the Center 中軍
of the Left 左軍
of the Right 右軍
righteous 義軍
Six (Armies) 六師
Strong 強軍
Three (Armies) 三軍
Army's Strategic Power 軍勢
artifice 謀
artisans 工, 匠人
Ascension and decline 盛衰, 興衰
Assembly 合
and divide 分合
Attack 攻
Incendiary 火攻
Orthodox 正攻
Sudden 突攻, 襲
Unorthodox 奇攻
Augury 卜
auspicious 吉
Authority (ch'ian) 權
Awesomeness 威
Ax 斧
yüeh 鐮
Balance of power and plans 權謀
embankment 防堤
emblem 章
emolument 禮
emotionally attached 親附
emotions 情
employing men 用人
employing the military 用兵
empty 空
encampment 帳
encircle[d] 圍
enemy 敵
entice 利之，動之以利，誘
error 錯，失
estimate 計
estimation 計
evaluate 考，策，察，測
enemy 敵敵情，料敵
men 考人，察才
evil 惡，惡
evil implement 兵器
excess 奇
excess (flaw) 過
execute 計
exterior 表
external 外
failure 失，敗
Fan K'uai 樊哙
Fan Li 樊臨
Fan Tseng 樊增
fatal 死
fathom (the enemy) 相，測，占
(fear 害)
Fei River 滯水
feigned retreats 佯北
Feng Kung 鄭宮
feudal lords 諸侯
efew 少
fields 野，田
fines 罰
fire 火
five 五
affairs 五事
colors 五色，五彩
flavors 五味
grains 五穀
notes 五音
phases 五行
weapons 五兵
flag 旗
flanks 偏，旁
flee (run off) 走
flourish and decline 勝衰
flying 飛
bridge 飛橋
hook 飛鉤
river 飛江
tower 飛樓
foodstuffs 食
foot soldiers 步兵
force 重兵
light 輕兵
ford [rivers] 渡 [水]，濟 [水]
forest 林
formation 陣
assault 衝陣
Former Kings 先王
forms of etiquette 礼 禮
fortification 城，壘，保，堡
foundation 本
four 四
Heads and Eight Tails 四頭八尾
limbs 四肢
quarters 四方
Seasons 四季
four-sided martial assault 四式衝陣
fragrant bait 香餌
frightened 驚懼
front 前
frontal assault force 戰鋒隊
Fu Chien 符堅
full 富
funeral mounds 填墓
gate 門
general 將帥
commanding 主將
enlightened 明將
Grand 大將
ignorant 聰將
subordinate 副將
ghost 鬼
glory 榮
gnomon 表
gong 金
gorge 縫
grain 穀
granary 倉
guarantee units 保
guest 客
halberd 戈
Han (people) 漢
Han Ch'in-hu 韓擒虎
Han dynasty 漢朝
Han Hsin 韓信
Han Kao-ts'ū 漢高祖
handles of state 國柄
hard 剛
and strong 強
harm 害
harmony 和
hasty 急
Heaven 天
Heavenly 天際
Deployment 天際
float 天浮
Offices 天官
Heaven's Fissure 天際
Furnace 天際
Huang 天潢
frontal assault force 戰鋒隊
full 富
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Heaven's Fissure 天際
Furnace 天際
Huang 天潢
Jail 天牢
Net 天羅
Pit 天陥
Well 天井
heavy force 重兵
hegemon 霸
heights 高
heights of Heaven 九天之上
helmet 穀，盔
hero 雄，傑
high official 大夫
hillock 丘
holding force 駐隊
honor 貴
horse 駝
host 主
Hsia dynasty 夏朝
Hsiang Yü 禹
Hsiao Ho 蕭何
Hsiao Hsien 懷鴻
Hsieh An 謝安
Hsieh Hsüan 謝玄
Hsin Lo 新羅
Hsin shu [New Book] 新書
hsing (form) 形
Hsüeh Wan-ch'ê 薛萬徹
Hsüeh-yen-t'ao 薛延陀
Hsüen Wu 萊昊
Huang Shih-kung 黃石公
Hui-ho [Uighurs] 回紇
Human Deployment 人員
human effort (affairs) 人事
human emotions 人情
hundred 百
illnesses 百病
surnames 百姓
Huo Chü-ping 霍去病
I Yin 伊尹
implements 器
impositions 耻
incendiary attack 火攻
indications 徵
infantry 步兵, 徒
heavy 重兵
light 輕兵
insignia 表, 號, 符
instructions 教, 練
intelligence (military) 敵情
interior 裏
internal 內
invader 窮客
jails 獄
Kao-li [Koguryo] 高麗
King Chou 紹王
King Hui 惠王
King Wen 文王
King Wu 武王
know yourself 知己
Kuan Chung 管仲
Kuan-tzu 管子
kuang 廣
Kuang Wu 武光
kung 宮
Kung-sun Shu 公孫述
K'ung Ch'ang 孔融
labor services 役
law 法
li [rites, forms of etiquette] 礼
Li Chi [Hsü Shih-chi] 李勣
(Du世勣)
Li Chien-ch'eng 李建成
Li Chung 李靖
light force 輕兵 [軍]
likes 好
limbs and joints 肢節
Liu Pang 劉邦
local guide 鄉導
long weapons 長兵
Lord Shang 商君
lost state 亡國
love the people 愛民
Ma Lung 马隆

nurturing the people 養人, 養民
oath 誓
observation post 斥侯, 長闘
observe [the enemy] 瞭, 伺 [敵]
occupy 佔, 居, 處
offense 攻
officers 士, 吏
officials 吏, 官
old army 老兵
omen 兆
opportunity 機
oppose 去, 拒
order 令
ordinance 律
orthodox (ch'eng) 正
pardon 赦, 舍
party 黨
discipline 軍治
power 軍勢
Military Pronouncements 軍識
misfortune 患, 禍
moat 溝, 池, 壁
mobilize the army 起軍, 興兵,
軍兵, 起師
mountains 山
movement and rest 動止, 動靜
Mu-jung Ch'ui 慕容傀
Mu-jung Pao 慕容寶
Mu-yeh 牧野
music 樂
mutual
change 相變
conquest 相剋
production 相生
protection 相保
responsibility 相任
name and action 形, 形名
narrow pass 藩塞
Nine Attacks, Law of 九伐之法
non-action 無為
not being knowable 不可知
punitive expedition 討
pursue 追
Questions and Replies 問對
raiding force 賊
rain 雨
ramparts 壘
rank 級
ravine 嶝
rear 後
rectify 正
Red Eyebrows 赤眉
regiment 旅, 師
regimental commander 師
regulations 律, 制
repel 賊
repress 擊
resentment 怨
responsibility 任
rested 佚
retreat 退, 北
rewards 賞
and punishments 賞罰
righteous 極
rites [see li] 禮
river 川, 水
rows and files 行列
ruler 主
enlightened 明主
obtrude (ignorant) 無知之主
rules 法
rumor 謠誹
Sage 聖人
salary 賜
San L-sheng 桑宜生
sated 飱
scouts (遠) 斥
seasonal occupations 時事,
季事
secret plans 陰計
secret tallies 陰符
security 安
segmenting and reuniting 分合
seize 奪
sericulture 纺, 织桑
ever 绝, 断
shaman 巫
shame 耻
Shang 帝
dynasty 朝
king of 商王
Shang shu 史書
shape [hsing] 形
shield 盾
shih [strategic power] 勢
Shih chi 史記
Shih Le 石勒
short weapons 短兵
shuan [snake] 亀然
Shun [Emperor] 劍
siege 围
six (domestic) animals 六畜
Six Flowers Formation 六花陣
Six Secret Teachings 六諫
soft 軟
soldiers 卒, 兵, 士
solid 固
Son of Heaven 天子
spear 矛
spies [see agents] 間
spirit (moral) 氣
spirits 神
Spring and Autumn 春秋
squad 伍
square formation 方陣
Ssu-ma 司馬
Ssu-ma Fa 司馬法
stalwart 堅
standoff 相拒
stimulate [the enemy] 剛 (敵)
storehouse 庫
stratagem 謀, 計策
strategic advantage 利, 地利
configuration of power [shih] 勢
dispersive 散地
easy 易地
encircled 圓地
en trapping 堑地
expansive 遠地
fatal [deadly] 死地
focal 衝地
heavy 重地
isolated 絕地
light 輕地
precipitous 階地
sinking 堡下
stalemated 支地
suspended 挂地
traversable 交地
treacherous 險地
terrified 恐懼
Three Armies 三軍
Three Chin 丙辰
Three Strategies 三略
Ti 狄
T'ieh-le 鐵勒
T'ien Tan 田單
tiger drop 虎落
Tiger Guards 虎賊
tired 勞, 努
tomb 墓
tortoise shell 龜殼
town 城
township 鄉
transformation 化
troubled 激
true humanity 仁
True Man of Worth [chün-tzu] 君子
trust 信
trustworthy 有信, 可信
Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操
Tso chuan 左傳
T'u-chüeh [Turks] 突厥
T'u Shan 塚山
unconquerable 不可勝
unity — 專
unorthodox [ch'i] 奇
uprightness 正
vaccinate 疫苗
vacuity 虛
cavous 洞
valley 谷
vanguard 鎮軍
victory 勝
by turn of events 曲勝
village 村
villain 賊
virtue 德
vital point 機
vulnerable point 空點, 弱點,
虛點 [地]
wage war 作戰
wall 道
Wang Hsün 王尋
Wang I 王邑
Wang Mang 王莽
Wang Meng 王猛
war 戰
ward off 拒
warfare 兵, 戰
explosive 突戰
forest 林戰
mountain 山戰
Warring States 戰國
warrior 士, 武
armored 甲士
water 水
weak 弱
weapons 兵器
Wei [state of] 魏
Wei Liao-tzu 尉織子
Wei Yang 汾陽
well 井
wetlands 泽, 泽, 沔
withdraw 卜
Worthy 賢人
Wu Ch'i 吳起
Wu Han 吳漢
Wu Kuang 吳廣
Wu-tzu 吳子
yang 陽
Yang Kan 楊千
Yangtze River 楊子江
Yao (Emperor) 堯

Yellow Emperor 黃帝
Yellow River 黃河, 河
Yen (state of) 燕
yin 陰
yin and yang 陰陽
Yin-fu ching 陰符經
yǔ 羽
Yü-chih Ching-te 趙充成德
Yü-li 魯壁
Yüeh (state of) 越

Indexes

Extremely common terms, such as “army” or “soldier,” are noted only where of significance or where discussed in the introductory material. References to the reputed authors of the various military classics, such as Wu Ch'i in the Wu-tzu, and the other figures participating in the dialogues are not provided when they appear as speakers in their own works, but only where they occur in either introductory material or other texts. Historical individuals cited in the texts, unless extremely prominent, are also omitted.

In order to facilitate the study of these military writings for the widest possible audience, two indexes have been provided. The first enumerates the basic strategic and tactical principles found embedded in the texts; lists essential tactics used to realize these basic principles; and concludes with a summation of commonly encountered battlefield situations and suggested responses. In compiling this index the emphasis has been upon selecting significant, illuminating passages rather than upon comprehensiveness.

For a more complete listing of relevant topics, the second index—presented in the traditional format—should be consulted.
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larly, although we have outlined the essentials of various concepts, such as unorthodox/orthodox, we have not analyzed them in depth, nor have we discussed the details of technology; concrete tactics of deployment; or the overall implementation of strategy beyond the discussions found in the Seven Military Classics. Furthermore, except in an occasional note, we have not explored the relationship of these texts to the Kuan-tzu, the Book of Lord Shang, or other Warring States philosophical writings that prominently espouse military policies, administrative measures, and strategic concepts. These and many other topics, including the systematic analysis and integration of ideas and methods in each of the classics, require extensive studies in themselves. Because their inclusion would be premature and would also make an already massive book more unwieldy, we will focus upon them in a future work integrating the interactive development of military technology and tactical thought.

Because this book is intended for the general reader, a rubric we assume encompasses everyone except those few specialists in ancient Chinese studies with expertise in the previously neglected military writings, we have provided somewhat fuller notes on many general aspects than might otherwise be necessary. Overall the notes have been designed for several different audiences; although much of the translation cries out for detailed annotation, in order to minimize the number of notes, we have refrained from exploring deeply every thought, concept, and strategy. Many of the notes simply provide contextual information or identify figures and terms for the convenience of readers unfamiliar with Chinese history and writings. Others are intended for those students of Asia—professional or not—who might benefit from further historical, technical, or military information or from the citation of certain seminal articles. Many notes comment upon the intricacies of translation matters: They provide alternative readings; note emendations we have accepted and commentaries followed; and sometimes indicate where we have relied upon our own judgment contrary to traditional readings. Finally, some amplify those portions of the introductory material where we sought to avoid dogmatic assertions about the numerous issues, such as textual authenticity, that have only tentatively been resolved or remain the subject of scholarly controversy. Every reader is encouraged to peruse them all, at least briefly, focusing upon those of greatest relevance in the quest to understand these texts.

Full bibliographic information is provided for each work at its first appearance in each chapter, with abbreviated titles thereafter. Consequently, for the bibliography we have departed from the usual format and instead provided a selected listing by subject for those who might wish to investigate the literature on a single topic. Numerous books with only tangential connections with the Seven Military Classics and solely of interest to specialists have been excluded. For matters of general knowledge that have not been annotated, the reader should consult the Western-language works listed in the bibliography for further reading.

A work of this scope, in our case undertaken enthusiastically without fully realizing the many thorny issues it would entail, is necessarily the product of years of reading, study, pondering, sifting, and effort. We have benefited vastly from the commentaries and essays of a hundred generations of Chinese scholars and from the growth of detailed knowledge deriving from the work of Western and Asian scholars in the present century. However, having left the academic community two decades ago, we have enjoyed a rather different, vibrant perspective on these ideas and philosophies—the result of twenty-five years of technical and business consulting at all levels in Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Southeast Asia. For a startling number of our Asian associates, the various military classics remain compendiums of effective tactics and strategies, providing approaches and measures that can be profitably adopted in life and employed in business practices. Their discussions and understanding of many of the concrete lessons, although not necessarily orthodox or classically based, stimulated our own enlightenment on many issues. In particular, conversations over the decades in Asia with Guy Baez, Cleon Brewer, Ma Shang-jen, Kong Jung-yul, Professor W. K. Seong, Professor T'ai Mao-t'ang, and especially C. S. Kim have been both stimulating and illuminating.

Certain early teachers had a lasting influence on my approach to Chinese intellectual history. In particular, as a graduate student at Harvard in the turbulent 1960s I was greatly influenced by Professors Yang Lien-sheng, Yu Ying-shih, Benjamin Schwartz, and especially Dr. Achilleas Fang, under whom I was privileged to be thrust into the true study of classical Chinese. Thereafter I was fortunate to read intermittently for more than a decade with Professor Chin Chia-hsi, a Chuang-tzu specialist and university professor of Chinese at National Taiwan University. However, my greatest intellectual debt is to Professor Nathan Sivin, initially a Sage at M.I.T.; a friend for more than twenty-five years; and ultimately responsible for both illuminating the Way and making the path accessible. However, these are all general intellectual obligations, not specific, for these scholars have not seen any portion of